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Abstract
This thesis examines the historical formation and contemporary circulation of 
competing variants of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms as they are realised in 
different Turkish Cypriot radio news outlets. Unlike North Atlantic models of 
journalism, these media are not governed by the values of neutrality nor of a 
fourth estate role, being closely aligned to political interests.
Presently, there is an ideological struggle between two versions of Turkish 
Cypriot nationalism in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Turkish 
nationalism’ se e s  TRNC as part of a pan-Turkish nation. Within this ideology, 
TRNC’s future is linked to Turkey and independent of the Republic of Cyprus. 
‘Pro-federation’ nationalism sees TRNC as part of an inclusive Cypriot identity. 
TRNC’s future is in a federation with the Republic of Cyprus. TRNC radio, each 
station closely affiliated to one of these nationalisms, is one site where national 
discourses can be accessed  and evaluated.
In this thesis, Critical Discourse Analysis is used to reveal how participants and 
their actions are represented in news stories. These shape the way that events 
appear, contributing to prevailing nationalisms. This analysis is contextualised 
historically, conceptually and ethnographically with newsroom studies. These 
produce an understanding of the processes behind a set of highly ideological 
news texts.
This thesis adds to existing academ ic work which indicates that Cypriot media 
frame events in ways which aggravate the Cyprus conflict. Unlike other studies, 
this thesis challenges the myth that national discourses are uniform expressions 
and allegiances in news media. Instead, the data analysed reveal national 
discourses are internally fractured, politically differentiated and temporal.
Though discourses mostly support interests associated with each station, some 
pretextual discourses of compromise, cooperation and unity are revealed. 
Though minimal, these contribute to a solution-friendly atmosphere which frees 
residents from a life of em bargoes, fear and isolation.
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I. Introduction
/. 1 Opening rationale for this thesis
I came to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 2001 for a short 
visit and was struck by the prevalence of national symbols on public display. As 
someone who worked in radio and television news, I was surprised by the 
abundance of TRNC radio and television channels. Before returning to TRNC 
again in 2 0 0 6 ,1 read up on the history of the division of Cyprus. This helped in 
understanding the importance of national symbols in TRNC.
Living in TRNC, one cannot help noticing how all aspects of life are political. 
Political affiliations affect one’s position, employment prospects and even friends. 
Listening and working in TRNC radio reveals how radio news is very political. It 
is clear that radio is in the hands of those with particular political interests, but 
what is less clear is how they use language to conceal their own interests.
Unlike my 11 years experience of working in radio and television news in Britain 
and Canada, this observation points towards there being a very different model 
of journalism adhered to in TRNC.
The aim of this thesis is to systematically reveal the historical formation and 
contemporary circulation of competing variants of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms in 
TRNC radio news. All stations are highly nationalistic yet carry subtly different 
versions of this, which represent the participants of the TRNC, their Greek 
counterparts, mainland Turkey, and the wider international community in subtly 
different ways. All of this serves to shape events in ways that serve the subtly 
different political and economic interests of those who control the stations while 
aggravating tensions in the Cyprus conflict.
It is only through understanding the historical background of TRNC and the 
Cyprus conflict that radio’s role in TRNC can be understood, so this is examined 
first in the thesis. Scholars who use CDA highlight the importance of historically 
contextualising analysis (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 1995a; Wodak 
2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Leeuwen 1993). This history is then
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placed into the broader sociology of nations, national identities and media’s role 
in these.
The reader is then taken into newsrooms through an ethnography of radio 
stations to look at newsroom practices. This reveals the “social goings on” 
behind the making of news answering how, why and where texts take on the 
shape they do (van Leeuwen, 2005:13-14).
Equipped with all this contextual information, the reader is then offered a close 
analysis of a selection of language used on TRNC radio news. Critical Discourse 
Analysis is used to reveal hidden ideologies in these news stories. This reveals 
that stations not only disseminate political opinion, but represent events in ways 
which serve their own different interests.
1.2 TRNC historical context
TRNC for all intents and purposes is independent from the Republic of Cyprus 
(hereafter the Republic), closely bound to Turkey, and has existed and continues 
to exist on the edge of violent conflict. It is a self-proclaimed unrecognised 
nation-state occupying one third of the island of Cyprus. TRNC was established 
in 1983 due to intercommunal violence, mainland Turkey and Greece vying for 
power in the area, and western powers’ (specifically American and British) 
designs on a military presence on the island.
Cyprus was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for over three hundred years after 
being captured from Venice in 1571. The Ottomans settled Turkish-speaking 
Muslims on the island to administer the Greek-speaking inhabitants. In 1878, 
Cyprus was ceded to the British before it became a British crown colony in 1925. 
After a short-lived shared Republic (1960 until 1963), intercommunal violence 
and political pressures forced Turkish Cypriots into enclaves. It was during this 
time that Turkish Cypriots began self-government. In 1974, after over a decade 
of inter-communal violence, a Greek-backed military coup increased violence 
against Turkish Cypriots and gave Turkey an excuse to intervene and effectively 
take control of one-third of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot authorities seized the 
opportunity to declare the T h e  Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ in 1975 as an
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interim measure until an agreement could be reached with Greek Cypriots. With 
a lack of progress in gaining an agreement or recognition, TRNC was unilaterally 
declared by President Rauf Denkta§ in 1983. This declaration resulted in 
international embargoes and isolation which remain to this day.
Today, TRNC is a multi-party parliamentary democracy governed by a 50- 
member House of Representatives. A president is the head of state and a prime 
minister is the head of the government. TRNC is a political, social and economic 
state1 which operates independently of the Republic. It has political, social, 
health, education, media and entertainment institutions as do other states. 
Residents go about their daily lives working and socialising, despite living with 
international isolation and economic sanctions which dictate that all links to the 
outside world are through Turkey. This negatively affects all aspects of life, 
whether this be participation in international culture and sport, having a voice in 
international bodies or buying and selling goods, services and information.
Turkey is the only state which recognises TRNC. Turkey supports TRNC 
financially, militarily, politically and culturally, with some questioning its very 
sovereignty (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). The Turkish government and military 
are major power holders in TRNC, a s  Greece is in the Republic.
It is questionable whether Turkey will relinquish its presence and influence in 
TRNC (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005; Mallinson, 2005). Presently, the Turkish 
military has approximately 30,000 troops on Cyprus. This military presence 
prevents the south of Turkey being exposed to potential hostile fire if Greece was 
to gain control of Cyprus, directly or indirectly (Richmond, 1998: xv). This 
presence also gives Turkey and TRNC a strong bargaining position with the 
Republic (ibid.).
Turkey’s  interest in Cyprus is more than of a military nature. On a social level, 
TRNC is seen by many mainland Turks a s  part of their nation. To give up part of 
their nation to an historic enemy is unimagineable. Politically, it would be a major
1 This thesis refers to TRNC as a ‘state’. Though it is not recognised as a nation-state within the world 
community of nation-states, for all intents and purposes it functions as a nation-state.
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climb-down for the Turkish government to no longer recognise TRNC, being its 
only official backer. Finally, many accuse Turkey of using TRNC as a political 
chip in its bid to be an EU member (Mallinson, 2005: 111).
1.3 Turkish Cypriot Nationalisms
Nations are “an imagined political community” (Anderson, 1991:5-6). They are 
mental constructs; a type of group identity. Unlike other group identities, nations 
are an ideological consciousness people believe are worth dying for (Billig, 1995: 
83).
There are between 200,000 and 300,000 people who live in TRNC, the majority 
who consider them selves Turkish Cypriots. However, there are two dominant 
ways of defining Turkish Cypriot nationalism, with different political motivations 
behind these definitions. These variant nationalisms are rooted in “competing 
claims for state power (and state-allocated wealth and status)” (Lacher and 
Kaynak, 2005: 148).
Turkish nationalist’ politics see  Turkish Cyprus independent from the Republic, 
yet part of a pan-Turkish nationalism.2 The main nationalist party is the Ulusal 
Biriik Partisi (hereafter UBP). During the years between partition (1974) and the 
Annan referendum in 2004, the UBP and Turkish nationalist ex-President Rauf 
Denkta§ were very popular, winning all but one election. TRNC was closely 
aligned to Turkey and being a Turkish Cypriot meant seeing oneself as a Turk 
living on Cyprus (ibid.: 156). The Greek Republic was feared and mistrusted due 
to past violence against the Turkish minority.
The UBP, with its pro-Turkey stance and pessimism towards talks and 
settlements, has been a natural ally of the Turkish government and military. 
However, it has had to soften its stance due to a changing political environment 
since 2003 which has seen  a rise in the popularity of pro-federation sentiments in 
TRNC and within the Turkish government (ibid.: 148-149). The UBP still
2 The descriptions of both types of nationalisms are according to interviews with the UBP Shadow 
Minister of the Economy, Ersin Tatar and the CTP’s Minister of Ideology Nazim Beralti. These concur 
with desciptions by Lacher and Kaynak, 2005.
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promotes the idea of independence from the Republic with strong links to Turkey. 
However, it also has agreed to a very loose federation or confederation with the 
Republic.3 Though this is presented as a ‘solution’, it is unlikely to ever succeed. 
The Republic has rejected proposals which would have given TRNC far less 
power. However, this ‘solution’ allows the UBP to present itself as ‘solution’- 
friendly yet maintain its political and economic power in TRNC.
The second type of Turkish Cypriot nationalism is ‘pro-solution’, ‘pro-federation’ 
or ‘left’ politics.4 Its popularity was evident by the electoral victories of the pro­
federation Cumhuriyetci Turk Partisi (CTP) which governed from 2003 until April 
2009. This support was confirmed with the acceptance by TRNC residents of the 
UN-brokered Annan referendum in 2004, which sought to establish a federation 
in Cyprus. ‘Pro-federation’ politics strive to create a federation with the Republic. 
It acknowledges its Turkish historical roots and cultural distinctiveness from 
Greek Cypriots, but distances itself from mainland Turkey.
The CTP m ade gestures towards improving relations with the Republic during its 
governance, such as opening up five crossing points and engaging in a new 
round of UN-brokered peace talks which started on 4 Septem ber 2008.
However, though these are positive moves in relations, it is questionable whether 
TRNC has the ability to agree to a solution (ibid.). Turkey has continued to 
determine much in TRNC. The CTP claims to be pro-solution, but all major 
decisions in TRNC are in close consultation with the Turkish government and 
military (ibid.). This situation finds the CTP taking a pro-solution stance, but 
within the factual nature of its dependence on Turkey. It is how these two 
‘solutions’ are presented that is of interest in this thesis.
Since 2003, there has been a move away from Turkish nationalism’, though it 
still remains very popular.5 Each political party works within the confines of 
voters’ desires and fears, political, economic and military realities, and Turkey’s
3 This was agreed with the Denkta§-Makarios accord and re-iterated in an interview with the UBP Shadow 
Minister of Finance, Ersin Tatar.
4 These labels are used interchangeably to identify this brand of politics in TRNC. However, seeing as both 
nationalisms claim to want a ‘solution’, this thesis refers to this type of nationalism as pro-federation.
5 Turkish nationalist UBP won the parliamentary elections in April 2009.
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role in TRNC. Political parties provide competing models and discourses about a 
Turkish Cypriot nation which serve their own interests at the expense of others’ 
interests. The media have been a key tool in the dissemination of these 
discourses.
1.4 Turkish Cypriot Media
TRNC has an abundance of media relative to its small population. It has nine 
television stations, 29 radio stations and eight daily newspapers. Its newspaper 
presence alone represents one of the highest concentrations of newspaper titles 
per capita anywhere in the world (Vassiliadou, 2007). Almost all broadcast 
media indude news as part of their programming, increasing the amount of news 
offered to residents.
Fairdough (1995: 219) claims the media is the single most important social 
institution in articulating discourse where “consent is achieved, ideologies are 
transmitted, and practices, meanings, values and identities are taught and 
learnt." In TRNC, the media have been used systematically a s  a means to 
disseminate particular models of the world. Partially due to media’s close links 
with politicial parties, economic interests and the government, nationalisms differ 
across stations.
The relationship between journalism and political and economic interests has 
been explored in various national settings (Weaver, 2005 and 1998; De Burgh, 
2005). Hallin and Mancini (2004) note the nature of a nation’s news media is 
dosely linked to other social factors. They (ibid.: 8) write:
one cannot understand the news media without understanding the 
nature of the state, the system of political parties, the pattern of relations 
between economic and political interests, and the development of civil 
society, among other elements of social structure.
They distinguish three models of media and politics in developed capitalist
democracies of W estern Europe and North American journalism: the
Northern/Central European Model, the North Atlantic or Liberal Model and the
Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model. The nature of TRNC media can be
thought of a s  characteristic of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Mediterranean or
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Polarized Pluralist Model. Like the Mediterranean model, TRNC has a politically 
oriented press; high political parallelism in journalism where the government, 
political parties, and industrialists with political ties use the media; the state plays 
a large role a s  owner, regulator and funder; there is weak journalistic 
professionalisation and a high degree of ideological diversity and conflict in 
society with a strong role for the state and political parties. There are also 
differences between TRNC and this model. For example, TRNC has a large 
press circulation, not small. Also, political power holders continue to control the 
media, so TRNC is not experiencing “savage de-regulation” or a rapid and 
uncontrolled transition from state controlled to commercial broadcasting; and 
freedom of the press is still curtailed (ibid.: 68-73).
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Mediterranean model differs from the model 
associated with Britain, America, Canada and Ireland, the North Atlantic model, 
in a number of ways. Nations whose media are characteristic of this model have 
a neutral commercial press, information-oriented journalism, low political 
parallelism, strong professionalisation and formal autonomy from governance 
(ibid.: 67). These social factors contribute to objectivity and the role of the fourth 
estate being an ideal, especially in nations characterised by this model.
Golding and Elliot (1979: 46), considering the roles of journalism in the state 
globally, identify the fourth estate as the role associated with Western media. In 
this role:
[...] journalism acts a s  an independent watchdog of the liberal freedoms in 
a parliamentary democracy, its independence guaranteed constitutionally, 
its public responsibility by the exercise of consumer sovereignty in the 
marketplace.
More contemporary research claims the fourth estate’s ‘watch-dog’ role has been 
the cornerstone of liberal accounts of the news media (Machin and Niblock,
2006: 96; Lloyd, 2004). These accounts claim there are three estates or 
branches of government, such as the executive, legislative and judicial. The 
fourth estate is the press. The principle is that the press make accountable or
7
“watch over" the other three estates of government. Machin and Niblock (ibid.) 
suggest without the fourth estate, democracy itself is threatened.
Objectivity is one key factor in the notion of journalism’s fourth estate role. 
According to Chalaby (1998: 130), objectivity encom passes clusters of discursive 
norms which became universally accepted in American journalism at the end of 
the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century. The norms of neutrality, 
impartiality, balance, fairness, truthfulness, factuality, accuracy and 
completeness were formed during the process of, and as a result of, separation 
of the press from party politics. The norm of retreatism is related to media 
organisations’ and journalists’ reluctance to take sides in the political processs.
But objectivity is not a universal norm. It is an ideal, a social construct of western 
journalism (Hanitzsch 2004; Schudson 2003; Chalaby 1998). It cam e late in 
some western nations, such as  France, and not at all in other parts of the world. 
For example, McGoldrick (2005: 4) claims in sub-Saharan Africa, journalists from 
11 nations do not consider objectivity a news value. Instead, journalists “use 
their education and position to improve the outlook for their society” and “believe 
they have a vital role to play in the prevention (sic) and resolution of conflict.”
Objectivity does not sit well with many nations with high political parallelism, such 
as TRNC. Even though som e of these nations “are seeped in the ideology of 
American journalism”, believing they are objective, this is not the case. For 
example, in Latin America, “journalists concealed from themselves that they were 
implicitly colluding with military regimes in the 1980s by priding themselves on 
being neutral professionals" (Waisbord, 2000 in Curran, 2005: xiii). Mancini 
(2000:267) observes that Italian journalists in the 1990s presented themselves as 
though part of an Anglo-American model when they were not. Mancini (2000: 
272) writes:
The journalist knows that he is practicing a strongly advocate journalism 
while thinking that his professionalism is essentially legitimated by his 
being objective and impartial.
The role of TRNC journalism does not suit either the fourth estate role or
objectivity. Almost all media, broadcast and print, are directly or indirectly linked
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to political parties, commercial and political interests, the military or universities 
(which are semi-governmental organisations). Media are too close to these 
power holders to fulfil a “watch-dog” role (Lloyd, 2004).
Like many other nations, objectivity is not part of TRNC journalism culture. 
Despite the appearance of journalism with employees called ‘journalists’ and 
‘editors’ who work with news agency feeds, write, produce, edit and air news 
stories for new scasts daily, this thesis’s ethnography and discourse analysis 
reveals that discursive norms such as neutrality, balance and objectivity are not 
present. In TRNC, according to this thesis’ ethnography, journalists claim they 
are “helping to solve the Cyprus conflict” and writing “what’s good for the nation.” 
Of course, how these priorities are articulated in news differ amongst stations, 
reflecting political interests associated with each station.
1.5 The object o f investigation
It has been widely argued that news is important culturally and politically 
(Richardson, 2006; Fairclough, 2003, 1995a and 1989; Knightley, 2002; 
Krishnamurthy, 1996; Billig, 1995; van Dijk, 1991; Tuchman, 1978). Richardson 
(2006: 13) claims:
Journalism has social effects: through its power to shape issue agendas 
and public discourse, it can reinforce beliefs; it can shape people’s 
opinions not only of the world but also of their place and role in the world 
[...] [it can] influence what you have opinions on; in sum, it can help shape 
social reality by shaping our views of social reality.
This takes on particular importance in regard to broadcast news due to its large
audiences (Krishnamurthy, 1996: 129). In TRNC, although no official audience
figures are kept, station m anagers believe radio is a popular form of media.6
This thesis examines the historical formation and contemporary circulation of 
competing variants of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms in TRNC radio stations. 
Specifically, this thesis analyses how radio represents events in news to 
promote, maintain and legitimise different politically motivated versions of TRNC,
6 Interviews with Ersin Tatar, Radyo T s manager and owner, and KFM's manager Erdin? Gunduz reveal 
that they believe their radio stations are popular amongst car drivers. BRTs Director Hiiseyin Giir§an 
believes BRT radio is the most popular radio in TRNC.
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the Republic, their citizens, and the way they behave. Though it is clear TRNC 
radio is political, what is much less evident are differences between radio 
stations’ representations. A close analysis of language in radio news reveals the 
subtly different, yet quite destructive way that pro-solution ideas are essentially 
denied. This analysis demonstrates that stations not only disseminate political 
opinion, but recontextualise even the most mundane events in ways which serve 
their own interests. Mundane events can be framed such that national identities 
become “a routine way of talking and listening”, a useful way to promote 
nationalism (Billig, 1995: 109).
Radio news from three stations is analysed. Stations are Bayrak International 
(BRTI), KFM and Radyo T. Their economic and political affiliations can be 
summarised as:
Station BRTI KFM Radyo T
Economic
affiliations
English language 
service of state- 
run broadcaster 
BRTK
Mostly state - 
funded
Radio service of 
large commercial 
media group KMG
Funded through 
advertising and 
KMG’s newspaper 
operations
Radio service of 
small media group 
Kanal T/ Radyo T
Funded through 
advertising
Political
Affiliations
Accountable 
directly to the 
Prime Minister
Legally mandated 
to promote TRNC
Answerable to a 
board of governors
Not independent 
of political parties 
(contrary to its 
claims) with 
management and 
owners closely 
associated with
Owned by UBP’s 
shadow minister 
for the economy.
Interested in 
political affairs, 
though claims to 
be party a-political
10
made up of pro-federation
military and CTP7
government
appointments
The government’s
mouthpiece, so
considers all
parties in the
Cyprus conflict
These stations frame events in ways which represent different Turkish Cypriot 
nationalisms. Differences challenge the working assumption that nationalism 
finds uniform expression and allegiance in and through the media. Instead, this 
in-depth examination of the complex and differentiated processes of news 
mediation reveals that news represents different Turkish Cypriot nationalisms 
which benefit those associated with each station.
1.6 Language and Ideology
It has been argued that ideology is key to understanding issues of language, 
power and politics (Fairclough, 2003: 9 and 1989: 2; Kress and Hodge, 1979:
15). This makes it a  useful concept for analysing and understanding Turkish 
Cypriot radio news. However, there are many meanings attributed to ideology 
(Williams, 1976:156). One useful definition by Fiske (1990:165) sees ideology 
as “a way of making sense  [of the world], the sense  it makes always has a social 
and political dimension.”
Althusser (1971) believes dominant ideologies are inescapable, being “deeply 
inscribed in the ways of thinking and ways of living [...]” (in Fiske, 1990: 174).
7 In March 2009, KFM's  owner Asil Nadir and the CTP government had a disagreement over a business 
deal to take over the running of a second airport in TRNC. This resulted in Nadir pulling his support from 
CTP and giving it to the Democratic Party, a Turkish Nationalist party. This support was evident in public 
statements and news content.
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This all encompassing role of ideology is shared by Gramsci. However, while 
Althusser’s ideas entrap everyone in ideology, Gramsci liberates society through 
the idea of “hegemony”. Williams (1976: 145), summarising Gramsci, writes 
hegemony,
[...] is not limited to matters of direct political control but seeks to describe 
a more general predominance which includes, as one of its key features, a 
particular way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships.
Hegemony introduces the idea of struggles for ideology, empowering society.
Hegemonic struggles are on-going, winning and re-winning the consent of the
majority in society (in Fiske, 1990: 176). Drawing on these concepts we can say
that in TRNC, though Turkish Cypriot nationalism achieved near hegemony in the
past, it is now a site of ideological struggle.
Echoes of Gramsci are found in contemporary definitions of ideology. For 
example, Fairclough (2003: 9) defines ideology as,
[...] representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to 
contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of 
power domination and exploitation.
Fairclough’s definition is useful for this thesis. It allows for the idea of Turkish
Cypriot national ideologies being “represented” on TRNC radio news. This
acknowledges language’s role in ideology. It also encom passes the idea that
representations are linked to “power, domination and exploitation” in TRNC.
Finally, this definition includes “establishing, maintaining and changing social
relations”, acknowledging the struggle for dominance of national ideology. For
these reasons, this thesis uses a definition which is closely aligned to that of
Gramsci and Fairclough.
A group of researchers working in linguistics began to investigate the way 
ideology could be studied through the analysis of language. They found that 
ideology, always “involve[s] language”, and language choices (Kress and Hodge 
1979:15). Fairclough (1989: 2) believes “the exercise of power, in modern 
society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through
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the ideological workings of language.” This highlights the importance of the 
study of language and discourse.
The relationship between discourses and ideologies is one of both informing and 
being informed by each other. According to Wodak (2001: 66), discourse is “a 
complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts”, 
which are thematically interrelated. She gives examples of discourses of 
unemployment, racism and immigration restrictions. Scholars link the two 
concepts by recognising that discourses are ideological (Richardson 2007;
Bishop and Jaworski 2003; Wodak and Fairclough 1997; van Leeuwen 1993). 
However, ideologies differ from discourses in being more encompassing.
Ideology is “[...] a particular way of seeing the world and human nature and 
relationships” (in Williams, 1976). However, discourses are less-encompassing, 
being linguistic acts concerned with topics like unemployment. For this thesis 
then, political parties and interests closely associated with radio stations have 
their own different national ideologies. These are a factor in how events are 
represented in news which articulate different ideological discourses about 
nationalism.
1.7 Critical Discourse Analysis principles
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a critical social science which is applied to 
the analysis of language (Fairclough, 2003:15). It is critical in the sense that 
scholars who use CDA have political commitments opposed to social inequality 
and the abuse of power (van Dijk, 1996). They presuppose that composing texts 
involves making lexical and grammatical choices which have political 
repercussions (Kress, 1985: 3). CDA analyses these choices to reveal 
ideologies within texts (Richardson 2007; Bishop and Jaworski 2003; Fairclough, 
2003, 2 0 0 1 ,1995a, 1995; Wodak 2001; Wodak and Fairclough 1997; van 
Leeuwen 1993; Kress, 1985). In fact, Wodak (2001: 10) claims “[o]ne of the aims 
of CDA is to ‘de-mystify* discourses by deciphering ideologies.”
This thesis aims to reveal ideological discourses about differing Turkish Cypriot 
nationalisms evoked by representations of events on TRNC radio news. It
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follows then that CDA is an appropriate approach to analyse this ideological 
language on TRNC radio news.
Scholars who work with CDA perceive discourse as a form of social practice, 
closely interconnected with other elements of social life. There is a two-way 
relationship between texts and their production and consumption contexts. For 
this reason, both text and context must be analysed (Richardson 2007;
Fairclough 2003; Wodak and Fairclough 1997; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 
92; van Dijk 1991).
1.8 This thesis’ structure
The analysis of discourse in this thesis is contextualised in three ways. In 
chapter two, TRNC’s recent political history and the role of TRNC media are 
described. This description clarifies the historical formation of competing variants 
of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms. It answers how stations can claim they are 
writing “what’s good for the nation” and “helping find a solution”, yet mean 
different things.
In chapter three, ideas of nation and media’s role in nation-building/ maintaining 
are explored. This examination reveals that nations are a relatively recent type 
of group identification and media play a role in its creation and maintenance.
Part of media’s  role is creating national ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups (McLaughlin 2001; 
Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart, 1999; Hobsbawm, 1997,1996). These observations are essential for 
understanding media’s role in Turkish Cyprus. The two Turkish Cypriot national 
ideologies vying for dominance are then examined. This informs the discourse 
analysis by defining who and what each Turkish Cypriot nationalism believes is 
part of their nation.
In chapter five, this thesis’s analysis of discourse is contextualised by the 
carrying out of newsroom ethnographies. This ethnographic research reveals the 
“social goings-on" behind news; that is, the complex and differentiated processes 
of news production behind the news which evokes different discourses of Turkish 
Cypriot nationalism. The running of stations is examined, including economic,
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political and production factors such as news gathering, writing and editing 
practices. This ethnography enhances understanding in the meanings within 
texts and answers where, why and how scripts take on different ideological 
discourses.
In chapter six through eight, radio news scripts from three TRNC radio stations 
are analysed. In these chapters, analysis is carried out on stories about an event 
(the opening of Lokmaci crossing point between TRNC and the Republic), stories 
about relations between TRNC and the Republic, and stories about more 
mundane events which are commonly referred to a s  “routine coverage”. While 
news output, particularly of political events, can appear ideological even at a 
casual listening, close analysis of texts through CDA reveals “opaque a s  well a s  
transparen t structural relationships of dom inance”, m any of th ese  only 
noticeable through close  analysis (Wodak, 2001: 2). CDA of TRNC radio 
texts uncovers hidden m essages which demonstrate differences between 
stations. CDA reveals language strategies employed by the three stations which 
show exactly how listeners are being persuaded.
1.9 What’s at Stake?
During the time of this research, TRNC was governed by pro-federation CTP.
The Republic of Cyprus also voted in a pro-federation government. UN-brokered 
face-to-face peace talks between the Presidents of the Republic and TRNC were 
being organised and the Lokmaci official crossing point between the Republic 
and TRNC was opened by both sides. Despite these pro-solution gestures, 
stations mostly omitted pro-solution discourses. By drawing upon discourses 
which satisfy stations interests and exasperate the Cyprus conflict, stations 
poison a volatile and potentially violent situation.
Nationalist violence against Turkish Cypriot visitors to the Republic is a reality8, 
a s  is the threat of para-military violence.9 By evoking national discourses which
* Violent attacks against Turkish Cypriot students and visitors have been reported. This was reported in 
http://www.c vonis-mai 1 .com/news/ downloaded 21 .01.09.
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do not offer possibilities for a solution to the Cyprus conflict, a life with economic 
embargoes, international isolation, the threat of violence, military presence and 
restrictions on the lives of TRNC residents is sustained and aggravated by 
stations. Alternatively, with discourses of compromise, cooperation and unity, an 
improvement in the life of TRNC residents is imagineable.
9 TMT has threatened to restart an armed conflict if they feel CTP compromises in its negotiations with the 
Republic. This was reported on http://www.brtk.cc/index.php/lang/en/cat/2/news/36492 downloaded on 21 
January 2009
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II. A history of Cyprus and Cypriot media from the 
British colonial period to present
11.1 Introduction
Cyprus has a history of violence and the past century, since the popularisation of 
mass media, is no exception. Turkish and Greek Cypriots have fought amongst 
each other in the name of nation, with the encouragement of outside influences. 
The media have played a role in this, contributing to opposing nationalisms and 
aggravating the conflict. Even today this is the case  with power groups using the 
media as a tool to propagate ideas of Turkish Cypriot nationalism in their own 
interests. With an historical understanding of the Cyprus conflict and media’s 
role in it, today’s media and their associated discourses can be best understood.
Cyprus has been fought over throughout its history due to its geopolitical 
importance. Presently it holds the dubious honour of hosting the UN’s longest 
running conflict zone. Though violence since 1974 is minimal, Panayiotou (2006: 
26) believes “the conflict is still open and unresolved.”
The conflict has not been resolved partly due to its complex nature. Richmond 
(1998: xvi) claims the conflict is tri-levelled. At the intercommunal level, the 
Greek Cypriot majority views the problem as one of minority-majority rights, 
legitimising its claim for a dominant voice in Cypriot affairs. Meanwhile, the 
Turkish Cypriot minority sees  it as being between two equal communities, 
legitimising its claim for an equal say in Cypriot affairs . At the regional level, 
Turkish authorities believe the TRNC is essential for the security of the Turkish 
Cypriot community and Turkey itself, w hereas the Greek government and many 
Greek Cypriots believe Cyprus is part of the Hellenic world. On a broader 
international level, the partition of Cyprus serves various global interests. For 
example, as there is no agreement in Cyprus, the 1960 Treaty of Establishment 
is still valid. This treaty permits British sovereign bases which house American 
listening posts and has given the W est great influence on Cyprus (Mallinson,
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2005: 111). Furthermore, by allowing a Turkish military presence on Cyprus, the 
US keeps Turkey as part of its middle-east strategy (ibid.).
A symptom of the unresolved conflict is the two Cypriot states. The Republic, 
based in the south, is Cyprus’s only UN-recognised government. It controls 63 
percent of the island and its Greek-speaking population of over 700,000. TRNC, 
based in the north, is an unrecognised, self-declared nation-state. It has a 
population of approximately 200,000, with an additional 150,000 students, 
expatriots and migrant workers from Turkey. The status of both sta tes is a result 
of UN resolutions from 1964 until 1974 which do not recognise Turkish Cypriot’s 
independent administrations and condemn Turkey’s military action of dividing 
Cyprus (Richmond, 1989).
TRNC media have historically aggravated the Cyprus conflict, contributing to 
Turkish Cypriot nationalisms and fear of Greek Cypriots (Bailie and Azgin, 2008). 
Azgin (1996: 642) sums up its role as:
The history of the Turkish Cypriot m ass media in a nut-shell is one of 
reaction to the Enosis movement [the Greek Cypriot idea of Cyprus uniting 
with Greece] -  and one of refuting the Greek views on the Cyprus 
question.
The analysis of TRNC newsroom practices and news texts carried out in the 
following chapters of this thesis are done with this rich historical context of 
conflict in mind. CDA theorists, on which the textual analysis in this thesis draws, 
em phasise the need to understand texts both as part of historical and ongoing 
social and cultural processes (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 1995a; Wodak 
2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Leeuwen 1993).
This chapter’s historical contextualisation exposes the emergence, processes 
and development of national ideologies produced through history and the media 
in different ways and at different times. The chapter is divided into three parts 
which follow chronological periods of Cypriot history. Within each part, events, 
issues and media’s  role in disseminating national ideologies in Turkish Cyprus 
are explored. Media sections focus mostly on radio after its introduction in 1948.
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Part one examines the British colonial period up to independence in 1960. This 
section reveals how the media contributed to the idea of a distinct Turkish Cypriot 
nationalism. The second part examines the duration of the “shared” Republic10 
(1960 to 1963) followed by the turmoil on Cyprus until the Turkish intervention in 
1974. This reveals how the news media and especially radio, reflected a 
radicalisation of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms divided along party political lines. 
The third part examines the time from the division of Cyprus until the present. 
Here, broadcast news media contribute to different national ideologies which 
benefit different power holders in TRNC.
Wodak’s (2001: 70) “discourse-historical” approach to CDA enables analysts to 
“detect and depict the disfiguring of facts and realities” by historically 
contextualising texts. The contextualisation in this chapter enhances an 
understanding of national discourses and their often subtle yet important 
differences when the thesis carries out newsroom ethnographies and textual 
analysis. It is on this information that light is shed on what discursive resources 
speakers and journalists draw upon, even if they are not aware of these during 
this time of ideological struggle in defining Turkish Cypriot nationalism.
II. 2 British Colonial Period (1878 to 1960)
//. 2.i Events and Issues leading to Cypriot Independence
Cyprus was part of the Ottoman empire for 300 years with Turks brought over to 
administer the Greek-speaking indigenous population. When Cyprus was ceded 
to Britain in 1878, Britain promised its return when an imminent Russian threat to 
Turkey subsided. However, due to Ottoman suppport for the Germans in the 
First World War, Britain reneged on its promises, annexing the island in 1914 
(Gazioglu, 2000: 130). During the First World War, many Turkish Cypriots, who 
were descendents of Turkish administrators, emigrated to Turkey as Britain 
treated them harshly a s  Ottoman allies. After the war, despite the Russian threat 
subsiding, Britain officially annexed Cyprus in 1923.
10 This thesis refers to the time between 1960 and 1963 as the “shared” Republic because this is the only 
time governance of a united Republic of Cyprus involved both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.
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Cypriots considered the British occupation temporary. The Greek Cypriot 
population claimed Cyprus belonged to them since they were the majority. They 
saw themselves a s  part of the Hellenic world. Alternatively, Turkish Cypriots 
believed Cyprus would be returned to Turkey one day as agreed with the 
Ottomans. Both communities were convinced they were Cyprus’s rightful heirs.
Britain’s divide-and-rule policies during this colonial period stoked conflicting 
nationalisms and emphasised segregation (Lacher and Kaymak 2005; Richmond 
1998). For example, the British segregated schools, separating Greeks and 
Turks. Britain also encouraged the immigration of significant numbers of Greeks 
and Turks with nationalist sympathies. This fostered conflicting patriotisms, 
emphasised ethnic segregation, but also aroused anti-colonial sentiments. The 
Greek community, with the Orthodox Church, instigated a campaign of civil 
disobedience in 1931. Subsequent rioting resulted in ten Greek Cypriots being 
deported by the British authorities and the suspension of both the constitution 
and Greek and Turkish flags (Beratli, 1999: 106-110). From this time until 1955, 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots co-existed relatively peacefully, though 
intercommunal tension “lurked ominously beneath the superficial calm” 
(Richmond, 1998: 70). In fact, the two communities co-inhabited the whole 
island until 1964.
A popular form of Greek Cypriot nationalism was Enosis, which is unification with 
motherland Greece. Their outlet w as the National Organisation o f Cypriot 
Fighters (EOKA). EOKA began with a series of attacks in 1955. Attacks against 
the British administration between 1955 and 1958, like the bombings of the 
Cyprus Radio Station and the Military Radio Station, later becam e attacks aimed 
at Turkish Cypriots (Gaziofjlu, 1998a: 71). EOKA’s activities affected not only 
Cyprus and Greece, but by the Greek government actively supporting Enosis, 
“the seeds of future conflict with Turkey” were sown (Richmond, 1998: 71).
Turkish Cypriot nationalism emerged later encouraged by the British to counter 
Enosis (ibid: 73). This included the arming of a paramilitary police force made up 
of Turkish Cypriots. In 1957, due partly to EOKA’s activities, the British
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announced that Cyprus would become conditionally independent (ibid.: 74).
Britain was to disengage from Cyprus politically, but not militarily. This allowed 
Britain to maintain its military bases.
The Turkish minority were completely excluded from negotiations for 
independence resulting in riots by Turkish Cypriots and the establishment on 1 
August 1958 of the Turk Mukavemet Teshkilati (Turkish Resistance Movement or 
TMT) (ibid.: 73). The aims of the TMT were to provide security and protection 
from EOKA, educate Turkish Cypriots, and promote Taksim (Ozcan, Ozdemir 
and Sagduyu, 1983; Gazioglu, 2003). Taksim aimed for division of Cyprus 
between the two motherlands Turkey and Greece.
The London Agreement was signed on 19 February 1959 and the structure for 
the semi-independent Republic of Cyprus w as drawn (Gazioglu, 2000: 94). The 
plans had more to do with external than internal considerations. Cyprus was 
seen a s  essential for NATO, being its eastem -m ost flank. It was considered too 
important strategically to be entirely independent. Importantly, British bases with 
US listening posts remained. Mallinson (2005: 2) claims,
After the USA cam e to regard Cyprus a s  a geostrategic necessity, a totally 
sovereign Cyprus was out of the question, both for the USA and Britain, 
whatever the inhabitants thought.
II. 2M Media’s role in establishing Turkish Cypriot nationalism
From their start in 1879 to the present, newspapers for the Turkish speaking 
population have been political tools, mapping out a Turkish Cypriot community 
distinct and mostly in opposition to Greek Cyprus. The ways these have been 
distinct have been differently formulated at different times and by different voices. 
Throughout the colonial period, newspapers were all linked to political 
movements, parties and ideas (Azgin, 1996: 642).
During this time, Turkish Cypriot nationalism was seen by most Turkish Cypriots 
as part of a wider pan-Turkish nationalism. For example, the owner and chief 
editor of Zaman, first issued in December 1891, also owned “Kiraathane-I 
Osmaniye” (The Ottoman Club). This political organisation was founded as a
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reaction to T he Cyprus Club’11 with the aim, “to repel their [Greek] attacks 
against the Turkish community” (ibid.). According to Dedegay (1988: 18), 
Zaman's manifesto was to fight against English colonialism, Greek newspapers’ 
views on the Cyprus issue, and Enosis, to propagate Turkish Cypriot views and 
to ensure Turkish language and society survived in Cyprus.
Another early newspaper was Yeni Zaman whose political stance w as “Cyprus 
legally belonged to the Ottoman state and should be returned to its legal owner -  
the sooner the better” (Dedegay in Azgin, 1996: 643). Kibris newspaper’s aim 
was “to fight against the Greek press, to render a service to the Turkish culture 
and Turkish people, to support the Young Turk movement, and to avoid writing 
false news” (ibid.).
Clearly, the aims of these early newspapers reflect variations of Turkish Cypriot 
nationalism which saw itself as  part of Turkey and opposed to Greek Cypriots 
and the British. The colonial government closed down newspapers when they 
were too critical of British policies. Despite these setbacks, Turkish Cypriot 
newspapers continued.
Due to disruptive actions by Greek Cypriots who began to challenge British 
colonial rule in 1931, clauses were added to the Press law which gave the 
colonial administration powers to cancel or suspend newspapers. Azgin (1996: 
647) notes that journalists were not allowed to write about controversial public 
issues. Yet despite these restrictions, Turkish Cypriot newspapers continued to 
be politically charged. For example, “newspapers like Soz which insisted on 
carrying articles with nationalistic flavour, were temporarily closed (with the 
responsible editors sent to prison)" (ibid.).
Azgin (1996: 648) observes that another newspaper named Ses,
[...] touched upon a substantial number of important problems of the 
Turkish community in Cyprus, such as  education, migration, women’s 
rights, the debts of the peasants, and the approaching war danger in 
Europe.
11 ‘The Cyprus Club’ was a Greek Cypriot political organisation which promoted the idea of Enosis.
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Between the two world wars, newspapers continued to produce content that 
depicted Turkish Cyprus mostly as part of mainland Turkey and opposed to 
Greek Cyprus and Britain.
Newspapers began to become more party-political as  the century reached its 
halfway point. Despite this trend, newspapers continued the pattern of being 
Turkish nationalistic by representing the Turkish Cypriot nation a s  part of 
motherland Turkey, and opposed to its Greek Cypriot counterpart. Halkin Sesi, 
established in 1942, became the voice of the owner Fazil Kuguk (the first and 
only Turkish Cypriot vice-president of the shared Republic) and his political party, 
Milli Parti. One of its policies w as for Taksim, division of the island between 
Turkey and Greece. Azgin (1996: 649) attributes Halkm Sesi with being:
[...] instrumental in the promotion and spreading of Turkish nationalism, 
especially after the uprise of the Greek Cypriot national movement EOKA 
in 1955 and EOKA-B in the 1960 and 1970s.
Nacak, which started publication in 1959 was owned by Rauf Denkta§, a leading
member of the Federation o f the Turkish Associations at the time and future
president of TRNC. It used militant, agitated language, representing a Turkish
nationalist view and was regarded as the mouthpiece for the Turkish resistance
movement TMT (Dedegay, 1988: 71). So the pattern of newspapers articulating
discourses which defined a Turkish Cypriot and Turkish mainland ‘us’ group and
a Greek Cypriot and British ‘them ’ group continued through editorial policies,
though em phasis differed depending on political alliances and interests.
Like other British colonies, radio was established in 1948 by and for the British 
military (Dedegay, 1988:45). It initially broadcasted half an hour a day of Greek 
programming and Turkish programmes were broadcasted twice a week for half 
an hour. Cyprus Radio was established a few years later in 1952. According to 
Kannaouros (2004: 2), the project was initiated to promote the colonial 
government’s policies. The Cyprus Broadcasting Service started broadcasting in 
1953. Programming was in Greek, Turkish and English reflecting the size and 
needs of the communities. News bureaus were established in every city and 
small town in Cyprus. These bureaus provided Cypriot news which made up
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some 45 percent of all programming (Dedegay, 1988: 49). In 1955, EOKA 
bombed CBS but programming continued.
Cyprus Television started in 1957. Again, the British used it to promote its 
economic and cultural existence in Cyprus (ibid.: 76). In 1959, the television and 
radio service becam e the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC). Broadcast 
media promoted Britain’s vision of Cyprus; that is, a Cyprus led by the British with 
two distinct “peoples” in order to maintain its hold on power. So, television, like 
radio and newspapers, served the interests of their owners, none of which 
promoted a single Cypriot nation for Cypriots.
II. 3 The Republic of Cyprus to Turkish Intervention (1960 to 
1974)
ll.3.i Events and Issues leading to military intervention
On 15 August 1960, after two years of negotiations between Turkey, Greece, 
Cypriot leaders and Britain, the British disengaged politically and the Republic of 
Cyprus was declared. However, there were many conditions for independence. 
For example, the Treaty of Guarantee, one of the agreem ents for independence, 
ensured that Britain, Greece and Turkey were allowed to intervene in Cyprus in 
order to maintain the Republic.12 Britain secured its prized sovereign military 
bases and access to all military instillations on Cyprus. There w as also a 
rejection of Enosis and Taksim by each community and their respective 
mainlands, a s  well a s  constitutional safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot minority. 
These safeguards included a Turkish Cypriot vice-president and Turkish Cypriot 
quotas in government and public service positions. The president was Greek 
Cypriot Archbishop Makarios II and the vice-president was Turkish Cypriot Dr. 
Fazil Kuguk.
Unfortunately, the constitution seem ed doomed to failure. Despite British, Greek 
and Turkish influences, Makarios was reluctant to sign the constitution, didn’t
12 Downloaded 20.04.09 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treatv of Guarantee.
24
support it and failed to create a stable government. His goal was to achieve 
Enosis and he saw the Republic as a stepping stone towards this aim.
Mallinson (2005: 109) describes a radical nationalism in both communities that 
made a constitutional crisis inevitable. The Greek Cypriot leadership and many 
Greek Cypriots wanted Enosis. Many Turkish Cypriots and their leadership 
wanted Taksim. Both nationalisms stressed their respective motherland’s 
importance and a lack of importance to a shared Cyprus. The new regime soon 
reached deadlock which caused both communities to pass separate laws and led 
to the em ergence of a violent underground militia. Even during this time of a 
shared Republic, both sides envisaged very different ideas of Cypriot 
nationalism.
Regionally, undermining the constitution, EOKA, Greece and Turkey all sought to 
dominate Cyprus at the expense of its Turkish and Greek populations. This 
interference gave rise to a real possibility of war between Greece and Turkey on 
several occasions. Only through American diplomacy was it avoided. The W est 
did not want war because it would threaten the eastern-most wing of NATO. A 
weakened NATO would play into the hands of Russia, the feared enemy of the 
West during these  cold war days. Russia had interests in Cyprus by supplying 
arms. More Russian influence in the area was not desirable.
During the time of the shared Republic (1960 to 1963), the Greek Cypriot 
majority in parliament tried to change the 70:30 power sharing agreement. 
Meanwhile, EOKA applied pressure on Turkish Cypriots in the form of violent 
attacks (Alasya, 1987: 23). This culminated in President Makarios’ proposal to 
change the constitution on 30 November 1963 “which would abrogate power- 
sharing arrangements" between the two communities13, thereby diminishing the 
powers of Turkish Cypriots (Lacher and Kaymak 2005:152; TCHRC: 23). 
Richmond (1998: 79) suggests that through these changes,
Makarios w as pursuing a policy of limited violence in order to obtain 
recourse to the UN and to nullify the voice of Turkish Cypriots, have the
13 Downloaded 23.04.08 from http://bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/fi/world/europe/countrvprofiles/1021835.stm.
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Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee abrogated and so gain complete 
independence.
With independence and no voice for Turkish Cypriots, Enosis could be achieved 
(ibid: 78).
The proposed changes were rejected by Turkish Cypriots and Turkey (Bahgeli, 
1998: 103-104). This rejection paved the way to an escalation of violent attacks 
in Nicosia by Greek Cypriots (Gazioglu, 2003: 415). A ceasefire was supervised 
by British troops from the sovereign bases “as  fighting in Cyprus threatened 
Britain’s strategic interests in the region” (Richmond, 1998: 78). On 26 
December 1963, the ‘Green Line’ in Nicosia was drawn and patrolled by British 
troops. From this time onwards, Nicosia has been a divided city. In 1964, the 
UNFICYP force took over from British troops who returned to their sovereign 
bases and have not been called on since.
On 1 January 1964, with Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians absent, Makarios 
abolished the power-sharing agreements. Turkish Cypriots abandoned their 
homes, villages and jobs for the relative safety of Turkish Cypriot ghettoes or 
“enclaves".14 These enclaves were under the control of the Turkish resistance 
group TMT and beyond the control of the government. The move to enclaves 
ensured residents’ security against continued violence and satisfied pressure 
from Turkish Cypriot hard-liners who wanted a complete withdrawal from 
cooperation with Greek Cypriots. Enclaves effectively divided the island and 
“implied that Turkish Cypriots also wanted to change the 1960 constitution and 
effect greater political and practical separation” (ibid.: 79).
Between 1963 and 1967, Turkish Cypriot enclaves evolved into a distinct political 
entity under the auspices of the General Committee (Ozcan, Ozdemir, Sagduyu, 
1983:179). Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots were prevented from taking up their 
positions in the Republic’s  government unless they accepted Makarios’s 
constitutional changes. They did not return. The Greek Cypriot government, 
paralysed by its constitution which stipulated Turkish Cypriot participation,
14 Sec Appendix 1-A for a map of Turkish Cypriot enclaves.
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appealed to the UN for help. The UN obliged by recognising the Greek Cypriot- 
led government on 4 March 1964 as the only legitimate government in Cyprus. 
This remains the case  to this day.
In 1967, the UN and US stopped Turkey from invading Cyprus in return for 
Greece removing its troops from Cyprus. Greek troops left, tensions relaxed and 
Turkey prepared to intervene. Both sides agreed to intercommunal talks in June 
1968 and UN troop numbers were reduced.
On 18 July 1970, the Turkish Cypriot leadership declared the Cyprus 
Autonomous Turkish Administration (Alasya, 1987: 74). The administration 
continued to govern until the establishment of the Turkish Federated State in 
1975 (Ismail, 1998). The formation of these administrations demonstrate Turkish 
Cypriots’ desires to distinguish themselves from their Greek Cypriot counterparts.
In 1973, inter-communal violence escalated again. Greece and the West wanted 
to maintain close relations with Cyprus to maintain its NATO-friendly eastern 
flank. However, Makarios upset the W est by purchasing arms from Russia and 
the US-friendly Greek junta’s relationship with Makarios fell to new depths. The 
result was a Greek-backed military coup on 15 July 1974 with “a strong dose of 
secret American connivance" (Mallinson, 2005: 118). Makarios fled to London. 
Coup leader and Greek EOKA fighter, Nicos Sampson, took control of Cyprus. 
Again inter-communal violence erupted.
Turkish Cypriots appealed to Turkey for help due to the escalation in violence. 
After unsuccessful UN talks, Turkey intervened on 20 July 1974 and again on 14 
August 1974. The coup was one reason given for Turkish military intervention 
(BBC, downloaded 18.02.08; Lacherand Kaymak2005; Mallinson 2005). 
Mallinson (2005: 119) notes,
The clumsy ‘Sam pson’ coup in July 1974 gave Turkey not merely an 
excuse to land on Cyprus, but a reason to do so, invoking Article IV of the 
Treaty of Guarantee.
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Turkish troops advanced from the north of the island until they had secured 37 
percent of Cyprus. Where they stopped, the border between the Republic and 
present-day TRNC was drawn.15
II.3.H Media’s contribution to a radical Turkish Cypriot nationalism
Newspapers were used as political tools that produced content about a distinct 
Turkish Cypriot nation, aligned to the views of political parties. This was 
especially pronounced during the time of Turkish enclaves (1963 to 1974). For 
example, Zafer, published between 1965 and 1969, backed the nationalist views 
of the Turkish military leadership and “took on itself the duty of exalting the 
personality cult around Denktag and criticised the policies of Kuguk” (Azgin, 
1996: 653). Sava§ (1968-1973) became the mouthpiece for the CTP party and 
Zaman (1973-1979) becam e the organ for the Turkish nationalist UBP.
Before the crisis of 1963, radio, run by the pro-Enosis government of Makarios, 
was seen as essential for propaganda purposes for the new Republic (Dedegay, 
1988: 79). However, instead of creating harmony between the two communities, 
broadcast media created division. Panayiotou (2006: 30) writes,
The emergence of the electronic media played a decisive role in the 
development of division between the two communities, to such a degree 
that these media incorporated the previous dominant medium (print) as 
their ‘content’.
According to the 1960 constitution, 30 percent of personnel and programming at 
CyBC had to be Turkish Cypriot. This gave Turkish Cypriots a voice on radio 
and television. However, on 22 December 1963, with the collapse of the shared 
Republic, Turkish Cypriots were forced to abandon their places at CyBC.
Though Turkish programming continued (and still does), it was (and still is) 
prepared by Greek Cypriots, giving control of broadcasting exclusively to Greek 
Cypriots. This monopoly on broadcasting was short-lived due to the priorities of 
the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Azgin (1996: 657) notes:
15 See Appendix 1-B for a map of Cyprus with the border between TRNC and the Republic.
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A radio station was one of the predominant tasks of the Turkish 
leadership. On 25 December, 1963 the voice of Bayrak (Flag) Radyo was 
heard for the first time.
Two weeks after the start of Bayrak Radyo, Halkm Sesi newspaper (14 January
1964: 2) through overly charged language, described the propagation of Turkish
radio stations:
When the last conflict appeared in Cyprus, another stupid action was 
made by the Greeks to dominate the government radio station and to 
make it a Greek Propaganda machine. Certainly, Greeks thought, 
simplemindedly, that the Turkish Cypriot community would be deprived of 
the opportunity to announce their voice by m eans of radio. But they were 
amazed to leam that Turks formed not only one but four radio stations that 
spread over the whole island.
During the time of Turkish enclaves, six radio stations were established and
controlled by the Turkish TMT (Azgin, 1996: 657; Sayil, 2000: 5). They were
known a s  Sancak stations, named after ‘Sancaktir’, a commander of the TMT
(Dedegay, 1988: 56). They aimed to make the outside world aware of the
existence of the Turkish Cypriot struggle, counter propaganda produced by
CyBC, inform Turkish Cypriots about political issues and TMTs policies, lift
morale, and entertain (Sayil 2000; Dedegay 1988; Atun 2000). One of these
stations was Canbulat Magusa radio. Atun (2000: 4) describes the role of the
station:
Programmes of Canbulat radio were a unique source of entertainment for 
Turkish Cypriots during the war, where there was not any connection with 
other regions. Magusa Canbulat Radio did not only give political news, 
but also included cultural, artistic, and humourous programmes and these 
programmes provided Turkish Cypriots’ social dynamism and morale.
One worker at Canbulat Magusa radio, Ismet Kotak, announced the aims of the 
station on its first day of broadcasting, 10 February, 1964. An extract from the 
text reads:
Because of the gaining speed of events and the increase in the number of 
broadcasts, which aim to wear Turkish Cypriots out, establishment of a 
radio in Magusa was inevitable. One needs a friend, who will lighten the 
way for his or her opinion against the made up news that are 
communicated by hypocritical people (in Qatal, 2003).
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This announcement of aims demonstrates how Turkish Cypriot radio from 1963 
onwards defined and shaped the concept of a Turkish Cypriot community, 
distinct from and opposing its Greek Cypriot counterpart through news and 
cultural programming.
11.4 Division (1974) to P resen t
ll.4.i Events and Issues contributing to diverse Turkish Cypriot nationalisms
The Sampson coup in Cyprus only lasted a few days and democracy was 
restored. President Makarios did not return from London immediately, but spent 
five months securing international recognition of his administration as the only 
government in Cyprus.16 Though this was achieved, when Makarios returned, 
the Turkish Cypriot community was separated from its Greek counterpart by the 
Turkish military.
In the north, almost immediately after Turkish troops took control of 37 percent of 
the island, Turkish nationalist political leader Rauf Denkta§ formed the UBP, 
which claimed that ‘no solution was a solution’ (Richmond, 1998: 135). On 13 
February 1975, Denkta§ unilaterally declared the Turkish Federated State, 
reportedly a s  a temporary governmental m easure until a new agreement with the 
Republic could be reached. Though this announcement received popular 
support from Turkish Cypriots (TCHR: 42: Alasya: 261), their provisional state 
was only recognised by Turkey. International trade embargoes and political 
isolation were announced by the UN.
The UN found itself fighting a losing battle in negotiations. The Secretary- 
General called for a federal solution, but Turkish Cypriots questioned the merits 
of a federation now that they had a separate state, and Greek Cypriots were not 
in favour, as they were already recognised internationally as the only legitimate 
power on Cyprus. Both sides continued talks with the UN for self interest; hopes
16 Downloaded 20.09.09 from
http://en.wikipedia.Org/wiki/Archbishop_Makarios#Makarios_and_the_Cyprus_problem_.281964.E2.80.93
1977.29
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of recognition for the Turks and maintaining the Cyprus issue on the world 
agenda for the Greeks.
From division until the present, there have been numerous peace processes and 
proposals with some agreem ent reached. In March 1977, both sides agreed that 
Cyprus should become an independent, non-aligned, bicommunal, federal 
republic. This was seen as a compromise by both sides: Turks giving up their 
dream of a state independent of the Greek Republic and Greeks giving up their 
desires for greater control of Cyprus to achieve Enosis.
Throughout the seventies and eighties, the Turkish community integrated closer 
with Turkey a s  the economy of the north worsened due to embargoes and 
political isolation. This integration was promoted by TRNC President Rauf 
Denkta§ and the Turkish government, whose relationship was (and still is) close. 
This integration led to an increase in Turkey’s influence in TRNC. It also costed 
Turkey, which financially supported (and still supports) TRNC.
TRNC’s lack of recognition and UN blame for a lack of progress in UN-brokered 
talks contributed to Denkta§ proclaiming independence from the Republic on 15 
November 1983 (Richmond, 1998: 164). The Turkish government was angered 
(at least officially) by the proclamation, though it was the only nation to recognise 
the new state. The international response has been political, economic and 
social embargoes and isolation.
The Republic applied to join the European Community in July 1990. Richmond 
(1998:201) claims the government “now appeared openly to pin [their] hopes on 
entry into the European Union (EU) to give [them] more leverage, a development 
that Turkey found somewhat alarming.” Turkey now encouraged talks with the 
UN and officially was willing to accept a confederation, while Denkta§ continued 
to want a confederation or absolute recognition. Positions on both sides of 
Cyprus hardened, though economic realities produced some cooperation.
Richmond (1998: 227) notes one reason there was no agreement during the 
nineties was that relative stability was preferred by Cypriots to a settlement with 
possible compromises. Some in the international community also prefer a lack of
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agreement, such as Britain which maintains its military bases with American 
listening posts (Mallinson, 2005: 5). It is feared that this historic anomaly would 
be questioned if Cyprus was united. Also, by playing down Turkish demands to 
maintain a presence on Cyprus, America keeps Turkey as part of its Middle East 
strategy. And the powerful American arms industry benefits from tensions 
between Turkey and Greece. Both are supplied with the majority of their arms by 
American arms companies.
Turkey not only benefits due to division, its military-bureaucratic establishment 
considers support for TRNC a “national cause” (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005: 148). 
This “cause" gives the military and political establishment a reason to involve 
itself in all matters of state. Observers believe the very sovereignty of TRNC is 
questionable (ibid.), with Turkey playing a major role in all decisions. The 
TRNC’s  questionable autonomy relates not only to policy, but also to top 
positions in the civil services. For example, the head of the Central Bank is 
reserved for citizens of Turkey and the police are under the control of the Turkish 
army.
Because TRNC residents consistently elected Turkish nationalist governments, 
Turkey’s  dominant presence in TRNC and its long-term demand for a “two state 
confederate solution” could be justified. This situation has changed since 2003.
On 24 April 2004, a referendum was held on both sides of Cyprus for a single 
Cypriot federation. The Prime Minister of TRNC at the time, Mehmet Ali Talat 
and his pro-federation CTP party, campaigned in favour of the Annan plan while 
the then President Rauf Denkta§, Turkish nationalists and the Government of 
Cyprus campaigned against the plan. According to Halkm Sesi newspaper, the 
question voted on was:
Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its annexes, as well as 
the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the 
provisions a s  to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of 
affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united?
75.8 percent of Greek Cypriots voted against the plan while it was accepted by
64.9 percent of Turks. Greek Cypriots joined the EU on 1 May 2004 despite
32
rejecting the plan, while isolation and embargoes continue against Turkish 
Cypriots despite accepting the plan. The EU has attempted to lift some of the 
restrictions on TRNC, though these moves have mostly been blocked by the 
Republic.
There are several reasons given for the large discrepancy between the two 
communities’ voting on Annan. Mallinson (2005: 189) claims the plan did not 
succeed in the Republic due to a lack of information, the Republic having already 
secured EU entry, and aspects of the plan being seen as unfair. Media coverage 
also played a part, a s  discussed below. Turkish Cypriot support for the Annan 
Plan, according to Lacher and Kaymak (2005: 154), was due to a re-imagining of 
community from one of Turkish nationalism to a Turkish Cypriot identity. 
Papadakis (2005: 249) believes Turkish Cypriots saw the plan as an end to 
decades of economic and political isolation.
The Turkish government has redefined its position on TRNC since the 
referendum. This is due a s  much to Turkish strategic objectives as to TRNC 
residents’ desires. Lacher and Kaymak (2005: 148-149) observe,
As the Turkish government embraced EU membership as Turkey’s 
primary strategic objective, the division of Cyprus was now considered an 
obstacle, rather than a s  a strategic goal in its own right.
Turkey has now effectively discarded its long-term demand for a ‘two state
solution’ and accepted the idea of a federation, though it continues to play a key
role in all major political matters.
On 24 February 2008, the Republic voted in Dimitris Christofias’ pro-federation 
government. Christofias won on a similar platform to the CTP; that is, prioritising 
a solution to the Cyprus conflict based on a federation. At his victory ceremony, 
he pledged, “As of tomorrow, we unite our forces [...] to achieve the reunification 
of our country."17 This election victory brought about two pro-federation 
governments for the first time since division of Cyprus.18
17 Downloaded from www.usatodav.com/news/world/2008-02-24-cvprus-elections on 22.08.08.
18 Subsequent to this research, on 23 April 2009, TRNC voted back in Turkish Nationalist UBP, reducing 
the pro-federation governments on Cyprus to one again.
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II.4.H Media’s contribution to diverse Turkish Cypriot nationalisms
Since division of Cyprus in 1974, newspapers in TRNC have flourished. In 2004, 
there were eight dailies and five weeklies, representing one of the highest 
concentrations of newspaper titles per capita anywhere in the world (Vassiliadou, 
2007). All newspapers are mouthpieces for political parties, promoting TRNC as 
a political entity in one form or another. For example, KIBRIS newspaper, which 
was closely linked to pro-federation CTP, actively promoted a ‘yes’ vote during 
the run up to the Annan referendum. This reflected CTP policies and their aim 
for a federation with the Republic.19
Radio in TRNC has seen many changes since division. In 1974, Sancak radio 
was re-organised to become Bayrak Radyo. With the introduction of Bayrak 
Televizyon in 1976, the two media were incorporated into Bayrak Radio- 
Television Corporation (BRTK) in 1983. BRTK was not granted autonomy from 
the government, but is directly answerable to the Prime Minister (Article 95 BRTK 
Law).20 The Prime Minister has the right to ban news or broadcasts deem ed a 
threat to ‘national security. It is governed by an executive board of six members 
and a director appointed by the government and the Turkish Armed Forces. This 
system results in both a lack of impartiality and changes in personnel and 
policies with every government change. BRTK is also financially dependent on 
the government. Furthermore, its constitution demands it promotes the TRNC 
nation (Article 5 BRTK Law). The role of BRTK’s news is to promote a Turkish 
Cypriot view on events, producing content which depicts a distinct Turkish 
Cyprus, separate from Greek Cyprus.
In 1997, a new broadcast law introduced by the ruling UBP government ushered 
in private broadcasting and a new body, the Broadcast High Commission (Yaym 
Yuksek Kurulu - YYK) to oversee broadcasting. All broadcasting, both private 
and state, fell under the jurisdiction of the YYK which establishes frequencies, 
issues licenses and enforces broadcasting regulations. YYK is defined as an
19 For a list of all TRNC newspapers and their political affiliations, see Appendix two.
20 This is taken from article 95 of TRNC Law No. 50/ 1983 which established BRTK downloaded from 
http://www.cm.gov.nc.tr/dir docs/50-1983.doc on 07.09.09.
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‘autonomous and impartial public judicial person’.21 But again, this body has 
political links. Its board is made up of eight members appointed by political 
parties according to their representation in parliament, and one member 
appointed by the president. So, political parties with power control this aspect of 
broadcasting.
Due to the influx in private broadcasters, TRNC now has 11 television stations,
29 radio stations, and numerous Turkish mainland radio and TV services. This is 
for a population of about 200,000. Most private radio and television stations are 
associated with political parties, the state, the military and universities.22 For 
example, Simm FMs  owner is in the secretariat of the CTP. Radyo T s owner is 
a leading member of UBP. GCiven FM s owner is the Turkish Cypriot national 
forces, while Vatan FM is owned by the Turkish military.23
Despite this large number of radio and television stations with diverse political 
interests, almost all TRNC news is sourced from the semi-official TurkAjansi 
Kibns (TAK) news agency. TAK was founded in 1973 with only a single person.
It now has over 20 employees. TAK offers written news and a photography 
service aimed mostly at newspapers, though it is used extensively by local 
broadcasters. In fact, over 90 percent of news that appears in newspapers 
com es from TAK 24 It focuses mainly on activities and statem ents of TRNC 
politicians which TAK considers “qualifies as news”. TAK journalists perform 
three functions. Firstly, they gather TRNC news through announcements of 
p ress conferences and events from e-mails, faxes, press releases, sources and 
phone calls from politicians and non-govemmental organisations. Secondly, they 
gather foreign news from Reuters and Anatolia News Agency. Thirdly, they send 
news items to AP, AFP, Reuters and Anatolia News Agencies.
TAKs political and economic context suggests it is far from impartial. It is 
overseen by a seven member board of directors (six at the time of research)
21 This is taken from article six of TRNC Law no. 39/1997 which established YYK downloaded from 
http://www.kktcwk.org/docs/esas.doc on 07.09.09.
22 Interview with Erdin9 Gunduz, KTV and KFM General Manager on 20 July 2007.
23 A list of all stations and their affiliations is provided in appendix three.
24 Interview with Selim Kumbaraci, TAK journalist on 12 February 2009.
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which consists of two representatives from the government, the director of the 
Press and Information Office (PIO), the BRT general director, the director of TAK 
and a member from the Gazeteciler Biriigi (Journalists’ Association). All 
members but one (the Journalists’ Association member) are government political 
appointments. It is financed by the TRNC government and subscription fees.
This political and economic context ensures TAK is pro-government. During the 
time of this research, the government was pro-federation CTP.
However, it is too simplistic to claim TAK simply reflects the CTP. TAK is just 
one part of the Turkish Cypriot civil service built up by 40 years of Turkish and 
UBP nationalist rule. According to Bekir Azgin25, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
civil services are nationalistic. Azgin said:
Our civil service was, for years, shaped according to ideology and not 
according to knowledge or ability. So was TAK. The yeast is nationalistic 
and you could see  its traces during the CTP era in all spheres. Moreover 
the military has the ability to influence groups of people even if they are 
not represented somewhere. Turkish military officers, unlike their western 
colleagues, ‘know everything’ and they know what is best. So they have 
the right to shape the society.
Although TAK at the time of this research promoted pro-federation CTP and its
activities, it also retained Turkish nationalist sympathies, like the rest of the civil
service. In short, its dependence on the government, and choice of content,
again suggest a political agenda reflecting political interests in TRNC.
Politics play a direct role in media, as outlined above, but media also play a role 
in TRNC politics. For example, media reflected their political alliances in the 
relatively recent acceptance and failure of the Annan referendum on both sides 
of Cyprus. The UN-brokered Annan referendum was a simultaneous referendum 
throughout Cyprus which asked whether residents wanted a single federation. It 
failed because the Republic rejected it, even though TRNC accepted it.
In TRNC, large media, such as the KIBRIS Media Group amongst others, 
supported the Annan plan referendum. News output on their radio and television
25 Interview with Bekir Azgin on 25 May 2009, professor of Journalism at Eastern Mediterranean 
University and author of numerous academic articles about TRNC and Cypriot media.
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services increased significantly and their content was purposely written in favour 
of the CTP and a 'yes’ vote to the Annan plan.26 KIBRIS's news output may have 
been one of many factors which resulted in a strong ‘yes’ vote in TRNC. 
Alternatively, the Republic voted strongly against the Annan plan. Panayiotou 
(2006: 31) claims the Greek-Cypriot media’s nationalist leanings were used in the 
run-up to the referendum. The media used “manipulation”, “censorship” and 
promoted selective news “to create the climate for a ‘resounding no’” (ibid.). A 
majority of the media created a spectacle of struggle which “hid the reality that 
Greek Cypriots were also saying ‘no’ because they did not want to lose the 
monopoly of the state” (ibid.). This recent and brief example illustrates how 
media are used by power holders, their content reflecting power holders’ 
interests, sometimes at the expense of Cypriot interests.
II.5 Conclusion
Some theorists in CDA have pointed to the importance of setting out an historic 
context, otherwise text analysis appears out of social and historical context 
(Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 1995a; Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen and 
Wodak 1999; van Leeuwen 1993). The above historical contextualisation aids in 
understanding the institutions, practices, texts and discourses now found in 
TRNC radio.
This chapter has revealed how the conflict in Cyprus is a complex issue, 
involving many parties’ interests. Mallinson (2005: 5) claims on a communal 
level, the majority has taken over the title of the government, while the minority 
has retaliated by declaring a separate state. In Turkish Cyprus, expressions of 
self-determination, independent from the Republic yet closely aligned to Turkey, 
have resulted in numerous forms of governance. On a regional level, two 
opposing powers se e  Cyprus as a key part of their military and political strategy 
against each other. On a wider international level, many participants benefit, 
including the American arms industry and the governments of Turkey, America, 
and Britain.
26 Interview with KFM news presenter Aysu Basri February 2008.
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TRNC news media have historically exacerbated the conflict by producing 
content which depicts diverse, yet mostly Turkish nationalist, views about 
Cyprus. These are not uniform expressions and allegiances in news media, but 
internally fractured, politically differentiated and changing through time. The 
language used in TRNC news analysed later can only be understood as part the 
historical processes outlined in this chapter.
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Ill Nationalism
111.1 Introduction
Theoretical and empirical work has described nations as mental constructs or 
‘imagined communities’ rather than the popular notion that nations are ‘natural’ 
group identities rooted in antiquity (McLaughlin 2001; Smith 1999, 1995; Wodak, 
de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; 
Hobsbawm 1997,1996; Billig 1996; Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983). Such group 
identification is a relatively recent construct (ibid.). Attention has also been 
drawn to the central role media play in the construction and maintainance of this 
idea of nation and national membership in the minds of the public. It is this idea 
of the constructed nation and the role of the media in this process that can be 
usefully used to characterise the processes of construction and legitimation of 
national discourses in TRNC generally and specifically in the role played by radio 
news.
The first part of this chapter explores the historically-constructed nature of 
nations, people’s imagining of nations and reasons for its rise to prominence.
The second part of this chapter examines media’s role in how nations emerged 
a s  a concept and how they are currently maintained. Particular attention is given 
to Billig’s  (1991) idea of ‘banal’ nationalism. This concept highlights the 
important role language in media plays in nationalism, such as defining ‘us’ and 
‘them’ groups. Others concur that creating national in-groups and out-groups is 
an important linguistic strategy used by media (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; 
Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart, 1999; Billig 1996). The creation of national ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups in 
language used in radio news is explored in great detail in this thesis’s textual 
analysis chapters.
Ideas and concepts explored in the first two parts of the chapter are considered 
when examining the contested area of Turkish Cypriot nationalism in part three. 
Firstly, the em ergence and development of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms and their
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associated discourses are explored. Then the two dominant national ideologies 
in TRNC which are currently struggling for dominance are described in detail. 
These national ideologies provide the context through which this thesis’s 
ethnographic and textual analyses are carried out. The way various powers in 
TRNC use language to construct and ‘imagine’ the nation is a factor in how radio 
stations reflect these imaginings in their news. These reflections are presented 
to TRNC residents and all have their political ramifications.
III. 2 The Ideology of Nation
lll.2.i Nations’ constmcted nature
It has been demonstrated that nations are a recent historically constructed form 
of group identity (McLaughlin, 2001; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; 
Billig, 1995; Hobsbawm, 1997, 1996, 1993a; Anderson, 1991; Gellner 1983).
One relatively recent development in society which relies on nationalism is 
industrialisation. Gellner (1983: 35) writes the development of nationalism and 
industrialisation are closely linked. Industrialisation needs “universal literacy and 
a high level of numerical, technical and general sophistication”, so there is a 
homogenisation of culture across previously heterogeneous areas. Low cultures 
are swept aside and a replication of a standard high culture takes their places. 
Gellner (1983: 55) explains:
When general social conditions make for standardised, homogeneous, 
centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just 
elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally 
sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit 
with which men willingly and often ardently identify.
Hobsbawm (1993a: 14) concurs with Gellner by demonstrating that modern
nations are not rooted in remotest antiquity, but “what makes up the modem
nation is made up of fairly recent symbols, or national histories and invented
traditions." Symbols, histories and traditions have been embellished and
invented for ends beneficial to those in power “to establish continuity with a
suitable historic past” (ibid.: 1). Trevor-Roper (1993) demonstrates how the
Scottish tartan w as invented for the benefit of a few manufacturers, while
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McLaughlin (2001) notes mythical stories of the past in Ireland were invented to 
promote various versions of Irish nationalism.
The constructed nature of nations includes creating attachments to a homeland. 
MacLaughlin (2001: 129-130) illustrates this in nineteenth century Irish nation- 
building. Billig (1995: 75) makes the following analogy about national feelings of 
territorial integrity:
Losing a part of the imagined homeland is worse than merely losing an 
ear: in the case  of territory, the lost ear always turns up on someone else’s 
face.
National construction also involves constructing a world of nations (ibid.: 83). 
Within a world of nations, each nation is unique in time and space. This 
suggests differences between those ‘in’ one’s  nation and those ‘outside’ of one’s 
nation. Billig (1995:61) observes a national identity,
[...] include(s) ways of conceiving of ‘us, the nation’, which is said to have 
its unique destiny (or identity); it also involves conceiving of ‘them, the 
foreigners’, from whom ‘we’ identify ‘ourselves’ as different.
This idea of difference, of ‘us’ and ‘them’, is a defining factor in the construction
of different Turkish Cypriot nationalisms.
111.2. i.a ‘Hot’ and ‘Banal’ nationalism
Importantly, Billig (1995) explores how the nation-state and nationalism, which 
have become ideological norms, are maintained in established states. For this, 
he distinguishes between ‘hot’ and ‘banal’ nationalism.
‘Hot’ nationalism is associated with struggles to create new states or extreme 
right-wing politics. ‘Hot’ national passions arise in times of social disruption, are 
reflected in extreme social movements and are used by existing nations in times 
of crisis and celebration.
But ‘hot’ nationalism, in the form of occasional events bracketed off from ordinary 
life, is not sufficient to sustain national identities. Nationalism is on-going with 
flags and national anthem s recounted when needed. This is the role of ‘banal’ 
nationalism which is the continual, numerous, mindless, unconscious, daily
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reminding of citizens’ national place in a world of nations. Billig (1995: 38) 
exemplifies ‘banal’ nationalism by,
The national flag, hanging outside a public building or decorating a filling- 
station forecourt [...] thousand upon thousands of such flags each day 
hang limply in public places.
‘Banal’ nationalism is also achieved through lexical choices in news and sporting
events. It provides a continual background for political leaders’ texts and cultural
products such as newspapers. These constantly remind ‘us’ of ‘our1 nationality
(ibid.: 8), discursively creating national ‘us’ groups, distinct from those outside the
nation.
III. 2. ii National imaginings and their origins
Anderson (1991) describes nations as “an imagined political community -  and 
imagined as  both inherently limited and sovereign” (ibid.: 5-6). The idea that the 
nation is a mental construct is an idea shared by many theorists and researchers 
across a range of academic fields (McLaughlin 2001; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl 
and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Hobsbawm 
1997,1996; Billig 1996).
Anderson believes nations are imagined because despite members of the nation 
not knowing all fellow members, “[...] in the mind of each lives the image of their 
communion.” Nations are imagined as limited, with borders beyond which are 
other nations. The nation is imagined as sovereign; that is, a territory which is 
free to govern itself. Each nation is imagined as a community with shared 
interests and characteristics, despite all the inequalities that in fact exist within 
them.
These national imagined group identities have taken on the form of modern 
nation-states. Anderson identifies two related factors which brought them about 
in Europe. Firstly, with scepticism about religions and Latin losing favour over 
vernacular languages in Europe’s religious communities, a process of 
fragmentation, pluralisation and territorialisation gave rise to nationalism.
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Hobsbaw m  (1993b: 268-269) points out that “[w]ith the demise of church and 
monarchy, an alternative ‘civic religion’ had to be constructed.”
The second factor was print-capitalism. Anderson (1991: 38) observes that with 
the dem ise of Latin and the saturation of the small Latin-reading market, 
publishers from 1500 to 1600 produced the bible using vernaculars which 
created large new reading publics. The many existing language types were 
assem bled into far fewer print languages. This activity made publishing more 
profitable and “created the possibility of a new form of imagined community” 
(ibid.: 46).
These print-languages laid the bases for national consciousness in three ways. 
Firstly, print created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin 
and above the vernaculars. People with similar languages shared the sam e 
information, ideas, mediated experiences and interpretations of information. 
Secondly, print-capitalism gave a  new fixity to language. This helped to build the 
image of antiquity central to the idea of the nation. Thirdly, print-capitalism 
created languages of power. Certain dialects which were ‘closer’ to print 
languages becam e dominant, while other dialects were demoted or died out.
By the eighteenth century, Hobsbawm (1997: 94) notes that print capitalism and 
the u se  of certain administrative languages resulted in languages of m ass 
spoken communication. This century also saw newspapers and novels which 
“‘re-present[ed]’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (Anderson, 
1991: 24-25).
In nineteenth century Europe, schools, universities and the press championed 
nationalism (MacLaughlin, 2001; Hobsbawm, 1993; Anderson, 1991). 
MacLaughlin (2001: 9) illustrates how ‘organic intelligentsia’ in Ireland, both 
nationalists and unionists, “struggled relentlessly” to convince both Protestants 
and Catholics that their best interests lay with their respective leaders (ibid.: 9).
The First World W ar brought an end to high dynasties and nation-states became 
the norm. After the Second World War, new nation-states (mainly non- 
European) copied their European counterparts. The mass media, education
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systems and administrative regulations all contribute to the hegemonic concept 
of the nation-state. Anderson (1991: 135) claims,
Above all, the very idea of ‘nation’ is now nestled firmly in virtually all print- 
languages; and nation-ness is virtually inseparable from political 
consciousness.
III.3 M edia’s  Roles in Nations
Media’s roles are  central to the nation. These roles can be divided into two main 
activities: nation-building and nation-maintaining. Both are evident in TRNC 
radio news.
Ill.3.i Nation-building
Anderson (1991: 34) describes the newspaper as an “extreme form of the book”, 
being very popular and binding imagined national communities together. The act 
of citizens simultaneously reading newspapers each day at specific times instills 
a feeling of nation in its readers. Newspaper reading is individual,
Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is 
being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of 
whose existence, he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the 
slightest notion (ibid.: 35).
Newspaper readers witness others reading the sam e newspaper and are
“continually reassured  that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life”
(ibid.: 35-36).
MacLaughlin (2001) dem onstrates the importance of the press in nation-building. 
It was essential in the creation of the two ideas of nation in Ireland (Catholic 
Ireland and Protestant Ulster). Since the nineteenth century, newspapers 
allowed wealthy farm ers from both communities to defend their right to control 
the economy and m anage the country’s affairs in their interest, not those of the 
landed elites. MacLaughlin (2001:193) notes these views in newspapers 
“provided the communicative cement” which linked together the bourgeoisie 
“binding them to their communities in great ‘reading coalitions’.” MacLaughlin 
(2001:195) writes these  ‘coalitions’ provided a new form of community by:
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[...] putting ordinary people ‘in touch’ with each other, and by permitting 
them to have a common sense of history and a complimentary image of 
themselves either a s  ‘Irish people’ or as ‘successful’ Ulster Unionists.
Broadcast media also contribute to nation-building. Anderson (1991:135, 327)
sites radio and television as “print allies” in conjuring up imagined communities.
Martin-Barbero (1997) believes film and radio in the 1940s gave people from
virtually all Latin American countries their first taste of nation by giving them
common experiences. Colombia’s national experience is described as:
Before the appearance and growth of radio, the country was a patchwork 
of regions, each separate and isolated [...] radio allowed the country to 
experience an invisible national unity, a cultural identity shared 
simultaneously by the people of the coast, Antioquia, Pasto, Santander 
and Bogota (ibid.: 51).
Moores (2000) believes broadcast media furthered the idea of nation in Britain
through simultaneous reception, similar to newspaper reading described by
Anderson. Describing British broadcasting before cable and satellite, Moores
(2000: 40) writes,
Programmes were heard or seen live by absent millions who were 
dispersed in their domestic settings. They were thereby invited to identify 
with a wider ‘general public’ - to imagine themselves as members of a 
national community which was then reproduced by TV and radio day in 
day out, week in week out, and year in year out.
The twentieth century saw  the press, cinema and radio not only propagate 
national ideologies through blatant propaganda, but more significantly through 
the use  of symbols. Hobsbawm (1997: 142) believes,
[...] deliberate propaganda was almost certainly less significant than the 
ability of the m ass media to make what were in effect national symbols 
part of the life of every individual [...]
For example, symbols such as the British royal family in their Royal Christmas
broadcast have m ade them an icon of Britain. Sportsmen and team s play an
important symbolic role:
The imagined community of millions seem s more real a s  a team of eleven 
named people. The individual, even the one who only cheers, becomes a 
symbol of his nation himself (ibid.: 143).
II.3.H Nation-maintaining
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Though Billig like Anderson believes the nation is an imagined community, he 
differs in the role he assigns to the media. The media do more than create a 
feeling of national community through the simultaneous consumption of media 
products. The language used in media also contributes. Billig (1995: 125) 
observes:
They [the media] operate directly, through their m essages, stereotypes
and deictics, rather than [...] a perceived feeling of similarity.
Many agree that language in media plays important roles in nations and 
researching language is a way to access discourses of nationalism (Bishop and 
Jaworski, 2003; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; van Leeuwen and 
Wodak, 1999).
Billig describes m edia’s role in nations in terms of ‘banal’ nationalism. The media 
produce ‘banal’ nationalism in two ways. Firstly, the speeches of politicians 
reproduce cliches of nationhood. Politicians reach millions on a daily basis 
through the media. Secondly, the media (like politicians) choose words which 
continually point to the audience’s home as the national homeland. Politicians 
and media discursively construct a national ‘us’ and a foreign ‘them’, defining 
who is included in ‘our’ nation. Billig (1995: 11) observes that newspapers daily 
address their readers a s  members of the nation within a world of nations.
This banal discursive construction is achieved by employing a routine ‘deixis’ 
continually pointing audiences to the national homeland. Deixis is a form of 
rhetorical pointing. It is how words are anchored to aspects of their contexts of 
utterances (ibid.: 106). This deixis is on-going, so we are unmindfully reminded 
of who ‘we’ are and where ‘we’ are; ‘our’ national identity. Billig (1995:109) 
writes, “In this way national identity is a routine way of talking and listening; it is a 
form of life [...]”.
‘Banal’ nationalism operates with prosaic, routine words which take nations for 
granted (ibid.: 94). The nation is constructed using the first person plural such as 
‘we’, and ‘us’ and spatial deixis such a s  ‘this’ and ‘here’. ‘The’ in phrases such as
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‘the people’, ‘the nation’, even ‘the weather1 all play their part. Billig (ibid.) 
observes,
In English, the definite article is continually playing its quiet part in a 
routine ‘deixis’, which banally points out ‘the’ homeland.
Likewise, those not in the nation are constructed in the third person. Billig (1995:
78) notes, “There can be no ‘u s’ without a ‘them’.” To conceive of ‘us’ the nation,
one must also imagine communities of foreigners “from whom ‘we’ identify
‘ourselves’ as  different.” These lexical strategies identified by Billig which
contribute to ‘banal’ nationalism are examined in this thesis’s textual analysis of
TRNC radio news.
The creation of ‘u s’ and ‘them’ groups when discursively constructing the nation 
is explored by others. Millas (2006: 16) found the Greek and Turkish press 
exploit this strategy by creating national ‘us’ groups opposed to the ‘other’. 
Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:2) note that “identity politics is 
always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference.” An “image of an 
enemy” is essential for the imagining of a nation. They claim national identities 
emphasise national uniqueness and intra-national uniformity, ignoring intra­
national difference. In the case  of TRNC news, ‘othering’ the Republic and 
constructing a hom ogenous Turkish Cypriot ‘us’ group are two common 
strategies used.
There are other discursive strategies used by media in constructing nationalism. 
Flowerdew and Leong (2007) examine the role of metaphors in the discursive 
construction of national identities in post-colonial Hong Kong new spapers. They 
find that m etaphors and other discursive strategies such a s  foregrounding, 
presupposition, framing, othering and subject positioning are used in newspapers 
to express various national ideologies (ibid.: 291).
Higgins (2004) analyses political stories in Scottish newspapers surrounding the 
opening of the Scottish parliament. He notes the role of lexical choices which 
remind readers of their nation. One lexical choice is naming the home nation 
(Scotland) far more than non-home nations (England and Wales) in coverage of
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the sam e event. Higgins also finds that ‘local’ place names and ‘u s’ and ‘the’ 
deixis further promote nationalism in news coverage (ibid.: 633, 639).
‘Banal’ nationalism is not confined to just stories about politicians and politics. 
Billig (1995:114) notes that daily newspapers “drape" the flag around all types of 
stories, such as  economic news, front page news, home news, sports and the 
weather. Flowerdew and Leong’s (2007) analysis includes a variety of new s 
stories, opinion articles and editorials. Though Higgins’s (2004: 635) analysis 
is of political stories, he notes the importance of symbols in,
[...] the Scottish press clothes itself in symbols of national identification 
and allegiance, with icons such a s  upright lions and thistles dominating the 
m astheads of most major newspapers.
Billig writes that sports sections wave the national flag with “regular enthusiasm”
in all newspapers. This is because sport is historically a largely masculine
domain and male sport is dominant on British sport pages. It uses terminology
about men ‘doing battle’ on ‘foreign fields’ on the nation’s behalf defining ‘whole
national honour*. These pages are a banal preparation for war. Billig (1995:11)
observes:
They [sport pages] can be seen  a s  banal rehearsals for the extraordinary 
times of crisis, when the state calls upon its citizenry, and especially its 
male citizenry, to make ultimate sacrifices in the cause of nationhood.
Bishop and Jaworski’s (2003) analysis of coverage of the England-Germany
Euro 2000 football match exemplifies nationalism found in sports pages. While
examining the representation of participants, they find homogeneous national
groups are  constructed by using ‘us’ and ‘them’ deixis. Discourses of national
unity are realised through literary strategies invoking stereotypes, generic
references, shared sporting and military history and the tim elessness of the
nation (ibid.: 244).
Though this thesis does not analyse sports stories, all these studies point to the 
importance of both political and non-political stories in nation-building and 
maintaining. Most also examine the representation of participants when
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analysing the nation. Both of these dimensions in an analysis of nationalism are 
important and are included in this thesis.
Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999: 2) believe that the nation and 
national identities “are produced and reproduced, as well as transformed and 
dismantled, discursively” This expands the role of media described by Billig. 
Their study of Austrian nationalism (ibid.: 33) identifies four main types of 
“macro-strategies” in formulating national identities. These are:
1. [Constructive strategies] attempt to construct and establish a certain 
national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as 
well a s  differentiation.
2. Strategies o f perpetuation attempt to maintain and to reproduce a 
threatened national identity, i.e. to preserve, support and protect it.
3. Strategies o f transformation aim to transform a relatively well-established 
national identity and its components into another identity the contours of 
which the speaker has already conceptualised.
4. Dismantling or destructive strategies aim at dismantling or disparaging 
parts of an  existing national identity construct, but usually cannot provide 
any new model to replace the old one. (my numbering)
Importantly to this thesis, which analyses participants, van Leeuwen and Wodak 
(1999: 92-93) add that constructive strategies:
[...] constitute a  ‘we’ group and a ‘they* group [...] [they] invite identification 
and solidarity with the ‘we’ group, which, however, at the sam e time 
implies distanciation from and marginalization of the ‘they’ group.
These strategies are an important supplement to Billig’s work, in that they identify
media’s role a s  more than just supporting a single idea of nationalism.
Nevertheless, none of the above studies on the role of media and nationalism
examine specifically how nationalism across media outlets are different, many
assuming consistency. This thesis dem onstrates that nationalism does not find
uniform expression and allegiance in and through the media, but varies between
media and throughout time.
III.4 Turkish Cypriot Nationalism
Turkish Cypriot nationalisms reflect Cyprus’s turbulent history and power holders’ 
interests. These nationalisms contribute to how people identify with being
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Cypriot and Turkish, and not being Greek and Greek Cypriot. Presently, there 
are two dominant Turkish Cypriot nationalisms vying for ideological prominence. 
These have similarities, such as both acknowledging their Ottoman origins, but 
also differences. Clearly identifying both these nationalisms is vital to 
understanding the national discourses drawn upon in TRNC radio news. A 
careful language analysis is needed to pick these apart, showing how they work, 
the models of the world they suggest and sequences of future action that they 
imply. Listeners know newscasts are political with different points of view. 
However, a close analysis of the language used in media can reveal fine details, 
language strategies and subtle differences in news content which demonstrate 
exactly how listeners are being persuaded (Wodak, 2001: 2). Though this is not 
always carefully thought out by news workers, discourses evoked in newscasts 
serve the interests associated with each station.
One nationalism is known as ‘pro-solution’, ‘pro-federation’ or ‘left’ politics. This 
ideology aims to establish a federation with the Greek Republic of Cyprus. It 
acknowledges its Turkish historical roots, but tries to distance itself from Turkey. 
It does not consider itself a part of a pan-Turkish nationalism, but more as a part 
of a future united Cyprus. The main pro-federation party is the Cumhuriyetci 
Turk Partisi (CTP). It w as established in 1970. Its roots are in Communism, 
though it now brands itself a s  a socialist party. The CTP was in power during the 
time of this research from December 2003 until April 2009.
The other nationalism claims Turkish Cyprus is part of a pan-Turkish nation. It 
se e s  itself independent from the Republic. This is reflected in what is termed 
Turkish nationalist’ politics. The main nationalist party is the Ulusal Birlik Partisi 
(UBP). It was established in 1976 by Rauf Denkta§. It claims to be a Liberal 
party which supports a free market economy. The UBP has been in power for 
most of TRNC’s history. After a six year absence from power, April 2009 saw the 
UBP return to power.
Ill.4.i History o f Turkish Cypriot nationalism
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Nationalisms are as much to do with internal as external grapplings for resources 
and power. Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 148) observe,
Competing nationalist projects and inter-ethnic conflict are often rooted in 
(though not reducible to) intra-ethnic elite competition and m ass 
mobilization for power, status and wealth. This, at least, was and is an 
appropriate framework for the case  of Cyprus, where competing claims for 
state power (and state-allocated wealth and status) were legitimized on 
the basis of nationalist ideologies.
On an all-Cypriot level during the British colonial period, there were three groups
competing for state power: the British, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.
Greek Cypriots instigated an uprising against the British in 1931. Turkish
Cypriots’ Turkish nationalism came mostly as a defence to the Greek Cypriot
anti-colonial struggle and their attempts to achieve Enosis with Greece
(Kizilyurek, 2003: 222).
Cypriot nationalisms were aided by Britain’s divide and-rule policies, relying on 
Turkish policemen, administrators and prosecutors to repress Greek actions 
before Cypriot independence in 1960. After independence, Greek Cypriot 
attempts to change the constitution played into the hands of the ultra-nationalist 
Turkish Cypriot leadership. Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 148) write the leadership 
created a “hegemonic conception of a Turkish identity, which had been 
constructed and sustained in the struggles against Greek-Cypriot enosis (union) 
with G reece”.
After division of Cyprus in 1974, the aim of the leadership, headed by Rauf 
Denkta§, was legalisation of two separate states which would end any possibility 
of Greek Cypriot influence in Turkish Cypriot affairs. Many bureaucrats and 
administrators felt sovereignty most desirable, though Denkta§ preferred Taksim 
with Turkey. Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 156) describe nationalism at the time as:
The ‘self in question was not the political community of Turkish Cypriots, 
but the Turkish nation, of which the Turkish Cypriots were regarded to be 
an extension [...] Self-determination was widely seen as something that 
would be pursued within the larger framework of Turkish nationalism.
Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 152) describe the mechanisms used to reproduce
Turkish nationalism as  the distribution of a sse ts taken as a result of controlling
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more than a third of Cyprus by approximately 20 per cent of its population.
These were used to secure support through patronage. Patronage came in two 
forms. One was the granting of land, which was plentiful, and the other was 
lucrative import monopolies. This patronage resulted in a significant group that 
had (and has) strong material reasons to favour division of Cyprus (ibid.: 153).
But this vision of a Turkish Cypriot nation was and is popular even amongst 
those who have not enjoyed the benefits of patronage. The TRNC government 
“has been able to shape social, economic, political and cultural life in North 
Cyprus as if it were sovereign; it had, for a while, also built on considerable 
legitimacy among its citizens” (ibid.: 148). This is evident by nationalist parties 
winning all elections from 1974 until 1998 and again in 2009.
Symbols have also played a part in Turkish Cypriot nationalism. A new TRNC 
flag was produced with the establishment of TRNC which closely resembles and 
is flown alongside the Turkish flag. Anastasiou (2002: 587) observes these flags 
are symbols that Turkish Cypriots identify with, bringing positive feelings of their 
own nationalism and loathing from Greek Cypriots.
However, there has been a gradual decomposition of Turkish nationalism since 
1983. This has happened due to external and internal affairs. Externally, the 
Turkish mainland’s financial crisis of 2001 reduced payments to TRNC. This 
reduced the ability of the Turkish Cypriot elite to contain discontent and the 
envisaging of political alternatives through patronage (ibid.: 154). The Republic 
joining the EU has also played a role in softening Turkish nationalism. The fact 
that the EU would admit the Republic with or without a settlement in Cyprus 
served a s  an incentive to pro-federation nationalism (Tocci, 2003).
Internal matters also contributed to the rise of pro-federation nationalism. Firstly, 
many citizens were disenfranchised and resentful of not enjoying the benefits of 
patronage. Secondly, many in TRNC considered it a “failing state”. Lacher and 
Kaynak (2005: 154) note its legitimacy eroded as Turkish Cypriots questioned 
whether the state actually reflected their political will, sceptical of the quality of
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TRNC’s sovereignty. Turkey’s dominance “contributed to a latent sense  of 
alienation of administrators and citizens from ‘their* state” (ibid.: 156).
Thirdly, with the immigration of large numbers of Turkish mainlanders, came a 
growing sense of Turkish Cypriot cultural distinctiveness through these close 
relations. Fourthly, there was dissatisfaction with the failure to gain external 
recognition. Lastly, invented traditions were employed to create a distinctively 
Turkish Cypriot national identity. According to Guven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez 
(2002: 185 in Lacher and Kaynak, 2005: 158):
Emerging from decades of cultural construction in the margins, classic 
mechanisms of nation-building were employed, inventing traditions like 
‘typical’ Turkish Cypriot folk-dancing -  the left promoting dances similar to 
Greek Cypriot ones, while Turkish nationalist dance groups stress 
Anatolian and Ottoman traditions.
These factors contributed to many citizens favouring pro-federation nationalism.
This nationalism prevailed when residents voted for the CTP in parliamentary
elections in 2003 and the 2004 Annan referendum which called for a federation.
Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 148) describe pro-federation nationalism as a re­
imaging, which puts distance between the Turkish mainland and Turkish Cyprus. 
Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 157) observe:
Turkish Cypriots no longer generally posit an identity of themselves with 
Turks in Turkey based on ethnic origins, but claim a distinctive self on the 
basis of cultural idiosyncrasies. This transformed notion of the “se lf now 
becam e the basis for an increasing willingness to abandon demands for 
formal sovereignty in exchange for a more substantial form of self 
determination, even if that m eant accepting the framework of a new 
federal state on Cyprus.
Pro-federation nationalism is a movement which re-defines “the ethno-nationalist
definition of political community”. Instead, there is “no Turkish Cypriot ethno-
nationalism, but a  post-national form of identity formation, marked precisely by an
absence of a singular identity” (ibid.: 159).
However, this nationalism, similar to Turkish nationalism, rejects just being 
“Cypriots pure and simple”. Lacher and Kaynak (2005:158) note,
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While no longer considering them selves to be merely Turks in Cyprus, 
most Turkish Cypriots insist on the recognition of cultural distinctions 
between themselves and Greek Cypriots.
III.4.H Present Turkish Cypriot Nationalisms
Though Lacher and Kaynak trace Turkish nationalism’s roots to British rule and 
pro-federation nationalism’s roots to more recent times, they also acknowledge 
that both forms of nationalism are very popular. In fact, the Turkish nationalist 
UBP party won the 19 April 2009 federal parliamentary elections, while pro- 
federation CTP’s Talat was still president. The present is a time when 
nationalism in TRNC is a contested ideology. Both the CTP and the UBP hold 
power, though differ considerably in how they see the nation.
To gain a clear and detailed account of these two nationalisms as they translate 
into practical party-political thinking, they are described by politicians below. 
These politicians were powerful authorities in regard to their parties’ respective 
thinking at the time of research. This is due to their high positions in each party. 
They were interviewed using a list of open-ended questions to reveal their 
thinking about the nation, making interviews somewhat formal. However, 
interviews diverged considerably from the set of questions, revealing priorities 
and concerns of the politicians and their parties. In the spirit of ethnography, all 
information gathered was recorded and used as evidence in the following 
account. These interviews proved invaluable, identifying political thinking during 
the time of this research, including who is a part of the nation and who is not. 
These descriptions provide the context through which this thesis’s ethnographic 
and textual analyses are carried out. Because radio stations are linked to 
political parties, and parties emphasise their ideas of nation, political ideas 
described here are reflected in radio news scripts, despite claims to the contrary.
Ill.4.ii.a The CTP’s Turkish Cypriot Nationalism
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Dr. Nazim Beralti was the Minister of Ideology for the CTP during this research. 
He was one of six people at the top of the power structure of the party and the 
government. The ideas expressed here reflect those of the CTP.27
The CTP does not believe there is such a thing as a “Cypriot nation”. Instead, it 
sees two “peoples” on Cyprus. Beralti said:
Unfortunately we don’t have a nation in Cyprus. It would be better for us if 
we did. We have two main peoples living in Cyprus, the majority 
belonging to the orthodox church who claim they are Greeks -  Hellenics. 
And the minority claims that they are Muslims, though we don’t practice. 
We speak Turkish and claim to be Turks. We claim we are part of the 
Turkish nation and the other part used to think they are a part of the Greek 
nation. But, we don’t have two independent nations and we don’t have a 
Cypriot nation.
The CTP sees  no nation on Cyprus, just people who “claim” to be Turkish or 
Greek. The CTP distills differences and similarities with Greeks and mainlanders 
to language and religion. Even claims of religious similarities with mainland 
Turks are usurped by “not practicing” their sam e religion.
There are som e contradictions in the CTP’s ideas of Cyprus’s two peoples. On 
the one hand, Beralti notes commonality between Cypriots: “For three centuries 
we were living together under the Ottoman empire, so we have some common 
customs, traditions and values.” On the other hand, later in the interview, he 
makes clear there are  differences in “religion, language, and our culture.” This 
discrepancy may be part of political banter which attempts to construct the idea 
of Cypriot commonality, yet appeal to conservatives who see  distinct differences.
The CTP distances itself from Turkey, but recognises its importance on four 
fronts. There are  historical ties, Turkish Cypriots being descendants of Ottoman 
administrators. There are Turkish troops which prop up Turkish Cypriots’ 
confidence in living with Greek Cypriots. There is Turkey’s political 
establishment whose acceptance of a solution is essential for its success. And
27 The following information was taken from an interview when Beralti was Minister for Ideology 15 
October 2008 . I use “Beralti” and “CTP” synonymously in this section because Beralti was speaking to 
me on behalf of CTP as the Minister of Ideology.
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there is Turkey’s public which must be convinced that a federation is in the 
interest of Turkey’s economy and EU aspirations.
But Turkey and Turks are not part of the CTP’s Turkish Cyprus. The CTP wants 
to send Turkey’s “foreign” troops back to Turkey. Beralti said, “Nobody wants 
foreign troops in his own country. Even if they speak the sam e language as 
you.” Turkish mainlanders or “settlers” who have immigrated to TRNC since 
1974 are also not part of the CTP’s Turkish Cyprus. Some settlers may be sent 
back to Turkey with a CTP solution. In fact, all Turkish mainlanders, Beralti 
believes, are different from Turkish Cypriots. He described the relationship 
between Cypriots and Greek and Turkish mainlanders as,
Both of them [Turkish and Greek Cypriots] don’t like the people who are 
living on the mainlands. They think that their neighbours [Cypriots from 
the other community] are more sincere than the people living on the 
mainlands.
Beralti clearly creates an ‘other’ Turkish mainlander group, describing it as 
“foreign”, “different” and “not sincere”, distinguishing it from Turkish Cyprus.
The CTP aims for a united Cypriot state, despite there being no “nation” and 
differences in “religion, language, and our culture.” Statehood is envisaged 
which is “not dependent on nationality but on citizenship with the two peoples.” 
The CTP se e s  two independent states and a common federal state, as  a first 
step in a process of integration into one political state. Beralti believes the state 
would firstly give all Cypriots “a common identity, a common passport and 
common money”. Interestingly, two of these three first steps are symbolic: 
passports and money. This illustrates the importance the CTP puts on symbols 
in creating a future united Cypriot nationalism.
The federal government would start with less important ministries, such as Health 
and Tourism, to “build confidence in both people towards a common state.” As 
confidence grows, the federal state would gradually become more integrated.
The CTP also wants “compositional equality”; that is, representational power 
relative to population size. This would recognise respect for the two peoples.
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Beralti said, “We are ready to respect their identity and we want them to respect 
our identity too.”
To achieve a future state, Beralti wants to negotiate and find a federal solution to 
the Cyprus conflict. The CTP sees this a s  a top priority, especially since the 
February 2008 election of Christofias’s pro-federation government in the 
Republic. Though the Annan referendum which called for an all-Cypriot 
federation was agreeable to the CTP in 2004, it is not essential. Beralti said 
what is important is “we must negotiate.”
There are reasons for this urgency. Firstly, with no solution, recognition of TRNC 
would necessitate the opening of two airports, three seaports, and at least 150 
diplomats all of international standards. With such a small population, this is 
difficult. Secondly, without a solution, “the world will choose to divide Cyprus.” 
This will result in foreign interests such as  Turkey, Greece, Britain and the US 
becoming even more dominant and Turkish Cypriots losing out. Thirdly, there 
are ideological reasons for wanting reunification. Beralti stated,
We want unification with Europe and after unification of the world. 
According to our ideology of socialism, it is against our ideas to divide 
such a little country, such a little island. We prefer a solution and to live 
together on Cyprus.
The CTP sees the root problem of the Cyprus conflict as internal. Beralti said,
“Greek Cypriots look toward Hellenic Nationalism and Turkish Cypriots look to
Turkey." Beralti believes the solution to the problem is to “find our own way out”.
This does not mean ignoring outside powers, because this is impossible. Turkish
and Greek Cypriots need to change their minds about their fear of the ‘other’.
Beralti said,
We have fears against the Greek Cypriots and they have fear against our 
population. They have fear against Turkey and us. W e are afraid of their 
church.
The CTP sees  this fear subsiding through negotiations and more bi-communal 
interaction between politicians, families and schools.
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The CTP stresses a close afinity with Europe. Beralti believes Turkish Cypriots 
are not European but “can become European". He said,
We believe we can easily join that culture and most of us can speak 
different languages, so most of us don’t feel different. OK, our colour is 
different but our ideology and mentality are the same. If we are members 
of the European community, we can think more European.
Not only does the CTP think culturally they can be European, the CTP’s socialist
ideology dictates that its future is with the EU, as part of a more global Socialist
comraderie.
Ill.4.ii.b The UBP’s Turkish Cypriot Nationalism
The UBP is the largest nationalist party in TRNC. At the time of research, Ersin 
Tatar was the UBP’s Shadow Minister for economic policies. He w as in the 
upper echelon of the party. The ideas expressed here reflect those of the UBP.28
Like the CTP, the UBP does not believe there is one Cypriot nation. Instead, 
Tatar claimed, “In Cyprus we believe that there are two nations on Cyprus: 
Greeks and Turks.” Tatar sees  the Turks on Cyprus as “an integral part of the 
Turkish nation.” This membership of a pan-Turkish nationalism is reflected in all 
aspects of the UBP’s nation. Tatar said,
We believe our future is based on a close partnership with Turkey 
because our motherland is Turkey. We share the sam e language, religion 
and culture. And afterall, we are all Turkish people. We are Turkish 
Cypriots, but we have roots on the motherland, mainland Turkey.
Like mainland Turks, Tatar believes Turkish Cypriots are the sam e in terms of
religion, political beliefs, and the reverence for Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.29 By
aligning many aspects of social life with those of mainland Turks, the UBP forges
a national bond with the mainland.
28 The following information is taken from an interview with Tatar on 20 September 2008. Tatar is now 
Minister of the Economy in the new UBP government. I use “Tatar” and “UBP” synonymously in this 
section because Tatar was speaking to me on behalf of UBP as its Deputy General secretary responsible for 
economic policies.
29 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is the founder of the modem nation-state Turkey formed out of the remains of 
the collapsed Ottoman empire.
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The UBP also acknowledges economic bonds. Tatar claimed the TRNC 
economy has developed “since Turkey cam e here”. It is not just past actions 
which bind the nations. In 2008, Turkey contributed 790 million dollars to the 
TRNC budget. These are strong economic bonds which the UBP wants to 
continue.
Turkish mainlanders are considered part of the UBP’s nation. Settlers who are 
“working here in TRNC in every possible industry” are seen as “keeping our 
economy at work”. Mainland Turkish settlers and Turkish Cypriots are one and 
the sam e. Tatar said, “We are all Turks, afterall.”
The Turkish military also enjoys membership in the UBPs vision of its nation. 
Throughout UBP policy, the Turkish military are praised for their contributions in 
the past and present. In the past, the Turkish army are credited with ending the 
“m assacre” of Turkish Cypriots, the prevention of Enosis, dividing Cyprus and 
giving Turkish Cypriots their own country. Tatar said,
If Turkey did not come in 1974, we would have all been slaughtered and 
there would be no Turkish Cypriots on the island. This is a fact of life.
Since division and currently, the army is credited with “giving TRNC security and
economic power in order for Turkish Cypriots to live in a civilised manner. So
1974 w as a fortunate year.” Tatar also se e s  the army remaining on Cyprus to
ensure security for Turkish Cypriots in its version of the future.
Part of UBP policy is stressing the success of TRNC as a state independent of 
the Republic. According to the UBP, TRNC has thrived ever since division.
Tatar recalled:
Turkish Cypriots were a poor minority who were just a community of 
workers and state employees employed by the Ottoman government. But 
since 1974, we have had our own businesses growing, we have had our 
own civil society growing, six universities, a number of hotels, an airport, 
harbours. Therefore we feel we have achieved a lot of good things in the 
past 30 years.
But the UBP praise for TRNC goes beyond its civil society. Tatar observed:
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W e live in a  nice country and Turkish Cypriots through the Turkish 
Republic of North Cyprus is part of the civilised world. W e are living 
healthy like m ost Europeans.
Though Tatar speaks positively about the present, the UBP grudgingly
acknowledge a  settlem ent to the Cyprus conflict is needed. Tatar believes this
for two reasons. Firstly, a t the moment "we believe that we have only partially
achieved peace." Som e form of lasting agreem ent with the Republic is
necessary  to ensure  the safety of the UBP’s  Turkish citizens. Secondly, he
believes a  settlem ent is needed because  there is "pressure from Europeans and
the world community for a  peaceful settlement on the island.”
The U B P s answ er to a  settlem ent is a  confederation "on the basis of a  bi-zonal, 
bi-communal island with two separate  and equal states, Greek Cypriots in the 
south and Turkish Cypriots in the north.” This confederation would have a  very 
w eak central governm ent with two equal and “distinct” states. This ensures there 
would be little interference and influence between the two states. This solution, 
Tatar believes, is the only way for lasting peace.
To achieve this, the UBP does not suggest negotiating with the Republic as 
freely a s  the CTP suggests. Tatar noted:
W e have to be very careful in searching for a  new agreem ent with the 
Greek Cypriots because  if we were to lose all this, we can not possibly get 
it back.
Tatar is referring to economic and political control of the north. Tatar shows his 
w ariness of the Republic when claiming the Republic have ulterior motives for 
negotiating: they want Turkish troops and Turkey’s  influence out of Cyprus. 
Turkish troops out of Cyprus plays on historical and present fears of Greek 
Cypriots. For these  reasons, the UBP is hesitant about negotiations with the 
Republic.
The UBP displays an obsession with security and fear of the Greek Cypriot 
‘other’ who may be characterised a s  the ‘enemy*. This fear is expressed in 
various forms. Politically, Greek Cypriots are credited with wanting Enosis. 
Enosis, or union with G reece, w as and still is a political goal for som e Greek
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Cypriots. For example, the only President of the shared Republic, Archbishop 
Makarios II, made an oath that all his life he would work towards the goal of 
Enosis. The UBP does not trust Greek Cypriots and believe this is still a Greek 
Cypriot aim.
Culturally, Greek Cypriots are to be feared. Tatar described it as “a radical 
society with an orthodox religion and their history is very much tied with Greek 
history.” The education system in the Republic is credited with stirring up 
dangerous national feelings. Tatar explained that young Greek Cypriots believe 
Turks are “barbarians” so the two communities “can not possibly live together”.
Historically, the UBP fears violence, as was the case throughout the sixties and 
seventies, before division. This violence is part of UBP’s fear of a possible 
future. Tatar said,
If the Turkish army are to leave the island, you might have a lot of 
unpleasant events happen because you have 700,000 Greek Cypriots on 
the other side, young and excited people who might want to take revenge 
for the past 30 years.
Fear of Greek Cypriots is an integral part of UBP policy which legitimises its calls
for a separate state.
The UBP’s outlook towards Europe is mixed. On the one hand, the UBP thinks 
Europe is partly to blame for hindering TRNC progress. Pressure from 
Europeans for a settlement and associated property issues hinders economic 
growth. For this reason, the UBP does not believe joining the EU at any cost is 
what is best for TRNC. Tatar attributes this position to the CTP. UBP policy is to 
join the EU as part of a confederation.
On the other hand, Tatar repeatedly claimed that Turkish Cypriots are 
“conditionally" European. Both Turkish Cypriots and Europeans share many 
“beliefs” and “values”. Tatar stated:
We [UBP] are aiming to be members of Europe. We are Muslim people, 
secular people, who adhere to Ataturk principles. And although we are 
Muslim, we feel very much we can be a part of Europe and we value our 
relationship with motherland Turkey.
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So the UBP wants to be European, but on their terms. The UBP wants to 
become part of the EU, but only if accepted as a separate state within a 
confederation.
111.5 Conclusion
This chapter has revealed that the nation is a mental construct recently invented 
due to industrialisation, print capitalism and the demise of an old world view. The 
media have played a role in the building of nations. Presently, media play their 
part in constructing and maintaining the hegemony enjoyed by the concept of a 
world of nations, though this thesis demonstrates how the nation is defined is not 
necessarily the sam e across media outlets and time. This maintaining of 
nationalism is described by Billig through his idea of ‘banal’ nationalism. 
Importantly, m edia’s  representations of nations create groups of ‘us’ distinct from 
‘them’. This em phasises the importance of a close analysis of how participants 
are represented when studying discourses about nationalism in media.
These ideas and concepts help in understanding the two nationalisms vying for 
dominance in TRNC. These ideologies and their associated discourses have 
been identified, historically contextualised and described in great detail by 
politicians. Prevailing TRNC national imaginings contextualise the newsroom 
studies and textual analysis of radio news in the coming chapters. The way 
various powers in TRNC imagine the nation and who are a part of it is a factor in 
how stations represent events in news. These representations evoke differing 
ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism and illustrate how 
nationalism varies between media and throughout time.
At the time of this thesis, Cypriot peace negotiations were being discussed by 
two pro-federation parties, while a vocal and popular pro-Turkish nationalist 
opposition remained influential. In TRNC, there are two nationalisms and their 
asociated discourses. This domain of ideology is being contested, like never 
before in Turkish Cypriot history.
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IV Methodology
IV. 1 Introduction
It is widely assum ed that news has a powerful effect on the social construction of 
reality. This takes a number of forms from direct effects, as in the “behaviourist 
approach” to more mediated ones like that proposed by Burton (1990: 206-223). 
News informs people about issues, events and politics (Fairclough, 2003: 8; ibid.: 
217). Tuchman (1978: 2) claims news helps audiences prioritise issues, has the 
power to “shape opinions” and provides “the context in which news consumers 
debate the meaning of events.” There are different ways to a sse ss  this 
construction of reality, one is through the language media uses and another is to 
examine news production through ethnography. For reasons that follow, both 
are used in this thesis.
The importance of language may be summarised as “[the use of language] is a 
version of the world, offered to, imposed on, exacted by, someone else” (Kress 
and Hodge, 1979: 9). Its role in society is not only to communicate, but also to 
control (Fairclough, 2003: 34 and 1989: 37; Silverstone, 1999; ibid.: 6). These 
roles of language take on particular significance in news (Richardson, 2006; 
Fairclough, 2003, 1995a: 2 and 1989: 37; Knightley, 2002; Krishnamurthy, 1996; 
Billig, 1995; van Dijk, 1991). For example, language in broadcast news aids 
governmental control in society by representing and transforming politics and 
government texts which are then represented,
[..Jin the texts and interactions of different practices, including, crucially 
everyday life, where it contributes to the shaping of how we live, and the 
meanings we give to our lives (Silverstone, 1999 in Fairclough, 2003: 34).
So a close study of language, according to Fairclough (1995a: 16), “remains a
central element of media analysis”, used to reveal what are often hidden
ideologies and world views of the language producer.
Newsroom ethnographies describe the social goings-on behind texts. They are a 
“microanalysis of news production processes” describing newsroom 
environments, professional routines, news gathering and writing practices and
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decision-making processes within temporal, organisational and economic 
contraints (van Dijk, 1988: 7-8). These produce detailed descriptions of 
newsrooms and practices, answering why texts appear as they do.
These two approaches to media research are used together in this thesis 
because of their compatibility (Richardson 2007; Bellier 2005; Fairclough 2003 
and 1995a; Moores 2000; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; van Dijk 1999; 
Pujolar 1997). When analysing news, van Leeuwen (2005:13-14) claims the two 
work well together: a close textual analysis to identify the issues and 
ethnography to explain the issues by examining “processes of selection and 
editing that precede such reporting”. This thesis follows this use of 
methodologies; the textual analysis looks at lexical and grammatical choices that 
communicate identities, sequences of events and behaviours which contribute to 
the different versions of nationalisms considered in the previous chapter, while 
the ethnography examines the processes of selection, writing and editing which 
explain how, why and where ideological discourses identified in the textual 
analysis come from.
This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, this thesis’s approach to 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the chosen form of textual analysis for this 
thesis, is examined. In the second part, newsroom ethnographies and a 
description of the ethnography employed in this thesis, are described. A review 
of a number of newsroom studies is examined. This is not an exhaustive review, 
but used to inform this thesis’s methodology and contextualise its findings. In the 
concluding part, limitations of this thesis’s approaches to the study of TRNC radio 
news are disclosed and how these are overcome are explained.
IV. 2 Critical D iscourse Analysis
IV. 2. i Basic principles of CDA and Rationale
CDA exam ines lexical and grammatical choices made by text producers to reveal 
obvious and not so  obvious discourses in texts. Discourses are “complex 
bundle[s] of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts”, which are
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thematically interrelated (Wodak, 2001: 66). CDA presupposes these 
compositional choices in texts have political repercussions (Kress, 1985: 3). For 
example, naming a member of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation a 
“freedom fighter” or a “terrorist” carries with it political significance.
Wodak (2001: 2) describes CDA’s political role as:
CDA may be defined as  fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque 
as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, 
discrimination, power and control a s  manifested in language. In other 
words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequalities as it is 
expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use 
(or in discourse).
This explanation illustrates how CDA is concerned with relations between 
language and power, a sentiment echoed by many CDA practitioners 
(Richardson 2007; Bishop and Jaworski 2003; Wodak and Fairclough 1997; van 
Leeuwen 1993). In fact, CDA prioritises a political commitment. Van Dijk (1996) 
highlights that scholars who apply CDA start by identifying a social problem with 
a linguistic aspect, choose the perspective of those who suffer the most then 
critically analyse those in power, those who are responsible and those who have 
the m eans and opportunity to solve such problems (cited in Richardson, 2007:1; 
Wodak, 2001: 1).
Writers such as  Fairclough (2003: 9) point out that it is important to see  all 
discourses as ideological. By ideological, this thesis uses Gramsci-inspired 
meanings such a s  “a systematic body of ideas, organised from a particular point 
of view” (Kress and Hodge, 1979: 6). CDA reveals ideologies in texts 
(Richardson 2007; Fairclough, 2003, 2001, 1995a, 1995; Wodak 2001; Kress, 
1985). In fact, Wodak (2001: 10) notes “[o]ne of the aims of CDA is to ‘de­
mystify1 discourses by deciphering ideologies."
CDA perceives discourse a s  a form of social practice or action. Discourse is a 
form of action, something people do to, or for, each other (van Leeuwen, 1993).
It is an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements 
of social life (Fairclough, 2003: 3). Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 92) describe 
a “dialectical relationship” where “[...] discourse constitutes social practice and is
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at the sam e time constituted by it.” Due to this relationship, both text and context 
must be examined (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Fairclough, 1995a: 62).
CDA is a useful approach for the textual analysis in this thesis. Its suitability is 
three-fold. Firstly, a s  noted above, CDA is highly suitable for the analysis of 
ideology. CDA offers the framework for revealing ideological discourses about 
nationalism realised through lexical and grammatical strategies used in radio 
news.
Secondly, it has been argued that all scholarly discourse and textual analysis are 
socio-politically situated, selective, limited, partial and thereby biased 
(Richardson, 2007; Fairclough, 2003). Choosing a critical approach provides “a 
scientific basis for a critical questioning of social life in moral and political terms, 
e.g. in terms of social justice and power” (Fairclough, 2003: 15). So, research 
should question and not support unjust aspects of social life. In the case of this 
thesis, research should question TRNC media’s prioritising of power holders’ 
interests at the expense of not finding a solution to years of social, political and 
economic isolation for TRNC residents.
Thirdly, CDA can be tailored to individual projects, depending on research needs. 
Wodak and W eiss (2005: 125) claim scholars who use CDA must ask “[wjhat 
conceptual tools are relevant for this or that problem and for this and that 
context?” Due to this flexibility, CDA offers a framework which can be tailored to 
reveal ideological discourses of nationalism realised in TRNC radio news.
IV. 2M This thesis's Approach to CDA
iV.2M.a Station and Story Samples
This thesis analyses news from three stations in order to obtain political and 
economic contextual variety, allowing for the investigation and revealing of a 
variety of discourses. One station is BRTK, the state-owned broadcaster. BRTK 
has an array of influences and interests which must be satisfied, such as the pro­
federation CTP Prime Minister, but also the Turkish military. This thesis analyses 
news from BRTKs English language service, BRTI, because its audience is large
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and influential. BRTI is aimed at English speaking residents of TRNC, English- 
speakers in the Republic, especially the Republic’s politicians, and English- 
speaking internet users.
The sample of stations also includes two private commercial radio stations. One 
is KFM, part of a  large successful commercial group which claims to be 
independent of political parties, but is in fact closely affiliated with the ruling CTP 
government. The other, Radyo T, has close connections with the Turkish 
nationalist UBP party. These two stations were chosen as their political 
connections and associated interests are from opposing near-ends of the TRNC 
political spectrum: KFM and pro-federation CTP; Radyo T and Turkish nationalist 
UBP.
The corpus of scripts of newscasts are taken from the period 24 September 2007 
until 30 Septem ber 2007 and then from 1 February 2008 until 11 April 2008. 
These two periods of time were chosen arbitrarily in that they fitted in with the 
research schedule. BRTI and KFM keep scripts in an archive, so access to all 
stories was not problematic. For Radyo T, however, not all these dates were 
accessible because the station has no archive system. In total, 77 newscasts 
(approximately 900 stories) were collected from both BRTI and KFM and 94 
stories from Radyo T, a large representation of news. These stories were all 
taken from each station’s evening newscasts. Evening newscasts were chosen 
for consistency, a s  all stations broadcast a daily main newscast at 19:00.
At the time sam ples were collected, a number of issues and them es became 
apparent. These issues and them es produce three samples for analysis. Due to 
the large number of texts, repetition of lexical and grammatical strategies which 
evoke discourses about nationalism occur quickly. For this reason, sample sizes 
are large enough to reveal discourses throughout the corpus without reaching 
saturation. Stories within each sample were selected on three criteria. Firstly, 
stories must represent Cypriot parties in the Cyprus conflict. Secondly, the 
stories must be more than a few sentences long. Longer stories generally 
produce more detail. Thirdly, stories were selected based on story sourcing. A
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variety of primary sources, such as the CTP government, the UBP opposition, 
ex-president Rauf Denkta§, non governmental organisations and foreign 
politicians reflect stations’ choices which contribute to a variety of perspectives 
on Turkish Cypriot nationalism.
The three sam ples chosen are the coverage of a specific event, stories about 
political relations between TRNC and the Republic and stories about events 
which appear to be non-political. The first sample comprises stories about the 
opening of the Lokmaci-Ledra Road checkpoint between TRNC and the 
Republic. This event was chosen as it was widely covered by the media. It was 
also seen as  an event about the nature of the future of TRNC and the Republic. 
This thesis analyses 12 stories taken from 31 March to 5 April, the week of 
Lokmaci’s opening.
The second sam ple comprises stories about political relations between TRNC 
and the Republic. This was chosen because relations were going through a 
process of change during the time of this research. This change can be put into 
three time periods. The first time period was during the governance of the 
Republic’s anti-federation President Papadopolous’ regime. The second time 
period was during a  transition in the Republic’s governance to pro-federation 
President Christofias. The third time period was during President Christofias’s 
governance. Nine stories, three from each time period, were chosen.
Ten stories about non-political events comprise the third sample. Events 
covered are the opening of an office, the announcement of Cancer Week and 
tourism events. These more m undane stories were chosen as they are a staple 
part of output on TRNC radio stations. A count of stories in the corpus reveals 
that such stories make up about ten percent of stories on BRTI and about twenty 
percent of stories on KFM and Radyo T. On BRTI, the Cyprus conflict told from a 
Turkish Cypriot perspective is a news priority, so there are fewer non-political 
stories. On KFM and Radyo 7", they are more numerous, fitting into their news 
priority of “what is good for the nation”.
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Two problems were encountered when building the sample of these more 
mundane stories. Firstly, stories about events covered by all stations were 
desired for comparison reasons. This proved to be difficult. In the case where 
tourism is analysed, two different events on the same day are part of the sample. 
The second problem involved finding stories about non-political events which 
were more than a few lines long. There are many stories analysed which are 
long, but in two c ase s  shorter stories were used in order to compare stories 
across stations.
These three analyses facilitate a body of data that approaches the central 
question of this thesis; that is, how different radio stations draw upon different 
discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism.
IV.2.ii.b This thesis’s approach to the analysis of texts
Discursive acts are constructed representations of events (van Leeuwen and 
Wodak, 1999: 93). For example, a radio story about a fire is not a fire itself, but a 
representation of a fire. CDA analyses representations as ‘recontextualisations’ 
of social practices; that is, “how social practices [...] are turned into discourse 
(into representations of social practices) [...]” (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 
93). Recontextualisations have three elements: actions or ‘process types’, 
circumstances and participants (Fairclough, 2003: 141; van Leeuwen and 
Wodak, 1999: 94). Any of these elements of discourse, whether participants, 
actions or settings, can signify, evoke, draw upon, and realise whole discourses 
(ibid.).
This thesis exam ines how participants are named and their actions represented. 
These representations realise discourses in texts. For example, identifying 
someone who w as found guilty of benefit fraud as ‘a Muslim man’ or ‘a father of 
three’ carries different meanings with political and social repercussions. In the 
first case, the man is labelled as an ‘other’, a Muslim who is part of an out-group. 
In the second, he is humanised, perhaps invoking sympathy as a father, while his 
difference as a Muslim is excluded. These may evoke different discourses,
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depending on their contexts, the first possibly anti-Muslim and the second 
financial hardship.
Participants other than objects are referred to as ‘social actors’ (Fairclough,
2003: 145; van Leeuwen, 1996: 67). It has been shown how analysing social 
actors is central to studying nations (Wodak and Weiss 2005; Bishop and 
Jaworski 2003; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999; Billig 1995). Wodak, 
de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999: 35) note one “important issue in this context 
[analysing nations] is the linguistic representation of those social actors who are 
perceived as members of a national collectivity”. Representations of those not in 
the nation are also essential to the study of nations. Wodak and W eiss (2005: 
131) observe “the general concept of insiders and outsiders is salient in all 
societies and between societies.”
There are a number of ways that social actors can be classified and categorised. 
Fairclough’s (2003) and van Leeuwen’s (1996) highly influential approaches to 
analysing social actors is followed in this thesis, though many differences are 
also evident. For example, Fairclough points out that social actors can appear 
grammatically as a participant in a clause, within a circumstance, or as a 
pronoun. In this thesis, pronouns are analysed lexicaliy and then grammatically 
within the first two roles. Other modifications in this thesis’s approach include a 
close examination of reported speech and the selective use of Appraisal theory. 
Modifications have been introduced to tailor the approach to the thesis, not the 
reverse.
The following outlines the elem ents of texts analysed in subsequent chapters. 
This provides a thorough framework for revealing discourses’ ideological 
implications in nation-building and maintaining. Analysing participants involved in 
the Cyprus conflict and their actions reveal the different ideological discourses in 
different stations’ news.
IV.2.ii.b. 1 1nclusions and exclusions
What is included or excluded in a text may be politically or socially significant in 
that these may suit text producers’ interests and purposes (Fairclough, 2003:
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149; van Leeuwen, 1996: 38). Exclusions come in the form of either 
“suppressions” or being “backgrounded”. A participant is “suppressed” if they are 
not mentioned in a text. A “backgrounded” participant is not mentioned, but 
inferred, in relation to an activity by being mentioned elsewhere in a text. For 
example, a text may contain the two utterances of “John hit the ball” and later 
“the ball that w as hit”. In the second utterance, John is “backgrounded”, though 
inferred.
IV.2.ii.b.2 Lexical Strategies 
IV.2.ii.b.2.i Namings
When considering namings, Fairclough (2003) states participants can be 
represented by nam es, such as “Mehmet Ali Talat” or in terms of class or 
categorised a s  individuals, such as “the president” or groups, such as 
“politicians”. W hen participants are classified, they can be represented 
specifically, such a s  “TRNC government politicians” or generically, such as 
“politicians”. Van Leeuwen (1996) claims these choices affect readers’ 
perceptions of participants. For example, named as groups, such as “Turkish 
Cypriots”, participants can become homogenised, ignoring differences between 
individuals (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2005: 133). Homogenisation can be used 
as a nation-building strategy. For example, Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and 
Liebhart (1999) observe homogenising members of a nation ignores intra­
national differences. This represents the nation as a single social and political 
entity, excluding differences which may threaten a single national ideology.
Van Leeuwen (1996: 48) states participants can be generically represented or 
specifically a s  individuals. As individuals, such as “Mr. Brown” or “Mr. Talat”, a 
“point of identification” for readers is presupposed. So, the government and “we" 
are more likely represented individually while “others", in terms of class or race, 
are generically represented. By representing participants generically, they are 
“symbolically remove[d] from the readers’ world of immediate experience, [they 
are] treated a s  distant ‘others’ rather than as people ‘we’ have to deal with in our 
everyday lives” (ibid.).
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According to van Leeuwen (1996), participants can also be “nominated” or 
named as individuals, such as “Mr. Talat”, categorised in ‘functional roles’ such 
as “the president”, or categorised by more or less permanent and unavoidable 
‘identities’ they share with others, such as “the Turkish Cypriot man”.
Though nominations offer a point of identification for readers to identify with, 
titulation plays a role in nominations. For van Leeuwen (1996: 53-54), the 
degree of formality attributed to participants contributes to representations of 
power and status. Names can be formal (surname with or without honorific). 
Honorifics include prefixes such as “Mr. Talat” or “Prime Minister Soye”. Names 
can be semi-formal (first name and surname such as “Mehmet Ali Talat”) or 
informal (first name such as  “Mehmet Ali”). Formal namings with honorifics 
contribute more to representations of power and status than informal namings.
Participants categorised in ‘functional roles’ are represented by what they do 
rather than what they are (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2005: 134). In the study of 
a conservative newspaper’s  feature article, van Leeuwen (1996: 59) found that 
“high-status social actors ... such as ‘government’ and ‘experts’, are always 
functionalised”.
Where participants are represented through ‘identification’, they are identified 
socially, such as by age, gender or race. Such identification can be classified as 
relational (‘friend’ or ‘aunt’), cultural (‘Turkish Cypriot’) or biological/ physical 
(‘blonde’). Van Leeuwen found that biological identification tends to have 
connotations, many negative (ibid.: 58).
Participants can be named using pronouns. Fairclough (2003: 149) identifies 
nouns and pronouns which promote ‘us’ and ‘them’ divisions, such as, ‘we’ and 
‘they*. These represent and construct groups and communities. But the groups 
and communities constructed using ‘we’ in political discourse are vague, referring 
to party, nation, government, residents or other combinations. How these are 
used serve politicians’ purposes (Billig, 1995: 106; Fairclough, 1989:148). For 
example, Fairclough (1995a: 181) notes:
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On the one hand, they [politicians] claim solidarity by placing everyone in 
the sam e boat, but on the other hand they claim authority in that the 
leader is claiming the right to speak for the people as a whole.
!V.2M.b.2M Personal or Impersonal Representations
Participants can be represented impersonally such as “the Republic of Cyprus” or 
personally, such as “President Dimitrius”. Fairclough (2003: 149) states 
“Impersonal representations of social actors [...] can dehumanise social actors, 
take the focus away from them as people”, while personal representations 
emphasise their human qualities.
IV.2.ii.b.2.iii Deixis
Billig (1995) is also interested in how lexical choices contribute to our 
understanding of texts. Though his focus is not on participants, he reveals other 
lexical strategies used in nation-building and maintaining. He reveals that lexical 
choices, such as deixis, realise ideological discourses about nationalism. Deixis 
is a “banal” method of naming aspects of nations. It includes lexical choices 
such as ‘the’, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’, ‘here’, ‘this’, ‘now’ and ‘our’ which point readers to 
their nation and construct those who are in the nation and those who are not 
(Billig, 1995:106-109). This is done by continually and unobtrusively collocating 
deixis in combinations such as “our homeland”, “the people”, “this country”, “the 
prime minister” and “the nation”.
lV.2.ii.b.3 Grammatical Strategies
The grammatic role participants are given in recontextualisations is a significant 
part of CDA. Van Leeuwen (1996: 43) points out that grammatical 
“[representations can reallocate roles, rearrange the social relations between the 
participants." Participants are represented grammatically either as participants in 
a clause or within a circumstance (e.g. in a preposition phrase).
IV.2.ii.b.3.i Participant in a clause
As participants in a clause, participants can be activated or passivated.
Activated, participants are represented as  “the active, dynamic forces in an 
activity”, the ones who do things and make things happen (van Leeuwen, 1996:
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43-44). For example, in “John hit the burglar”, John is activated. Being activated 
is an important and generally positive aspect of representation. An activated 
participant’s capacity for “action, for making things happen, for controlling others 
and so forth is accentuated” (Fairclough, 2003: 150).
Alternatively, when a participant is passivated, such as “the burglar” in the 
example above, “what is accentuated is their subjection to processes, them being 
affected by the actions of others” (ibid.). This is generally a negative aspect of 
representation being subjected to others’ actions. But when a participant is 
subjected to negative actions by another, though weakness is represented, 
sympathy may also be constructed. For example, “John hit the puppy” creates 
sympathy for the puppy being hit.
Discourses can also be signified and ideologies identified by a close analysis not 
only of how the participants are represented but through how they are depicted 
as acting. In English, there are five types of actions or ‘process types’ 
participants perform. These are action, event, state, mental and verbal 
processes (Fairclough 1992; Halliday 1985 in Fairclough, 1995a: 110).
Fairclough (1995a: 110) describes these as:
i. An action “the actor does something to patient" (eg. Police kill 15).
ii. An event involves just one participant (15 die).
iii. A state describes a state of affairs as ‘being’ or having (15 are dead)
iv. There are three types of mental processes: cognition (eg. Thatcher
realises it’s  time to go), perception (Thatcher sees the writing on the wall),
and affect (eg. Thatcher wants to go)
v. Verbal processes involve an actor and what was said.
The types of actions ascribed to participants are important. For example, action 
processes foreground agency, contributing to representations of power (ibid.:
113). Alternatively, Fairclough (2000) notes that transforming an active process 
into a relation or ‘state of affairs’ “removes agency” (in Richardson, 2007: 56) 
removing the representation of control and power. Furthermore, Hodge and
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Kress (1979) draw attention to nominalisations; that is, transforming a process, 
such as “the door opened", to a nominal (or noun) such as “the opening of the 
door”. These changes may be ideological because agency is omitted or 
backgrounded, making the representation “very abstract and distant from 
concrete events and situations” (in Fairclough, 1995: 112).
lV.2.ii.b.3.ii Within a Circumstance
Other than being activated or passivated, participants can also be represented 
within a circumstance. Here, prepositional phrases and subordinate clauses are 
used extensively. For example, “The burglar was hit by John.” Here, “by John” 
is a prepositional phrase, John represented within a circumstance.
Although Fairclough (1995a: 82) states using subordinate clauses achieves 
backgrounding, he does not specify that this is a strategy for de-emphasising 
participants. This thesis argues that participants within subordinate clauses, and 
especially prepositional phrases, are de-emphasised. This de-emphasis works 
as follows:
Prepositional phrases are used to provide context to dominant clauses. 
Richardson (2007: 207) notes this when analysing newspaper headlines. He 
claims prepositional phrases are “used to provide context... not responsibility”. 
Prepositional phrases provide “details on the time, place or the manner of action” 
(ibid.). So, the “action” is in the dominant clause, while the prepositional phrase 
supplies the circumstances. Thus far, there is no mention of de-emphasis. 
However, Richardson’s examples demonstrate how de-emphasis occurs. A 
headline from The Guardian, 2 April 2003 reads:
Children killed in US assault.
Here, “Children killed” is the em phasis of the sentence while “in US assault” is 
de-emphasised in a prepositional phrase. According to Richardson (2007: 208) 
“more forcefully, the sub-editor could have written ‘US kill children in assault’. In 
this second hypothetical utterance “US” becomes dominant, its action to “kill” 
foregrounded and “children” passivated. “In assault” is de-emphasised,
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supplying circumstances to the emphasised dominant phrase. These examples 
demonstrate how “US" and “assault” in prepositional phrases are de- 
emphasised.
In a similar argument, van Dijk (1991) claims participants’ actions can be “played 
down” when represented later in a sentence and/or embedded in a clause. Van 
Dijk (1991: 216) notes:
Events may be strategically played down by the syntactic structure of the 
sentences, for example, by referring to the event in a ‘lower’ (later, less 
prominent) embedded clause, or conversely by putting it in first position 
when the event needs extra prominence.
So sentence position and ‘lower* embedded clauses, such as prepositional
phrases, effect prominence. One use of prepositional phrases which de-
em phasises actions is the passive sentence (Richardson, 2007; van Dijk 1991,
1988; Sykes, 1985; Fowler et al., 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979). Van Dijk
(1991: 215-216) observes,
[...] negative acts of in-group members, such as the authorities or the 
police, may be reduced in effect by placing them later in the sentence or 
by keeping the agency implicit, for instance in passive sentences.
Again, Richardson offers examples. Richardson (2007: 55) notes ‘John kicked
the ball’ is an active construction. A passive construction is The ball was kicked
by John’. ‘By John’ is now in a prepositional phrase at the end of the sentence.
This is a less dominant sentence position, according to van Dijk (1991).
Furthermore, the process type becom es a state process, removing the
representation of control and power. The end result is participants are de-
emphasised and less prominent when in prepositional phrases.
lV.2M.b.4 Reported Speech
Reported speech plays a prominent role in news reporting. Francis (1989: 202) 
claims that even though “the ostensible purpose of news reports is to inform the 
reader about events....a good deal of news is also about what people say about 
events.” In other words, what people say is much to do with what is reported 
(Caldas-C oulthard, 1994: 303; Bell, 1991: 53; Verschueren, 1985: 9).
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Reported speech also works ideologically. It is a powerful resource used by 
media writers to legitimise what is reported, implicate reliability, and support “their 
aims and ideological point of view” (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 303).
It is not only what is reported, but also how something is reported. How speech 
is reported reveals the politics of those who compile reports by either distancing 
or evaluating what is reported (White, 2006: 62; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 307).
For example, media generally choose sources of speech with power (Fairclough 
1995a; Schudson 1986; Fishman 1980; Tuchman 1978). Choices made by 
media within this sphere of power are ideological (White, 2006: 58). Caldas- 
Coulthard (1994: 304) points out that speaker selection reflects power structures 
and cultural beliefs of media writers, giving voice to some people instead of 
others. Likewise, which participants are represented within the reported speech 
selected by writers and how their actions are represented lexically and 
grammatically are  also ideological choices.
IV. 2. //. b. 4. i Speaking Verbs
The choice of speaking verbs are ideological (White, 2006: 60; Tadros, 2001: 75; 
Fairclough, 1995: 83; Caldas-C oulthard, 1994 and 1987; Bell, 1991: 207). 
Though distinctions are made between speaking verbs such a s  “claimed” and 
“say” (ibid.), this thesis uses Caldas-Coulthard’s (1994 and 1987) categories of 
speaking verbs for a detailed analysis.
Caldas-Coulthard classifies speaking verbs according to their function in relation 
to reported clauses. There are ‘neutral and structuring glossing verbs’, 
illocutionary glossing verbs', ‘descriptive verbs’ and ‘discourse-signalling verbs’. 
Neutral and structuring glossing verbs introduce a saying without explicitly 
evaluating it. Examples are “say”, “tell”, “ask” and “enquire” (ibid.: 305).
Though news media mostly use neutral glossing verbs, there are many instances 
of other more interpretive verbs. Illocutionary glossing verbs “are highly 
interpretive” and evaluative, positioning writers ideologically. For example, “to 
claim" detaches reporters from responsibility of what is being reported (ibid.:
295). These verbs name speech situations, make explicit the illocutionary force
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of a quote, while labelling and categorising contributions of speakers. Verbs 
include assertives like “remark”, “explain”, “agree”, “accept”, “correct”, “counter”; 
directives like “urge”, “instruct”, “order”; and expressives like “accuse”, “grumble”, 
“confess”, “complain" and “swear".
Descriptive verbs describe speaking interaction such as “cry”, “shout”, “yell”, 
“whisper”, “mutter”, “laugh”, “giggle”, “sigh”, “gasp” and “groan”. These 
interpretive verbs are rarely used in news reporting. The final category of speech 
verbs are discourse-signalling verbs. These either “mark the relationship of the 
quote to other parts of the discourse, like repeat, add, or they mark the 
development of the discourse -  pause, continue, go on" (ibid.: 306).
IV.2.ii.b.4.ii Direct and indirect speech
Bell (1991: 209) observes that journalists mostly use indirect speech. The 
tranforming of speech to indirect speech adds another layer of interpretation to 
reported speech events. Fairclough (1995: 81) notes this action “may transform 
and translate them [speech events] into discourses which fit more easily with the 
reporter’s voice.” C aldas-C oulthard  (1994: 304), describing this p rocess as 
‘integration’ or ‘absorption’ of speech, observes a writer “is in complete control of 
the character’s supposed talk.... There is not even the pretence that the voice of 
the character is heard.”
Direct speech, alternatively, “maintains boundaries” between reporters and those 
reported. Fairclough (1995: 81) sta tes it “allows people to speak for themselves” 
and preserves original wording including deixis, pronouns and verb tenses. 
However, the authenticity of direct speech is disputed by Caldas-Coulthard 
(1994: 303) who points out:
What is finally reported is filtered through the news process, in other 
words, through the re-interpretation and evaluation of many people -  
reporters, copy-writers, sub-editors and editors [...] In all cases what is 
seen as direct quotation or even as a quasi-direct quotation is interpreted 
a s  being a direct link to a source.
IV.2.ii.b.4.iii Appraisal Theory
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A parallel field of language analysis to CDA is Appraisal theory. Many of its 
concepts are very similar, however there is one particularly useful aspect of 
Appraisal theory used in this thesis; that is, its analysis of representations of 
speech.
Apraisal theory, though operating within the paradigm of Systemic Functional 
Linguistics (White, 2006: 38), as does CDA, investigates media using neutrality 
as an over-riding criteria in analysis (White, 2005: 229). This is one way it 
distinguishes itself from CDA. At the sam e time, it acknowledges that news 
reporting is “a value laden, ideologically determined discourse with a clear 
potential to influence the media audience’s assumptions and beliefs about the 
way the world is and the way it ought to be” (White, 2006: 37).
Appraisal theory analyses texts in terms of ‘evaluation’; that is, “the text’s 
positioning of its audience to take either negative or positive views of the 
participants, actions, happenings and state-of-affairs therein depicted” (ibid.: 39). 
Evaluative positioning is achieved through numerous “mechanisms”. One 
mechanism is “attitudinal inscription” which uses lexical choices with stable 
meanings across a wide range of contexts (such as “disgraceful”, “brutal”, 
“repressive”). These are rarely used in news (ibid.: 42). “Attitudinal tokens” are 
more common. These are “formulations where there is no single item, which, of 
itself and independently of its current co-text, carries a specific positive or 
negative value." (ibid.: 39). Co-text, association and implications ‘trigger1 or 
‘betoken’ evaluative position. Agency and affectedness are mechanisms which 
influence who is to be blamed for actions (ibid.: 40). How reported speech is 
represented is another mechanism.
Speaking verbs and co-text can evaluate reported speech in one of three 
manners. The first is “authorial endorsement” which uses lexical choices such as 
“reveal”, “demonstrate”, “show”, “find” and “indicate" to imply support. More 
neutral verbs such as to “say”, “report”, “declare” and “believe” can also be used 
to suppport reported speech. This is where co-text must be considered.
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The second is “authorial distancing” which uses verbs such as “claim” to distance 
writers and withold support for propositions (ibid.: 62). White (2006) warns that 
“to claim” does not always cast doubt but “rather does this as the result of 
interactions with other nearby meanings” (ibid.). Again, this points to co-text.
The third is “evidential standing" which acknowleges that the social standing or 
authority of a source can act as a sign of credibility for a proposition. For 
example, a large group of experts or a famous person such as Nelson Mandela 
adds credibility. Using words like “reportedly” and “it is believed” can achieve the 
sam e effect by inferring the propositions are widely accepted (ibid.: 65).
IV.2.ii.b.4.iv Multi-layering
Multi-layering is a result of using the reported speech of others. It occurs when a 
reporter reports on what another person has reported someone else saying. The 
problem with multi-layering is it adds yet another layer of interpretation to 
sayings. This over-interpretation can work in favour of the interests of reporters. 
As Caldas-Coulthard (1994: 304) points out,
The multi-layering of saying makes the direct quote very dubious....The 
problem is that the words of a real person who takes part in a reportable 
event are already interpreted and represented according to the point of 
view of the first reporter, are re-interpreted (and probably changed) by a 
chain of people.
IV. 2. //. b. 5 Abstraction of action
Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 96) describe how representations always 
involve recontextualisation; that is, transformations which “depend(s) on the 
interests, goals and values of the context into which the practice is 
recontextualized.” One type of transformation is abstraction of activities. Van 
Leeuwen (1995: 99) identifies two types of abstractions: generalisations and 
distillations.
Generalisations generalise a sequence of micro-events by “abstractpng] away 
from the more specific ‘micro-actions’ that make up an action” (ibid.). For 
example, “If there is a problem we [TRNC government] discuss and speak but 
our borders are never discussed”. Here, the generalisation “we discuss and
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speak” describes a generalised positive action of a government, though micro­
actions are missing. The choice to generalise has ideological repercussions.
Van Leeuwen (1995: 99) notes “texts mainly concerned with legitimising and de- 
legitimising actions and reactions tend to move high up on the generalisation 
scale, including only the names of episodes, of whole social practices.” 
Distillations abstract “qualities” from actions; that is, the “substance” of what 
people actually do. They highlight some aspect of an action at the expense of 
others. For example, “the government moves in harmony with Turkey”. “Moving 
in harmony” may highlight cooperation, but at the expense of the actual actions 
of “the government”. Distillations also are used to legitimise and realise purpose 
(ibid.).
IV.2.ii.b.6 Presuppositions
Assumptions or ‘presuppositions’ are “a taken-for-granted, implicit claim 
embedded within the explicit meaning of a text or utterance” (Richardson, 2007: 
63). These are powerful ideological tools (Richardson, 2004: 64; Fairclough, 
1995a: 14). Fairclough (1995: 108) observes, “[t]he unsaid, the already said, the 
presupposed, is of particular importance in ideological analysis, in that ideologies 
are generally embedded within the implicit meaning of a text rather than being 
explicit.” These implicit ‘taken for granted’ claims enforce ideologies without 
questioning them (Richardson, 2004: 187).
lV.2M.b.7 Collocations and co-text
Collocations are the grouping together of words which reveal common ideological 
schem es or “collocative patterns” (Fairclough, 2003:131 and 2001: 95). There is 
debate as to how to identify collocations. Sinclair (1991: 117) claims four words 
on either side of the word under investigation is considered a collocation. Some 
argue that this is not wide enough (Stubbs, 1995: 47), while others are interested 
in strictly adjacent words (Kjellmer, 1994: xiv). Though an examination of 
adjacent words is most definitely a collocation, co-text again broadens the scope 
of analysis. Co-text is the “verbal environment of a word or phrase” (Sinclair 
1997: 34 in Widdowson, 2004: 59). This verbal environment of a word is a useful
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tool in analysis. Both Widdowson and Sinclair (ibid.) note “a great deal can be 
leamt from” co-text.
IV.2.M Criticisms o f CDA and how these are addressed
A major criticism of CDA is its lack of contextual analysis. Widdowson (2004) 
states one must analyse text along with co-text, context and pretext. Analysis of 
co-text is the “consideration of the textual product as such” (ibid.: 58); that is, the 
words in a text. Context involves examining where a text is physically located 
and how a text “keys in with my knowledge of reality as shaped and sanctioned 
by the society I live in -  that is to say, my social knowledge” (ibid.: 7). The third 
concept is pretext. This refers to the motive or purpose for creating and 
processing a m essage. Widdowson calls this the “perlocutionary purpose in 
general” (ibid.: 79-80). Widdowson claims CDA’s close analysis of text does not 
consider pretext and context (ibid.: 159).
Widdowson also criticises CDA’s lack of analytical rigour of text itself. He 
accuses Fairclough of not demonstrating actual procedures for analysis (ibid.: 
92). Citing examples of research by Kress, van Dijk and Fairclough, he claims 
sampling and selection of features for analysis are motivated by pretext, thereby 
lacking scientific rigour (ibid.: 103-107). In short, “[t]he difficulty is that there is so 
little in the way of explicit procedures for us to follow” (ibid.: 166). He calls for a 
methodology which includes a detailed analysis of text, context and pretext.
Another enlightening criticism comes from Philo (2007) who compares the work 
of the Glasgow Media Group to CDA by Fairclough and van Dijk. His basic 
criticism is that Fairclough and van Dijk analyses are too text based. Philo (2007: 
184) believes one must examine production, content and reception before 
making judgements about social meanings and the potential impacts of texts on 
public understanding.
Another critic of CDA is Chilton (2005: 22-23) who believes CDA has “not paid 
any attention to the human mind”, which ought to be a “prime concern”. He 
claims CDA has not addressed whether the mind can be tricked, deceived and 
manipulated through the use of language. Though he (ibid.: 43) notes there is
82
evidence that “humanfs] may already have a critical instinct”, he recognises that 
“under certain social, economic and political conditions people may not be able, 
or may not be willing, to respond critically” (ibid.: 45). If this is the case, CDA 
may be useful.
This thesis addresses most of these criticisms. Firstly, the approach to 
examining lexical and grammatical features in radio news texts outlined above 
answers Widdowson’s criticism of a lack of rigour in selection and analysis 
procedures of texts. The approach offers a comprehensive analysis as to how 
participants and their actions are represented in TRNC radio news. This 
analytical approach clearly identifies the different ideological discourses about 
nationalism in TRNC news.
Secondly, criticisms concerning a lack of context and pretext are valid if studies 
are indeed text-based only. Philo’s and Widdowson’s claims that context and 
pretext are not explored enough in Fairclough’s and van Dijk’s work is not 
disputed here. But pretextual and contextual concerns can be met through an 
analysis of production and/or reception, something Fairclough (1995a: 62) calls 
for. A CDA analysis which includes an ethnography of production practices, as 
well as an historical and theoretical contextualisation addresses these concerns 
about CDA.
IV. 3 Ethnography
Ethnography has been used to understand newsroom practice. It has revealed 
how ideology is often not so much about individual journalistic bias but is 
embedded in the very logic of news production, such as what sources are used, 
news values which determine news selection and the need to produce a steady 
and predictable supply of copy (Machin and Niblock, 2006; Garcia Aviles and 
Leon, 2002; Fishman, 1980; Tuchman, 1978). Ang (1990: 251) argues that 
ethnography can provide such detail because it:
[...] favours interpretive particularisation over explanatory generalization, 
historical and local concreteness rather than formal abstraction, ‘thick’ 
description of details rather than extensive but ‘thin’ survey.
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So, a newsroom ethnography can offer detailed descriptions of where ideology 
becomes a part of news.
In CDA, it has become common to point out that discourses are a form of social 
action which are in a two-way relationship with their situations, institutions and 
social structures, each shaping the other (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 
1995a; Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Fairclough and Wodak, 
1997; van Leeuwen 1993). This relationship dictates that an analysis of texts 
also requires an examination of contexts which “shape” discourses. One such 
context is radio new s’ context of production. Newsroom studies done with CDA 
not only reveal the “social goings on” behind the making of news, but also 
answer how, why and where ideologies identified in textual analysis come from 
(van Leeuwen, 2005:13-14).
lV.3.i Basic Principles o f Ethnography and Rationale
Ethnography borrows the important anthropological concept of studying people in 
a way that does not disconnect them from their everyday lives; in other words, in 
their natural environment. Ethnography involves observing and listening. 
Machin’s (2002:1) definition illustrates this point:
At the heart of the idea of ethnography is the act of observing and listening 
to people a s  they go about their everyday lives in order that we can 
understand the way that they behave or think on their own terms.
This observing and listening produces ‘thick’ descriptions of everyday social
practice such a s  watching television, reading romance novels, being a fan and
producing media. For example, Lull’s (1980) The Social Uses of TV involved
three years of watching 200 households watch TV. He found the main
advantage to this methodology “was the access it promised to give to everyday
routines” (in Moores, 1993: 33).
Observation allows access to and insights into the kinds of cultural values and 
decisions that are a part of everyday social practices. People may not have 
access to reasons for doing things they do because their actions may not seem 
worthy of reflection, are invisible to them, are seen as common sense beliefs, or
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taken for granted values and assumptions (Polanyi, 1958 and Malinowski, 1922). 
As Machin (2002: 4) observes,
[...] people do not generally have conscious access to the reasons why 
they behave in particular ways. They are not conscious of the cultural 
toolkit through which the social world is made meaningful to them.
In newsrooms, ethnography has shown how these taken for granted aspects of
newsroom culture contribute to ideology expressed in newscasts (Machin and
Niblock2006; Fishman 1980; Tuchman 1978).
Many ethnographic studies use other methods of data collection such as 
interviews and conversations to collect ‘inside information’ and clarify ‘ambiguous 
m essages’ (Lull 1980; Hobson 1980; Radway 1987; Morley 1986; Moores 1993, 
2000; Palmer 1986, 1988; Buckingham 1987; Algan 2003; Machin 2002; Machin 
and Niblock 2006; Garcia Aviles and Leon 2002; Garcia Aviles et el. 2004). For 
example, Garcia Aviles and Leon’s (2002) newsroom study used interviews, a 
two-day station observation and a questionnaire to reveal the impact of 
digitalisation on two television newsrooms in Spain. Morley’s (1980) The 
‘Nationwide9 Audience conducted group interviews by using open-ended group 
discussions from audiences of television programmes.
The length of time observing and interviewing varies considerably amongst 
ethnographic studies. “Longitudinal ethnography” involves observations over a 
long period of time. For example, Tuchman (1978) spent ten years observing 
newsrooms. More recent ethnographies, such as Garcia Aviles’s “production 
ethnography” cited above are more focussed and less time consuming.
Combinations of these data-collecting tools in ethnography produce “data that 
are more accurate, truthful, or trustworthy than structured interviews” (Graham 
1984, Mishler 1986 in Elliot 2005). Data collected from ethnography is also 
credited with reflecting external reality more so than other methodologies 
because ethnographers do not rely on what people say, but observe behaviour in 
natural settings (Machin, 2002: 4).
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Focus groups, questionnaires or structured interviews do not have the advantage 
of respondents going about their business in their natural environment. It has 
been argued that “people often behave very differently in different contexts and 
what they say they do may not always turn out to be what they actually do”
(ibid.).
IV. 3.ii Newsroom Studies Findings
Newsroom studies focus specifically on the social goings on behind news texts. 
Used with CDA, they can be used to answer how, why and where ideology 
identified in textual analysis comes from. Two classic longitudinal newsroom 
studies are Tuchman’s (1978) “Making News” and Fishman’s (1980) 
“Manufacturing the News”. Fishman observed news workers at one newspaper 
for 12 months. Tuchman observed and interviewed workers over ten years at a 
television station, a press room and a newspaper. These extensive observations 
reveal aspects of newsgathering that were taken for granted previously. For 
example, practical concerns produce news which favours official institutions. 
Tuchman (1978: 21) notes:
Today’s news media place reporters at legitimated institutions [such as 
police headquarters, courthouses, city hall] where stories supposedly 
appealing to contemporary news consumers may be expected to be 
found.
This creates a “news net”, in Tuchman’s words, which is designed to capture big 
stories. Fishman observes journalists have beats to get a predictable supply of 
news stories. Due to time and space constraints, journalists use officials as 
sources, with little time or space for unofficial contacts. The result is news which 
is aligned with official institutions.
How stories are written also reflect powerful bureaucracies. This is due to 
routines. Firstly, Fishman found journalists follow the same bureaucratic 
“phases" a s  organisations. So criminal proceedings such as an arrest, hearing 
and sentencing provide potential news events. In this sense, the reporter sees 
the world a s  the organisations do. Secondly, Tuchman (1978:193) notes 
“occurences” are transformed into events and then “framed" into “strips of reality”
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written as stories. Framing is ideological, by what is included and excluded due 
to routines of news gathering and writing.
Thirdly, professionalism contributes to ideology in news. Professionalism (ibid.: 
66) is “knowing how to get a story that meets organisational needs and 
standards” such as  using “legitimate” sources. Fourthly, Fishman notes that 
reporters treat bureaucratic accounts as factual, while not making their own 
inferences and rarely using non-official accounts (in Machin, 2002: 106). 
Tuchman (1980: 92) states that reporters use official sources to prevent libel 
suits and save time. This further legitimises the status-quo. Both studies 
conclude that news is ideological, supporting existing power structures, a finding 
reflected in more recent research (Bowman, 2006; Reich, 2006; Atton and 
Wickenden, 2005; Schlesinger and Tumber 1999).
There are a number of more recent newsroom studies which examine news- 
making in various national settings. Weaver (2005 and 1998) studies journalism 
and journalists in 21 countries. Regionally, journalism is explored in Arab states 
(Sakir, 2005), Africa (Ronning, 2005) and Latin America (Alves, 2005; Waisbord, 
2000), while individual nations’ journalism is examined in China (Lee, 2005),
India (Thussu, 2005), Spain (Garcia Aviles and Leon, 2002), England (Machin 
and Niblock, 2006) and Italy (Mancini, 2000). Patterson and Domingo (2008) 
edited a group of studies on online news-making. These ethnographies describe 
the evolution of online journalism and how newsrooms deal with innovation and 
change.
These studies’ more recent findings reflect changes in modem news-making, 
m any similar to th o se  in TRNC radio newsroom s. Firstly, market forces and 
technology affect news values. Machin and Niblock (2006: 46-47) observe that 
classic news values are now applied differently due to concentrated ownership, 
drive for profits, staff cuts and digital technologies which have changed 
newsroom production over the past decade. News is selected and angled for 
“niche market-defined groups” identified through extensive market research 
(ibid.; Cottle 1999). The gatekeeper role in news is now shared by journalists,
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advertisers and consumers. That is, market-research-constructed target 
audiences define news selection by journalists, not what is important.
Secondly, these studies reveal that newsrooms rely heavily on news agency 
feeds and pre-packaged material assem bled by organisations such as the police 
(Machin and Niblock 2006; Garcia Aviles and Leon 2002; Garcia Aviles et al. 
2004). This reliance on wire services has been noted in studies about newsroom 
practices globally (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2007; Patterson, 1998), in terms of 
economic news (Palmer, Boyd-Barret and Rantanen, 1998) and when examining 
individual nations (Wilke, 1998; Rantanen, 1998). Studies have found that 
journalists select, simplify and remodel source material for a variety of 
programmes.
Thirdly, reduced staff numbers, multi-skilling, various platforms to feed, 24-hour 
news and digital technology have affected the quality of news. Staff work without 
resources or time to investigate, analyse or verify information (Machin and 
Niblock 2006; MacGregor 1997; Hardt 1990). Going out on news stories is 
becoming a thing of the past (Garcia Aviles et. al., 2004).
Fourthly, these studies find that time and economic constraints as well as 
technology affect news. The beat has been replaced by the internet. But similar 
to classic newsroom studies, newsroom practices are driving ideology, not 
blatant ideological stances by the stations.
Vl.3.iii This Thesis’s Ethnography
In order to examine the production context of radio news to discover how, why 
and where ideology comes from, the newsrooms of three radio stations have 
been observed. Participant observation was mostly used, supplemented with 
informal conversations and interviews. Firstly, each newsroom was visited for an 
initial one week period to create a rapport between the researcher and workers. 
After this initial contact, newsrooms were observed one day each week for a 
year. Days of the week were randomly chosen for each station, fitting into the 
researcher’s work and research schedules. This has been supplemented by 
occasional visits to each station to enhance information gathered in the first year.
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News agenda setting meetings, newsgathering, news writing and news editing 
were observed.
In the spirit of ethnography, while at radio stations, interviews and informal 
conversations were carried out. All information contributed to data for this 
newsroom study. Informal conversations with workers were held while they were 
on breaks or during slow times. These involved asking one or two questions in 
regard to something observed beforehand, such as “why did you change the title 
of Christofias?” These would either be recorded or extensive notes were written 
as soon as was possible. These conversations supplemented participant 
observations.
Since senior m anagem ent were not available for less formal conversations, 
interviews with all station managers were conducted. These interviews provided 
information about the political and economic contexts of stations, including 
relations between broadcasters and political parties. The director of BRTK 
Huseyin Gur§an, the editor-in-chief for Kibris Media Group Suleyman Erguglu, 
the manager of KFM/KTV  Erding Gunduz, and the owner and manager of Radyo 
77 Kanal T Ersin Tatar were interviewed. These were recorded and later 
transcribed.
In order to gain information about political parties, their relations with radio 
stations, and their version of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, two interviews with 
senior politicians were conducted. Of course, these people to some extent gave 
official positions but nevertheless they clearly described the views of their 
political parties. One politician from the governing CTP party (Nazim Beratli, 
Minister of Ideology) and one politician from the oppositional UBP nationalist 
party (Ersin Tatar, the Shadow Minister of Finance) were interviewed. These 
recorded interviews were later transcribed.
W.3./V Criticisms o f Ethnography and how these are addressed
One criticism of ethnography is external validity is difficult to produce due to its 
micro-analytical nature (Elliot, 2005: 26). Ethnographers’ answer to this criticism
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is ethnography ought to balance between the completely ungeneralisable and 
“law-like statements”. Elliot (ibid.) believes:
Qualitative research therefore often adopts what we might call a ‘common- 
sense’ view of generalisability such that the reader is left to make up his or 
her own mind as to how far the evidence collected in a specific study can 
be transferred to other information about the same topic in similar settings.
Another criticism of ethnography is its lack of scientific credibility. Quantitative 
research and statistics have vast appeal and “have the credibility of appearing 
scientific” (Machin, 2002: 6). By isolating variables and measuring, results have 
the quality of “reproducibility and findings can be said to have reliability” (ibid.). 
However, ethnographers argue that the social world should be studied in its 
natural state and not in artificial settings with variables isolated (ibid.).
In a related criticism, ethnography is accused of not providing a transparent way 
of representing the social world (Machin, 2002: 6). Geertz (1973: 9 in Moores 
2000: 62) describes ethnographic data as “really our own constructions of other 
people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to.” But Machin 
(2002: 6) argues a lack of transparency is endemic in other research methods by 
selecting topics examined and questions posed. For example, issues and 
variables are pre-selected in questionnaires and interviews (ibid.: 4), yielding 
results which may be considered self-interested. Moore (2000) believes one way 
to improve ethnography’s transparency is by recognising ethnographers as active 
interpreters. Some ethnographers go so far as to include autobiographic details 
in order to expose their position in relation to their research (Walkerdine, 1986; 
Ang, 1985; Hobson, 1982). Moores (2000: 64) believes this is unnecessary 
because audiences for ethnographies are capable of recognising its status as a 
constructed representation. Instead, he believes ethnographers ought to 
“examine the ‘meaning system s’ of others -  whilst retaining a crucial space for 
ideological evaluation and critique” (ibid.: 69).
IV.4 Limitations and Conclusion
IV.4.i Limitations
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CDA, the primary methodology used in this thesis, involves a very close analysis 
of text. Of the three stations sampled, only BRTFs service is in English. 
Analysing these texts are not problematic. However, Radyo T and KFM’s 
services are in Turkish. The scripts analysed in this thesis are translations from 
original Turkish scripts. With such a close reading of scripts some inaccuracies 
are inevitable. Fairclough (1995: 190) claims translated material should be 
avoided. However, translations are used (Flowerdew and Leong, 2007; van 
Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Wodak 1991; Yankah 1991; Chilton, 1990). Even 
Fairclough (2008: 813) uses translated material when looking for nominals in the 
works of Marx.
Translations in this thesis cause a problem on two levels. One level is the 
accuracy and political bias of the translations, and a second level is the 
discrepancy between the structure of English and Turkish sentences. To 
address the problem of accuracy and political bias, four translators were hired. 
One translator is a Turkish Cypriot BRTI editor with impeccable English and 
Turkish. His full-time occupation is translating scripts from Turkish to English.
He was aware of this thesis’s need for grammatical and lexical accuracy. His 
political sympathies are aligned closely to CTP.
To avoid CTP sympathetic translations, an English Language teacher with 
excellent English and Turkish was hired. He too was aware of this thesis and the 
necessity for accuracy. His political leanings are far more Turkish nationalistic.
A third translator is a Turkish Cypriot with excellent English and very little interest 
in politics. These three performed an initial translation of all scripts. A fourth 
translator did a detailed check of the work by the other three. She is a TEFL 
teaching assistant and professional translator. She declared a “dire” disinterest 
in politics.
Despite diverse political leanings, there were almost no discrepencies in the 
readings of the texts. Any discrepencies were minor and did not affect any 
analysis. The resultant translations are interpretations of four TRNC residents 
which inevitably reflect how many residents interpret the news.
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A second problem in translating these scripts is Turkish and English sentence 
structures are very different. In English, the emphasis of a sentence is at its 
beginning (van Dijk, 1991: 216), which also usually contains a sentence’s subject 
and verb. For example,
“I kicked the ball.”
Here, “I”, the subject and “kicked”, the verb are the emphasis of the sentence. In 
Turkish, however, the sam e sentence reads:
“Topa vurdum.”
“Ball kicked I.”
Here the subject and verb are the last word in the sentence “vurdum”. Turkish 
sentence construction dictates the last word contains the subject and verb. 
However, when a person is named, the person’s name appears at the beginning 
of the sentence, though the verb and a grammatical indicator which 
acknowledges the sentence is in the third person is again at the end of the 
sentence. For example, using Richardson’s (2007: 55) examples, in English an 
active contruction of a sentence is:
“John kicked the ball.”
In Turkish, this sentence reads:
“John topa vurdu.”
“John ball kicked he.”
So, now the subject “John” is at the beginning of the sentence, while the verb 
“vurdu” is at the end of the sentence, the final “u” in “vurdu” indicates the 
sentence is in the third person.
These examples illustrate how sentence position and emphasis in sentences can 
be analysed whilst using translations. For example, in the first example, “I kicked 
the ball”, it can be claimed that sentence position (at the beginning in English and 
at the end in Turkish) effects emphasis in sentences. With the second example, 
“John kicked the ball”, again sentence position in English and Turkish effect
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emphasis, though in Turkish the emphasis in sentences with named subjects is 
at the beginning and end of the sentence.
Prepositional phrases are an important part of this thesis’s textual analysis. In 
English, an example of a passive constructed sentence with a prepositional 
phrase is:
“The ball was kicked by John.”
Here, “the ball” becomes the emphasised element of this sentence, while “by 
John” in a prepositional phrase becomes de-emphasised. The sam e applies in 
Turkish, remembering that with a named subject, the emphasis is at the 
beginning and end of the sentence. The Turkish reads:
“Topa John tarafindan vuruldu.”
“Ball John by kicked.”
Here, “John” has been moved out of first position, and put into the middle of the 
sentence. This is a de-emphasised sentence position. Meanwhile “ball” takes 
first position becoming emphasised, as does “kicked” which is at the end of the 
sentence.
These examples illustrate how dealing with translations makes an analysis as 
close as this thesis’s flawed to som e small degree. Sentence structure, for 
instance, can be examined but one must be sensitive as to where the emphasis 
in the originals lie. These examples also illustrate that although working with 
translations is flawed, this is a valuable analysis. This is because the same 
elements of analysis, such as sentence position and emphasis of sentences, can 
be applied to translations, as long as the translations are sensitive to such 
concerns.
IV. 4M Conclusion
To answer this thesis’s research question of how TRNC radio news 
recontextualisations evoke different ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriot 
nationalism, CDA has been chosen as its main methodology. This is 
supplemented with an ethnography of newsrooms. In this chapter both have
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been described with a rationale given for using both. These methodologies 
produce detailed analysis and complement each other. The resulting analysis 
promises to be both detailed and revealing. W eaknesses in the thesis’s 
methodology have been disclosed along with how this thesis addresses these.
Broadcast news is important culturally and politically. This is accentuated in 
TRNC where economic and political elites have a direct say in station content, 
despite claims to be broadcasting what is “good for the nation” and “helping in 
finding a solution” to the Cyprus conflict. The analysis to follow reveals how 
stations with different political contexts represent Turkish Cypriot nationalism to 
the benefit of stations’ interests and to the detriment of a better life for residents
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V News Production in TRNC Radio Stations
V.1 Introduction
On the surface, news can appear as what is commonly known as biased, or as 
sociologists of news have put it, shaped by a number of limited them es and 
values. In CDA, it has been common to investigate the language of this bias to 
reveal its underlying ideology. Others, however have argued that we cannot 
understand texts properly without understanding the social practices that lie 
behind them (Bellier 2005; van Leeuwen, 2005; Fairclough, 2003). Bellier (2005: 
252) underlines the importance of such an understanding:
For me as an anthropologist, without considering the actual personality of 
the individuals who are engaged in the production of the discourse, 
without observing the kind of emotions that lay behind the wording of a 
particular sentence, without knowing the arguments which have been 
exchanged before the final text is agreed upon, the researcher is not 
allowed to qualify the constitutive character of the assembly and of the text 
it produces.
In newsrooms, ethnography is one way the social practices behind the making of 
news has been examined. It has been found that newsroom culture and 
practices directly and indirectly affect news output (Machin and Niblock, 2006; 
Fishman, 1980; Tuchman, 1978). This is because discourse is a form of social 
practice where there is a dialectical relationship between discursive events and 
their situations, institutions and social structures (Richardson 2007; Bishop and 
Jaworski, 2003; Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough 1999). Scholars (some of whom use CDA) find ethnography is a 
preferred approach for examining this context of production due to its reliability, 
accuracy, descriptive qualities and compatibility with CDA (Richardson, 2007; 
Bellier, 2005; Elliot, 2005; Galasinska, 2005; van Leeuwen, 2005; Fairclough, 
2003, 1995 and 1995a; Machin, 2002; Moores, 2000; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 
1999; Scollon 1998; Pujolar 1997). This thesis’s textual examination of 
competing variants of Turkish nationalism in different radio news stories is best 
understood as a direct product of specific newsroom practices and situations 
revealed through newsroom ethnographies.
In this chapter, ethnography is used to describe the conditions in which news 
stories are written. Aspects of newsmaking culture in three newsrooms are 
examined, focusing on the making of the stations’ news stories which draw upon 
different ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism. This chapter 
is divided into two parts. In the first part, radio stations’ political and economic 
contexts are described in turn: BRTI, followed by KFM and then Radyo T. In part 
two, news production processes within these political and economic contexts are 
outlined at each station. This involves examining news gathering and writing 
daily routines, addressing where stories are sourced from, who and what 
influences story selection decisions, news writing, development and editing 
practices.
These areas of study are based on previous ethnographic studies (see summary 
in van Dijk, 1988: 7-8). These produce a finely detailed level of description which 
is desired for two reasons. Firstly, there is very little known about Turkish Cypriot 
media, even in Cypriot literature. A detailed description of practices in TRNC 
newsrooms supplements this neglected area of research. Secondly, this detailed 
ethnography provides a description of the social practices behind texts analysed. 
This highlights the importance of political and economic factors in news 
production and describes the goings on, the small decisions and processes that 
lead to the production of texts. With description this detailed, this ethnography is 
an answer to critics and those who work in CDA who claim this type of work is 
needed, but so little of it is actually done (Philo, 2007; Widdowson, 2004; 
Fairclough, 2003).
The following newsroom studies of three radio stations generate a clear picture 
of the way events and agency material are processed to produce deeply 
ideological stories of a nature that may not even be evident to the producers 
themselves. These studies describe the processes which result in news that 
carries with it different ideological discourses of nationalism described in this 
thesis’s textual analysis. These discourses benefit interests associated with 
stations and not the interests of TRNC residents.
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V.2 Political and Economic Contexts
Radio stations’ political and economic contexts are examined starting with a brief 
description of radio stations’ settings, followed by their programming, finance, 
political control and political affiliations, staffing and resources. These 
observations reveal that all stations are working under tight financial constraints 
and are closely associated with political parties. Stations are poorly resourced, 
with poorly trained staff and politically-motivated ownership and/ or control.
These factors help shape stations’ variations of ideological news stories.
V.2.i BRTI
BRTK is TRNC’s state-run broadcaster established in 1983. It employs 700 
people. BRT offers two television services, and five radio services; one English 
and four Turkish. There is one main newsroom for all services except the 
English service, BRTI, which has a smaller separate newsroom. This thesis is 
concerned with the news programming on the English language radio service, 
BRTI.
V.2.i.a Setting: BRTK is housed in a large 60’s style three storey cement building 
in need of some repair on the outskirts of TRNC’s capital Nicosia. It is fenced in 
with lookout towers, reminders of past intercommunal violence. It used to be 
protected by army personnel, though security guards are now employed since 
tensions between the two communities have decreased.
Decor at BRTK is political with symbols, flags, posters and stickers of Turkey and 
TRNC together. Paintings of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic 
of Turkey, hang in most rooms, a s  do photographs of TRNC President Talat, 
Prime Minister Soyer and ex-president Rauf Denkta§. These are reminders that 
BRTK is a broadcaster closely linked to politics.
Despite the friendly and helpful atmosphere at BRTK, visitors are reminded that 
BRTK has its enemies and so are treated with a degree of suspicion. For 
example, upon first arrival, visitors recounted how they were questioned by 
BRTKs director, Huseyin Gur§an. This researcher was asked “We want to know
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what you’re doing. You’re not a spy or anything are you?” Later, a news worker 
said, “He is serious because of the political situation.”
V.2.i.b Programming: News workers and management believe BRTI 
programming is aimed at the government of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots who speak English, international parties with interests in Cyprus 
and the English ex-patriot community on Cyprus. Because there is no official 
lines of communication between TRNC and the Republic, the Republic and other 
interested parties listen to BRTI to hear TRNC’s perspective on issues.
Almost all programming is in English in order to reach this diverse, international 
audience. There are two ten-minute English news programmes at 13:00 and 
19:00, which are television-radio simulcasts, and two radio bulletins in Arabic, 
Russian, German, Greek and English daily at 11:00 and 15:00.
V.2.i.c Finance: BRT is a part of the TRNC government. It is mostly financed by 
the government, with advertising supplementing its income. Advertisers, which 
make up “a very small amount of our income”, are all TRNC-based companies 
such as mobile phone providers, restaurants, car sales outlets and construction 
companies.30 This financing arrangement affects news programming, according 
to Huseyin Guven, BRTs Chief News Coordinator. He said that BRTK does not 
provide “sensational” news to appeal to audiences. Instead, it focuses on the 
Cyprus conflict from a Turkish Cypriot perspective.
V.2.i.d: Political control/ affiliations: It was observed that BRTK has an array of 
influences which determine its political agenda. One influence is its mandate 
outlined in TRNC’s Bayrak Radio-Television Corporation Law number 50/1983 
(hereafter BRTK Law). This law, passed by TRNC’s parliament on 22 July 1983, 
established BRTK. It dictates that BRTK is not independent, but directly linked to 
the Prime Minister’s office.31 Guven said this relationship is reflected in its news. 
In former years, the station used to produce propaganda aimed against the
3° empj0yees were unable to give a percentage of its income which comes from advertising.
However, when asked, most news workers made remarks such as that noted in the text.
31 This is taken from article 95 of TRNC Law No. 50/ 1983 which established BRTK downloaded from 
http://www.cm.gov.nc.tr/dir_ docs/50-1983.doc on 07.09.09.
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Republic. But since 2003, due to the electoral win of pro-federation CTP, Guven 
claimed:
BRT is making news to try and get the two cultures together again. 
Politicians are looking for solutions and BRT wants to play a role in the 
peace making atmosphere. We want to help find a solution to the Cyprus 
problem.
The BRTK Law also dictates a national prioritisation regardless of which party is 
in power. According to Article five of the BRTK Law, BRTK must:
a. make effective live broadcasts of successful events and anniversaries 
of national days
b. instil a sense of patriotism for the country
c. broadcast educational, cultural and entertaining programmes for 
developing social, economic and cultural structures of the community
d. carry out authentic news services in accordance with the national and 
public interests.
All four aspects of the law cited above refer to the “nation”, “patriotism” or “the 
community”. These are the foundations of programming on BRTK, so influence 
news. Ali Demerioglu, English news Chief-Editor, exemplified this thinking when 
describing BRTs reason for broadcasting:
BRT is the voice of the Turkish Cypriot people. We are here to promote 
our political stance on the Cyprus issue. Here to promote the Turkish 
Cypriot side.
Another influence in BRTK’s political agenda is its board of governors. Meryem 
Dagun, English news’ second chief editor explained:
We [BRT editors] have to answer to the board of governors. The 
governors are made up of not just CTP, but the Turkish military, and you 
know who.
When asked for clarification, she said “money interests”. This is an euphemism 
for power holders in TRNC such as those who have been granted land and 
monopoly import licenses for their support for governments.
There is also evidence of direct Turkish military influence in broadcasting at 
BRTK, confirming that BRTK’s political context plays an ideological role in its 
programming. During this newsroom study, a documentary was aired on BRT-
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TV which criticised the Turkish and Greek military during the 1974 conflict. The 
Turkish military complained and within a week, director of BRTK Huseyin Gur§an 
was sacked and replaced. News workers told this researcher that “everyone 
knows that he left because the military pushed him out.”
V.2.i.e Staffing: Compared to other radio stations’ staffing levels, BRTK is 
overstaffed with a total of 70 in the news service; 40 in the main newsroom and 
30 in the BRTI newsroom. It was observed that although most news workers 
work hard, there is a lot of non-working time for some news workers thoughout 
each day. English news Chief-Editor Demerioglu explained that staffing levels at 
BRTK have remained high because “staffing is political. BRT hires people to 
prevent them from leaving TRNC.”
Despite these staffing policies, there is little training. BRTs Chief News 
Coordinator Guven complained that his biggest problem is the lack of qualified 
personnel with media expertise. This researcher heard newsreaders complain of 
no news-reading background or training, previously being housewives, music 
programmers or secretaries. Likewise, it was observed that reporters rely on 
news agency feeds instead of their own observations and notes when writing up 
stories, possibly due to a lack of experience and confidence.
V.2.i.f Resources: There is clearly a severe lack of necessary equipment at the 
station. In BRTrs newsroom, 15 editors share two phones, one fax machine and 
three computers. The chief editor takes one computer, while the remaining 
editors use the other two computers. This results in queuing for computers and 
leaves little time for investigation or verifying information. There is no sound 
recording-editing programme on computers, so clips and sound effects can not 
be part of newscasts.
Radio editor Ibrahim Guneser, complained that the limited equipment and 
computers mean “there is no time to do your own stuff.” For outside recording, 
there is only one analogue and one digital voice recorder. Both were not 
functioning on a day this researcher asked to borrow them, meaning a further 
reliance on agency feeds.
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It was observed how the three or four available video cameras in the main 
newsroom affect BRTPs radio coverage of TRNC events. This dependence on 
cameras is because all BRT services share scripts based on stories selected by 
the chief editors. BRT (KFM and Radyo T also) rely on TAKs news service for 
news gathering and writing. However, TAK only offers a script and photography 
service, not a video service. So, for BRT to offer a TRNC story on TV (and 
therefore all services including BRTI), it needs to be assigned a camera. If there 
is no camera, there is no story for radio or television. For example, one day a 
planned story on Civil Rescue was cancelled. Because no camera and reporter 
went to the event, BRT reporters did not cover the event and it was not included 
in BRTPs radio news, despite its planned inclusion. A similar system applies 
across all three stations.
V.2M KFM
The Kibris Media Group (KMG) is the largest commercial media conglomerate in 
TRNC, owned by businessm an Asil Nadir, who has close personal contacts with 
the governing CTP party .32 KMG owns two newspapers, a television and a radio 
station. This ethnography is concerned with news production on KMG's radio 
service KFM which started broadcasting in 1997.
V.2.ii.a Setting: The KMG building is a modem, glass-fronted structure on the 
outskirts of Nicosia. Despite outside appearances, KFM and KTV occupy a small 
almost forgotten m aze of rooms, studios and corridors on the top floor of the 
building. KFM posters, signs and bumper stickers adorn the news area’s walls 
and doors. Symbols of politics and political allegiances in KFM’s cramped 
newsroom are confined to only a few pro-Annan plan referendum car stickers, 
showing support for pro-federation CTP.33
3: In March 2009, Nadir became involved in a public dispute with the CTP government and switched 
allegiances to the “Democratic Party”, a Turkish Nationalist party. KMG publicly endorsed the Democratic 
party and began criticising the CTP in its news (Azgm interview, 2009).
33 The Annan Plan referendum was an all-Cypriot referendum in 2004 which asked Cypriots if they wanted 
to become a federation. The CTP supported the Annan plan. It received overwhelming support from 
residents of TRNC and was rejected by residents of the Republic.
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Guests are treated with modest curiosity at KFM. The politically-charged 
atmosphere noted at BRT is absent. Instead of being brought to management 
and being questioned about spying, this researcher was questioned casually 
about the topic of research by news workers before they returned to their daily 
routines.
V.2.ii.b Programming: News workers and management believe car drivers are 
their target audience. KFM offers its listeners hourly three-minute news bulletins 
from 09:00 until 22:30. It also airs a 25 minute news programme at 19:00 which 
is a television-radio simulcast.
V.2.ii.c Financing: KMG consists of two companies divided between print and 
broadcasting. The print company which publishes KIBRIS (TRNC’s most popular 
newspaper) and Cyprus Today (a successful English weekly) is profitable, while 
KFM and KTV lose money. Print subsidises broadcasting.
As part of a profit-driven venture, commercial interests directly affect news 
programming on KFM. KMG's editor-in-chief Suleyman Erguglu said he has to 
balance all his operations to ensure profitability. He explained that:
I have to maintain a balance of sharing news with radio and TV to make 
sure the newspaper sells the next day. If you listen to a story on radio and 
the sam e story the next day is in the paper, you wouldn’t buy the paper.
V.2.ii.d Political control/affiliations: Political interests of the owner and
management also affect news, despite this being denied. Before the 2003
parliamentary victory of the CTP, Nadir and KMG were vocal supporters of the
UBP and Turkish nationalism. This was evident in the station’s content at the
time (Azgin 1996: 656). This support was also evident by some editors, such as
KMG's editor-in-chief Erguglu, running for office as a UBP candidate in 1998
elections. However, Nadir switched allegiances before the 2003 elections and
developed close personal contacts with pro-federation CTP. Mehmet Moreket,
Radyo T’s newsroom manager recounted that Nadir switched to the CTP when
he believed the CTP were about to win the 2003 elections and “he wanted to be
on the winning side.”
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All correspondents and those in power at KMG also support the CTP. For 
example, Erguglu ran for political office again in 2003, this time as a CTP 
candidate and KIBRIS newspaper editor Basaran Duzgun is a CTP activist.
Despite this obvious affiliation with pro-federation CTP, its editors told this 
researcher that KMG is independent of political parties. Erguglu said that his 
news operation’s top priority is “what is good for the nation” and he does not 
prioritise party politics. This mantra of “what is good for the nation” being a top 
news priority was repeated by almost all news workers throughout KMG. Some 
employees, however, expressed a different view. News presenter Aysu Basri 
described how m anagem ent’s support for the CTP and KFM being part of a 
commercial enterprise influence content. She said, “We create a balance 
between supporting CTP and making a profit.”
V.2M.e Staffing: The entire radio and TV operation at KMG employs twenty 
people. There are  nine staff in the newsroom and a handful of part-timers.
Radio technicians were cut with the introduction of computers and a self­
operated radio studio in 2003. With no technicians, guests and radio discussion 
programmes have stopped. Not only are there few staff, it was observed that 
most are inexperienced, young, female graduates.
KFM offers no training. Basri, the most experienced with nine years, complained 
that this lack of experience affects news quality. She said:
Our editors are not news experts. They are young because the salaries 
are very low. They have no connections outside, no sources.
V.2.ii.f Resources: Like BRTI, there is a severe lack of necessary equipment at
KFM. There are four computers and five desks in the small newsroom. For
outside recording, there is no radio equipment. Like BRTI, cameras are used to
record visuals for television and very rarely sound. This is because the two
cam eras use archaic coil-spring microphones, not broadcast quality. The result
is news is always a straight read relying heavily on news agency feeds.
V.2.iii Radyo T
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Radyo T and Kanal T are owned and managed by Ersin Tatar, the UBP’s 
Shadow Minister for Finance. The UBP is a Turkish nationalist political party 
which wants closer ties with Turkey and independence from the Republic. The 
focus of this ethnography is the radio station, Radyo T, which started 
broadcasting in 1998.
V.2.iii.a Setting: Radyo T and Kanal T are located in a small nondescript three 
storey building sandwiched between two other nondescript buildings in the centre 
of Nicosia. Once inside, the station’s politics are obvious in its decor. The small 
building is full of either prints of Ataturk (Turkey’s national hero) or photographs 
of nationalist politicians, many accompanied by Tatar and programmers. These 
display the close links between Turkish nationalist politicians and Radyo T. Even 
guests are seen as an audience for Turkish nationalist information, this 
researcher being offered CDs, pamphlets and stories about the Turkish Cypriot 
struggle for independence.
V.2.iii.b Programming: Newsroom manager Mehmet Moreket identifies Radyo T s 
audience as car drivers and “people who want to know what is happening in our 
country of Turkish Cyprus.” Owner Tatar believes his audience is “a niche 
market interested in local affairs.” Judging by the amount of political 
programming, local affairs m eans TRNC politics. Radyo T offers its politically- 
interested audience three daily newscasts at 13:00, 19:00 and 24:00. These 
three newscasts and all political programmes are television-radio simulcasts.
V.2.iii.c Finance: Tatar’s broadcasting company “is just making a profit”. He 
blames the lack of profit for TRNC broadcasters on two factors. Firstly, 
international advertisers prefer to use Turkish mainland stations due to their 
audience reach on mainland Turkey and TRNC. This leaves all TRNC stations 
chasing a few TRNC advertisers. The second reason is the continual 
propagation of new stations despite broadcasting making little money in TRNC. 
Tatar believes stations continue to open because broadcasting gives owners 
“political clout”. One can not help wondering if this is part of the motivation 
behind Radyo T.
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V.2.iii.d Political control/affiliations: Radyo T s affiliation with the UBP is obvious. 
Owner Ersin Tatar is a powerful and active UBP nationalist politician. It was 
observed that nationalist politicians frequent the operation almost daily. Despite 
newsroom manager Moreket’s claims that Tatar “does not dictate what politics to 
include in news”, he is a daily presence in operations. He and Moreket meet 
formally and informally throughout each day to discuss programming. Moreket is 
also an avid nationalist who recounted on numerous occasions his days as a 
Turkish Cypriot fighter who fought alongside Turkish troops in 1974. His career 
in news includes working at Radyo T for nine years and another nationalist 
station beforehand. Moreket’s personal politics and those of Tatar are known to 
all in the station.
V.2Mi.e Staffing: Radyo T has 12 full-time radio and television staff, eight of 
whom work for news. There are only two reporter-editors (one being manager 
Moreket). All workers have some university education, though no training is 
offered at Radyo T. It was noticed that Moreket rarely leaves his desk and his 
newsfeeds, bemoaning the lack of staff. He complained that:
I make 20 news stories everyday by myself. We have one cameraman, 
two writers, what can we do? I sit here for ten hours a day writing news. I 
help with editing, then I go home.
V.2.iii.f Resources: Necessary equipment is even more scarce than the other 
stations. The newsroom consists of two desks, two computers and a couple of 
televisions for monitoring and recording other stations’ newscasts. The radio 
operation boasts a small un-manned radio studio and a voice booth for pre­
recorded news pieces. There is only one camera available for gathering outside 
news. This severely limits what is included in newscasts because, like all 
stations, a cam era is essential for newsgathering.
V.3 Newsroom practices from event to air
The newsroom practices which transform events into news stories in each of the 
stations introduced above are examined. This involves a description of news 
gathering, story selection, writing, development and editing practices. First, how
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each station uses news agency feeds in news gathering and writing on one 
particular day is explored. Then each station’s daily routines are described. 
These observations reveal that all stations rely heavily on news agencies for 
news gathering and writing. A reliance on wire services has been noted in 
studies about newsrooms elsewhere (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2007;
Patterson, 1998; Palmer, Boyd-Barret and Rantanen, 1998; Wilke, 1998; 
Rantanen, 1998). For news about TRNC and the Republic, which is the majority 
of news and the focus of this thesis, there is an almost exclusive reliance on TAK 
news service. However, these observations also reveal differences in newsroom 
practices which contribute to news stories which evoke different ideological 
discourses.
V.3.i Radio station’s dependency on TAK
The huge dependency of the stations on the TAK news agency for news is 
illustrated by an examination of news gathering on one randomly chosen day.
On that day, all stations got the sam e TAK daily agenda feed which consisted of 
60 stories, 44 concerned with TRNC.34 Of these 44 TRNC stories, 33 covered 
either politicians’ statements, press conferences or actions. The following 
describes how each station used TAK to gather TRNC news.35
On that day, BRTI aired an 11 story newscast. Five of these stories were about 
TRNC government actions or statements (three concerning the Cyprus conflict), 
two were statements from foreign politicians about the Cyprus conflict and four 
were international stories. All five TRNC stories, one of the Cyprus conflict 
stories and one international story were sourced from TAK. The one story about 
the Cyprus conflict and the three international stories not sourced from TAK, 
were sourced from the BBC website. This means that no stories were 
independently gathered and researched.
On that day, KFM aired a 13 story newscast. All these stories were about TRNC 
government actions and statements (four concerning the Cyprus conflict). All
See Appendix four for a list of all sixty stories
45 See Appendix five for a list of story titles and their sources for each station.
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stories but one were sourced from TAK. The one exception was sourced from 
the BRT website and appeared on the BRT news the previous day. This means 
that no stories were independently gathered and researched.
On that day, eight stories were given to this researcher, purportedly aired on 
Radyo T. However, three stories were from other days. All five of the remaining 
stories report TRNC events (four concerning the Cyprus conflict). Four of these 
were sourced from TAK. The fifth was sourced from BRT, appearing on BRTs 
previous day’s news. This means that no stories were independently gathered 
and researched.
This snapshot of the way stories were acquired by the three stations on one day 
demonstrates the almost exclusive use of TAK for news gathering for TRNC 
events and the Cyprus conflict. It also shows that BRTI uses sources other than 
TAK, such as the BBC, for non-TRNC news. Finally, it demonstrates that the two 
commercial stations use BRT as a source for their news.
On this sam e day, TAK’s feed provided an extensive account of a weekly news 
briefing by Presidential Spokesman Erpakica. BRTI and KFM covered this 
event.36 A comparison of the original TAK feed and these stories reveals how 
stations use TAK in different ways in their writing.
BRTs story included Erpakica’s comments on TRNC’s continued isolation, ferry 
boat services, EU manipulation by the Republic and Talat’s desire to meet with 
the Republic’s President Papadopulos. All these topics were selected from the 
longer original TAK feed. But BRT used the TAK original for more than just topic 
ideas. The BRT story used one quote and the last sentence of its story direct 
from the TAK original. The rest of the story is obviously TAK sourced with words 
and sentences changed and ideas summarised. For example, the first sentence 
in BRTs story is very similar to the first sentence in the TAK original which reads:
36 The TAK original feed is in Appendix six. The original Turkish scripts from BRT1 and KFM are 
included in Appendix seven. The sections of the radio scripts which are identical to the original 
TAK feed in bold. Parts of the scripts which are obviously sourced from TAK but re-written are 
italicised. Furthermore, the BRT1 script is used for this comparison, because this is the script 
BRTI editors used a s  their source before translating the script into English. Using the Turkish 
script allows a much closer comparison.
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Presidential spokesperson Hasan Ergakica has said that the international 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people is due to the attempts of the Greek 
Cypriot side and if we consider the latest events this reality becomes 
clear.
In this sentence, Ergakica blames the Republic for isolation. Another sentence 
about halfway through the TAK feed reads:
Ergakica stated that the Greek Cypriot side has no power to play that 
game [incorporating TRNC into a Greek Cypriot state] however, it 
contributes to deadlock to the solution in the Cyprus problem.
In this sentence Ergakica accuses the Republic of wanting to incorporate TRNC
into the Republic which results in no solution. BRT editors incorporate the main
ideas from both these sentences in its opening sentence in its story which reads:
Presidential spokesperson Hasan Ergakica has said that the Greek 
Cypriot attempts to maintain the international isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriot people are contrary to the efforts aimed at bringing about a 
peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem.
The sentence used by BRT is a shorter amalgamation of the two TAK sentences,
combining the ideas of isolation from TAKs first sentence and not aiding in
solutions taken from TAK’s second sentence.
KFM’s treatment of the TAK original is quite different. KFM focuses on one 
aspect of the TAK feed: President Talat’s desire to meet with Ban Ki Moon and 
Papadopulos at the United Nations. A comparison of the TAK feed and KFM’s 
story reveals that with the exception of KFM’s first sentence, the entire story is 
taken word for word from the TAK original. There are no modifications and 
interpretations. This is a result of news gathering practices which see workers 
cut and paste directly from TAK.
Radyo T did not cover the Ergakica news conference. A different example, like 
the story of a meeting between three TRNC parliamentary parties37, shows how 
Radyo T uses TAK.
Three sentences in Radyo T s story are almost identical to the TAK original.
There are a few details missing such as “the parliamentary parties” which appear
37 See Appendix eight for the TAK original feed and Radyo T s  story. Again, sentences which are identical 
to TAK are in bold and those which are obviously sourced from TAK in italics.
108
in the TAK feed. This is probably a genre consideration, keeping radio news 
simple. The scripts, however, differ thereafter. The seven remaining sentences 
are original, mostly referring to the UBP and its actions. These were sourced 
and written independent of TAK.
This short comparison of one story from each station reveals that each station 
uses TAK in news writing, but treats TAK differently. It demonstrates that BRTI 
and Radyo T use TAK, but interpret its writings for its audiences. KFM does a 
strict ‘rip and read’ treatment of its news feed. With the exception of Radyo T s 
seven sentences, there was no further research or investigation into any of these 
agency stories.
V.3.H News gathering and writing priorities and processes
In this section, news gathering processes, news selection, influences on writing, 
story development and editing practices are examined for each of the stations.
To get a full picture of newsgathering and writing practices, a typical sequence of 
news selection and production at each station is described. Although each 
station uses TAK extensively, as outlined above, it is observed that each station 
uses TAK differently in gathering and writing news.
V.3.ii.a BRTI news gathering and writing priorities and processes
V.3.ii.a.1 Daily Routines
In the main BRT newsroom, the day begins at 07:30 for the two chief news- 
editors Efdal Keser (television) and izzet Valkan (radio). They watch A/TV, BBC 
and Greek news, read TRNC newspapers, scan websites, and most importantly, 
open up TAKs agenda to prepare for the day’s agenda-setting meeting. At 
08.30, they meet Huseyin Guven, BRT Chief News Coordinator, to set the 
agenda and running order for the day’s news on all services.
News selection is non-controversial: these managers almost exclusively select 
government activities, the Cyprus Issue and follow-up stories all announced on 
the TAK agenda. Between 15 and 25 stories are selected. Once the news is 
agreed, BRTs news agenda is put on the intranet for BRTI to select from.
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At 08:45 and again at 14:30, the three m anagers meet with the main newsroom 
staff to allocate stories and resources. For the most part, talk amongst editors 
and directors is over BRTKs limited resources, especially cameras. Cameras 
are needed to collect visuals for television stories. Because all services share 
scripts, if a cam era is not assigned to a story, the story is not covered on any of 
BRTs services, including BRTI. So, a camera is essential if an editor is to get 
his or her story on air.
Sometimes, there was discussion over content. However, it was observed that 
the view of m anagem ent prevailed. For example, one day, Keser included 
triplets being born on the news agenda. Reporter-editors complained that this 
was not newsworthy. However, Keser insisted and the story was covered.
After the morning and afternoon meetings, staff do one of four things. First, 
some cameramen and reporters are sent out to gather footage and take notes of 
(usually political) events. Though reporters are attached to radio, television or 
BRTI, one write up is shared by all services.
Second, some reporters who have no access to cameras, log on to TAK and wait 
for scripts to edit. They contribute to writing up stories the cameramen and 
reporters go out to cover. Third, some editors assigned to foreign news, log on 
to NTV or BBC to copy, cut and paste stories. Finally, some editors read TRNC 
newspapers or watch live political proceedings on TV. Management expect them 
to search for story ideas and contribute to stories being written. Observation 
revealed there w as not a lot of either of these activities, reflecting BRTKs 
condition of over-staffing.
Chief editors believe these four activities produce “exclusive” news. Radio’s 
chief editor Valkan claimed that almost all TRNC news comes from BRTs 
reporters, with 20 percent from TAK. Reporters, alternatively, believe they do 
almost no original work. Observations reveal that although reporters and 
cameramen are assigned stories, there is a heavy reliance on TAK as a primary 
source of information.
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News workers gather and write their assigned news stories until the end of their 
shift at 17:00 when they are replaced by a skeletal evening shift who continue 
preparations for the main newscasts at 19:00. Many drift off early after their 
assigned story is complete.
V.3.ii.a.2 Story Selection
In BRTf s newsroom, the most senior editor (Ali Demerioglu or Meryem Dagun) 
starts the day at 09:30 by checking the agenda on the intranet sent by BRT Chief 
News Coordinator Guven earlier. The senior editor selects approximately 15 
stories from Guven’s agenda. Which stories get covered are based on audience 
preferences assumed by the senior editor, BRTrs political context and 
practicalities.
Firstly, assum ed audience preferences dictate that local TRNC news like sewage 
and road works are not selected for BRTI. This is because editors say these 
stories are not of interest to their international audience.
Secondly, BRTFs political context determines selection. BRTFs top news 
priorities according to editors are “helping to find a solution to the Cyprus 
problem”, “the Cyprus issue from a Turkish perspective” and “government 
activities”. These priorities are either a part of BRTs mandate or a reflection of 
BRTs close link to the Prime Minister. Huseyin Guven noted that one 
disadvantage of such close relations with the Prime Minister is:
We have to follow the Prime Minister. If not, the government gives us 
trouble. By trouble I mean they would ask ‘why didn’t you do this news.’ 
We follow him, even when we know it’s not that important for people.
Thirdly, there are practical reasons for news selected. Chief news editors Keser
and Valkan claim non-political news is difficult to cover. Unlike politicians, who
are easily accessible, the police give out information 24 hours after an incident.
This is because the police are part of the military, not civilians so they have a
“different m indsef. Hospitals are the same. These practicalities favour
government activities.
I l l
The prioritising of politics leaves little room for other news throughout BRTK. 
Radio editor Ibrahim Guneser complained that cameras are always booked for 
government activities. For example, during one morning meeting, the three 
cam eras were booked to shoot a three-party conference, a Talat conference, a 
government statement, an antique theatre rehearsal, a folk dance show and a 
festival. With such a busy shooting schedule, any stories reporters wanted to do 
were sidelined.
Each day, after TRNC and Cyprus conflict stories are selected and written, a 
number of foreign news stories are selected. These are a low priority, usually at 
the bottom of the running order with their amount of air time determined by the 
amount of TRNC-Cyprus conflict news. Observation and conversations revealed 
that foreign news prioritises Turkey, the Republic and European news.
News from the Republic is supplied by BRTKs listening service. A translator 
literally listens, records and translates news from the Republic’s TV, radio and 
newspapers. As Guven proudly announced “we are listening to the south.” 
Everyday, one or two political stories about the Cyprus conflict are produced and 
used.
For Turkish and world news, BRTI almost exclusively cuts and pastes from the 
BBC or A/TV websites. One editor claimed that Turkish news sources are 
preferred because “foreign news sources could be against our policies.”
However, it was observed that in many cases the BBC was used. This is 
because BBC news can be cut and pasted quickly, without having to translate 
A/TV Turkish scripts into English for BRTfs English-speaking audience.
V.3.ii.a.3 Influences on writing
The writing process at BRTI almost always starts in the main BRT newsroom. 
This is where stories are first written in Turkish for BRTs Turkish services before 
being translated in the English newsroom for BRTI. Occasionally, if a news 
event involves an English speaker, the English newsroom writes the original for 
BRTI before it is translated into Turkish for BRTs Turkish services.
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In either case, two factors are considered in this and the following sections. One 
addresses the factors which affect the writing in original scripts (English or 
Turkish). The second factor is how decisions are made in translations.
When writing stories, all BRT editors have many interests to consider. Meryem 
Dagun, English news’s second chief editor, described how she makes decisions 
about writing: “We have to answer to the board of governors. They don’t tell us 
what to write, but we just get a ‘feeling’.” The ‘feeling’ she experiences when 
writing is also to do with other influences:
When we write, we try not to offend the various interests in BRT and 
Cyprus. These include the board members and besides the military, 
government and money interests, we have to consider Turkey, the UN, the 
EU and the US. Its all about keeping them happy; that is, not offending 
them.
Dagun tries not to offend these interests because “we [TRNC] are not strong 
enough to stand on our own.” TRNC’s existence depends on not offending. This 
juggling act also has a temporal aspect to it. According to Dagun, a change of 
government brings about a change in management. She said:
Whatever government is in power at the time will have more influence 
than the other parties because they change the management to those who 
have sympathies with their policies.
So, the relationship with the government contributes to ‘the feeling’, by employing
managers with party sympathies. This affects writing in two ways. Firstly, Dagun
claimed:
Things have changed in the past few years because we now have a left 
wing parliament. Whoever sits in the chair [of government] what he says, 
we write.
Secondly, it was observed that senior news editors who are party-politically 
selected control all scripts and directly instruct editors. One editor said, “The 
chief editors have meetings with us editors occasionally to tell us what to write 
and how to write it.” But this seem s to be rare.
On a day to day basis, writing styles are affected by ‘the feeling’ described by 
Dagun. Yurdakul Cafer, a young editor, described how his writing has changed
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due to the change in government from the Turkish Nationalist UBP to the pro­
federation CTP in 2003. He said, “We don’t attack the other side [the Republic] 
like we used to. We still do, just not as much.” Gorgin, another editor, believes 
the relationship between the government and BRT directly affects what she 
writes. She said,
The BRT director and the news director want long newscasts because 
they love [TRNC President] Talat. We are a part of government. We have 
to do what they say.
V.3M.a.4 Story development
After reporters return from TAK suggested shoots, TAK news feeds are used to 
write stories. For example, one day a reporter returned from a President Talat 
news conference with written notes and footage from the cameraman. One of 
the editors helped her write up her story. They used TAK and her notes. TAK 
was used to confirm what she had just witnessed. Once complete, the story was 
given to a senior editor for approval before being put on the intranet for other 
services to use.
At other times, TAK alone is used. Editors cutting and pasting original TAK feeds 
for their write ups was a common observation. This process usually involved 
shortening TAK feeds for radio.
V.3.ii.a.5 Editing
At BRT, there are numerous checks and controls throughout the process of 
writing. A reporter, whether writing up a shoot, or re-writing a TAK story, firstly 
gives the finished script to an editor to proof-read. After approval, it is put on the 
intranet so the other services can use the script. Here, another editor in each 
service proof-reads and adjusts the script. It then goes to the chief editors for 
final approval before recording.
So at BRTI, after a script is approved in the main newsroom, it is translated by an 
editor, then proof-read by Devecioglu or Dagun, then final approval is given by 
the head of foreign languages services, before it is recorded. These checking
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and control mechanisms ensure all news workers are writing in the prescribed 
BRTI manner.
A lot of script control seem s to be lexical translation corrections at BRTI rather 
than overt political choices, though these can be political. For example, Dagun 
explained to one new editor that the President of the Republic is “the leader of 
the Greek Cypriot Administration, not President.”
There is also a lot of mentoring between senior staff and young editors to create 
a standard format, style and content. Editor Cafer commented,
You can write whatever you like. But if you do not follow the norm, your 
work will be re-written, so we do it.
More subtle manners of control were also observed. For example, at BRTI,
English news’s chief editor Devecioglu contributes to many scripts. Devecioglu is
an encyclopedia of help with names, vocabulary, facts, where to find information
and how to write sentences. He is well respected, solving disputes about timing
of stories, selection and wordings on a daily basis. For example, there was a
discussion about whether a visit from British politician Geoff Hoon on 25 April
should appear in the news on 19 April, a slow news day. The conversation
involved three editors. Finally, Devecioglu was consulted and he said it was too
early. This ended the debate.
V.3.ii.b KFM news gathering and writing priorities and processes 
V.3.ii.b. 1 Daily Routines
The first editor of the day, usually Ozen Qatal, arrives in the newsroom at around 
09:30 after hosting a live TV information programme. She opens and scans the 
TAK agenda. Cameraman Bahar Uygur arrives shortly afterwards and also looks 
at the agenda. They select five or six stories for the two cameramen to shoot. 
Cameramen go to events with no reporter, record talking heads and then move 
on to their next destination. They do not record soundbites because scripts are 
provided by TAK. Also, they do not have broadcast-quality microphones, the 
time, news directors or reporters to help select what to record. This lack of 
staffing contributes to a heavy reliance on TAK scripts.
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In the newsroom, the editors drift into the newsroom by mid-morning. There is 
no chief-editor to control what stories are selected. The editors are on a rota, 
taking responsibility for writing and reading radio news each day. The other 
editors consult with the day’s editor in charge of radio news and contribute to 
selection and writing or write television scripts. Editors rarely leave their 
computers, cutting, pasting and re-writing TRNC stories from TAK throughout the 
day. Surprisingly, there is very little sharing of information between KFM and 
KMG’s newspapers. None was observed during this research. By the 13:00 
newscast, editors have written about seven stories. By the evening newscast the 
number has risen to 15.
For Turkish and international stories, it was observed that editors cut and paste 
from the BRT and Turkish websites. They use Turkish news agencies because 
their English is weak and Turkish affairs “have an impact on Cyprus.”
KFM manager Erding Gunduz’s managerial approach is laissez-faire, allowing 
editors to gather and write news independent of checks and controls. Aside from 
a political context which supports the CTP and a reliance on news agency feeds, 
there is little consistency in news work. Gunduz finds the reliance on TAK 
distasteful, but claims to have little choice. He said:
As a manager I am very much against it. But I can’t do much about it. We
need more staff. We’re stuck on TAK.
All editors admit they use TAK almost exclusively for TRNC news. Announcer- 
editor Aysu Basri believes,
If TAK was to be turned off one day, we would have to close. Nobody
would know where to look for news.
However, a lack of staff is not the only reason for a reliance on TAK. Apathy is 
also to blame. It was observed that news workers take long lunches and spend 
most of their time chatting on the internet. The newsroom is mostly empty by 
17:00, with the exception of a couple of news workers finishing work for the 
evening newscasts. Gathering news is not a priority. One announcer explained 
that,
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We sit and wait for TAK. If our editors were interested, they would go out 
and cover stories.
V.3.ii.b.2 Story selection
Story selection at KFM is based on KMG's politics at the time. KMG’s editor-in- 
chief Erguglu distanced the station from party political reporting by claiming,
We leave the routine news like ‘the president says this’ and ‘the PM laid 
the foundation..’ to TAK. But setting the agenda for the country, we 
decide on the agenda and then work on it.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence of this claim in the newsroom. However,
Erguglu’s views on news gathering priorities are relevant:
TRNC, Cyprus Issue and domestic news are the priorities for KMG. What 
is good for our nation is our top priority. Nowadays, that is sorting out 
domestic issues here in TRNC.
Like his superior and all editors at KFM, Erding Gundtiz claimed the Cyprus
conflict is not their top priority, “what is good for the nation” is. Editor Gurses
said, “I pick what is important for the TRNC like the economy, jobs, culture and
life in TRNC.” Ekinci, another editor, admitted:
When Talat speaks we use it in the bulletin. But if he speaks a lot, we cut 
a lot. Things that affect people are what we are looking for. A car crash 
involving fatalities is more important than a politician saying nothing new.
But this independence from party politics claimed by almost all employees is not
evident in newscasts. Basri acknowledged that news workers are aware of the
station’s closeness to the CTP and this influences story selection and writing.
She said,
You won’t see  any anti-CTP stories in our news. We tend to protect CTP. 
In radio and TV this is to a lesser extent, because we follow TAK who are 
controlled by the [CTP] government anyway.
Like BRT, the selection of foreign news depends on the amount of TRNC news
which in turn depends on the TAK agenda. Some days as many as 66 items on
the TAK agenda were observed, while other days there were as few as five. On
such days there is a lot of searching the internet for stories from Turkish
agencies, while on other days, there is no foreign news.
V.3.ii.b.3 Influences on writing
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KFM’s owner and management influence writing at KFM indirectly and indirectly. 
The owner, all management and correspondents are CTP supporters or activists. 
It was observed that all workers know the allegiances of the station’s 
management and owner. Almost all workers also repeat the mantra of writing 
about “what is good for the nation”. In the newsroom’s context, supporting the 
CTP is “what is good for the nation”.
At the sam e time, editors are not politically active, concerned more with their own 
personal affairs. They never leave their desks, gathering, cutting and pasting 
TRNC news exclusively from TAK. As TAK is financed and managed by CTP 
government appointees, newscasts inevitably favour the CTP.
At times, however, station policy directly affects news writing. KMG’s editor-in- 
chief Erguglu said management and its owner made the decision to support the 
Annan plan in 2003 which called for a federation in Cyprus. Erguglu believed 
this plan was for “the good of the nation”. Basri remembered the run up to the 
Annan plan fondly. She said,
There was a real focus on news. We were focused on a solution to the 
problem. We started making more news. We had news at night.
The focus of news presently, according to Erguglu, is on domestic problems.
V. 3.//'. b. 4 Story development
Story development at KFM is much simpler than at BRTI. Writing TRNC news, 
which is most of the news, involves cutting, pasting then printing stories from 
TAK. It was observed that editors mostly use the same wording and emphasis 
as TAK. The process is usually a matter of eliminating sentences and 
paragraphs because TAK stories are too long for radio. Sometimes this is a 
matter of cutting repetition thereby making stories simpler.
These observations were confirmed by Basri, who complained that the scripts 
lack any sort of individuality. She said,
The editors rarely write stuff in their own words. If you look at the words 
used in other newspapers or newscasts, they look the sam e as each 
other.
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Decisions about what parts of TAK feeds to include in KFM stories are also 
based on pro-CTP influences. Editor-reporter Aksoygin claimed editors 
“summarise paragraphs, choosing what is good for the TRNC.” The mantra of 
“what is good for TRNC” interpreted by workers at KFM means what is good for a 
CTP-led TRNC.
V.3.ii.b.5 Editing
There is no official editing process or system in place at KFM. The young 
inexperienced editors cut and paste from TAK. When they finish, they give the 
scripts to another young inexperienced editor who is that day’s person in charge 
of radio. She reads the scripts in the adjacent on-air room live, many times 
without rehearsing the script.
However, mentoring does contribute to a common writing style at KFM. Aysu 
Basri is seen by editors as a big sister figure -  one to be respected and learn 
from. She occasionally holds workshops on speech and writing for radio, though 
this is rare and was not observed during this research. She also re-writes stories 
during her announcing duty if she feels they are not good enough. However, she 
rarely does this “out of respect for the editors.” This is not the same as the 
control witnessed at BRTI. In fact, Basri and another editor-reporter (Ekinci) 
expressed distaste at the amount of control at BRTI, claiming there is too much 
“propaganda” and “flag waving”.
V.3.ii.c Radyo T news gathering and writing priorities and processes 
V.3.ii.c.1 Daily Routines
Moreket arrives at 09:30 and opens up TAK to get his daily news agenda. Like 
the other stations, TAK is the primary source for news gathering. One of his 
cameramen, a video editor, owner Ersin Tatar and editor-reporter Alihan Ozer 
arrive around 10:00 to read and discuss the morning newspapers over coffee. 
Here Moreket and the others discuss story ideas and, importantly, politics.
These meetings mentor workers about the politics of their superiors which 
influence news making accordingly.
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After these informal meetings, Moreket briefs Ozer on the day’s events he has 
picked from the TAK agenda. Sometimes Ozer has an idea for an “exclusive” 
story. These are usually political reaction pieces, such as people’s reactions to 
the latest move in negotiations with the (Greek) Republic. If Moreket approves, 
Ozer leaves with the cameraman. Otherwise, Ozer edits a few stories or plays 
on the internet.
Meanwhile, Moreket selects and cuts stories from TAK, concentrating on TRNC 
politics. He supplements TAK with information from the BRT website and UBP 
politicians. It was observed that Moreket discussed politics and the day’s news 
with UBP politicians who regularly visited the building. These discussions 
inevitably inform his news gathering. For Turkish mainland stories, he uses the 
NTV website.
The cameramen and video editors get instructions from Moreket as to what to 
download, record or shoot. The cameramen shoot four or five locations selected 
by Moreket from the TAK agenda. As TAK stories arrive, Moreket scans, re­
words, cuts and pastes. He works on several stories at the sam e time. By 
13:00, they usually have prepared four or five stories, so this is the length of the 
newscast. As the day continues, more stories are added, so by midnight there 
may be 20 stories.
In the afternoon, Moreket prepares for his live politics show. At 14:30, he drops 
his editing, puts on a tie and hosts his live television and radio Cyprus political 
programme. Many times, guests are nationalist politicians who inform Moreket’s 
news stories as named or unnamed sources. At 16:00, he returns to the 
newsroom and writes and produces more stories for the 19:00 news programme. 
At 19:00, he leaves the building for the day. The duty cameraman and video 
editor ensure the midnight news is broadcasted.
V. 3. //. c. 2 Story Selection
Moreket outlined what he sees as Radyo T s news selection priorities. These 
are:
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Our country is the most important thing in news. This is usually the 
Cyprus Problem, what politicians say and what Greek Cyprus says about 
the problem. The next priority is what outside politicians such as Turkish, 
European and American politicians think about the Cyprus Problem. Then 
it is news from Turkey because Turkey directly affects us. And Turkish 
Cyprus is news for us, you know like electricity in Karpaz.38
Observations confirm these priorities which emphasise TRNC politics. Moreket
said politics are a top priority at the station due to three influences: pressures
from ownership, TAK’s prioritising of politics and his assumed audience
expectations. Firstly, owner Tatar is a daily presence at the station, involved in
many discussions with workers. Moreket claims,
Tatar likes political programmes. So we must do political shows, but he 
does not tell us what politics and politicians to use.
Though Tatar may not tell Moreket what politics to include, he is the owner and
manager of the station and the UBP’s Shadow Finance Minister. This dual role
no doubt influences Moreket’s decisions. Furthermore, Moreket’s personal
politics are nationalistic. These factors contribute to the prioritising of nationalist
politics.
Secondly, Moreket explained that politics are prioritised on Radyo T because he 
uses TAK to gather news. Most stories from TAK are about politics. Thirdly, 
Moreket assum es that listeners’ preferences prioritise politics. He said,
Everyone speaks about politics at the coffee shops, with friends. When 
we ask people what type of programmes they want, they say politics.
V.3.ii.c.3 Influences on writing
Similar to KFM, influences at Radyo T are very much a one-sided affair. 
Newsroom manager Moreket for all intents and purposes is the news 
department. According to Moreket, what he writes into his stories taken from 
TAK feeds depends on two influences. Firstly, there is an emphasis on politics 
due to the owner’s affinity with politics. Moreket writes in politicians’ voices when 
“what they say is good for the nation.” Due to the station’s and Moreket’s politics, 
and the accessibility to UBP politicians, the voices he chooses are Turkish
38 Karpaz is an area of TRNC which at the time of writing had no electricity. There was a political and 
environmenatl debate as to whether to install electricity.
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nationalists’ voices. There is a second more practical influence in what is written 
from TAK feeds. Moreket said, “I wait for our cameraman, I look at the pictures 
and decide what works with the pictures.” So visuals help determine the 
narrative, an issue explored by Montgomery (2005: 244).
V. 3. //’. c. 4 Story De velopment
Writing at Radyo T is a relatively simple affair due to the small number of staff. 
Moreket cuts TAK feeds to the minimum, keeping whole paragraphs, eliminating 
others. He eliminates headlines, changes dates from ‘today’ to ‘last night’ and 
eliminates bi-lines. He changes words for clarity and replaces pronouns such as 
‘he’ with names. Sometimes he combines related stories from TAK to produce 
one story. He also uses the BRT website and visiting UBP politicians to 
supplement his work. When he finishes, he gives a copy of the script to the 
announcer to rehearse and a copy to the video editor who he supervises in the 
production of the news piece.
The writing of a story involving TRNC politicians was observed one day. Moreket 
started with the TAK feed. He then cut and pasted the same story from the BRT 
website. He inserted whole paragraphs from BRT. He said he did this to 
produce a more “readable” story. So genre-related considerations such as 
“readability” are part of the process of writing.
Editor-reporter Ozer’s “exclusive” stories also start with TAK. Though he claims 
his stories are “exclusives”, it was observed that he gets his ideas from TAK or 
A/TV. For example, he did a story about a visit by Turkish President Gul. This 
visit had been heavily covered by TAK and all TRNC media.
Ozer’s stories generally support Radyo T politics, transforming TAK stories into 
stories which support Turkish nationalist ideology. For example, two women 
protested against Turkey’s links to TRNC by demonstrating during Giil’s visit. 
Though this exemplified anti-Turkey politics, Radyo T changed this. The story 
was made comical by the use of double speed on the women’s voices and 
actions, comical editing so the women repeated themselves and light-hearted 
music. The women were made to look foolish, thereby confirming support for Gul
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and Turkish politicians. The story involved Moreket’s prior approval and his help 
in the video editing process, ensuring the story maintained the station’s Turkish 
nationalist politics.
V.3.H.C.5 Editing
All editing and control in the newsroom is through newsroom manager Moreket. 
He writes almost all stories. Ozer’s exclusive stories have to get Moreket’s idea, 
script, shot and editing approval before they are aired. In fact, Moreket has a 
hand in all video editing, sitting in on the cutting of stories and advising the video 
editor which shots to use and when.
Mentoring also plays a part in the newsroom, whether over coffee or whilst 
making decisions about stories. For example, one morning, Moreket and Tatar 
were in a heated discussion about the failings of pro-federation CTP. A video 
editor, cameraman and a few others did not contribute to the conversation. 
Instead, they listened attentively, shaking their heads and occasionally grunting 
in agreement. Throughout this newsroom’s observations, these junior 
employees reiterated the sam e politics to this researcher who was considered 
the most junior person at the station. No doubt these political discussions not 
only make clear to workers the politics of their superiors, they also play a role in 
decisions they make whilst constructing news stories.
V.4 Conclusion
This chapter has described radio stations’ political and economic contexts, news 
gathering and news writing practices. It has shown how all three of these 
aspects of newsrooms are a factor in determining the different ideological 
discourses in TRNC news stories.
For example, BRTFs newscasts are influenced by its mandate to promote TRNC, 
its answerability to the government and other power groups, its over-staffing and 
its lack of resources. Its reliance on TAK is supplemented by BRTs own 
reporters for newsgathering and news writing. These practices along with 
perceived pressures from politicians and management, control mechanisms and
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mentoring ail contribute to ‘the feeling’ news workers experience when writing 
news stories. This ‘feeling’ determines how news workers recontextualise events 
which draw upon ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism.
KFM and Radyo T s newscasts, likewise, are also influenced by their relations 
with political parties, the political perspective (or lack of political interest) of news 
workers and management, their lack of staff and resources. Their reliance on 
TAK for news gathering and writing about “what is good for the nation”, however, 
evoke very different national discourses in news stories.
All three stations claim to write news not as an objective account of events, but 
interpretations of “what is good for the nation” or what will “help find a solution to 
the Cyprus problem”. This ethnography has demonstrated that stations’ different 
situations, institutions and social structures affect what is read out on TRNC radio 
news. With this knowledge, the next few chapters’ analysis of station’s 
competing variants of Turkish nationalism is informed by knowing how, why and 
where this ideology comes from in its production context.
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VI Lokmaci-Ledra Gate Opening Analysis
VI.1 Introduction
Up to 1956, Ledra Street in the centre of Nicosia was a popular shopping and 
socialising district for all Cypriots and Britons. Its popularity with Britons and
39Turkish Cypriots faded when EOKA started using the crowded street for 
attacks. Later, with an escalation in intercommunal violence in 1958, local 
Turkish Cypriots withdrew to the North of Nicosia, and the street was divided with 
a barricade at a sweet shop, known as a “Lokmaci”. Lokmaci, as the barricade 
became known, was the first erected in Cyprus dividing the two communities and 
became a symbol of division (BRTI, 03.04.08).
The barricade was dismantled during the time of the shared Republic from 1960 
to 1963. With the end of the shared Republic came the end of both Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots inhabiting the whole island. In 1963, Turkish Cypriots withdrew 
to enclaves throughout the island, one being in North Nicosia. Various streets 
which ran between the northern and southern part of the city, including Ledra 
Street, were blockaded. This time, Lokmaci was blocked and sealed for 45 
years, with the UN patrolling the blockade separating Greeks from Turks.
After Cyprus w as divided in 1974, there were no legal ways of crossing between 
the two sides. Division was ensured by the military from both sides of the island 
and the UN. The area surrounding Lokmaci declined in popularity to the point 
where it supported very little trade or visitors.
The first crossing to be opened between the Republic and TRNC was the Ledra 
Palace Hotel crossing in Nicosia on 23 April 2003. It is fifteen minutes walk from 
the centre of Nicosia, making it inconvenient for many residents who wish to 
cross. Four more have been opened since. These are vehicle crossings in non- 
urban areas spread out along the border. It took four years of negotiations 
between the TRNC and the Republic’s governments before the Lokmaci
39 EOKA was the Greek Cypriot armed militia which aimed to liberate Cyprus from British colonial rule 
and join Cyprus with Greece politically.
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barricade was dismantled to be replaced by a small pedestrian crossing on 3 
April 2008.
Along with the opening of the crossing, much money and preparations went into 
rejuvenating the area with the expectation of economic benefits. Shops were 
opened, pavements were mended and cafes appeared in preparation for visitors 
from both sides of Cyprus. Lokmaci is seen as unique, being in a central location 
in Nicosia and being only a few metres long (some crossings are more than one 
kilometre long). This makes it easy to pass between the two sides. As a 
pedestrian crossing, the atmosphere of the crossing is more relaxed. Its 
narrowness keeps with the character of the area, old Ottoman two-floored 
buildings rising above cluttered, narrow streets.
The crossing has proven to be popular, re-uniting residents from the two 
communities in this area again. According to a 2009 survey, the opening has led 
to an increase in social contact between the two communities, an increase in the 
frequency residents of both states cross to the other side and a revitalisation of 
both local areas’ economies.40
The opening of the Lokmaci crossing point was a celebrated success for pro­
federation enthusiasts and political parties, especially TRNC’s CTP government. 
Its opening was one of a number of pro-federation moves by CTP, such as 
participating in co-community technical groups, engaging in UN peace talks and 
opening up other crossings between the two states. These are seen as part of 
its ultimate aim of a single Cypriot federation.
VI. 1.i Lokmaci Media coverage
BRTI, KFM, and Radyo T gave Lokmaci extensive coverage. In the week of its 
opening (31 March to 5 April 2008), Lokmaci appeared in main newscast stories 
seven times on BRTI, thirteen times on KFM and eight times on Radyo T.
Events covered were preparations to the area, the opening ceremony,
40 This survey was perfonned by the independent all-Cypriot PRIO Cyprus Centre research organisation. 
Downloaded 18 April 2009 http://www.prio.no/upload/EN%20PRESS%20RELEASE LEDRA- 
LOKMACI%2 0CRQSSING.doc
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international responses to the opening, a three hour closure and a protest. All 
stations appear to allow these events to be represented positively, possibly due 
to public opinion which on the whole was in favour of the opening. However, pro­
solution discourses are mostly omitted. When they are present, they serve as a 
pretext to be negative. Van Dijk (1993:7) notes this strategy when examining 
texts about race. He finds that because negative talk about minorities may be 
heard as racist “such talk will often be accompanied by disclaimers [...] as in the 
case in such well-known formulas as ‘I have nothing against blacks (Turks, etc.) 
b u t In this case, pro-solution discourses play the role of the disclaimer.
Analysis of the language of the texts reveals that each station shapes its 
coverage slightly differently. Stations subtly use their coverage of events as an 
opportunity to promote their own ideas and interests about the nature of Cyprus, 
TRNC and its condition. This allows even a story that on one level appears to be 
pro-solution to be shaped to subtly foreground its negative aspects.
Stations recontextualise events about Lokmaci’s opening which evoke differing 
ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriotness. BRTI stories realise 
discourses which benefit its pro-federation interests such as the CTP 
government, but also its Turkish nationalist interests, such as the Turkish military. 
BRTI editor Meryem Dagun said she and all editors feel they must consider both 
pro and anti-solution participants in the Cyprus conflict when writing. Editor 
Yurdakul Cafer said ‘the feeling’ he experiences when writing is reinforced by the 
direct control of scripts by his supervisors, such as Dagun.
KFM news stories recontextualise events in ways which signify discourses of 
unquestionable CTP governance at the expense of discourses of unity, 
cooperation and compromise. Radyo T stories draw upon discourses from UBP 
Turkish nationalist ideology. These recontextualisations arise not as a result of 
individual journalistic bias but as a result of stations’ closeness to political parties 
and newsroom practices. These ideological messages are almost automatic in 
fashion, with news workers themselves unaware of how their practices become 
political. Editor Ekinci said KFM news is not politically biased and Radyo T editor
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Moreket said his news does not favour any party, though both these claims are 
refuted in this analysis.
The opening of Lokmaci could reasonably have been represented as a positive, 
celebrated event which re-united aspects of Cyprus, a stepping stone on the way 
to a solution to the Cyprus conflict. One could imagine the way this would have 
been covered in a North Atlantic news outlet, framed sentimentally as ‘one 
people’ coming together, where differences were essentially superficial or existed 
only as imposed by politicians and bureaucrats, returning the area to how it 
should be. Such reports would carry short vox pop interviews with people mixing 
and chatting in cafes, where they would say how happy they are and how natural 
it all feels. However, these chances are lost. Instead, the three stations 
recontextualise the opening so that it is an event that is used and shaped for their 
respective ideological interests. In each case, the events are used to signify 
discourses which support interests closely associated with each station and not 
settlements on Cyprus.
VI. 1.ii Chapter’s structure and analytical approach
This chapter examines the way each station covered events about the opening of 
Lokmaci border crossing point. BRTI stories are analysed, followed by KFM and 
finally Radyo T.41 Three aspects of the sample are explored. In part one, a short 
extract from each station’s coverage of a temporary closure of Lokmaci is 
examined. Following Fairclough (2003: 10, 52, 136), an extract is analysed to 
determine who are the participants shaping events, how listeners perceive of 
them, understand their identities and what their actions mean. This 
demonstrates how the same basic sequence of events, such as the temporary 
closure of Lokmaci, can be placed into different discourses about Turkish Cypriot 
nationalism.
In part two, the representation of governance in TRNC and the Republic is 
analysed using the whole sample of stories. This is another common approach
41 See appendix 9a for original scripts from BRTI, appendix 9b for original scripts and translations from 
KFM and appendix 9c for original scripts and translations from Radyo T.
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used by practitioners of CDA, identifying lexical and grammatical strategies used 
across a wide sample to reveal dominant discourses (Flowerdew and Leong, 
2007; Higgins, 2004; Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; van Dijk, 1991). This analysis 
illustrates how each station represents leadership in their nation and the 
Republic. It also reveals the nature of relations between the two states’ 
governments, a contested part of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. This analysis 
reveals that the way governance is represented reflects the different interests 
associated with each station.
In part three, who and what are being governed in TRNC and the Republic are 
examined. This illustrates who and what each station includes in their concept of 
a Turkish Cypriot nation and the Republic, each slightly different and each 
reflecting interests associated with each station.
Together, these three analyses reveal how each station recontextualises events 
which signify ideological discourses about the nation. These discourses benefit 
power-holding interests closely associated with each station, with little regard for 
the interests of other TRNC residents. Overall, these three levels of analysis are 
necessary to see  the type of Turkish Cypriot nation each station represents in 
terms of governance, its governed and relations with the Republic whilst 
representing an event.
VI.2 Lokm aci’s  Temporary Closure: Extract Analysis
Lokmaci was opened on 3 April 2008. That same evening the Republic’s 
authorities closed pedestrian traffic one way for three hours. The Republic’s 
authorities claimed that a TRNC police patrol had entered the crossing in 
violation of Lokmaci agreements. TRNC officials claimed the police patrol had a 
right to be where it was. The UN mediated a solution and the Republic’s 
authorities re-opened traffic.
On 4 April, all stations reported the closure. This extract analysis examines this 
coverage. This event could have been framed as an example of how small 
misunderstandings between the two communities, such as the positioning of a
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police patrol, can be resolved through negotiations, which was in fact what 
actually took place. None of the stations emphasised the teamwork and 
negotiations needed to re-open Lokmaci. When asked specifically about the 
event, BRTFs Chief Editor Ali Demerioglu demonstrated the influence of 
journalists’ personal politics by saying he saw the closure as a typical example of 
the Republic being untrustworthy, so it was written as such. These sentiments 
and others are part of the stations’ stories which highlight participants closely 
associated with each station and their actions. Though satisfying stations’ 
interests, differences between the two states are emphasised. In fact, Radyo T 
represents the Republic as a dangerous foe. These representations draw upon 
different discourses of a Turkish Cypriot nation at the expense of discourses of 
unity, compromise and cooperation, discourses conducive to finding solutions on 
Cyprus.
VI.2.iBRTI
Analysis of the BRTI story shows that journalists recontextualise the closing of 
Lokmaci in ways which clearly reveal how power holders associated with BRT 
influence scripts. On the one hand, positive discourses about CTP governance 
are signified. On the other hand, a distinct Turkish Cypriot nation and an 
oppositional Republic are represented, far more in line with Turkish nationalist 
thinking. The following is the opening five sentences from the BRTI story:
1. The crossings at Lokmaci-Ledra Border Gate are continuing between 
the two sides in Cyprus despite a brief closure of the gate late on 
Thursday.
2. The gate - which was opened to crossings yesterday morning -  was 
closed by the Greek Cypriot Side at around 8:30 with a claim that Turkish 
Cypriot police violated the buffer zone.
3. The crossing was reopened around three hours later after mediation by 
UN officials.
4. President Mehmet Ali Talat has said that Thursday’s developments at 
Lokmaci were an isolated incident that should not be exaggerated.
5. Speaking at Ercan Airport on his return from Istanbul, President Talat 
reminded that the Turkish Cypriot Side has been working since 2005 for 
the opening of the gate, (my numbering)
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It can be seen from this extract that there are some pro-solution lexical choices. 
Unfortunately, these choices act as little more than a disclaimer for a number of 
features which indicate BRTI support for the CTP government, the police (which 
aids in representing the Republic negatively) and a distinct TRNC nation while 
representing the Republic as an oppositional ‘other’.
My experience in the BRTI newsroom showed the extent to which pro-federation 
and Turkish nationalist interests are both part of news-making decisions. Before 
2003, according to editor Cafer, the latter had been most influential at BRT in 
terms of “attacking the Republic” in news due to Turkish nationalist UBP’s grip on 
power. This dominance dissipated somewhat after the election of pro-federation 
CTP, though like most civil services, Turkish nationalism continued at both 
institutional and individual journalists’ levels.42 Editor Dagun said these interests 
contribute to ‘the feeling’ writers experience when writing, trying “not to offend” 
TRNC power holders. Personal politics also play a role. One editor claimed that 
pro-solution lexical choices are not a conscious decision when he writes. 
However, after he was presented with my analysis of some of his choices in 
stories, he said his pro-federation politics indeed were an important influence on 
his lexical and grammatical decisions 43 For example, naming Lokmaci the 
“Lokmaci-Ledra Border Gate” (as discussed below) was not a conscious pro­
federation decision, but felt “natural” to him at the time.
In this extract, a few pro-solution lexical choices are used. One example is 
positively naming Lokmaci a “crossing” in sentence one, two and three, 
connoting a place to pass through. This is in contrast to “gate” which is the most 
common naming of Lokmaci on all stations. Though this word seem s to be an 
arbitrary choice, it connotes separation. A gate is something which can be
Interview with Bekir Azgin on 25 May 2009, professor of Journalism at Eastern Mediterranean 
University and author of numerous academic articles about TRNC and Cypriot media. Bekir Azgin stated 
that all civil services in TRNC are mostly Turkish nationalist due to 40 years of UBP and Turkish military 
governance.
43 The editor was shown some of his lexical choices and he commented as such on 19.09.09. He did not 
want to be named as the government at this time changed to Turkish nationalist UBP, which has a direct 
say in affair at the station.
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closed to separate two distinct places. It reminds listeners of a border, an exit 
out of TRNC and an entrance to another place.
Another pro-solution naming is “Lokmaci-Ledra Border Gate” in line one. Here, 
the Greek Cypriot name for the crossing point and the area is included, informing 
listeners of the ‘other place’, the area on the other side of the border. This 
acknowledges the crossing point indeed goes to the Greek Cypriot Republic. 
Unfortunately, this is the only mention of “Ledra” used on the stations throughout 
the whole corpus of stories. Elsewhere it is suppressed. These namings 
(“crossing” and “Ledra”) draw upon discourses of compromise and possibly 
cooperation, appealing to journalists and power groups which have an interest in 
finding a solution to the Cyprus conflict. However, these are the exception, 
acting as little more than a pretext for more dominant discourses.
In this extract we find one dominant discourse is support for the CTP. Though 
BRTs Chief News Coordinator Huseyin Guven said a BRT priority is following 
the government, editor Cafer said editors do not consciously support the 
government. Their support is a result of using TAK, aiming to please CTP 
supporting management and prioritising government activities.
Positive representation of the CTP can be seen in both lexical and grammatical 
choices. In terms of lexical choices the government is named personally as 
“President Mehmet Ali Talat” and “President Talat”. Personal representations 
highlight human aspects of the government. Naming the government offers 
listeners a point of identification, showing BRTI’s empathy with the CTP (van 
Leeuwen, 1996: 48). The functional honorific “President” highlights function and 
importance (ibid.: 53). Generally, all of the stations name actors formally with 
functional honorifics once in each story whereas in this extract, President Talat is 
named with functional honorifics twice. This positive naming emphasises Talat’s 
function and importance, showing BRTFs support for the CTP. This is in contrast 
to the Republic’s government which is named “the Greek Cypriot side”, neither 
human nor official just a “side”.
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At the level of grammatical choices we find that the CTP is represented as 
powerful, important and hard working. This is achieved by President Talat being 
activated twice in verbal processes. In sentence four, he is placed in dominant 
beginning of sentence position. In sentence five, he is placed in the dominant 
beginning of phrase position. These sentence positions foreground Talat, while 
activating him represents Talat as a participant with power (van Dijk, 1991: 216).
The government is also activated through the use of a segment of reported 
speech from Talat in sentence five. Here Talat activates the government in “has 
been working" at opening Lokmaci. The choice of activating the government is a 
reflection of BRTF s obligation to follow the government and report its statements, 
which inevitably represent the government positively. This particular action is a 
distillation abstraction (van Leeuwen, 1999: 99). It does not really explain what 
the government has been doing, nevertheless it conveys a sense of agency, 
responsibility and planning. In fact, many question whether some government 
activities have been working at opening Lokmaci.44 Critics and even members of 
the CTP government itself have admitted not spending enough time and energy 
in working for solutions 45 However, by abstracting actions, Talat is able to 
represent the CTP favourably. This draws upon discourses of the CTP being 
TRNC’s pro-solution and hard-working government, satisfying BRTI’s close links 
to the Prime Minister’s office.
BRTFs representation of the closure of Lokmaci is also recontextualised to 
positively represent the CTP through collocations. A positive representation of 
Lokmaci shows support for the CTP, since the opening was an event the CTP 
claimed as pro-solution. A positive theme is achieved through collocating 
Lokmaci with “continuing” in sentence one, “opened” in sentence two and “re­
opened” in sentence three. These all appear in dominant sentence positions, 
emphasising this positive theme. “Closure” is also collocated with Lokmaci in
44 The CTP constructed a footbridge for Turkish soldiers to cross over the Lokmaci crossing. This caused a 
long delay in opening the crossing. Negotiations stopped until the bridge was dismantled.
45 Nazim Beralti, CTP’s minister for ideology, claimed CTP had wasted too much time and energy on 
matters not to do with finding a solution to the Cyprus conflict the first four years it was in government.
This was said to me in my interview with him in 2008.
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sentence one, though modified as “a brief closure”. We can see this is in a 
clause in the non-dominant end of sentence position, de-emphasising it (van Dijk, 
1991: 216). In sentence five, Talat is cited as uttering “developments at Lokmaci 
were an isolated incident”. “Developments” is an abstraction of Lokmaci’s 
closure. By abstracting its closure and it being “an isolated incident”, the closure 
is de-emphasised, made out to be unimportant. The result of these collocations 
is that Lokmaci is represented in a positive light, while its closure is de­
emphasised.
The extract also shows that BRTI supports the TRNC police reflecting the 
relationship between the police and BRTI. The Turkish military are in charge of 
the TRNC police. The military also have a member on BRTs governing board, 
influencing all major decisions. Though direct intervention is rare, BRTI editor 
Dagun said the military is one participant she considers when writing the news.
So representing the police positively satisfies the military which has a controlling 
voice in both institutions.
In this extract, the police “violated the buffer zone”, a negative action. However, 
this is slightly concealed by grammatical strategies. Van Dijk (1991: 216) claims 
sentence position and embedded clauses are used to de-emphasise in-group 
negative actions. In this case we find that in sentence two, “police violating the 
buffer zone” is de-emphasised by being placed at the end of a long sentence in 
an embedded clause. Furthermore, the clause is preceded by “with a claim”. 
“Claim” can shed doubt on a proposition (White, 2006: 62; Caldas-Coulthard, 
1994: 295). So the whole idea of police negative actions is thrown into doubt, 
drawing upon a discourse of support for TRNC police.
In the extract we also find evidence of the way that BRTI shows its support for 
the idea of a distinct Turkish Cypriot nation, independent of the Republic. When 
asked why TRNC is promoted in BRTPs stories, Chief Editor Demerioglu said this 
is an obligation as  outlined in TRNC’s BRTK Law. Editor Gorcin said mentioning 
the nation in stories has become second nature to her in order to satisfy 
managerial expectations. This emphasis on the nation is seen in line two and
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five where the police and government are named “Turkish Cypriot”. These 
namings remind listeners that their police and government are “Turkish Cypriot”, 
not “Greek” or “Cypriot”. The government’s naming furthers the idea of 
difference by being named a “side”. In fact, “side” is used twice in this short 
extract. A “side” carries connotations of opponents in a game or war.
It is not only the reminder of TRNC’s very existence as an entity that is found in 
this extract, but its struggle for recognition. This is seen in the fact that “Ercan 
Airport” is named. Ercan is the only passenger airport in TRNC. It is not 
internationally recognised as a legal port of entry to Cyprus except by Turkey and 
TRNC and is therefore in violation of the 1944 Chicago convention on 
International Civil Aviation which dictates that only airports under the Republic’s 
jurisdiction on Cyprus are legitimate. This is because the Republic is the only 
internationally recognised authority on Cyprus. Despite this unrecognised status, 
Ercan boasts being the destination for 90 flights a week. In this way, it has 
become a symbol of defiance against the Republic’s claims of authority over the 
whole island and TRNC’s struggle for recognition. Including Ercan Airport 
reminds listeners of TRNC’s struggle and partial successes.
W hereas the TRNC’s government and its actions are foregrounded and 
represented positively in this extract, lexical choices representing the Republic 
are negative, while its actions are suppressed. Lexical choices represent an 
oppositional ‘other’. The Republic’s government is named once in sentence two 
as “the Greek Cypriot Side”. This is an impersonal representation, de­
emphasising its human aspects (Fairclough, 2003: 149). At the sam e time, 
naming it “Greek Cypriot” emphasizes the government’s ‘otherness’, though less 
than when the simplification of “Greek” is used, as is the case on the other two 
stations. An oppositional ‘other’ is suggested by using “side”. It could have been 
named as ‘the government of Cyprus’ which would have minimised difference 
and backgrounded opposition. Instead, these namings evoke discourses of an 
oppositional ‘other’.
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In this extract, in contrast to the TRNC government and its actions being 
emphasised, there are a number of strategies used to background the Republic’s 
agency and visibility as a participant, moving it sometimes into abstraction. In 
sentence one, the Republic is not named, but inferred in the clause “despite a 
brief closure of the gate”. This clause, in a near-end sentence position, does not 
mention who is responsible for the closure. This is made clear in sentence two. 
Here, “the gate” is in a dominant sentence position, emphasising it. The action of 
“was closed” is a passive construction which de-emphasises agency. Only after 
these are identified is the Republic named and de-emphasised in a non-dominant 
sentence position within a prepositional phrase. This construction identifies the 
Republic and its actions negatively, but is less negative than the activation “the 
Republic closed the gate” (van Dijk, 1991: 216). By BRTI clouding agency in 
negative actions, discourses about the Republic being negative are less clear, 
drawing upon discourses of compromise.
However, BRTI also backgrounds the Republic when involved in positive actions 
with TRNC. In sentence one we find “The crossings at Lokmaci-Ledra Border 
Gate are continuing”. Here, the actions of the two sides to re-open the gate after 
“a brief closure” are suppressed. This suppression is achieved through a passive 
agentless sentence construction which obscures agency; that is, the action of re­
opening the gate so that crossings can continue is not represented. The same 
agentless construction is used in sentence three, suppressing the two 
governments working together to “reopen” Lokmaci.
By suppressing positive actions of the Republic working with TRNC, editor 
Cafer’s comment that “We don’t attack the other side [the Republic] as much as 
we used to [before the election of the CTP]” is reminded. The resultant 
discourses suppress the idea of the two Cypriot sides working together making it 
difficult for listeners to imagine the Republic engaged in positive actions.
VI.2M KFM
It was revealed that the BRTI extract positively represents the CTP, TRNC and 
its police while suppressing the actions and negatively representing the Republic.
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KFM's treatment of the closure is similar, though differs by representing the 
closing in ways far more beneficial to its CTP-supporting owners and interests. 
Different kinds of foregrounding, suppression and agency evoke discourses of 
not only CTP support, but personality politics. The story begins as:
1. President Mehmet Ali Talat finished his meetings in Istanbul and 
returned back to the island.
2. From Ercan airport, he commented to reporters yesterday morning, we 
opened the Lokmaci gate with a ceremony and last night at 20:30 Greeks 
closed the gates one way.”
3. Talat said, this development, “its an old hinderance mirrored today.”
4. President Mehmet Ali Talat said Greeks closed the Lokmaci gate one 
way.
5. It did not happen on the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek side is 
mirroring the old barriers, (my numbering)
It can be seen from this extract that the KFM  story supports the CTP government
and especially Talat more than BRTl. It does not show this type of support for
the nation, the UBP, the Republic or a Cypriot federation. These are either
backgrounded, used as a backdrop for CTP actions, or represented negatively.
Despite KFM  support for the CTP, this extract omits most CTP policies. These 
policies include the aim of creating a Cypriot federation evident by CTP 
statements and some cooperation with the Republic despite a chronic lack of 
mutual trust. This extract’s omission of CTP policies is a result of newsroom 
practices and culture. On the one hand, KFM  editors such as Ekinci said their 
news prioritises “what is good for the nation”, not politicians and politics. On the 
other hand, my ethnography revealed that news is highly political because 
editors rely heavily on the government-run TAK news agency for both news 
gathering and writing within a CTP-friendly newsroom context. Though TAK 
mostly covers government events, it has retained many of its Turkish nationalist 
tendencies.46 This results in news which foregrounds the government and its
46 Cypriot media scholar Dr. Bekir Azgin in an interview 28 May 2009 said that TAK, like most civil 
services have retained their Turkish nationalist tendencies due to 40 years of Turkish and Turkish 
nationalist UBP answerability, despite the CTP coming to power.
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activities while many of its political policies such as its aim of a Cypriot federation 
are omitted, as is evident in this extract.
Like BRTI, KFM  shows support for CTP. It differs in representing the CTP more 
positively and Talat as the CTP party itself. These differences are achieved 
using a variety of strategies. Firstly, lexical choices are used. The government is 
represented personally only, highlighting its human side. Talat is named five 
times in these five sentences, while BRTI only names him twice. He is twice 
named formally with functional honorifics as “President Mehmet Ali Talat” and 
once formally as “Talat”. If KFM  had named him semi-formally such as “Mehmet 
Ali Talat” or informally such as “Mehmet Ali” this would have suggested less 
importance and respect, but possibly more closeness. However, the sheer 
number of positive functional and formal namings create an impression of an 
important president deserving respect.
Secondly, grammatical strategies contribute to CTP and Talat support more than 
seen on BRTI. Talat is activated five times in a variety of process types, 
compared to only twice verbally on BRTI. Talat is important enough to “finish” 
meetings abroad, “return” to Cyprus in sentence one, “comment” to reporters in 
sentence two, and make comments in sentences three and four. Within Talat’s 
reported speech which KFM  chose to represent in sentence two, Talat and the 
government are attributed with the action process of ‘W e opened the Lokmaci 
gate”. These actions realise discourses about a powerful, pro-solution Talat and 
CTP, more than BRTI.
Thirdly, support for the CTP is represented through collocations. The CTP is 
collocated with “opened Lokmaci gate with a ceremony” in sentence two. 
Representing the opening as an important enough government success to 
warrant a ceremony emphasises Lokmaci’s importance and significance . 
Together, these strategies evoke discourses which envision a nation steered by 
the CTP.
Unlike the BRTI extract, this extract contains presuppositions that serve to 
represent the Turkish nationalist UBP negatively. In sentence three, Talat is
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cited as describing the closure of Lokmaci as “an old hinderance mirrored today”. 
In sentence five, “the Greek side is mirroring the old barriers.” These utterances 
presuppose that there were hinderances and barriers in the past, a pre-CTP 
past, before 2003 when the Turkish nationalist UBP were in power. These 
utterances associate “barriers” and “hinderances” with the UBP by the Republic 
“mirroring” the UBP past. These utterances evoke both discourses of a dark 
TRNC past with the UBP and discourses of support for the CTP who remove 
barriers and hinderances.
KFM names only two aspects of its nation other than the CTP: Ercan airport and 
Lokmaci. This is contrast to BRTI which emphasises “Turkish Cypriotness” in its 
recontextualisation of Lokmaci’s closure. By minimally representing the TRNC 
nation and de-emphasising its “Turkish Cypriotness”, alternative ways of 
representing a different form of nation seem natural. This reflects CTP desires 
for a re-imagining of nationalism, such as a federation.
Unfortunately, an alternative nation is not represented, only division. Like BRTI, 
division is reminded by the lexical choices of “side” which connotes opposition 
and “Ercan” which suggests struggle for recognition. Lokmaci is also 
represented extensively, showing KFM  support for this government success. 
However, division is reminded by Lokmaci being named as a “gate”, lexically 
severing Cyprus in two. More positive lexical choices seen on BRTI such as 
“crossing” and “Lokmaci-Ledra crossing” are omitted. Together, these lexical 
choices realise discourses about division even more than seen on BRTI.
Lexical choices in this extract also make it difficult to imagine compromise and a 
Cypriot federation, a CTP policy aim. The Republic is named “Greeks” and “the 
Greek side". Unlike BRTI, these namings do not include the common “Cypriot” 
naming. This evokes discourses about an ‘other’ “Greek” group on the other 
“side”.
Grammatically the Republic is represented as powerful, but acting against the 
CTP. For example, in sentences two and four “Greeks closed the gate”. KFM  
chose to write this as an action process, and write it twice in this extract. Action
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processes carry connotations of power and control (Fairclough, 1995a: 113). 
Representing a powerful Republic performing negative actions twice evokes 
discourses about a worrisome oppositional Republic, far more than on BRTI 
which uses passive constructions. This negative representation of the Republic 
is contrary to CTP policies which promote a federal solution to the Cyprus 
conflict.
W.2./7/ Radyo T
Unlike the two previous extracts which positively represent the CTP and 
negatively represent the Republic, Radyo T s treatment of the closure differs 
considerably. Despite newsroom manager Moreket’s assertion that news does 
not favour the UBP, the Radyo T story represents the closing in ways which 
clearly reveal a Turkish Cypriot nation from a UBP Turkish nationalist perspective 
which favours a TRNC independent of the Republic with close ties to Turkey.47 
The story begins as:
1. The Greek administration said the pedestrian crossing at Lokmaci gate 
in Nicosia had one way traffic for three hours before opening again.
2. “Its to be expected” and the Greeks think they compromised by opening 
the gate.
3. Related with this topic, an Anadola reporter talked with a TRNC 
authority: Greeks think “Its to be expected”.
4. Greeks have an aim to give the Turkish area to UN control.
5. He thought that “all manoeuvres on it” are part of a game and “if it is not 
given to UN control, they will close.” (my numbering)
It can be seen from this extract that Radyo T supports Turkish nationalists and a
Turkish TRNC nation while the Republic is represented as not only an ‘other’, as
is the case on the other stations, but as a dangerous enemy.
Key to understanding this text is the sources used. The primary source is “a 
TRNC authority” and the secondary source is “an Anadola reporter”. My 
ethnography taught me that the “TRNC authority” is a Turkish nationalist and
4 Mehmet Moreket was the manager and editor at Radyo T during this research. He acknowledged that the 
news was political, but claimed that the news was written with “what is good for the nation” as a priority 
and not what was best for the UBP.
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most likely a UBP politician because many frequent the station. By not naming 
the source, Radyo T clouds the source’s political affiliations and represents the 
source as official, neutral and not politically biased. This allows Radyo T to 
promote nationalist views, but represent them as politically neutral.
The autonomous reporter is from the ‘Anadolu News Agency’, a much used and 
respected wire service for Turkish news internationally. Identifying a reporter 
from this respected news agency as a secondary source adds credibility to their 
comments and to the story.
In this extract we find evidence of Radyo T support for Turkish nationalists as 
leaders of the nation, not the CTP as is the case in the other two extracts. This is 
achieved by excluding the CTP and representing nationalists personally as “a 
TRNC authority” . This is a functional representation which emphasises role and 
importance. An ‘authority’ connotes the source is knowledgeable about TRNC, 
adding legitimacy to his Turkish nationalist claims.
This extract also reveals that nationalist beliefs are given support through the use 
of sources. It has been demonstrated that source choices are ideological by 
giving voice to some people instead of others, reflecting power structures and 
cultural beliefs of media writers (White, 2006: 58, Fairclough, 1995; Caldas- 
Coulthard, 1994: 304). In this extract, the Turkish nationalist ‘authority’ is named 
and activated as the source twice. Both activations attribute the ‘authority’ with 
nationalist beliefs such as the Republic is untrustworthy in sentence three and 
wants to give control of parts of TRNC to the UN in sentence five. Newsroom 
manager Moreket said he gives voice to politicians if what they say is “good for 
the nation”. In this extract, these politician’s utterances reflect Turkish nationalist 
politics and what Turkish nationalists think is good for the nation.
In this text, it can also be seen how the nation is represented in ways which 
reflect a Turkish nationalist perspective. Firstly, Lokmaci is only named once in 
this extract. On BRTI and KFM  “Lokmaci” is named twice each in their extracts. 
This is part of Radyo T’s strategy of playing down the importance of Lokmaci, by
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naming it less often. It is played down because the opening of Lokmaci was a 
CTP government success, thus against UBP interests.
Another aspect of Turkish nationalist ideology revealed in this extract is Turkey’s 
closeness to TRNC, not seen on the other stations. Part of the negotiations 
between the Republic and TRNC before opening Lokmaci involved allocating 
and claiming responsibilities and control of the no-man’s land surrounding 
Lokmaci. The Republic wanted the UN to control no-man’s land, while TRNC 
wanted to give the Turkish army control. Negotiations led to part of the area 
being controlled by Turkish Cypriot police under the jurisdiction of the Turkish 
army and part of the area under the control of the UN. Radyo T describes this 
area under TRNC police control as “the Turkish area”, not the Turkish Cypriot’ 
area. This slippage between the two terms blurs the lines between TRNC and 
mainland Turkey. This is a reflection of Turkish nationalist politics which 
considers Turkish Cypriots Turkish people who live on Cyprus, a sentiment 
expressed repeatedly by newsroom manager Moreket. By naming the area “the 
Turkish area”, a discourse of sameness and unity amongst Turkish Cyprus and 
Turkey is signified.
Like the other two stations, the Republic’s government is the only aspect of the 
Republic named. It is never referred to by its recognised name. Instead, it is 
referred to in this extract as “the Greek Administration”. An ‘administration’ is an 
entity with far less prestige than a ‘government’. An ‘administration’ does not 
recognise the Government of Cyprus as the sole authority in Cyprus, a position 
held by both the CTP and the UBP. For this reason an ‘administration’ is used by 
all stations, though only appears in the present Radyo T extract.
Radyo T differs from the other stations in how it represents the Republic, 
drawing on UBP discourses of a “Greek” oppositional ‘they’ out-group more than 
the other stations. This is achieved in two ways. Firstly, like KFM, the 
government is named “Greek" omitting the common “Cypriot” naming. Secondly, 
Radyo T names the Republic “th e /’. This popular lexical choice on Radyo T 
realises discourses about difference, constructing a Turkish in-group and a
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Greek out-group (Fairclough, 2003: 150). This clearly demarcates who is a part 
of Radyo T s nation. As owner Tatar said, “There are two nations on Cyprus: 
Turks and Greeks.”
Grammatical strategies emphasise not only difference, but the Republic as an 
enemy reflecting UBP policies which want full independence from it. The 
Republic is activated in various process types performing acts against TRNC 
interests in each sentence. This is different than BRTI which uses passive 
sentence constructions in lines one, two and three when representing actions of 
the Republic, and KFM  which activates the Republic twice in lines two and four. 
So, Radyo T represents the Republic as being far more powerful than on the 
other stations.
This is seen in sentence one where the Republic is activated verbally with the 
bad news of Lokmaci closing. By collocating the Republic with ‘bad news’, 
Radyo T writers contribute to a negative theme associated with the Republic 
(Fairclough, 2001: 95; Stubbs, 1995: 47; Kjellmer, 1994: xiv; Sinclair, 1991: 117).
The Republic is attributed with three mental processes and one action process, 
all counter to Lokmaci, a solution and TRNC itself. In sentences two through 
five, “Greeks think they compromised”, “Greeks think ‘Its to be expected’”, they 
“aim to give the Turkish area to UN control” and “will close” Lokmaci. Possibly 
the most threatening activation is aiming to give control of TRNC to the UN, 
threatening the nation’s very sovereignty. These negative thoughts and aims 
echo the sentiments and fears of nationalists.
While these actions realise discourses about the Republic as an enemy, they are 
multi-layered and their accuracy should be treated as dubious (Caldas-Coulthard, 
1994: 304). For example, in sentence three, Radyo T reports that a reporter 
spoke with an authority who describes what Greeks “think”.
The Republic is also attributed, though multi-layered again, with using the 
metaphor of Lokmaci as a game in sentence five. The game is bleak indeed, 
their actions described as ‘manoeuvres’ carrying military connotations. This 
metaphor, the Republic’s actions within it and multi-layered sayings, thoughts
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and aims evoke discourses about a dangerous enemy. These utterances serve 
Radyo T well. By representing them as the enemy, UBP’s vision of a two-state 
solution seems natural.
W.2./V Extract Summary
This analysis has highlighted how stations recontextualised the closing of 
Lokmaci in ways which draw upon distinct ideological national discourses, each 
reflecting the interests of power holders associated with stations. In this extract, 
events surrounding the misunderstanding of where a police patrol found itself 
could have been constructed as an example of how through negotiations the two 
sides can solve problems. Instead, lexical and grammatical choices use the 
three hour closure of Lokmaci as an excuse to realise discourses of division, 
difference, opposition and even danger. This is despite stations’ claims to either 
be “helping to find solutions” or writing “what is good for the nation”.
On BRTI, traces of TRNC power groups’ interests, newsroom practices, 
journalists’ personal politics, BRTPs obligations towards the government and its 
legal obligations are all evident in its recontextualisation of the closure. BRTI 
represents the CTP personally, active, important and looking for solutions. 
Discourses about a Turkish Cypriot nation are evoked, drawing a border around 
who is in its nation. Residents are excluded while police and politicians are 
included, all Turkish Cypriot. Outside the nation is the Republic which is the 
Greek Cypriot ‘other’. Though it is responsible for negative actions and shared 
positive actions, it is difficult to imagine due to suppression and passive 
constructions. Some lexical choices (“Ledra” and “crossing”) and the Republic 
being attributed with vague positive actions evoke discourses of compromise and 
cooperation. These discourses leave some room for a more inclusive 
nationalism. Unfortunately, because this is a very small part of how the closure 
of Lokmaci is recontextualised, they act as little more than a pretext for BRTPs 
story which does little in “helping a solution”.
Similar discourses to BRTI are revealed on KFM, though some differences are 
also exposed. The CTP government, and especially Talat, are worthy of
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celebration, powerful and pro-solution. Aside from Lokmaci (a government 
success), the nation is all but excluded. This almost exclusion and the promotion 
of the CTP allows for discourses about alternative group identification. However, 
this chance is missed. The Republic is represented as the ‘other’ which is 
powerfully negative, more than on BRTI. A station which supports pro-federation 
CTP should carefully choose how it recontextualises events to realise discourses 
about a nation without embargoes and isolation. However, due to a lack of 
interest in politics and news by news workers, careful lexical and grammatical 
selections are not part of news writing practices. The result is though the CTP is 
praised, pro-solution discourses are absent. Though this serves KFMs power 
holders well, these discourses are not “what is good for the nation”.
On Radyo T, discourses are realised which clearly map out a Turkish Cypriot 
nation, including a clear border between itself and the Republic but a porous one 
between itself and Turkey. It is a Turkish nation headed by knowledgeable 
Turkish nationalists. The CTP is excluded and its successes de-emphasised.
The nation is opposed to the “Greek” Republic which thinks, says, aims and does 
things against TRNC, actions which threaten the very sovereignty of TRNC. 
Military lexical choices evoke discourses of conflict and danger. It is an 
aggressive enemy, not a prospective partner. These discourses reflect UBP 
policies which aim for a state fully independent of the Republic, with close ties to 
Turkey. By writing from a Turkish nationalist perspective, discourses about 
TRNC as it is presently are realised with no improvements in the lives of 
residents. This is not what is “best for the nation”. Instead, self-interests are 
satisfied at the expense of TRNC’s residents across this and all stations.
VI.3 The importance of Governance
Events throughout the week of Lokmaci’s opening, such as the preparations, the 
opening ceremony itself, international reactions, a temporary closure and a 
protest were recontextualised by radio stations in ways that governance of TRNC 
and the Republic were represented more than other aspects of these events. In 
fact, on BRTI and KFM , the CTP government is represented more times than any
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other participant, legitimating, supporting and emphasising the CTP and its 
actions. Clearly, political actors are foregrounded and other residents who were 
actual participants are backgrounded, illustrating how recontextualisations of 
social practice delete and add elements of social practice to legitimate actions 
and situations (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 96-98).
This section analyses representations of the Republic’s and TRNC’s governance, 
including the CTP and the UBP throughout the whole sample. The previous 
extract analysis introduced how recontextualisations on each station articulate 
some dominant and differing themes about the nation. This analysis draws upon 
a wider sample to reveal in fine detail who is represented as governing, what 
aspects of this governance are positively represented, and how governance is 
represented. This allows for a much clearer understanding of the similarities and 
differences between stations as to governance of TRNC and the Republic. How 
governance is represented tells us much about the ideology of those who 
represent it. It allows stations to shape a sense of how the nation is led, who can 
be trusted, who can not, and who is worthy of leading the nation. In regard to the 
Republic, it shapes a sense of how listeners should regard the Republic’s 
government: as a potential partner in finding solutions or more negatively as an 
other’ not to be trusted, or worst.
VI. 3. i Turkish Cypriot governance
Vl.3.i.a BRTI
Representations of the government during this week’s events show BRTFs 
support for a distinct Turkish Cypriot nation with governance in the hands of the 
CTP, which is hard-working, in control, protective, friendly and knowledgeable.
In the extract analysis, it was seen how BRTI named aspects of the nation 
“Turkish Cypriot” , partially fulfiling its nation-promoting mandate as outlined in the 
BRTK Law. This same strategy is used extensively throughout the sample in 
namings of the government personally and impersonally, such as “the Turkish 
Cypriot side”. This strategy reminds listeners that their government and nation
146
are indeed “Turkish Cypriot”, distinct from the Republic and not part of an all- 
Cypriot nation.
The use of honorifics and functional titles in naming the government also plays a 
role in nation-building. Functional titles emphasise the roles of individuals, giving 
them a sense of importance. This is a common strategy to legitimise power and 
status (van Leeuwen, 1996: 59). The common use of functional honorifics 
throughout the sample like “President Mehmet Ali Talat” and functional names 
like “the Turkish Cypriot aide” represents CTP politicians as important and part of 
a multi-functional government. Highlighting functions of politicians in TRNC not 
only emphasises the importance of CTP politicians, but also highlights the multi­
functional character of the TRNC state.
As seen in the extract, the sample also reveals a theme of the CTP leading 
TRNC by positively representing the party. One strategy used is the CTP is 
mostly represented personally and nominalised, like “Prime Minister Soyer”. This 
highlights personal aspects of the government and provides listeners with CTP 
points of identification (van Leeuwen, 1996: 52-53).
Throughout the sample, BRTI shows CTP support by accentuating the 
government’s ability to control and make things happen through exploiting the 
strategy of activating the CTP. For example, Soyer is activated by “rejecting” 
claims in:
[...] Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer rejected Greek Cypriot Side’s claims 
that Turkish Cypriot police violated the buffer zone.
Here, Soyer is at the beginning of the main clause, a dominant position. He is
controlling a situation by rejecting claims made by the Republic, claims which run
against TRNC interests. This evokes discourses of the CTP protecting TRNC
interests from the Republic.
Another strategy used to indicate support for the CTP is in representing reported 
speech. BRTI uses CTP government sources almost exclusively for reported 
speech, showing its support (White, 2006: 58, Fairclough, 1995; Caldas- 
Coulthard, 1994: 304). A strategy not seen in the extract is the choice of
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speaking verbs which carry connotations and position a journalist attitudinally 
(White, 2006: 58-59; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 295). Though “said” is mostly 
used, BRTI shows support for government utterances through selecting 
illocutionary verbs which represent the CTP as powerful (“announce”, “stress”, 
“remind”, “point to”, “reject”), friendly (“thank”) and knowledgeable (“state”, “note”, 
“explain”).
Another strategy used throughout the sample to show support for a CTP-led 
nation is the representation of agency within reported speech. Sources in BRTI 
stories are represented as mostly activating the government performing positive 
actions. The government is constructive in it “has been working since 2005 for 
the opening of the gate”; powerful in it “[has] moved ahead with the decision to 
open Lokmaci” and thoughtful in it is “paying particular attention to the sending of 
positive messages”.
Vl.3.i.b KFM
Like BRTI, KFM  shows support for the CTP through its representations of 
governance. However, it differs in two ways. Firstly, it foregrounds President 
Talat far more than BRTI. Secondly, it backgrounds the TRNC nation and its 
Turkish Cypriot character, unlike BRTI which emphasises it.
Throughout the week, KFM positively represents the CTP. One way KFM  
achieves this is by mostly representing the CTP personally and nominalised, as 
seen in the extract. This highlights personal aspects of the government and 
provides listeners with CTP points of identification.
The CTP is also represented as the legitimate leader of the nation. One strategy 
not seen on BRTI is naming the government as part of a “we” group. Fairclough 
(1995a: 181) claims “we” is used by politicians for self-serving purposes by 
“claim[ing] solidarity by placing everyone in the same boat” and “claim[ing] 
authority in that the leader is claiming the right to speak for the people as a 
whole”. In the week’s events “we” is used extensively in the reported speech of 
CTP politicians to promote their versions of governance, as in this Avci reported 
speech:
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If there is an issue, we deal with it but within the borders of Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus we never give permission.
Here, “we” refers to the government whose authority is presupposed by speaking
for the people of TRNC as a whole. Its authority to "deal with” issues and “never
give permission” is presupposed and unquestioned, realising a discourse of CTP
legitimately leading the nation.
The sample also reveals that KFM  represents the CTP as TRNC’s legitimate 
leader due to its knowledge, power and hard work. The CTP are used 
exclusively as sources of speech, unlike BRTI which mostly uses the CTP. This 
limits the voices heard on KFM  to CTP politicians only. Choices in glossing 
verbs represent the CTP as powerful (“remind”), knowledgeable (“explain”,
“note”, “specify”) and understanding (“acknowledge” and “discuss”).
This theme of legitimacy is furthered through government activations throughout 
the sample. The CTP is represented as constructive in “we did our work”; 
powerful in “we never give permission”; and thoughtful in “we discuss and speak 
but our borders are never discussed”. Sometimes, abstractions are used to 
represent an active government and legitimate its actions. The following 
utterance by Avci is a generalisation:
If there is a problem we discuss and speak but our borders are never 
discussed.
Here, the generalisation “we discuss and speak” does not really explain what the 
government does when there is “a problem” with the Republic. However, it 
legitimises the actions of the government.
Unlike BRTI, KFM  not only foregrounds Talat, but represents him as a political 
celebrity. This is achieved using three strategies throughout the sample. Firstly, 
he is named formally with functional honorifics more than any other actor.
Naming him “President Mehmet Ali Talat” four times in one story alone, grants 
him status and importance unlike all other politicians.
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A second strategy is representing Talat performing positive actions. The CTP is 
activated in action, event and mental processes, almost all attributed to Talat.
The following excerpt shows how Talat is empowered:
Talat wants TUSiAD to continue working on the topics solving the Cyprus 
problem, and the ending of the Turkish Cypriot isolation. They gave him 
positive answers.
In the first sentence, Talat is activated in a mental process. Talat is powerful, 
being in a position to ask a Turkish institution to “continue working” on the Cyprus 
conflict. In the second sentence, he is passivated by being given a positive 
answer. But the passivation is a response to Talat’s request and a result of 
Talat’s meetings. So, co-text empowers Talat positively. In fact, he is collocated 
with “finish meetings” or “had meetings” four times. These collocations are a 
third strategy used to stress Talat’s importance as being an important politician 
who has “meetings”. He is a hard-working, powerful and active celebrity in a 
world of powerful politicians.
Though KFM supports the CTP and Talat, this same support for TRNC is 
omitted. The popular “Turkish Cypriot” government naming seen on BRTI is 
omitted throughout the whole sample on KFM. So, politician Ergakica is named 
as “Presidential Spokesman Ergakica” , instead of “the Turkish Cypriot 
Presidential Spokesman”. This suppresses the nation. Also, the government is 
named with far fewer functional and formal namings than BRTI. This strategy de- 
emphasises the functions of the government and thereby the functions of the 
nation.
W.3./.C Radyo T
Throughout recontextualisations of the week’s events, Radyo T demonstrates its 
political allegiances through the representation of governance. Unlike the other 
two stations, it represents the CTP lacking status as a government and a failure.
It uses CTP representations as a way to legitimise Turkish nationalist UBP’s 
policies. Alternatively, the UBP and Turkey are represented as the obvious 
choice for governance of TRNC. Though newsroom manager Moreket claimed 
the station emphasises politics and not the UBP, these scripts show otherwise.
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It can be seen from the sample that Radyo T witholds its support for the CTP 
using a number of lexical and grammatical strategies. One strategy is it rarely 
represents the government, less than most other participants in these stories. 
When it is named, it is mostly impersonal representations and almost never 
nominalised, such as “the leaders”. These strategies background the 
government and de-emphasise its human aspects.
The CTP is also represented as lacking status. Generally, on all stations, 
politicians are first introduced in a story with functional honorifics. This is not the 
case for CTP politicians in Radyo T Lokmaci stories with the exception of 
“Internal Affairs Minister Ozkan Murat”. Instead, Radyo T culturally classifies 
Talat as “Turkish Cypriot Talat”. Cultural classifications carry connotations, 
mostly negative (van Leeuwen, 1996: 58). This break in the routine naming of 
politicians evokes a discourse of the CTP lacking status (ibid.:59).
The theme of the CTP being unworthy of leading the nation is common in these 
stories. Though the CTP is activated mostly, positive activations are attributed to 
a “we” which includes nationalists (discussed below). Furthermore, the CTP’s 
unworthiness to lead the nation is accentuated through negative activations. 
When the CTP is named without the UBP, the government is represented as 
acting wrongly. For example:
The leaders and partners read the account [of negotiations] [...] one or the 
other of the leaders thinks twice [...] [then] leaders negotiate and strongly 
say ‘no’.
Here, the government fails in finding solutions to the Cyprus conflict because 
they “think twice” and “say no”. The government is a failure on Radyo T.
In the sample, we also find evidence that Radyo T uses representations of the 
government to support the UBP’s nationalist policies. One strategy is using 
generalisations to legitimate its stance that peace initiatives do not work. For 
example, “leaders thinks twice about [peace] proposals” and “strongly say ‘no’”. 
Though indeed a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus conflict has alluded 
negotiators to date, some talks have been successful. For example, both sides 
agree to the 1977 “Makarios-Denkta§ accord” which claims that Cyprus should
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be an independent, nonaligned, bicommunal federal republic.48 Talks have also 
contributed to the successful opening of crossing points between the two states. 
However, this generalisation legitimates the sceptical stance taken by Radyo T 
towards negotiations which “fail”.
Alternatively, Radyo T represents the UBP as the answer to CTP’s poor 
leadership and limited successes. One way this is achieved is through granting 
the UBP status, more than the CTP. The UBP is always named personally and 
mostly nominalised. Unlike the CTP, nationalist politician Denkta§ is named 
formally with the functional honorific “President Rauf Denkta§” . Denkta§ has not 
been president of TRNC since 2004, yet Radyo T writers give him the title 
“President”, showing the station’s and nationalists’ reverence for him.
The UBP is credited with positive actions, again demonstrating that the UBP is 
the party to lead TRNC. The UBP and Denkta§ are activated with an array of 
action types such as mental, verbal and event processes. This empowering 
strategy illustrates Radyo T support for Turkish nationalists.
A number of times “we” is used when the UBP are doing positive actions. These 
create a “we” UBP, Turkey and resident group. For example, Denkta§ is 
represented as saying:
We opened it [Lokmaci] under the same conditions as before. The Greeks 
used to say, ‘If there are soldiers, we won’t open.’ But we didn’t step 
back.
Here, Denkta§ has included himself in the “we” who opened Lokmaci and set 
conditions. However, it is CTP which opened Lokmaci. The same can be said 
for “we didn’t step back”. Here is a brave move showing strength again attributed 
to “we”. Using “we” allows Denkta§ to claim solidarity with voters, background 
CTP government actions by not naming them and take responsibility for positive 
actions.
JS This was agreed at a meeting with the two leaders Makarios and Denkta§ on 12 February 1977. 
Downloaded 28 June 2009 from
Imp: /www.photius.com/countries/cvprus/govemment/cvprus government 1977 makarios denkta~-1454.h 
tml
152
But governance of TRNC is represented as not confined to the UBP alone. 
Turkey is an important part of governance for Turkish nationalists. Turkey, 
according to UBP nationalists, is TRNC’s motherland, close friend and protector. 
This is reflected in Turkey’s high number of representations in these stories.
“We” is used by Denkta§ to suggest governance is shared with mainland Turkey 
in:
We will make an agreement as to how many soldiers will remain. Turkish 
soldiers are our guarantors.
In the first sentence, Turkey is part of “we” who will make agreements about its
soldiers. Obviously, Turkey is the principle decision-maker about its troops.
However, using “we” ties TRNC governance with Turkey. The second sentence
describes the relationship between the two. Turkey is “our guarantor”, a
nationalist position in terms of Turkey’s relationship with TRNC. This realises
discourses about a Turkish, TRNC and Denkta§ ‘we’ group, with Turkey as
protector and TRNC needing protection. It is presupposed “we” need protection
from “them” the Republic.
VI.3.H Governance of The Republic
On all three stations, the Republic’s government is represented in ways which 
suggest ‘other-ness’. One common strategy is its namings. Impersonal namings 
of the Republic’s government, such as the “Greek Cypriot side” and “the Greeks” 
are simplifications of the national make-up of the Republic which in fact is multi­
cultural. However, these namings create a ‘them’ group on the other ‘side’, 
evoking discourses of difference and opposition.
However, there are subtle differences between stations revealed throughout the 
sample which suggest the nature of relations between the two states. For 
example, the Republic is personally represented on BRT112 times, KFM  six 
times and Radyo T once. Personal representations allow listeners a point of 
identification with the Republic’s politicians on BRTI and less so on KFM. This 
makes negotiations seem more probable. Radyo T s impersonal namings make 
it easier to treat the Republic as an enemy (Kress, 1989:134).
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Vl.3.ii.a BRTI
Throughout the sample it can be seen that BRTI represents the Republic’s 
government as a troublesome ‘other’. The Republic is represented involved in 
negative and positive actions, though clouded agency represents the Republic 
less positively and negatively than it could be. These veiled activations act as a 
pretext to promote CTP governance.
At the level of lexical choices it can be seen that personal namings of the 
Republic’s government are more numerous than other stations, giving listeners a 
point of identification with the Republic’s politicians. However namings such as 
“the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias’ aide” highlight difference. If 
written as “the President of the Republic’s Dimitris Christofias’ aide” difference 
would be de-emphasised, not accentuated.
The Republic is not just the ‘other’, but it is also represented as troublesome.
The Republic’s government is collocated with “saddening”, “do(es) not comply”, 
“closed”, “not giving” and “attempts” which are a "critical negativity”. The 
Republic is activated three times blocking aid and blaming Turkey for no solution. 
These collocations and activations realise a discourse of a troublesome 
Republic.
However, the negative representation of the Republic is positively modified 
through grammatical strategies. Prepositional phrases are used extensively to 
de-emphasise the Republic’s government, while emphasising its negative 
actions, a strategy identified in the extract and exploited throughout the sample.
In fact, BRTI sometimes represents the Republic positively, though agency is 
clouded or activations act as a pretext for discourses about CTP support. In the 
following citation, the Republic is represented with the positive news of:
The first speech was delivered by the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris 
Christofias’ aide Yorgos Yakovu.
The choice of a passive structure and de-emphasising Yakovu in a good news
event of a speech being delivered at the opening ceremony of Lokmaci cannot
be overlooked. Yakovu becomes backgrounded while the “first speech”
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becomes foregrounded. It can be seen in the following citation how the CTP 
actually benefits from positive representations of the Republic:
President Mehmet Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias 
agreed on the 21st of March to open the gate [...]
This strategy of Republic officials sharing good news with TRNC officials who
enjoy prominent sentence position (van Dijk, 1991: 215), diminishes the good
news factor for the Republic. In fact, due to dominant sentence position, this
strategy actually highlights positive CTP actions and governance.
Vl.3.ii.b KFM
In this sample, it can be seen that KFM  represents the Republic more negatively 
than BRTI. These representations run against CTP policies for partnership and 
compromise with the Republic, reflecting KFM  newsroom practices.
Similar to BRTI, the Republic is named in ways which highlight ‘other-ness’. 
However, three strategies are used to represent the Republic more negatively 
than BRTI. One strategy is representing the Republic with far fewer personal 
namings. These limit the number of points of identification, making it easier to 
treat the Republic as a distant ‘other’ (van Leeuwen, 1996: 48).
A second strategy is activations which represent a far more troublesome 
Republic. Six of eight activations represent the Republic acting against TRNC 
interests. These represent the Republic closing Lokmaci and wanting to “slow 
down the removal of the continuing isolation of the Turkish Cypriot public”.
These actions are similar to those on BRTI. The differences are firstly there are 
far more negative activations on KFM  and fewer positive actions. Secondly, 
agency is not obscured in passive constructions like on BRTI. The Republic is 
given agency and thus represented more powerfully negative.
A third strategy used to advance the theme of a troublesome Republic is 
collocations. Eight times there is negative co-text associated with the Republic. 
All four times the words “Turkish Cypriot” are used, the word “isolation” is in the 
same sentence, three times collocated. When the Republic is in the same 
sentence, the theme becomes “continuing isolation of the Turkish Cypriot public”.
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This realises discourses of resident victimisation at the hands of the Republic. 
This incongruency between CTP policies and KFM recontextualisations is further 
exploited when the Turkish Jewish Association is in the sentence. The theme 
changes to “ending of the Turkish Cypriots isolation”. So, the Republic is 
negative in terms of isolation and a Turkish association is part of the solution. 
These recontextualisations draw upon discourses more in line with Turkish 
nationalist views and indicate a lack of care taken in lexical and grammatical 
choices. When shown this analysis, editor Qatal said these themes were written 
into scripts because this was “the concern of the government at the time” 
according to TAK, despite running counter to CTP policies which want 
cooperation and compromise with the Republic to achieve a federation.
W.3.//.C Radyo T
In this sample, it can be seen that Radyo T represents the Republic not only 
negatively, but as a dangerous enemy. This helps legitimise Turkish nationalist 
policies. A feared Greek enemy is not a government to negotiate with to form a 
federation. Instead, Turkish nationalists can claim their future lies within a pan- 
Turkish nation.
One way Radyo T represents the Republic as being unworthy partners is through 
lexical choices. Other than “Greeks” and “the Greek side”, an ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
relationship is re-inforced by Radyo T s extensive use of naming the Republic 
“they”, a strategy identified in the ‘extract analysis’ and exploited throughout the 
sample (Fairclough, 2003:149; van Dijk, 1991). By using “they”, a pro-solution 
future is blatantly questioned by creating discourses of difference between the 
Republic and TRNC. This reflects UBP Turkish nationalist ideology which 
dismisses the idea of negotiations with the Republic.
Unlike the other stations, Radyo T represents the Republic as an untrustworthy, 
dangerous enemy. This is achieved through its numerous activations. Though 
activations empower participants, the Republic is empowered performing actions 
against TRNC interests. These can be grouped into seven themes. The 
Republic:
156
1. Is weak: “they [Republic] pleaded."
2. Lies: “they make a story like the Berlin wall".
3. Is untrustworthy: “They will close the gate again”.
4. Is against TRNC interests: The Republic “didn’t agree [to Lokmaci]”.
5. Is naive: “they think this [opening of Lokmaci] has affected negotiation 
timing”.
6. Is wrong: “they can’t do this [change the borders]”.
7. Wants to control TRNC: “Greeks aim is to replace the 1974 TRNC border 
with the 1963 border”.
Through these activation, Radyo T evokes discourses of opposition and threat 
even though eleven of these actions are mental processes with no agency. Also, 
many of these actions are distillations such as in number five where the Republic 
“thinks” and in number seven where it “aims”. These actions give no detail as to 
what the Republic is actually doing. Details are removed and used to legitimise 
and realise purpose. Radyo T s purpose is to represent the Republic as a threat, 
thereby legitimising its stance that the status quo and no negotiations are the 
best option to the Cyprus conflict.
VI. 3. Hi Summary of Governance
Through recontextualising events of the week, BRTI stories signify discourses 
which show support for the CTP, a Turkish Cypriot nation and difference with the 
Republic. The CTP government is represented personally, important, active and 
multi-functional, fulfiling BRTFs obligations to the CTP Prime Minister. The CTP 
is part of a multi-functional “Turkish Cypriot” nation. By representing the 
government and nation as such, BRTI fulfils its obligations of promoting TRNC 
but also draws upon discourses of difference from the “Greek Cypriot 
administration”.
The Republic’s government is represented mostly negatively as the ‘other’, 
though there are some reservedly positive representations. This is a result of
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journalists’ answerability to pro-solution power holders, personal politics, and ‘the 
feeling’ produced in the newsroom. Points of identification are offered to 
listeners, as are representations of positive acts, though these only occur if the 
Republic is either de-emphasised in prepositional phrases or listed with Turkish 
Cypriot counterparts. These evoke some discourses of compromise and 
cooperation, though mostly act as a pretext for other more dominant discourses 
on BRTI such as CTP support.
Recontextualisations of the weeks events on KFM  also realise discourses about 
the CTP being multi-functional and active. But the “Turkish Cypriot” aspect of the 
government is omitted. Instead, KFM represents the CTP and its actions 
positively while promoting the personality cult of President Talat. Talat is a 
celebrity amongst a powerful and active CTP.
KFM evokes negative discourses about the Republic’s government more than 
BRTI. This is a result of newsroom practices which prioritise the CTP while 
ignoring or playing down other aspects of events, such as the Republic. KFM 
uses less personal representations of the Republic’s government than BRTI and 
the government is mostly activated performing actions contrary to TRNC 
interests. These acts are to do with isolation and troubles at Lokmaci. These 
representations of governance position the CTP at odds with the Republic’s 
government over issues such as isolation, regulations and Lokmaci, evoking 
discourses of opposition, more than on BRTI.
The week’s events on Radyo T are recontextualised in ways which are critical of 
the CTP, saving praise for the UBP and Denkta§. Scripts emphasise the power, 
activities and namings of nationalists, while vaguely naming and activating the 
CTP in less-favourable circumstances or representing it failing. Discourses of 
mainland Turkey as a part of governance, being TRNC’s guarantor and protector, 
are drawn upon. This closeness to Turkey is a cornerstone of UBP policy which 
sees Turkish Cypriots as Turks living on Cyprus.
Representations of the Republic’s government on Radyo T represent it as a 
threatening enemy. This reflects newsroom practices such as using UBP Turkish
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nationalist politicians which emphasise UBP policies. There are no personal 
representations of the Republic’s government and “they” are activated negatively, 
some threatening the very existence of TRNC. The Republic’s government is 
represented as a dangerous enemy, legitimising UBP policy of full independence 
from the Republic.
VI .4 The Governed
The first section in this chapter introduced how recontextualisations of Lokmaci’s 
closure on each station articulate some dominant and differing themes about the 
nation. The second section explored how governance is represented differently 
on each station over the week’s recontextualisations of events. This final section 
examines who is governed in Turkish Cyprus and how they and their actions are 
represented throughout the sample of stories. This section also examines what 
aspects of the nation are represented as part of the governed nation. This is 
contrasted with the limited number of representations of the Republic’s residents 
and their nation.
Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s (1999) macro-strategies in formulating 
national identities is considered to aid in assessing what sort of nation stations 
signify in their stories. If, on the one hand, stations’ stories signify positive 
discourses about many aspects of a Turkish Cypriot nation and nationalism, they 
show support for TRNC as it is presently. This exemplifies constructive and 
perpetuation strategies which “construct and establish a certain national identity 
by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation 
[from the Republic]” (ibid.: 33). On the other hand, if stations’ stories play down, 
minimally or negatively represent the TRNC nation and its residents while 
representing alternative forms of nation, this can be seen in terms of strategies of 
transformation, dismantling or destruction of the nation (ibid.). These last 
strategies hold the most potential for change, if indeed discourses suggest more 
positive alternatives of nationhood.
VlA.i Turkish and Greek Cyprus common namings
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There is much commonality between stations in how they represent TRNC’s and 
the Republic’s residents and their nations. Residents of the Republic and TRNC 
are minimally represented on all stations. This is significant, because one aspect 
of the week was the significant number of people who used the Lokmaci 
crossing.49 The crossing allowed for Turkish and Greek Cypriots to share a 
common social and commercial space, yet this was omitted. There are no 
stories of Turkish Cypriots going to the Republic and drinking tea in Greek cafes 
or Greek Cypriots strolling through the area around TRNC’s Lokmaci.
Newsrooms chose to all but exclude residents, while including many 
representations of power holders.
Residents are only represented impersonally, de-humanising them and removing 
a point of identification for listeners. When TRNC residents are named, a 
common “Turkish Cypriot” nation and national identity is suggested. For 
example, “Turkish Cypriots” is the most common naming on all stations. This 
naming is part of nation-building which “primarily emphasise[s] national 
uniqueness and intra-national uniformity but largely ignore intra-national 
differences” (Wodak et al., 1999: 4). Homogenising residents as “Turkish 
Cypriots” ignores intra-national differences; that is, the multi-cultural reality of 
TRNC. At the same time, it realises discourses of sameness within TRNC and 
difference from the Republic.
Aspects of the Republic’s nation are rarely identified on the stations. All 
representations, with the exception of “Nicosia”, remind listeners of either conflict 
(“barricade”), two oppositional entities (“side”) or the ‘other’ (“Greek”). These 
again draw upon discourses of difference and even opposition.
Nevertheless, there are subtle differences between stations which signify 
ideological discourses of different Turkish Cypriot nationalisms.
VlA.i.a BRTI
Vl.4.i.a. 1 Residents of TRNC and the Republic
49 According to the Cyprus Mail on 8 April 2008, almost 20,000 people used the crossing in the first six 
days of it being opened. Downloaded 06.07.09 from www.cvprus-mail.com/news/
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Throughout the sample, it can be seen that BRTI demonstrates support for 
existing power holders in TRNC, like the police and other officials. It also 
continues its nation-building strategy of identifying a multi-functional Turkish 
Cypriot nation through namings. A small number of namings and representations 
suggest a more inclusive Cypriot identity, however, these are minimal. When 
asked why inclusive namings are not used more often, editor Cafer said they are 
not acceptable to managers who cite the BRT Law which aims to promote TRNC.
BRTI shows its support for a TRNC nation and various power-holding groups in 
TRNC. Namings identify a group of CTP-supporting businessmen named “the 
Citizens’ Initiative for the Opening of Lokmaci”, “Turkish Cypriot police” and 
“immigration and customs officials”. Representations of these groups help shape 
BRTI’s nation in two ways. Firstly, naming these three groups identifies roles 
people play within TRNC. By emphasising roles, a multi-functional nation is 
represented. For example, “immigration and customs officials” reminds listeners 
that their nation has a legal aspect to it with a need for immigration and customs.
Secondly, naming these groups emphasise their importance. Namings of the 
“immigration and customs officials" is a functional representation and “Turkish 
Cypriot police” is a specific classification, emphasising roles and importance. 
Support for these power holders is also realised grammatically. They are all 
activated, suggesting power and control. For example, police are activated in:
He explained that Turkish Cypriot police intervened in the protest and took 
the placards from protestors to prevent the disruption of crossings.
Here, “TRNC police” are represented performing the action processes of
“intervened” and “took placards”. These actions have agency which represent
the police as powerful (Fairclough, 1995a: 113), passivating protesters from the
Republic literally and grammatically.
The sample reveals some representations of residents which suggest inclusive 
politics on BRTI. Once “people” is used in:
A special ceremony was held at Lokmaci this morning which was marked 
by high participation of people and peaceful slogans.
161
“People” is a reference to residents and politicians from both states, creating a 
more inclusive Cypriot ‘us’ group. Elsewhere in the sample, “Turkish Cypriots” 
and “Greek Cypriots” are collocated with “experiencing” and “witnessing” positive 
events like Lokmaci’s opening and “solving” problems “together”. These evoke a 
more inclusive and cooperative Cypriot discourse, reflecting some of the station’s 
pro-solution interests.
However, “Turkish Cypriots” and “Greek Cypriots” are the most common naming 
of residents of the two states. Though they share a common “Cypriot” naming, 
they also repeatedly evoke a discourse of difference, accentuated by being 
commonly collocated. These strategies remind listeners of their “Turkish” identity 
which is distinct from their “Greek” counterparts.
Vl.4.i.a.2 The nations of TRNC and the Republic
It can be seen in the sample that BRTI legitimises the TRNC nation through its 
multiple representations. Multiple mentions remind listeners of their nation which 
includes Lokmaci, borders, “Cikkos area”, “Ercan airport” and “Nicosia”. These 
utterances map out what is included in the nation, differentiating it from the 
Republic.
It can be seen that Lokmaci, in particular, is named in ways which legitimises 
TRNC. Lokmaci is collocated with the “Turkish Cypriot Side”, “northern part”, 
“gate”, “barricade”, “crossings” and “border”, reminding listeners of “our” Lokmaci 
and border. Collocating “historic” with “Lokmaci” represents a temporal aspect to 
Lokmaci and TRNC which is a nation-building strategy (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, 
and Leibhart, 1999: 26).
Despite multiple mentions of Lokmaci and the nation, it is mostly represented as 
powerless, de-emphasised, and a recipient of action. This is achieved through 
representing the nation almost exclusively in prepositional phrases or passivated. 
Part of the reason for this grammatical strategy is Lokmaci is named “a gate”. It 
is inanimate and needs to be “opened” and “closed” by somebody. For example,
The gate -  which was opened to crossings yesterday morning -  was 
closed by the Greek Cypriot Side [...]
162
However, Lokmaci could have been represented as a “state of affairs” verb 
process such as “The gate is open” (Fairclough 1992 and Halliday 1985 in 
Fairclough, 1995:110) activating and emphasising it, a strategy used on Radyo T 
which emphasies the nation more than is done on BRTI.
Representations of the week's events all but exclude aspects of the Republic 
other than its government. When the nation is mentioned, difference and also 
negativity are highlighted by collocating it with negative news like “a brief closure 
of the gate” and protesters “crossed the Greek Cypriot barricade”.
V IA lb  KFM
Vl.4.i.b. 1 Residents of TRNC and the Republic
It can be seen from the sample that KFM names TRNC residents only a few 
times and the Republic’s residents are omitted from all scripts. This is due to 
KFMs emphasis on CTP politicians in its stories.
Like BRTI, KFM once identifies residents using an all-inclusive naming. In the 
following, residents are named “Cypriots”:
The United Nations, Cypriots’ and the island’s cooperation is the aim to 
start compromise.
Though this is more inclusive, it is in direct reported speech, distancing KFM 
writers from the utterance (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). It also appears in a 
non-dominant middle of list sentence position, de-emphasising it somewhat. Like 
BRTI, this naming is not repeated elsewhere, deeming positive effects 
minimal.
More common namings see residents represented in ways which identify 
residents as Turkish Cypriot, while positively representing the CTP as in the 
following:
[...] both the public relations improvements and the Turkish Cypriot public 
are connected to the solution process to remove the isolations.
Here, the “public” is activated, but as one of two agents, the other being “the
public relations improvements”. It is presupposed that there are “public relations
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improvements” due to the CTP. Listing “public relations improvements” at the 
beginning of the clause emphasises government activities and places residents 
in a less-dominant position. This signifies discourses of suppport for the CTP.
VI.4.i.b.2 The nations of TRNC and the Republic
As seen in the two previous sections, KFM  almost excludes the TRNC nation. In 
fact, aside from Lokmaci and borders, “Ercan airport" is the only other aspect of 
the nation named. These are almost exclusively in prepositional phrases which 
de-emphasises these aspects of the nation. Excluding and de-emphasising the 
current TRNC nation highlights the need for negotiations, a CTP policy.
Despite this lack of importance given to TRNC nation, the border is uttered 
extensively. KFM  exploits deixis using “the” and “our” with borders five times, 
articulating discourses of division. Collocations with border connote permanence
in:
[...] our borders are never discussed [...] within the borders of Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus we never give permission [...]
To “never give permission” and “never discuss” evokes discourses about
timelessness of the nation, having borders in the future. This is a constructive
strategy of nation-building (ibid.). These reflect Turkish nationalist politics, a
result of KFM's lack of care in lexical and grammatic choices, as pointed out by
editor-announcer Basri.
Representations of Lokmaci emphasise its importance more than on the other 
two stations. This benefits the CTP, it being represented as responsible for its 
opening. One strategy used is writing Lokmaci opening “is of special value”.
This state process, though agentless, emphasises this government success by 
highlighting it being “special”. Another strategy is collocations such as 
“celebrated”, examined in the extract analysis.
Aspects of the Republic’s nation are either passivated, de-emphasised or 
activated performing acts against TRNC interests. These produce a negative 
representation of the Republic’s nation. For example:
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Hrisostomos’ term, as the head of the Greek church, has become as 
political as possible.
Here, “Hrisostomos’ term” is activated in a state process of being “political”. For
the church to be political presupposes these politics are against TRNC interests,
drawing on negative discourses about the Republic and its actions far more than
on BRTI.
Vl.4.i.c Radyo T
VI.4.i.e. 1 Residents of TRNC and the Republic
Looking at the sample, we find that representations of residents are used to 
remind listeners of the success of TRNC. This is in contrast to BRTI which 
promotes TRNC and KFM which all but excludes residents except as a pretext to 
show support for the CTP. Radyo T representations also serve to legitimise the 
power of those closely associated with Turkish nationalists, such as the police 
and soldiers.
Like BRTI, one group of residents represented positively is the police. They are 
named the “Turkish Cypriot police” and “our police”. These namings draw upon 
discourses of difference by identifying them as “Turkish Cypriot” and not 
“Cypriot”. Also, being specific classifications, roles people play in the nation are 
emphasised. This serves the station’s Turkish nationalist interests well by 
representing a multi-functional nation.
It can also be seen that Radyo T, like BRTI, supports the police by activating 
them in:
Nearly 20 Greeks shouting slogans and carrying protest signs passed the 
Greek barricades and came to the TRNC’s controlled area north of 
Cikkos. TRNC police intervened, blocking their [protesters] path and 
taking their protest signs while pedestrians continued to pass.
Here, “TRNC police” are represented performing three action processes of
intervening, blocking protesters and taking their signs. These actions have
agency which represent the police as powerful (Fairclough, 1995a: 113). Radyo
T supporting the police, who are directly controlled by the Turkish military, is in
line with Turkish nationalist ideology. Nationalists support the presence of the
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Turkish military in TRNC and attribute them with the very existence of TRNC.
So, representing the police positively is seen by Turkish nationalists and 
newsroom manager Moreket as “what is good for the nation”.
This same utterance represents the Republic’s residents activated performing 
negative acts like “chanting slogans” and “carrying placards”. Some lexical 
choices, such as “crossed” the “barricade” and entered “TRNC’s controlled area” 
connote military acts of aggression, drawing upon discourses of a dangerous 
‘other’.
Radyo T also represents soldiers positively. “We” which includes politicians and 
soldiers are activated extensively. TRNC residents, alternatively, are powerless. 
For example:
He [Denkta§] said, [...] “He [Turkish General Buyukanit] gives trust to our 
people because that trust can slowly decrease because we forget what 
happened.”
There are two issues about the nation represented here. Firstly, a power 
hierarchy is established. At the top is the Turkish General and Turkish nationalist 
Denkta§ who are activated positively by giving trust and speaking, respectively.
At the bottom of the hierarchy are residents who are passivated by the General’s 
giving of trust. Secondly, a Turkish-TRNC ‘us’ group is created. Placing the 
possessive “our” with “people” defines the “people” as those of Denkta§ and the 
General: a Turkish-TRNC grouping. “W e” residents are then activated forgetting 
“what happened". The “we” group in this case is forgetful residents and 
politicians from TRNC and Turkey. The “happenings’ Denkta§ is referring to are 
the actions of the EOKA militia in the sixties and seventies, the Greek-backed 
military coup of 1974 and the subsequent Turkish invasion. Denkta§ uses guilt to 
remind listeners of their duty to be nationalists, while reminding listeners of the 
importance of the Turkish military. These utterances draw upon discourses 
familiar on Radyo T, namely, fear of the Republic, the importance of Turkey and 
the importance of being a Turkish nationalist.
Radyo T names residents of both states in ways which show no commonality. 
Though TRNC residents are named as “Turkish Cypriots”, “Greeks” are used to
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name residents of the Republic. This naming, seen on KFM, evokes discourses 
of difference more than on BRTI, again demonstrating Turkish nationalists’ views 
that Cyprus has two nations and two nationalities: “Turkish” and “Greek”.
Like BRTI, the “Greeks” are collocated with “Turkish Cypriot”. Unlike BRTI, they 
are not collocated with positive cooperative events, but with “the Cyprus 
problem”. This not only identifies the two groups of residents as different from 
each other, but reinforces a negative theme of Cyprus as a problem. These help 
legitimise the maintenance of separation on Cyprus, a UBP Turkish nationalist 
stance.
VI.4.i.e.2 The nations of TRNC and the Republic
Throughout the sample, representations of the TRNC nation are extensive, far 
more than the other stations. These represent more aspects of Turkish 
nationalism, such as the importance of the TRNC state and Turkish military, the 
unimportance of Lokmaci and the threatening nature of the Republic.
Radyo T identifies many aspects of the nation throughout the sample. Both “the 
nation” and aspects of “TRNC” such as Lokmaci, the border, “here” and 
“customs” are identified. Deixis is exploited by identifying “our nation”, “our 
soldiers”, “our flag” and “our vigilance”. Furthermore, giving TRNC the 
personality trait of “our vigilance” exploits an aspect of nation-building identified 
by Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Leibhart (1999: 76), articulating a discourse of 
TRNC being a feasible solution in Cyprus.
The sample contains eleven representations of the border, far more than on 
other stations. These clearly demarcate and remind listeners that there are two 
nations with a border separating them. One representation of an utterance by 
Denkta§ is:
This wall doesn’t divide a nation, it prevents genocide, this wall is a peace 
wall.
This sentence presupposes there are two nations and genocide is a possibility 
without the border. Naming barricades as “the peace wall” with the function of 
“preventing genocide” evokes discourses of fear of ‘the other’.
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On Radyo T, unlike the other stations, some aspects of the nation are 
empowered, emphasising these and legitimising the TRNC state. Symbols of the 
state (“wall”, “gate”, “flags”, “nation” and “TRNC”) are activated in state 
processes. This grammatical strategy emphasises the nation more than when it 
appears in prepositional phrases, as is the case on BRTI and KFM.
Alternatively, Lokmaci is not represented positively as is the case on the other 
stations. It is represented as a small success or part of a problem with the 
Republic. Collocations and grammatical strategies are used for this. Lokmaci is 
collocated with negative lexical choices like “very small detail”, “no importance” 
and one of “many gates”. Co-text includes the “Cyprus problem”, “very difficult” 
and “a little crisis”. When Radyo T collocates Lokmaci and the TRNC with the 
Republic, they are always passivated or in prepositional phrases. This de- 
emphasises both the ideas of TRNC and the Republic together, and Lokmaci, 
two discourses counter to UBP interests.
The Republic is further made out to be not only troublesome, but a threat. For 
example:
Here, one nation tried to destroy the other nation but God bless our 
motherland’s soldiers because the soldiers drew a border.
The Republic is backgrounded by being named “one nation”, while its actions are
loaded with negative connotations. Trying to “destroy” another nation is a terrible
act by anyone’s calculations (Billig, 1995: 3). By adding moral gravity to Turkish
soldiers’ actions (“God bless”), the Republic is immoral, evil and dangerous.
Another aspect of nationalist politics revealed through representations of the 
nation is Turkish military importance. This is achieved through the nation being 
collocated or in co-text of Turkey and its soldiers. This occurs eight times, as in:
Soldiers are here; when peace comes and after an agreement is reached. 
We will make an agreement as to how many soldiers will remain. Turkish 
soldiers are our guarantors. Turkey told us and underlined this. They give 
us power and moral support. Truly our nation is alive and confident.
Here, Turkey and its soldiers are represented in every sentence along with five
mentions of the nation (“here”, “we”(twice), “us” and “our nation”). These
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collocations signify discourses about a close and helpful relationship between 
Turkey, the military and TRNC and discourses about a threatening Republic.
VI.4.H The Governed Summary
This section has examined how events during the week of Lokmaci’s opening 
were recontextualised in ways which signify different discourses about who and 
what is being governed in TRNC and the Republic.
On BRTI, we find a limited number of representations of TRNC and the 
Republic’s residents acting positively together and named using inclusive lexical 
choices. These recontextualisations of events draw upon discourses of 
cooperation and unity, a result of some journalists’ personal politics and their 
answerability to pro-settlement power holders. These representations exemplify 
“strategies of transformation [which] aim to transform a relatively well-established 
national identity and its components into another identity the contours of which 
the speaker has already conceptualised” (Wodak et al., 1999: 33). The national 
identity conceptualised is one which sees the Republic as a potential partner. 
Unfortunately, these representations act as little more than a pretext for more 
dominant discourses of CTP and TRNC support. Grammatical strategies de- 
emphasise cooperation between the two groups of residents and the Republic’s 
role in such actions. Furthermore, unifying lexical choices are limited to one 
throughout the whole sample.
More dominant discourses signified throughout the sample include sameness 
amongst “Turkish Cypriots” who belong to a multi-functional nation. The nation is 
represented as populated with powerful police, businessmen and immigration 
officers. It has a Turkish language, a border, an airport and a crossing. These 
representations utilise constructive strategies identified by Wodak et al. (ibid.), 
satisfying BRTPs mandate which demands national construction from its content. 
It also satisfies BRTrs interests with Turkish nationalist leanings such as the 
police, some journalists, the military and money groups which benefit from a 
divided Cyprus.
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On KFM, the limited number of representations of residents emphasise Turkish 
Cypriot-ness and the CTP with its positive actions. Aspects of the nation are all 
but excluded except for borders and Lokmaci, another government success. 
These recontextualisations satisfy K FM s closeness to the CTP. However, KFM 
evokes discourses of the Republic more negatively than BRTI, performing 
actions contrary to TRNC interests. Residents are victims of its actions, with 
Turkish institutions aiding Turkish Cypriots. This diversion from CTP policies is a 
result of newsroom practices which show a lack of care in lexical and 
grammatical choices in a CTP-friendly environment. These representations 
exemplify a strategy similar to “dismantling or destructive strategies [which] aim 
a t dismantling or disparaging parts of an existing national identity construct, but 
usually cannot provide any new model to replace the old one” (ibid.). Though 
K FM  does not disparage the nation, it mostly excludes it, showing a lack of 
support. By realising negative discourses about the Republic during the week’s 
events, KFM  does not provide a new model (such as a federation) as an 
alternative to TRNC.
On Radyo T, the sample reveals that power holders associated with UBP 
interests are empowered and emphasised: police, soldiers and “we” which 
includes nationalist politicians. Residents are reminded of their duties to be 
nationalists. Many aspects of the nation are named and emphasised, mapping 
ou t a distinctly Turkish TRNC nation with borders, areas, customs, flags and 
personality traits. Turkey, its military and its importance are constantly reminded. 
These draw upon discourses of a successful TRNC nation closely associated 
w ith  a powerful Turkey.
Representations of the Republic’s residents and the nation evoke discourses of a 
dangerous threatening enemy. Residents are involved in protests represented 
w ith  military lexical choices, while the nation seeks to destroy TRNC. These 
recontextualisations reflect newsroom practices which emphasise what is good 
fo r  the nation from a UBP perspective. Radyo T employs strategies of 
perpetuation which “attempt to maintain and to reproduce a threatened national 
identity” (ibid.). A distinct TRNC national identity aligned closely with Turkey and
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a threatening Republic are reproduced, leaving no room for alternatives to 
TRNC.
VI.5 Lokmaci Analysis Conclusion
For over forty years, a once popular shopping and socialising area in the centre 
of Nicosia was divided with barricades. During the week of its re-unification, 
TRNC radio news gave events extensive coverage. Despite the opening being 
an event which could have been recontextualised as being associated with 
Cypriot unity, events were recontextualised in ways which signify discourses of 
division, difference, antagonism and fear. These discourses differ across 
stations drawing upon different versions of Turkish Cypriot nationalism which 
benefit interested parties associated with each station. Unfortunately, these do 
very little in “helping to find a solution” to the Cyprus conflict or “writing what is 
good for the nation”.
For the most part, this chapter’s analysis confirms studies before it which reveal 
that TRNC media contribute to Turkish Cypriot nationalism and not unity in 
Cyprus (Azgin and Bailie, 2008). But unlike previous studies, it demonstrates 
differences between the types of nations and nationalisms each station 
represents.
BRTI recontextualises events in ways which represents an active, multi­
functional and important government that governs a multi-functional Turkish 
Cypriot nation. This positive representation of the government reflects BRTFs 
close relationship with the Prime Minister’s office. The nation is populated by 
powerful politicians, police, businessmen and immigration officers. It has a 
Turkish language, a border, an airport and a crossing. These representations 
evoke discourses about Turkish Cypriot-ness which satisfy BRTFs legal mandate 
that dictates promotion of TRNC. Discourses about the Republic’s government, 
residents and the nation evoke an ‘other’. They are different, “Greek Cypriot” 
and a “side” led by an “administration”. These representations draw upon 
discourses of difference and opposition, satisfying BRTFs Turkish nationalist 
interests.
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However, BRTI also realises discourses o f cooperation and unity, albeit as little 
more than a pretext to more dominant discourses. Namings acknowledge that 
Lokmaci is a crossing to the Republic. Though the Republic’s government, 
residents and nation are an ‘other’, the government is named personally, giving 
listeners a point of identification. The Republic’s government and residents 
perform positive acts and are associated with positive news, though grammatical 
strategies de-emphasise this. These recontextualisations mostly evoke 
discourses of difference, but also cooperation and unity. Together these 
discourses realise a national ideology on B R TI which for the most part is closed 
and “Turkish Cypriot” in nature, but also has some potential for an alternative 
more-inclusive group identification.
KFM  stories realise discourses of CTP governance which are positive and 
unquestioning. The CTP is a multi-functional and active government. President 
Talat is a celebrity, powerful and active. These recontextualisations arise not as 
a result of individual journalistic bias, but as a result of the station’s closeness to 
the CTP and newsroom practices. With the exception of Lokmaci, which is 
framed as a government success, aspects o f the nation are all but excluded. 
Residents’ representations are limited, though mostly named as Turkish Cypriots 
which evoke discourses of sameness within TRNC and difference from the 
Republic.
In fact, themes of difference and antagonism surround the Republic. It is 
represented more negatively than on BRTI. There are less personal 
representations and the Republic is either activated performing actions contrary 
to TRNC interests or collocated with negative events and issues such as isolation 
and troubles at Lokmaci. Representations o f the Republic realise discourses of 
difference, trouble and antagonism. Though these recontextualisations serve the 
interests of K F M s pro-CTP owners and management, these do nothing to evoke 
discourses about a nation without embargoes and isolation faced by residents 
daily.
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Radyo T stories represent a Turkish Cypriot nation opposed to an aggressive 
enemy. Governance is in the hands of nationalists and mainland Turkey. 
Mainland Turkey is represented as a guarantor and protector of TRNC. The CTP 
government is a failure. Power holders associated with the UBP are empowered 
and emphasised while residents are reminded of their duties to be nationalists. 
The TRNC nation is emphasised, mapping out a distinct nation with borders, 
barricades, soldiers, police, areas, customs, flags and the personality trait of 
vigilance. This draws upon a discourse of TRNC statehood, again in line with 
UBP policies. The Republic and its residents think, say, aim and act in ways 
which threaten the very existence of TRNC. ‘They’ are de-emphasised while 
their negative actions such as wanting control over TRNC are highlighted. The 
status quo of TRNC closely linked to Turkey with an enemy Republic, is in line 
with UBP policy.
Together, these analyses begin to reveal the type of nation each station 
represents through discourses signified by recontextualising events during the 
week of Lokm aci’s opening. Each Turkish Cypriot nation signified reflects the 
interests of those who control stations. Overall, these ideologies are not 
conducive to solutions to the Cyprus conflict.
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VII TRNC and the Republic’s Relations
VII.1 Introduction
Former president Rauf Denkta§ and the UBP governed TRNC from 1975 and 
1985 respectively until 2003. According to the UBP’s Shadow Minister of the 
Economy Ersin Tatar, although the UBP recognises the need for a solution, it 
does not seek close relations with the Republic, aiming to establish two distinct 
and independent states with TRNC closely aligned to Turkey. Since 29 
December 2003 until 18 April 2009, the TRNC government was the pro­
federation CTP which won TRNC’s parliamentary elections on a platform of 
seeking a federation with the Republic. It went on to support the 2004 Annan 
plan, which aimed to re-unite Cyprus with a federation.
The CTP’s pro-federation efforts were made difficult throughout most of their time 
in office by the Republic’s government of Tassos Papadopoulos which was 
regarded as opposing a federation.50 Papadopoulos was an EOKA fighter, the 
regional chief of operations in Nicosia.51 He vowed never to share political power 
with Turkish Cypriots saying, in reference to the Annan plan’s idea for a 
federation, “ I received a state; I will not deliver a community.”52 This aversion to 
power sharing was evident by his government’s lack of commitment to the UN- 
brokered 8 July 2006 agreement which aimed to create cooperation on both day- 
to-day and comprehensive solution issues.
On 24 February 2008, fortunes changed for the CTP as the Republic voted in 
Dimitris Christofias’s pro-federation government. Christofias not only shares the 
same communist political origins as the CTP, he also won on a platform which 
prioritised a federal solution to the Cyprus conflict. At his victory ceremony, he 
pledged, “As of tomorrow, we unite our forces [...] to achieve the reunification of
50 Noted in many places including in http://en.wikipedia.orq/wiki/Politics of Cyprus downloaded 
09.06.09.
51 EOKA was a Greek Cypriot armed militia whose aim was Enosis; that is, Cypriot union with Greece.
52 Taken from http://en.wikipedia.Org/wiki/Tasso s  Papadopoulos downloaded 09.06.09.
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our country.”53 This election victory brought about two pro-federation 
governments for the first time since division of Cyprus in 1974.
Vl.I.i Media coverage o f relations
Throughout their history, both Cypriot communities have identified themselves in 
relation to the ‘other’ Cypriot community (Panayiotou, 2006: 30; Lacher and 
Kaynak, 2005: 156; Mallinson, 2005: 109). Cypriot media, which have worked in 
the political context of conflict, contribute to this situation by representing an 
oppositional ‘other’ community (Azgin and Bailie, 2008: 57). According to Billig 
(1995: 61), this is a strategy in nation-building:
[national identities] include ways of conceiving of ‘us, the nation’, which is 
said to have its unique destiny (or identity); it also involves conceiving of 
‘them, the foreigners’, from whom ‘we’ identify ‘ourselves’ as different.
However, with one and then two pro-federation governments in Cyprus, the
media have had to consider a more positive pro-federation political atmosphere
along with its traditional role of representing an oppositional Greek Cypriot
‘other’. CDA’s view is there is a dialectical relationship between context and text
(Fairclough, 2003: 3, van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 92). If this is accepted,
then the changing political contexts of radio news production should see changes
in representations in texts. This chapter examines how the media represented
relations with the ‘other’ Cyprus during this time of change which saw peace
talks, celebrated election victories and peace gestures.
VI. 1M Chapter’s analytical approach and structure
During the time of this thesis, relations can be seen as going through three 
different eras: before, during and after Christofias’s win. This chapter examines 
stories which recontextualise events about relations between the Republic and 
TRNC during these time periods. Participants examined are TRNC, the 
Republic, Turkey and Cyprus, starting with those with the most mentions on BRTI 
to those with the least. The first two participants are obviously the focus of these 
stories. Turkey is included because it is a contested part not just of the nation,
53 Taken from w w w .usatodav.corn/new s/world/2008-02-24-cyprus-e1ections downloaded 02.02.09.
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fbut also of relations between TRNC and the Republic. Cyprus is included 
because an important aspect of relations between the two states is the idea of a 
federation; that is, a politically and socially united Cyprus.
This analysis considers how stations draw upon discourses which are conducive 
to a partnership with the Republic, the stated aim of the CTP and Christofias. If a 
station is “helping to find a solution” or writing “what is good for the nation”, it will 
represent relations positively. So, Turkish Cypriot participants will be 
represented as part of Cyprus. The Republic will be represented positively and 
Cyprus will be represented as a single positive entity.
Alternatively, a Turkish nationalist stance will draw upon discourses of difference 
between TRNC and the Republic. Discourses about Turkey as a close ally, 
protector and motherland will be present. The Republic will be negatively 
represented, possibly as an enemy to discourage the idea of partnership.
Cyprus will be represented negatively or backgrounded to disregard the idea of it 
as a single future option.
My ethnography reveals that due to the context of production of TRNC radio 
news, the pro-solution scenario outlined above is more of an ideal than a reality. 
Stations have differing political and economic contexts as well as newsroom 
practices, each making the pro-solution scenario unlikely. However, the CTP 
and Christofias claimed this was their desire, so this influence should be obvious, 
especially on stations with pro-CTP interests such as BRTI and KFM.
Stories chosen for this analysis are based on two criteria. Firstly, stories which 
represent relations between the Republic and TRNC during the three time 
periods were chosen; that is, Papadopolous’s governance,54 Christofias’s 
election victory55 and then during Christofias’s governance.56 These three eras 
are represented in the three sections of this chapter.
54 Original scripts and translations from all three stations are in Appendix 11 A.
55 Original scripts and translations from all three stations are in Appendix 1 IB.
56 Original scripts and translations from all three stations are in Appendix 11C.
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Secondly, stories which show traces of different newsroom practices were 
chosen. Some stories are very similar to each other due to the use of TAK news 
service for news gathering by all stations. This is evident in the stories analysed 
during Christofias’s governance. Other stories are very different due to political 
influences in the newsroom, such as the stories analysed during Papadopoulos’s 
governance.
Analysis of the language used in these stories reveals that each station shapes 
its coverage slightly differently. Stations use their coverage of relations as an 
opportunity to promote the ir own ideas and interests about the nature of Cyprus, 
TRNC and the Republic. This allows for stories that on one level appear to be 
applauding a change o f government to be shaped in ways which foreground 
negativity for the benefit o f those associated with each station.
BRTFs recontextualisations benefit pro-federation CTP, as well as Turkish 
nationalist interests. K F M  unquestionably supports the CTP, while Radyo T 
shows its support for Turkish nationalist UBP. Unfortunately, these 
recontextualisations are not “what is good for the nation” and do little to “help find 
a solution”, signifying discourses of difference, opposition and threat more than 
cooperation, compromise and unity.
VI1.2 25 S e p te m b e r 2007 the Papadopolous Era
Papadopoulos’s governance was during the Annan and post-Annan plan era, 
where scepticism towards any agreement was rife.57 According to BRTFs chief 
editor Devecioglu, this w as because TRNC residents felt they had compromised 
in good faith by agreeing to Annan’s plan for a federation, while residents of the 
Republic had refused to share power. Papadopoulos and the CTP were involved 
in peace talks according to  the UN-brokered 8 July 2006 agreement which 
covered everything from w ater management to governance and citizenship.
57 This scepticism and reasons behind it were evident in government statements and media coverage during 
this time.
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stations on 25 S ep tem ber 2007. BRTI and  KFM  covered a p ress conference 
held by the  C TP’s  Deputy Prime M inister - Foreign Minister Turgay Avci. Radyo  
T covered a  public criticism of CTP policies tow ards the Republic by UBP’s §erife 
Onverdi. Though TAK w as used  for new s gathering and writing of these  stories, 
BRTI and KFM"s story source is CTP politician Avci while R a dyo  T s  story 
source is UBP politician Onverdi. This is not an accident, but a reflection of 
newsroom cultures. BRTI is answ erab le  to th e  CTP Prime Minister’s office and if 
governmental even ts are  not covered, according to B R T s  Chief News 
Coordinator Huseyin Guven, the governm ent will put pressure on BRTI by 
“asking why”. Likewise, K F M s  m an ag em en t and owners support the CTP while 
Radyo T s  ow ners and m anagem en t support the  UBP.
This th e sis ’s  ethnography also  revealed  that stations use TAK differently; BRTI 
uses TAK  with im pressions from its reporters, KFM  cuts and p as te s  sentences 
and R a d y o  T  a lso  cuts and p a s te s  but with m ore consistency in term s of its 
Turkish nationalist politics. Together, th e se  newsroom practices are  a factor in 
the different and  self-serving rep resen ta tions of relations between TRNC and the 
Republic, an important part of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.
VIL2.i TRN C
It can be seen  from this sam ple that the  s ta tions’ stories represent the 
government and  residen ts in similar w ays. The government is alm ost always 
named personally and formally. T h e se  nam ings grant the governm ent status, 
more than if informally nam ed, and  offer listeners a point of identification with 
TRNC governm ent officials.
* Both sides accused the other for a severe lack of progress. A year after the agreement the two sides still 
had not met. Downloaded 22.03.09 from http://www.cvprus-mai 1.com/news/
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difference and opposition betw een the Republic and TRNC.
How residents a re  nam ed  also  contributes to nation-building. On all stations, 
residents are rep resen ted  hom ogenised a s  “the  Turkish Cypriot people” and 
“Turkish Cypriots”. R esid en ts  in TRNC are  actually far more heterogenous, 
including many British, Kurdish, African and Turkish mainlanders. 
Homogenisation is a  nation-building strategy identified by Wodak, de Cillia, 
Reisigl, and Leibhart. (1999: 4). T hus hom ogenised, stations evoke discourses 
of sam eness within TRNC and  difference from the Republic. This representation 
appeals to Turkish nationalist interests.
Despite these  com m onalities in representations of TRNC, subtle differences are 
also evident. T h ese  articulate different d iscourses of nation on each station.
VI.21a BRTI
VII.2./.a. 1 Politicians a n d  p a r tie s
Analysis of the BRTI story show s that it rep resen ts  politicians and parties in ways 
which realise positive d isco u rses  about CTP governance and a distinct Turkish 
Cypriot nation.
The CTP governm ent is rep resen ted  a s  active and legitimate. This is signified 
using a num ber of s tra teg ies  including activating CTP politican Avci 12 times in 
verbal p rocesses. C hoosing a CTP politician a s  the only source adds legitimacy 
to CTP, a s  d o es  th e  choice of glossing verbs (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). 
Interpretive glossing v erb s  like, “explain”, “brief* and “point out” connote 
knowledge, while “a d d re s s” and  “call on” o n e ’s  audience connotes CTP 
importance (ibid.: 307). Within reported sp eech , the governm ent is collocated 
with “efforts" in finding solutions. T h ese  s tra teg ies represent an active, legitimate 
government.
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The story also represents CTP’s (and nation’s) legitimacy as international. 
Collocations of the government with, “the Italian government”, “ Italian 
parliamentarians”, “an audience of deputies”, “the current EU Term President 
Portugal” produce a theme of an international government. These 
representations reflect both governmental and legal influences in the BRTI 
newsroom outlined by BRTFs chief editor Devecioglu by promoting the CTP and 
a Turkish Cypriot nation.
The nation’s legitimacy is further signified through namings of the government. 
Like Lokmaci coverage, namings emphasise functions of politicians and the 
nation as in “the presidential spokesman”. By highlighting functions, a normal- 
functioning government and nation are represented. These namings partially 
fulfil BRTT s mandate of promoting the nation while evoking discourses of 
difference and opposition between the Republic and TRNC.
VI1.2. i. a. 2 Residents
In this story it can be seen that residents are represented in ways which further 
legitimise the CTP and its policies. One strategy used is residents are activated 
in ways which align their thoughts and feelings with the CTP as in:
[...] [residents] expressed their free will and fulfiled their obligation [by 
accepting the Annan plan].
Residents are cited as accepting Annan, a position which the CTP promoted,
wanting a federation with the Republic. However, this activation is multi-layered;
that is, a reporter describes Avci’s speech which attributes residents’ “will”. This
ought to be treated with caution. All the same, it creates a CTP and resident ‘us’
grouping which aligns residents with CTP policies. This serves CTP well and
satisfies BRTI’s obligations to the government.
During the Papadopolous’s government, the CTP was frustrated at a lack of 
progress on finding “solutions”, according to CTP politician Beralti. This 
frustration is evident in media coverage of political statements. These represent 
residents in ways suitable to the CTP. One theme is of “unjust international 
isolation" collocated with residents. Co-text reveals this is due to “the Greek
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Cypriot Administration". Another theme is the spectre of losing TRNC. 
Residents are collocated with “assimilation” and “[the Republic] not prepared to 
share political power” . These collocations realise a discourse of resident 
victimisation at the hands of the Republic. Also, by representing the Republic 
negatively, the CTP passes the blame for not finding a Cypriot solution on to the 
Republic.
VI1.2. i.a. 3 Nation
Representations of the nation construct a distinct and multi-functional Turkish 
Cypriot nation and negative relations with the Republic. Not only is “North 
Cyprus” and “the TRNC” named, but so is an aspect of the nation: the “North 
Cyprus economy”. These impersonal namings represent a distinct and multi­
functional Turkish Cypriot nation. The nation is collocated with positive news 
such as “direct trade between North Cyprus and EU countries”, “strengthening” 
and “political settlement” . These articulate positive discourses about TRNC, a 
part of BRTFs mandate. However, co-text creates a theme of negative relations 
with the Republic. Ending isolation is “being prevented within the EU by the 
Greek Cypriot Administration”.
Vll.2.i.b KFM
Vll.2.i.b. 1 Politicians and parties
The CTP government is represented positive, legitimate, active, powerful and in 
control, more obviously than on BRTI.
KFM uses collocations to represent a hard-working government similar to that 
seen on BRTI. The government “was adopting a constructive stance” and 
“introducing new initiatives”. Relations between the governments of TRNC and 
the Republic are represented as the CTP wants “solutions” and the Republic 
prevents them by saying “no to the Annan plan”. This is a CTP-influenced 
position which represents the CTP being pro-solution and frustrated at a lack of 
progress due to a reluctant Republic.
me nanan paniam enr g io sses  a  saying by Avci. To deliver a speech  at a foreign 
parliament rep resen ts Avci and the governm ent a s  being important and 
international.
KFM differs from BRTI by supporting th e  CTP more obviously within reported 
speech. W hen asked  why KFM  supports the  CTP as obviously as  it does, editor 
Qatal dem onstrated a lack of a w a re n e ss  of the implications of her news writing. 
She said, UKFM  d o es  it the sa m e  a s  everyone else. We are reporting what is 
happening in TRNC.” This analysis proves differently. On BRTI, the government 
is not activated but collocated with positive lexical choices, while on KFM the 
CTP is activated positively, such  a s  the  s ta te  process of “the Turkish Cypriot side 
was adopting a constructive s tan ce  on the Cyprus Issue”. This represents the 
CTP positively and powerful. D espite this being a distillation which does not 
make clear w hat exactly the governm ent is doing, sayings like this articulate 
positive d iscourses abou t CTP governance.
Vll.2.i.b.2 R e s id e n ts
This story rep resen ts  residen ts  similarly to that seen  on BRTI. Firstly, like BRTI, 
residents’ rep resen ta tions a re  u sed  to legitimise CTP frustration. Residents are 
activated in a m ental p ro cess  of having the “general perception that a 
comprehensive solution to the  C yprus Problem will not take place any time 
soon”. This c rea te s  a CTP and  residen t ‘u s ’ group which is frustrated and 
blames the Republic for a lack of p rog ress  in finding solutions to the Cyprus 
conflict.
Also similar to BRTI, residen ts a re  rep resen ted  a s  victims of the Republic. For 
example, they are  d e-em p h asised  in th e  following prepositional phrase: the 
Republic’s aim of “assim ilation of Turkish Cypriots into a minority within a Greek 
Cypriot s ta te”. U tterances such  a s  th e se  articulate a discourse of resident 
victimisation by the  Republic.
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KFM differs from BRTI in this story by emphasising difference between the two 
groups of residents differently than on BRTI. BRTI names “Turkish Cypriots” 
seven times in the story, while KFM only represents them twice, a reflection of 
BRTPs mandate to promote the nation. KFM, however, makes clear there are 
“two equal peoples” on Cyprus, drawing on discourses of difference between the 
two Cypriot communities.
VIl.2.i.b.3 Nation
The most stark difference between BRTI's and KFM's stories is the TRNC nation 
is excluded on KFM. This is a reflection of CTP policies which aim to create a 
new nation. By not representing TRNC, the nation is difficult for listeners to 
imagine. This highlights the need for negotiations to create a new kind of 
national identity.
VIl.2.i.c Radyo T
VI1.2.i.e. 1 Politicians and parties
On Radyo T, the CTP is represented as unworthy of governing the Turkish 
Cypriot nation while Turkish nationalist UBP is supported through 
representations. According to newsroom manager Moreket, exposing the CTP 
flaws through the eyes of an UBP politician is “good for the nation”.
Unlike the other two stations, Radyo T limits its support for the CTP. Although 
the government is personally and formally named, Radyo T uses the pronouns 
“she”, “her” and “herself’ seven times, reducing nominations and points of 
identification to five.
In fact, Radyo T mostly represents CTP negatively. A number of strategies are 
used for this. One strategy is naming the CTP negatively as in:
Unverdi stressed that all the members of UBP believe in the Turkish 
Cypriot community, even though there are attacks from inside and outside.
Here, the government is backgrounded, named vaguely as “inside” and ascribed
a negative action of “attacking” the Turkish Cypriot community, a negative
representation which serves UBP interests well.
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Another strategy used to represent the CTP negatively is activating it in acts 
against TRNC interests. The CTP is activated in state, event and action 
processes, representing a powerfully negative government as in:
Mrs. Ekenoglu shouldn’t forget that she is the speaker of the Northern
Cyprus Republic’s assembly today, her position is indebted to 40 years of
struggle and politics, which she herself is criticising.
Here the government is activated four times: in the modal event process, 
“Ekenoglu shouldn’t forget”; in the state processes, “she is the speaker”, “her 
position is indebted to 40 years of struggle and politics”; and “she herself is 
criticising”. This sentence presupposes that Ekenoglu forgets that her position is 
due to UBP’s nationalist struggle for political independence. Not only does she 
forget this, she also criticises this, another negative action. These actions draw 
upon negative discourses about the worthiness of the CTP, criticising and 
forgetting its TRNC nation, a grave action for nationalists.
Another strategy used to discredit the CTP is collocations. The government is 
collocated with “trying to waste” time, “incorrect handling of the Cyprus issue”, 
“deceiving the Turkish Cypriot community”, “benefit herself and “will not be 
successful” . These produce themes of a government which lies, is unsuccessful 
and wrong for self-interest. Its relations with the Republic is represented as 
sinister. It wastes time on “blind promises” of compromises with the Republic. It 
is in secret agreements with the Republic in “the Greek side is agreeable, but 
CTP will not be successful at keeping this agreeability secret”. Lying about 
agreements to maintain politically advantageous positions is represented as a 
priority for the CTP, articulating discourses about the CTP being unsuitable to 
govern Turkish Cypriots.
While Radyo T represents the CTP negatively, it saves its support for the UBP. 
Again, a number of strategies are used. One is the naming of “§erife Unverdi, 
the Lefko§a UBP representative member of parliament”. She is named as such 
twice (once more than normal), stressing not only her function and importance 
but also adding credibility to her claims. She is also named semi-formally as
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“§erife Unverdi” . This softens her otherwise formal and functional 
representations, connoting a closer, warmer and friendlier UBP politician.
Another strategy is activating the UBP positively. It is positively activated in 
event, state, action and mental processes. For example, “all the members of 
UBP believe in the Turkish Cypriot community” and “the UBP will continue its 
path in order to achieve a place deserved by the TRNC state in an honourable 
manner.” The activations of “believes in” TRNC and “will continue its path” are 
distillations. It is unclear what either activation means in terms of UBP micro- 
processes, but represents a protective and TRNC-friendly UBP. Furthermore, 
this representation maps out a future imaginary for TRNC; that is, a “deserved” 
place which is “honourable” for the TRNC “state”. This articulates discourses of 
TRNC statehood in line with UBP policies.
Another strategy used to support the UBP is the use of glossing verbs. Onverdi’s 
sayings are glossed with “expressed” and “stressed”. These are 
metapropositional speech reporting verbs which emphasise sayings. What is 
“stressed” and "expressed” are UBP vigilance, support for TRNC and the wrong­
doings of the CTP and the Republic. These themes are pillars of UBP policy.
Another strategy which shows support for the UBP is linking its actions to those 
of Turkey. Here, they both are represented positively in:
Before the UBP and Turkey, Turkish Cypriots had no land, no economy, 
no government, but now residents live in a safe and comfortable state.
Though a prepositional phrase usually adds context to a sentence, the UBP and
Turkey are given credit for providing a “safe and comfortable state”. This
sentence presupposes that before the UBP and Turkey, residents were unsafe
and uncomfortable. It presupposes that the UBP and Turkey supplied this
condition. This draws upon discourses o f the UBP and Turkey together
governing Turkish Cypriots.
VI1.2.i.e.2 Residents
On Radyo T, residents are represented not only as distinct from their Greek 
counterparts, but also as part of a pan-Turkish nation. Residents are named
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“residents”, which is more inclusive than “Turkish Cypriots”. This naming 
includes settlers from Turkey. An inclusive naming reflects UBP policy which has 
brought over many Turkish mainlanders in order to maintain a nationalist 
population base, while supplementing the Turkish Cypriot population. It also 
evokes discourses of pan-Turkish nationalism reflected in owner and UBP 
politician Tatar’s claim that “we are all Turks, afterall”.
Residents are also represented in ways which show opposition to the CTP. They 
are named once as “anybody”, an indetermination, in:
[...] she [Ekenoglu] expressed that this situation [CTP deceiving the 
Turkish Cypriot community] will not contribute anything to anybody.
Van Leeuwen (1996: 51-52) claims an indetermination is used when “the writer
treats his or her identity as irrelevant to the reader.” Radyo T chose to use
“anybody” in this sentence in order to emphasise the wrong-doings of the CTP.
VI1.2.i.e.3 Nation
On Radyo T, the TRNC nation is important. Tatar made this clear when he 
described TRNC’s many successes as an independent state. Representing a 
successful TRNC suggests a two-state solution is the answer to the Cyprus 
conflict. In this story, it is represented eight times far more than on the other 
stations, showing importance given to the nation (ibid.: 42). Four times “state” is 
used while excluded from other stations’ stories, again a reflection of the UBP’s 
preference for TRNC statehood. Deixis is used in all but one naming, banally 
reminding listeners of “the” community, state and “this” country (Billig, 1995: 94). 
These realise discourses about the TRNC being an option to the Cyprus conflict, 
in line with UBP policies.
These national representations are either in prepositional phrases or passivated. 
These grammatically weak representations serve the purpose of identifying 
aspects of the nation, while emphasising UBP positive actions and CTP negative 
actions. The nation is used as a backdrop for political parties’ actions.
VII.2.H The Republic
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On all stations, the only aspect of the Republic represented is its government. 
This limited representation offers no personal representations and no 
nominations on any station, giving listeners no points of identification. It is only 
represented in the reported speech of TRNC politicians who represent it acting 
against TRNC interests. By limiting representations as such, articulating 
discourses of an ‘other’ or even an enemy is made easy.
Despite these limited representations of the Republic, subtle differences are 
revealed. For example, on BRTI and KFM , the government is named “Greek 
Cypriot” . Though “Greek” represents difference, “Cypriot” represents some 
commonality. Alternatively Radyo T names it “Greek”, evoking discourses of an 
‘other’ with no commonality. This reflects UBP policy which claims there are only 
Turks and Greeks on Cyprus. As Turkish nationalist politician Denkta? 
repeatedly claims, “The only true Cypriots are the Donkeys in Karpaz.”59
VH.2M.a BRTI
Though the Republic’s government is represented as an oppositional ‘other’ 
which lacks legitimacy, it is not as negative as it could be. The Republic is 
represented acting against TRNC interests by rejecting the Annan plan, not 
willing to share power, preventing E.U. direct trade and delaying political 
settlements. However, it is mostly represented in prepositional phrases in 
passive sentence constructions, a strategy noted in the Lokmaci analysis. For 
example:
[...] the implementation of the regulation which aimed to allow direct trade 
between North Cyprus and EU countries as well as to end the isolation of 
the Turkish Cypriot people was being prevented within the EU by the 
Greek Cypriot Administration.
Here, a passive sentence structure sees the Republic de-emphasised at the end
of a long sentence, while its actions of preventing regulations which can end
isolation are emphasised. Though still a negative representation of the Republic,
it is not as negative as if the Republic was activated in “the Republic prevents EU
aid”.
59 Karpaz is a part of Cyprus which is known for its population of wild donkeys.
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Despite the extensive use of this grammatical strategy which limits negativity, 
lexical choices represent the Republic lacking legitimacy. This is a reflection of 
both CTP and UBP policies which do not recognise the government as the sole 
authority on Cyprus. Naming it the “Greek Cypriot Administration” connotes 
temporality, which offers far less status and legitimacy than a “government”.
In this story, it can be seen that the “administration” is also an oppositional 
‘other’. A number of strategies are used. One strategy is naming it the “Greek 
Cypriot side”, “side” connoting opposition. Another strategy is the Republic is 
collocated with “rejects” peace plans, “prevents” the end of isolation, “delays” 
political settlements and only accepts “assimilation” of Turkish Cypriots as a 
solution in Cyprus. These are very negative, reflecting Turkish nationalist 
interests on BRTI and doing nothing to realise discourses about cooperation. 
Though editor Cafer claimed BRTI “does not attack the other side” as much as 
before the CTP came to power, these representations are very negative.
Vll.2.ii.b KFM
In this story, it can be seen that the Republic is not only an ‘other’, but an 
adversary more than that seen on BRTI. By representing the Republic as such, 
listeners are offered a reason for a lack of progress on solutions.
An adversarial role is achieved through a number of strategies. One strategy not 
seen on BRTI is naming the Republic’s government “they” and “them”. “They” 
and “them” aid in creating an ‘other’, not a part of an ‘us’ in-group (Fairclough, 
2003: 146).
A second strategy used is grammatical choices. Like BRTI, actions attributed to 
the Republic are negative, though KFM  represents more of them. Unlike BRTI 
which uses prepositional phrases that de-emphasise the role of the Republic in 
negative actions, KFM  mostly activates the Republic’s government. This 
represents a more negative government than BRTI. For example:
Avci said that the Greek Cypriot side had said a resounding no to the 
Annan plan which proved it was not ready to share political power with 
Turkish Cyprus.
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negative media coverage (Panayiotou, 2006: 31; Mallinson, 2005: 189). 
Negative activations such a s  this evoke d iscourses of difference and opposition, 
more than BRTI. This is desp ite  K F M s close affiliation with pro-federation CTP, 
reflecting a lack of care  in lexical and grammatical choices in the newsroom. As 
editor Basn sarcastically said, “The girls (editors) put in their hours until they find 
a rich husband. News is not their main interest here.”
A third strategy which rep resen ts  the Republic more negatively than BRTI is the 
use of collocations and co-text. T h ese  reveal the Republic introduces “delaying 
tactics” to solutions, w ants “assim ilation of Turkish Cypriots”, “aim[s] to prevent 
Turkey’s EU m em bership” and sidelines finding “a solution". Again, these 
collocations draw upon Turkish nationalist discourses about the Republic. At the 
sam e time, KFM p resen ts  a reason  why the  CTP has not found a solution to the 
Cyprus conflict. This benefits the CTP, though goes against its policies for 
solutions.
VIL2.ii.c R ad yo  T
In this story, it can  be se e n  tha t the Republic is represented a s  not only an 
oppositional other a s  se e n  on the o ther stations, but as  an enem y. This 
legitimises and supports UBP nationalist ideology which w ants full independence 
from the Republic.
A num ber of strategies are  em ployed to represen t the Republic a s  an enemy of 
TRNC. In “there are a ttacks from inside and outside”, lexical choices and 
collocations are used. Here, the  Republic is backgrounded a s  “outside” and 
collocated with the CTP (“inside”). T ogether they attack the Turkish Cypriot 
community. Van Leeuwen (1996: 50) term s the tem porary naming of groups an 
“association” which he describes a s  “an  alliance which exists only in relation to a 
specific activity or se t of activities”. H ere the  CTP and the Republic form a group
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which acts against the interests of TRNC by “attacking” it. This representation is 
in line with UBP policies by signifying discourses about the Republic being an 
enemy, while discrediting the CTP.
Another strategy is activating the Republic. The Republic is represented in a 
variety of grammatical roles, acting even more negatively than on other stations. 
For example, it is activated in an action and state process in:
[...] the Greeks and Greece rejected all peaceful political attitudes, with the 
intention of being the owner of the whole island, and she expressed that 
now the Greek side is agreeable, but CTP will not be successful at 
keeping this agreeability secret.
Here, the Republic “rejects” peace, wanting to own the whole island with Greece.
Collocating the Republic with Greece raises the spectre of Enosis, a real fear in
the past and even now amongst TRNC residents. This is far more of a threat
than “assimilation” seen on the other two stations because Enosis has been a
stated goal of many Greek Cypriot politicians. The Republic is then represented
as being “agreeable”. Though this is a positive state process, agreeable to what
is unclear, even with co-text. Positiveness is modified by the Republic and the
CTP implicated in “keeping this agreeability secret”. This represents the
Republic and the CTP as deceitful. “Now” also raises the question of how long
this secret agreeability will last. These activations evoke discourses not only of
adversaries, but of a dangerous enemy which wants Enosis.
Vll.2.iii Cyprus
On all three stations, Cyprus is either represented negatively or de-emphasised, 
despite stations’ different politics. Lexical choices such as the “Cyprus Problem” 
and “Cyprus issue” create a negative Cyprus theme. Cyprus is de-emphasised, 
buried in prepositional phrases, mostly at the end of a sentence or end of clause 
position, further de-emphasising it. Naming it “the island” backgrounds the idea 
of Cyprus behind a term for a land mass and never representing it personally 
excludes a point of identification for listeners. While these strategies negatively 
represent or de-emphasise Cyprus, the Republic’s negative actions and/ or CTP 
and UBP positive actions are emphasised.
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Vll.2.iii.a BRTI
In this story, it can be seen that Cyprus is represented negatively. This is despite 
BRTPs close links with pro-federation CTP which aims to unify Cyprus. At the 
same time, representations create pro-CTP themes.
On BRTI and KFM  Cyprus is represented as “a Greek Cypriot state”. This is a 
negative imaginary, described by Fairclough (2003: 208) as a powerful lexical 
strategy which can be inculcated as a new way of being and new identities. In 
this case, the ‘imaginary’ of the Republic wanting to assimilate residents is 
something TRNC has been resisting since British rule.
This negative theme associated with Cyprus is also revealed through collocations 
and co-text. Cyprus is collocated with “non-solution”, “risk” and “instability”. 
However, co-text reveals pro-CTP ideas. For example:
Referring to the Turkish Cypriot Side’s ongoing efforts towards finding a 
solution to the Cyprus Problem, the TRNC Foreign Minister said that 
Turkish Cypriots were with the opinion that a comprehensive solution will 
not be found to the Cyprus Problem in the near future.
Here, “Cyprus problem” is mentioned twice, but so is “solution”. Though the
theme of the sentence is not positive, co-text draw upon positive discourses
about the CTP searching for solutions.
Vll.2.iii.b KFM
In this story, it can be seen that KFM  uses negative representations of Cyprus to 
suppress criticisms about the CTP and highlight positive actions of the CTP, 
even more than on BRTI.
Suppressing criticisms of the CTP is achieved through nominalisations. “Cyprus 
Problem” is used to describe a stalled peace process, activated in the state 
process of:
Avci said that the Cyprus Problem had entered a new phase following the 
2004 referendum turning point.
Here Avci hides agency, the fact that his pro-federation government has not 
made progress in finding a solution. This could have been written as “The CTP
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and politicians in the Republic have found no solutions and now have entered a 
new phase”. This would activate the government in a negative act. The 
sentence further insulates the government from negativity by the action “had 
entered a new phase”. This is an abstraction. What this means is not described. 
However, the CTP is distanced from the negative news of its lack of success at 
finding solutions, maintaining a CTP-friendly recontextualisation of events.
KFM  also creates a theme of CTP support through co-text, more than that seen 
on BRTI. Despite negative collocations of “problem”, “issue” and “non-solution” 
with Cyprus, the CTP is represented as the answer. Its “efforts” are more 
pronounced than on BRTI. The CTP “was adopting a constructive stance”, 
“introducing new initiatives”, “revitalis[ing] the negotiations process” and “had 
entered a new phase”. All is not negative on Cyprus with discourses about the 
CTP’s “efforts” and work being articulated.
Vll.2.iii.c Radyo T
On Radyo T, Cyprus is collocated with the negative lexical choices of “incorrect 
handling”, “grave sadness” and “misleading”. Co-text reveals these negative 
collocations are due to the CTP and the Republic. Here, there is no CTP to solve 
problems on Cyprus, it is the problem. Representing a single Cyprus negatively 
draws upon discourses of two separate states on Cyprus as a positive answer to 
the conflict, benefitting the UBP and its supporters.
W/.2./V 25 September 2007 summary
These three stories recontextualise events about relations in ways which 
articulate discourses that benefit parties associated with each station. 
Unfortunately, these discourses do little to “help find a solution” and are not “what 
is best for the nation”.
BRTI realises discourses of Turkish Cypriot sameness, victimisation and CTP 
legitimacy. The TRNC government is represented as part of a “Turkish Cypriot” 
nation. But it is also a “side”. It is legitimate and international. It talks and looks 
for “solutions”. Though Cyprus is surrounded with negative themes, the CTP is
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offered as a positive option, a way out of the problem. Residents are 
homogenised as “Turkish Cypriots” who are passivated by international isolation 
and the threat of being assimilated into a Greek Cypriot state. These 
representations are a result of both BRTI's closeness to the CTP government 
and its mandate to promote the nation.
BRTI also draws upon discourses of difference and opposition with the Republic. 
Representations of the Republic offer no point of identification. It is “Greek 
Cypriot”, an “administration” and a “side”. It is credited with rejecting peace 
plans, not willing to share power, preventing the end of TRNC’s international 
isolation, delaying solutions and wanting Cyprus to become “a Greek Cypriot 
state”. This negative discourse of the Republic is modified somewhat by passive 
sentence constructions which de-emphasise the Republic’s role in negative 
actions. Despite these modifications, these recontextualisations give the CTP a 
reason for little progress on solutions. Solutions to the Cyprus conflict is a major 
plank in the CTP’s political platform. By the CTP blaming the Republic, criticisms 
aimed at it are deflected. This serves BRTI's closeness to the Prime Minister’s 
office well, but articulates discourses not conducive to a federation.
On KFM, similar discourses are signified, though differences are apparent. The 
CTP is represented as a Turkish Cypriot “side” which is important, international 
and constructive. It wanting solutions from its efforts, new initiatives and 
constructive stances is emphasised far more than on BRTI. KFM also differs 
from BRTI by not representing the nation. This is a reflection of CTP policies 
which play down the nation in order to make discussions about other forms of 
national identification seem natural.
Unfortunately, KFM  draws upon discourses of oppositional difference, not 
compromise and federations. The Republic is named in ways which create a 
‘them’ Greek Cypriot group, more than on BRTI. Like BRTI, the Republic is 
represented acting against TRNC interests, though negative representations and 
activations are more numerous evoking discourses of a more actively negative 
Republic. These make it difficult to imagine the Republic as a partner in
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solutions. These serve CTP and KFM interests well, though do nothing towards 
realising the appropriate discourses for cooperation, compromise and unity.
On Radyo T, discourses about the CTP’s inability to lead are realised. The 
government acts against TRNC interests, activated and collocated negatively. It 
is represented attacking TRNC and in secret agreements with the Republic. The 
CTP is named as a problem in the Cyprus conflict. In contrast, the UBP is 
peaceful, friendly, resists attacks and aims to create “a deserved and honorable 
solution for the TRNC state”. The UBP and Turkey are represented as legitimate 
leaders of TRNC. Residents are de-emphasised while CTP negative actions or 
UBP positive actions are emphasised. The nation is constantly reminded 
through this story, showing its importance to Radyo T.
Unlike the other stations, discourses of a dangerous enemy are articulated. It 
lies, keeps secrets with the CTP and wants Enosis. This evokes discourses of 
the Republic as an enemy, with very little chance of seeing it as a partner in a 
solution. These representations reflect the UBP and Radyo T interests by 
drawing upon national discourses of a two-state solution as the answer to the 
Cyprus conflict.
VII.3 28 February 2008 Christofias’ win
Christofias’ election victory in the Republic was a welcome change of 
government for the TRNC’s pro-federation CTP government. It ushered in an era 
where there were two pro-federation governments on Cyprus. The international 
community also expressed its pleasure over a new government. This analysis 
examines each station’s recontextualisations of events concerning international 
reactions to the election victory.
BRTI covered America’s reaction, KFM covered British responses and Radyo T 
covered both. Stories of these reactions show striking similarities. Radyo Ts 
coverage of America’s response is very similar to the BRTI story. KFMs story 
again is similar to Radyo Ts coverage of the English response. In fact, the one 
paragraph on the English response on Radyo T is exactly the same as the first
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O i i i i n a i i u c o ,  u i i i c i c i  I O C O  a p f j c a i  u u e  t U  W l l c t l  W d b  S t i l f c J U l f c J U  a n u  H U W  I I  W d b
written, reflecting different new sroom  practices. The three stories represent 
imaginary relations and solutions to the  Cyprus conflict, evoking differing 
discourses abou t Turkish Cypriot nationalism  while covering responses to pro­
federation C hristofias’ electoral win.
VII.3J The R epu b lic
In th ese  stories, it can be seen  that represen ta tions of the Republic across all the 
stations em p h asise  difference from TRNC and a lack of status. Stations mostly 
represent the  governm ent, though BRTI and R a d yo  T also represent residents 
and the nation. Though th ese  contribute to a wider representation of the 
Republic, nam ings draw  upon d iscourses of difference, not commonality.
VIl.3.i.a BRTI
Despite this story on the  surface being one of congratulations, the Republic’s 
governm ent is rep resen ted  lacking sta tus and it is surrounded with uncertainty. 
Differences betw een  its residents and th o se  of TRNC are also em phasised.
In this story, it can  be se e n  that the Republic’s  government is represented lacking 
status. G overnm ent nam ings are  used  for this. Christofias is named twice, 
giving listeners a  point of identification. However, the point of identification is not 
formal with functional honorifics, a s  is the c a s e  with all other politicians on BRTI. 
Christofias is first nam ed “Dimitris Christofias”, a semi-formal naming and then as 
“Mr Christofias”, a  formal naming. Editor D agun said it is BRTI policy to name 
the president of th e  Republic a s  “leader of the Greek Cypriot administration" and 
not “president” a s  this would acknow ledge the  status of the Republic as  the sole 
authority in Cyprus, against the politics of both the  CTP and the UBP. In this 
story, the only m ention of Christofias’s  s ta tu s  is “his victory on Sunday’s
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presidential election in South Cyprus”, ignoring his title of “President-elect”, 
despite this being the topic of the story.
Again, despite the story being one of congratulations, BRTI represents a 
government surrounded with uncertainty. Two strategies are used to achieve 
this. One strategy is using grammatics as in:
Speaking at a press briefing, the spokesman expressed the hope that Mr 
Christofias will work together with the US.
Here, Christofias is passivated by the spokesman’s “hope” that the Republic “wil”
work. By saying the spokesman “hopes” he “will” work with the US, there is no
certainty of cooperation. This is a conditional representation of the future.
Uncertainty is also expressed through co-text. The Republic’s government is 
collocated with positive lexical choices such as “congratulated”, “victory”, “hope” 
and “will work together”. This positive theme is in line with CTP policies which 
wanted solutions and hoped Christofias would deliver some results. But co-text 
reveals uncertainty. The U.S. is “still committed” to a federal solution. To “still” 
be committed, means it has been committed. This presupposes that there have 
been obstacles, one being the Republic. Elsewhere, the U.S. “would jointly work 
with [both Cypriot governments]”. Again, “would” is modal adding uncertainty. 
These articulate discourses of uncertainty about Christofias which reflects CTP 
desires for a solution while still being able to blame the Republic for no solutions.
In this story, it can also be seen that representations of residents emphasise 
difference between TRNC and the Republic, while de-emphasising the two 
groups together as in:
Mr Casey reiterated that the US was still committed to a bi-zonal and bi- 
communal federal solution on the island which will be accepted by the 
majorities o f Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
This sentence names “Greek Cypriots” and “Turkish Cypriots”. By differentiating
“Turkish” from “Greek” and homogenising each group of residents, the idea of
two nations is represented (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Leibhart, 1999: 4). At
the same time, this sentence de-emphasises the idea of the two groups together.
They appear in reported speech at the end of a long sentence in a prepositional
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phrase. By de-emphasising Greek and Turkish Cypriots together, nationalist 
discourses of separation and division are signified.
VIl.3±b KFM
In this story, the government is the only aspect of the Republic represented, 
unlike the other stations. Even Christofias is excluded from the story despite it 
covering reactions to his electoral victory. This sparse representation of the 
Republic offers listeners no points of identification, making it easy to ‘other’ the 
Republic (van Leeuwen, 1996: 48).
Like BRTI, in this story we find the government is represented in ways which limit 
its status, though different strategies are used. It is impersonally named as “the 
Greek Administration”, not its internationally recognised name of “the government 
of the Republic of Cyprus”. This limits the status of the government. Also 
identifying it as “Greek” does not include the common”Cypriot” naming used 
throughout BRTI stories. These namings articulate discourses of difference more 
than on BRTI and a lack of status similar to other stations.
Despite its lack of status, we find the government is represented conditionally 
positive. Two strategies are used here. One strategy is it is collocated with 
positive lexical choices such as “willing to find a solution”. This reflects the CTP’s 
endorsement of the government. However, activations are conditional, like BRTI, 
as in:
She explained that Turkey stressed its willingness about this topic and 
now the Greek Administration is contributing this willingness [to finding a 
solution].
This utterance, though positive, sees  Turkey in dominant sentence position, 
activated positively by already “stressing its willingness” to find a solution. 
However, the Republic is activated in a state process with no agency, de­
emphasising its power. It is collocated with “now”, realising a discourse of the 
Republic’s reluctance in finding a solution. This is part of CTP policy of deflecting 
criticisms aimed at itself.
W/.3./.C Radyo T
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On Radyo T, it can be seen the Republic’s government is represented 
conditionally positive, lacks status and is surrounded with uncertainty, like on 
BRTI. However, there are two subtle differences in this story which reflect 
Turkish nationalism. One difference is Christofias’s formal naming on Radyo T 
includes no honorific (BRTI used Mr.) denying him respect and formality 
attributed to other politicians. The second difference is the government is 
impersonally named as “the Greek Cypriot side” a name not seen in the BRTI 
story. This naming accentuates both difference (“Greek Cypriot”) and opposition 
(“side”).
Residents and the nation are also represented very similarly to BRTI. Residents 
are represented in ways which accentuate difference and de-emphasise the two 
groups together. Like BRTI, the nation is named “South Cyprus”. Again, this 
naming maps out two distinct nations, the North and South of Cyprus which 
articulate discourses of difference.
VII.3.H Cyprus
Cyprus is de-em phasised in similar ways across all stations. All stations at least 
once refer to Cyprus by its name, thereby acknowledging it as a single entity. 
However, naming it “the island” almost half of the time on all stations 
backgrounds “Cyprus”. All stations also put Cyprus in prepositional phrases. 
These strategies de-em phasise the idea of a single Cyprus, contrary to CTP 
policies which aim to unify Cyprus.
Vll.3.ii.a BRTI
In this story, we find Cyprus is represented as a future imaginary which mirrors 
the solution to the Cyprus conflict called for by the CTP. It is named twice as “a 
bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution on the island”. It is a CTP desire for a 
federation which is bi-zonal and bi-communal. Naming it as such draws upon 
discourses which make clear BRTrs and CTPs vision of the future and confirms 
CTP influence on BRTI writing.
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CTP influences are also evident through Cyprus collocations in this story.
Cyprus is collocated with “solution", “reunification” and “settlement”. These 
positive collocations articulate discourses of solutions to the Cyprus conflict 
clearly in agreem ent with CTP policies. These policies are represented as 
legitimised by the U.S. which is “committed to” or “working towards” a solution. 
This aligns the U.S. with the CTP articulating discourses of CTP international 
legitimacy.
Vll.3.ii.b KFM
In this story, we find Cyprus is represented as a vaguely positive entity. It is 
collocated with “solution! this being an “important time” and “reunification”. In 
fact, “solutions” appear six times in this story, three times collocated. But there is 
no indication of what this solution is. The word rings hollow. There is the 
qualification of “fair and balanced solution”, in line with CTP policies. But this 
tells listeners little about a solution. The idea of the present being a “very 
important point in time” is another CTP sentiment. It was due to hold elections 
the following year (April 2009) and wanted to show voters progress. This made 
2008 an important time for the CTP. In short, discourses about Cypriot 
“solutions” and “importarioe” are evoked which serves the CTP well, but gives no 
information as  to what these “solutions” might be.
Vll.3.ii.c Radyo T
In this story, Cyprus is represented far more negatively than the other stations. 
Furthermore, a Cyprus solution is represented which echoes UBP Turkish 
nationalist policy.
Cyprus is named “a federation which consists of two regions and two societies”. 
This naming by a  U.S. official is an imaginary which both the CTP and the UBP 
claim they aim for, though both interpret this very differently. The CTP would like 
to see  a close federation with the Republic. The UBP claims a solution is 
necessary, though a federation is not necessarily its idea of a solution. UBP 
politician Ersin Tatar said the UBP aims to create a very weak federation or 
better yet, a confederation with two independent states; Turkish Cyprus closely
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tied to Turkey. “Two regions” and “two societies” on Cyprus reflect UBP policies 
of two nations, two societies and two peoples. Due to the vagueness of this 
utterance, this could be interpreted as supporting UBP policies, representing U.S. 
policy aligned to UBP policy.
We also find that Radyo T demonstrates its reservations about a single Cyprus. 
Cyprus is collocated with “compromise”, “efforts” and “important time”. 
“Compromise” is not as positive as “solution”, a popular lexical collocation on 
BRTI and KFM. In fact, the word “solution” only appears twice and not collocated 
with Cyprus. Collocating “efforts” with Cyprus reminds listeners of the 
“compromises” and work needed for a solution. This throws into question the 
idea that the efforts needed for compromise are not worthwhile. These 
collocations articulate far less positive discourses about Cyprus than the other 
stations reflecting Turkish nationalism which aims for two separate states on 
Cyprus.
VIl.3.iii TRNC
TRNC is not represented in these stories. This is because the stories’ sources 
are foreign officials and no country other than Turkey recognises TRNC. 
However, there are references to a Turkish Cypriot entity on Cyprus in these 
officials’ reported speech. How this reported speech is represented differs 
across the stations.
VIl.3Ma BRTI
It can be seen through the use of lexical choices that TRNC is represented in 
ways which distinguish it from the Republic. Cyprus is represented as “the two 
sides on the island” and “a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution”, the former 
articulating discourses of division and the latter a future imaginary which 
emphasises two zones and two communities. Residents are named “Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots”. Collocating the two Cypriots together reminds 
listeners that there are two peoples on Cyprus who share a common”Cypriot” 
identity, yet one is “Greek” and one “Turkish”. By representing two zones,
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communities and peoples, BRTI articulates discourses of difference on Cyprus 
while addressing its mandate to promote a  Turkish Cypriot nation.
VIl.3.iii.b KFM
In this story, references to the nation are more vague than on BRTI. “A solution 
on the island” is uttered four times which presupposes there is a problem. 
However, there is no mention of “communities”, just “solutions”. This exclusion of 
nation is common on KFM.
However, TRNC residents are named in ways which demonstrate KFM"s support
for the CTP. They are represented in:
*
Straw pointed out that Turks who live on the island are faced with some 
problems in regard to a solution. W e have to stand behind these people 
who have good intentions in terms of real change and we need to provide 
the help which is needed by them.
Residents are collocated with “stand behind”, “help which is needed” and “faced 
with some problems”. This creates a theme of a powerless group which needs 
help. However, this group is not all TRNC residents but CTP-supporting pro­
federation residents. British politician Jack Straw makes this clear in the second 
sentence of the excerpt cited above. The “Turks” who need help and whom 
Straw wishes to “stand behind” are those with “good intentions in terms of real 
change”. In other words, CTP supporters who are looking for “solutions”. This 
representation of Straw’s speech is framed in such a way that Straw supports 
CTP “solutions”, thereby contributing to CTP legitimacy.
VI1.3.Hi.c Radyo T
On Radyo T, the nation is again vaguely represented, though division of Cyprus 
is emphasised. For example, “reuniting the island” presupposes that Cyprus is 
divided. “A federation which consists of two regions and two societies” points to 
there being two governances and peoples. Twice, “the Turkish Cypriot public” is 
named, identifying specifically Turkish Cypriot society. The two utterances of 
“the Turkish Cypriot public” are collocated with “Greek Cypriots” and “the Greek
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Cypriot side”. Collocating the two reminds listeners of their difference to the 
‘other’ which is “Greek” and an oppositional “side”, even more than on BRTI.
Though excluded due to political context, the nation, its governance and its 
people are identified. By representing TRNC as a distinct nation in news stories 
more than other stations, Radyo T realises national discourses of TRNC as a 
solution to the Cyprus conflict.
V7/.3./V Turkey
Turkey is not the em phasis of the stories in this sample. This is evident by being 
de-emphasised in prepositional phrases in all representations, adding context to 
subjects in dominant clauses. This is a common role of prepositional phrases 
(Richardson, 2007: 207). What is emphasised in these stories are solutions and 
differing ideas about Cyprus’s future.
VIl.3.iv.a BRTI
On BRTI, Turkey is only represented once in the middle of a list, a non-dominant 
sentence position. It is collocated with “the two sides on the island” and “Greece” 
in a list of participants needed for a solution. This representation acknowledges 
Turkey as an important player in Cyprus, but just one of a few. This lacklustre 
representation of Turkey reflects CTP policy which distances TRNC from Turkey, 
a strategy most notable on KFM.
Vll.3.iv.b KFM
Unlike most stories on KFM, this story represents Turkey extensively. This is 
due to the nature of the event recontextualised which is a speech delivered at a 
meeting of a Turkish organisation.
Like most other representations on KFM, Turkey is framed in ways which show 
support for the CTP. This is achieved through lexical choices and collocations.
At the level of lexical choices, we find that all namings are impersonal, offering 
listeners no nominations or points of identification while withholding closeness.
On the level of collocations, it is seen that Turkey is collocated with positive 
lexical choices such as “celebrated” and “a great chance”. However, co-text
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sees CTP pro-federation ideas as a condition to these positive themes. For 
example, Turkey’s “great chance” in its E.U. application is due to its “willingness” 
to find a solution. Furthermore, its chances depend on “a solution” to the Cyprus 
conflict. Connecting a Cypriot solution to Turkey’s E.U. prospects, though a real 
possibility, also outlines CTP desires for a solution. Lexically binding CTP’s 
policies with Turkey’s future represents an imaginary relationship between the 
two and contributes to the legitimisation of CTP policies.
VIl.3.iv.c Radyo T
In this story, it can be seen that Turkey is represented more positively than on 
the other stations. Like KFM, all namings are impersonal, such as “Turkey” and 
“Turkey’s Labour Party’s political branch”. Though no nominations or points of 
identification are represented, functional namings evoke discourses of Turkish 
importance, rather than personalities.
Like BRTI, Turkey’s importance is revealed through collocations. Turkey is listed 
as one of several actors necessary in Cypriot solutions which work “to find a fair 
and permanent solution”. Turkey’s collocations differ from BRTI’s in that it is 
twice collocated with “celebrated”, similar to that on KFM. However, this story 
differs from KFM by omitting any CTP conditions in co-text to these positive 
collocations. These collocations, then, draw upon discourses of Turkish 
closeness and partnership more than the other stations.
VII. 3. v 28 February 2008 Summary
The stories about the international reaction to the election of Christofias across 
stations produce more similarities than differences. For example, Christofias is 
never named as “President-elect” despite this being the assumed topic of the 
stories. In fact, on KFM he is not even named. Though these stories obviously 
use the sam e sources, lexical and grammatical changes, omissions and 
inclusions produce stories which signify discourses about different relations 
between TRNC and the Republic, an important aspect of Turkish Cypriot 
nationalism.
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BRTI recontextualises the international response to Christofias’s win in ways 
which articulate discourses of difference, CTP legitimacy, uncertainty and 
compromise. These reflect BRTfs various interests. On the one hand, some 
pro-solution discourses are drawn upon by associating the Republic’s 
government with positive themes, though these are modally constructed adding a 
significant degree of uncertainty. Discourses of reunification and settlement 
surround Cyprus which is imagined twice as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal 
“solution”. But these discourses are a pretext for discourses about CTP support. 
Positive discourses draw upon CTP policies thereby legitimising the CTP. Even 
the U.S. is represented as endorsing the CTP. These articulate discourses 
which are federation and especially CTP friendly.
On the other hand, there are other influences in these scripts, as is normal on 
BRTI. Christofias’ status is belittled while uncertainty surrounds the Republic. 
Cyprus is represented as having two sides and two peoples, one of them the 
TRNC with Turkish Cypriots, reflecting BRTI’s mandate of promoting the nation 
(and division). Though these recontextualisations draw upon discourses which 
envision better relations with the ‘other’ Cypriot government than during the time 
of Papadopolous, these signify discourses not conducive to federation-building.
On KFM, discourses of CTP legitimacy and praise are articulated while offering 
no accompanying pro-solution discourses. The present and “solutions” are 
represented as important. These reflect CTP policies which wanted a solution 
before the following year’s election. Meanwhile, TRNC is minimally represented, 
suggesting a desire for another “solution”.
However, unlike the other stations, another solution is not represented. The 
Republic’s government is named in ways which emphasise ‘other’-ness while 
unlike BRTI, the nation, residents and nominations are omitted leaving no point 
of identification for listeners. The only positive discourse realised is that the 
Republic’s government is pro-solution, like the CTP has been for some time.
Even Turkey’s abundant representations are framed such that it is positively 
constructed, but with CTP pro-solution conditions attached.
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These representations paint a thin veneer of “solutions” over a troubled Cyprus. 
There is a need for “solutions”, but no solution is represented and with whom is 
unclear. This articulates positive discourses about CTP like a campaign slogan, 
but recontextualises events in ways which offer no substance to consider.
On Radyo T, aspects of Turkish nationalism are reflected in this story. The 
Republic is an oppositional “side” headed by Christofias, who is belittled. Though 
some positive them es are associated with the Republic, modality surrounds it, 
evoking discourses of uncertainty similar to BRTI. A federation is uttered once, 
but Cyprus is associated with two societies, two regions, efforts and compromise. 
The ideas of two societies and two regions are in line with UBP policies while 
efforts and compromise evoke discourses far less positive than the other 
stations’ discourses of “solutions”.
TRNC, is constructed and contrasted with the Republic. Turkey is represented 
positively, this time with no CTP conditions. Though these recontextualisations 
do not articulate negative discourses about relations, they evoke discourses of 
difference and uncertainty more than other stations. These contribute to a 
Turkish nationalist ideology evident in Radyo T s newsroom, thereby offering the 
least possibilities for change.
VI1.4 4 March 2008 Christofias’s Era
A week into Christofias’s governance, Presidential spokesman Erpakica held a 
weekly press conference. My ethnography revealed that these press 
conferences are an important way the TRNC government and the Republic 
exchange information, due to a lack of formal channels of communication 
between the two sides. Huseyin Guven, BRT Chief News Coordinator said, “We 
are listening to the south and the south is listening to us”, thus BRT is aware of 
the importance of its programming.
Christofias’s time in office was a time of high hopes with Lokmaci being prepared 
for its opening and face-to-face talks were on the agenda of both Christofias and 
Talat. Though the press conference touched on many issues of the day, radio
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stations selected the sam e few topics. These were the possibility of Talat and 
Christofias meeting, the UN coming to Cyprus, Ergakica’s perspectives on the 
new Christofias government and Lokmaci gate negotiations.
Radio stations recontextualise this event in very similar ways. This is due to the 
TRNC newsroom practice of extensively using TAK to gather news about TRNC. 
This reliance on TAK sometimes produces stories which are almost identical (as 
in this case), despite stations’ very different politics. This illustrates how 
newsroom practices have a dialectical relationship with news texts.
KFM and Radyo T use the sam e sentences with only three exclusive sentences 
on KFM and eight on Radyo T. This indicates the stories were cut and pasted 
from TAK. BRTI does not use the sam e sentences, though the same ideas are 
covered and even written in a similar order. Firstly, the full BRTI story and 
sections of the KFM and Radyo T stories which are identical to each other are 
analysed. Secondly, three sentences exclusive to KFM and Radyo T are 
examined. This analysis reveals that different national discourses associated 
with each station’s interests are drawn upon, despite news stories being almost 
identical.
VIlA.i TRNC
VllA.i.a BRTI
In this story, it can be seen that the TRNC nation is represented as multi­
functional, distinct from the Republic and led by the CTP which is pro-solution 
and waiting for the Republic to be the same. These representations reflect both 
BRTPs pro-CTP and pro-Turkish nationalist influences.
BRTI represents TRNC in ways which represent a multi-functional nation distinct 
from the Republic. One strategy used is personal namings which emphasise 
function. For example, Ergakica is functionally named four times, once as “the 
Presidential spokesman”. The unspecified categorisation “reporters” 
acknowledges another function within the nation. Representing a multi-functional 
government and nation is part of BRTFs mandate.
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It can be seen that impersonal namings of the government represent difference 
and opposition to the Republic. It is represented as the “Turkish Cypriot side”. 
This differentiates the government from the Republic’s by noting its “Turkish 
Cypriot-ness” and it being a “side”.
In this story, it is also found that the CTP is supported through a number of 
strategies. One strategy is nominating Ergakica. By him being the only person 
nominated, listeners are offered a point of identification with a government 
spokesman whose function and importance are emphasised (van Leeuwen, 
1996: 53).
Another strategy is to represent the government as active. The government is 
either activated in verbal processes or in state, event, mental and action 
processes within Ergakica speech. For example, the government’s position "has 
not changed”, it “will only be contributing positively to the new process”, “is ready 
to work towards finding” a solution and “desired the opening” of Lokmaci. It is 
collocated with pro-solution lexical choices such as “clearly supports a solution” 
and “has not changed”. This presupposes that the Republic is not pro-solution 
and the CTP is waiting for them. These articulate discourses about the CTP 
government working positively to improve relations with the Republic, while the 
Republic procrastinates.
The only time the government is not activated is when Talat and Christofias are 
named together. They are named “the two leaders”. Though this is a personal 
representation, the two men are backgrounded lexically and de-emphasised in a 
prepositional phrase at the end of a sentence. This indicates BRTI is not ready 
to emphasise the two sides working together, just the CTP working hard. Editor 
Dagun described how when she writes, she tries not “to offend” power holders in 
the Cyprus conflict. Here, on the one hand, the two leaders are represented 
working together which satisfies pro-solution interests. On the other hand, by de­
emphasising this, Turkish nationalist interests are “not offended”.
Another strategy noted in this story which lends support to the CTP is the choice 
of speaking verbs. Ergakica’s reported speech is mostly glossed with neutral
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saying verbs. However, “reiterated”, a discourse-signalling verb is used when 
the government “reiterated the Turkish Cypriot Side is ready to work towards 
finding an immediate and just solution to the Cyprus Problem.” A reiteration 
implies it has been said before, emphasising the CTP government’s role as a 
peacemaker but waiting for the Republic.
VIlA.i.b KFM-Radyo T
KFM-Radyo T represent TRNC as different and in opposition to the Republic, 
more than BRTI. It also creates a ‘we’ group which includes TRNC and mainland 
Turkey. The nation is represented as CTP-led, though what it actually does is 
unclear.
Like BRTI, this story represents the CTP positively. A number of strategies are 
used, one is activating the government performing mental, action, state, verbal 
and event processes. Unlike BRTPs story, activations create a theme of CTP 
importance. For example, “President Talat is chairing a committee” points to 
Talat’s important role as chairman while the governmental committee is important 
in “it will meet with senior contacts”. The lexical choice of “senior contacts” 
elevates the importance of the meeting.
Another strategy used to represent the CTP positively is collocations.
“Intentions” and “attitudes” are collocated with the government repeatedly. For 
example, “the intention of the Turkish side on the opening of the gate”, “the 
attitude of the Turkish side is clear and continues” and “the attitude of the Turkish 
side was confirmed". These are good intentions and attitudes in regard to finding 
a solution. Nevertheless, attitudes and intentions are not actions. They are 
distillations which draw upon discourses about a positive and active CTP 
government, despite actions being few and far between.
Another strategy used is positively representing Lokmaci. It is uttered five times 
in this story (twice in BRTfs story), though always in prepositional phrases. This 
reminds listeners of this government success without attributing emphasis to it. 
The emphasis through activations is CTP government officials, reflecting TAKs
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close links with the CTP government which follows CTP actions closely but does 
not necessarily represent CTP’s policies.
Difference between TRNC and the Republic is accentuated in this story more 
than on BRTI. Two naming strategies emphasise this difference. Firstly, “side” is 
used three times but it is collocated with “Turkish” and not “Turkish Cypriot”.
Using “Turkish” blurs the lines between mainlanders and Cypriots. It also 
eliminates the common “Cypriot” lexical choice used on BRTI. These namings 
are in line with Turkish nationalist ideology which claims there are only Turks and 
Greeks on Cyprus, not Cypriots.
A second strategy is the six uses of “we”. Five of these namings are in this direct 
speech of Ergakica:
We have come to a point where we need detailed meetings. Specifically 
we don’t have any kind of expectations. We will re-examine our attitudes 
with the Turkish authorities. We don’t have any suspicions or worries or 
arguments, but these consultations are needed.
The use of “we” is unclear, as has been pointed out in other cases (Fairclough,
2003:149 and 1989:148; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Leibhart, 1999:45; Billig,
1995: 106). In this story, “we” includes the TRNC and Turkish governments and
may include the UBP and residents who need meetings about Lokmaci. This
binds together the two states and excludes Greek Cypriots, furthering discourses
of sam eness amongst “Turks” and difference from “Greeks”.
VU.4M The Republic
VllAM.a BRTI
Like most other stories analysed, only the Republic’s government is represented 
in this story. These representations emphasise difference, opposition, a lack of 
authority and uncertainty. This is achieved through both lexical and grammatical 
strategies.
At the level of lexical choices we find the Republic’s government is named in 
ways which em phasise difference, opposition and a lack of authority. It is named 
“Greek Cypriot”, reminding listeners of a ‘them’ group, the ‘other’ Cypriot
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government. “Side” and “administration” are used connoting opposition and a 
lack of authority.
In this story, it can be seen that uncertainty is represented surrounding the new 
government. Two strategies are used for this: high modality when activating the 
government and collocations. These two strategies are exemplified in:
[...] the Presidential spokesman said that how the Greek Cypriot Side will 
contribute to the talks now that there has been a change in leadership, will 
only become clear following the meeting between the two leaders.
Here the government appears as “the Greek Cypriot Side” activated modally
(future). Questions surround its future actions. This uncertainty is magnified with
lexical choices. “How” the government “will” contribute to talks with a “change” in
government “will” become clear later. In another utterance, “eyes have
turned.. .to see  what kind of stance” the government takes. Both these
representations of the Republic are collocated with question words (“how” and
“what”). The Republic’s stance towards the Cyprus conflict is uncertain. The jury
is out on the Republic, clouding the future of Cyprus.
Vll.4.ii.b KFM-Radyo T
In this story, the Republic is represented more times than on BRTI, giving 
listeners more chances to imagine the ‘other’. Twice, Christofias is nominated 
giving listeners a point of identification. However, the Republic is represented 
not only as an uncertain ‘other’ like BRTI, but negatively as a possible enemy.
The Republic is represented as different from TRNC, more than on BRTI. Most 
namings use the lexical choice “Greek”, creating a ‘them’ group with no “Cypriot” 
commonality. Even the nation is named as “South Cyprus” and not “the Republic 
of Cyprus”, which would de-em phasise difference. However, these namings 
articulate discourses of ‘otherness’.
Like BRTI, uncertainty is represented with the Republic. This is achieved using 
both modal activations like Talat and Chritofias “will be coming together” and 
conditional phrases like “If he is willing to meet with Talat”. But unlike BRTI, the 
Republic is represented negatively. Two strategies are used. Firstly, the
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government is represented acting against TRNC interests. In the following, 
Christofias is represented activated in a state and mental process:
‘If Turkey is ready I [Christofias] am ready too’, Ergakica continued: ‘He 
[Christofias] intends to say that Turkey is blocking the solution in Cyprus’. 
This is really a very wrong attitude.
Here, Christofias is attributed with saying that if Turkey is ready to find a solution,
so is Christofias. He then blames Turkey for no solution. This is refuted by
Ergakica in the subsequent sentence. This utterance represents the Republic
verbally attacking Turkey. This attack is “wrong”. However, Christofias’s saying
of “I am ready too” is multi-layered and should be treated as dubious (Caldas-
Coulthard, 1994: 304). Ergakica’s interpretation of what “he intends to say” is
also multi-layered. Despite the questionability of their accuracy, these
representations of the Republic signify discourses of an enemy which is wrong in
attacking Turkey.
A second strategy used to represent the Republic negatively is co-text. For 
example, accusing Turkey of preventing a solution, Ergakica says “When you 
[the Republic] identify the problem falsely, providing a solution will be 
impossible.” Here, the Republic “identifies] the problem falsely” thereby making 
a solution “impossible”. The jury is out on KFM-Radyo T, but the jury is also 
blaming the Republic for acts counter to good relations with TRNC.
VI1.4. Hi Cyprus
Throughout this sample, Cyprus is represented either de-emphasised or 
negatively. All namings are impersonal, giving listeners no point of identification, 
named as the “Cyprus problem” and the “Cyprus issue” with negative 
connotations or backgrounded as “the island”, a term for a landmass. 
Grammatically it is either in prepositional phrases or passivated. These naming 
and grammatical strategies do not evoke discourses conducive to imagining 
Cyprus as a single federated entity, but articulate negative discourses of Cyprus.
VIlAMi.a BRTI
211
Though Cyprus is mostly represented negatively in this story, we find there are 
also some positive CTP-Cyprus and uncertain Cyprus-Republic themes revealed 
through examining co-text. When the CTP is in co-text with Cyprus, it is “finding 
an immediate and just solution”. When the  Republic is in Cyprus co-text, 
uncertainty such as “what kind of a stance” is represented. These draw upon 
discourses about CTP looking for solutions and waiting for the Republic’s 
government to be pro-solution too.
VIlAMi.b KFM-Radyo T
Though this story sees Cyprus represented negatively, collocations of “solution in 
Cyprus" contribute to more positive them es. Co-text reveals the Republic’s 
government is contributing “to the hopes of a  comprehensive solution”. The 
subsequent sentence, however, links these  “hopes” with the CTP which has the 
“aim of finding a complete and early solution”. So, although there is a positive 
theme associated with Cyprus, a CTP-friendly discourse is evoked, reflecting 
TAKs government connections which em phasise CTP actions without 
representing its policies.
VllA.iv Turkey
One significant difference between the recontextualisations of this press 
conference is that Turkey is excluded from BRTI but represented 12 times on 
KFM-Radyo T. Five of these are Turkey’s inclusion in “we”, examined in the 
TRNC section. Together, these represent Turkey as important, powerful, close 
and cooperative with TRNC.
It can be seen in this story that Turkey’s importance, closeness and power are 
represented using a number of strategies. Naming Turkish politicians and 
officials “senior contacts” and “Turkish authorities” are specific categorisations 
that emphasise function and connote importance. “Ankara” is named three 
times, emphasising closeness and localness with Turkey (Higgins, 2004: 643).
Another strategy used to represent Turkey a s  an important place populated with 
important people is collocations. Talat and his committees “go to Ankara” in
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order to “re-examine our attitudes”. Ankara has “expectations” which need to be 
addressed. These collocations evoke discourses of Turkish importance.
Collocations also produce a theme of cooperation between TRNC and Turkey. 
For example, meetings are “necessary” and the cooperative spirit between the 
two nations is em phasised in “[w]e don’t have any suspicions or worries or 
arguments” between Talat and Turkey. When attacked by Christofias, Ergakica 
said the Republic had “a very wrong attitude”. Turkey is an ally which is 
defended. These representations articulate discourses of a close alliance 
between TRNC and Turkey, again reflecting Turkish nationalist ideology.
VI1.4. v Difference within the same
BRTfs story has been analysed in full, however, KFM and Radyo T have 
sentences which are exclusive and have not been analysed yet. This section 
examines three of these sentences which are exclusive to KFM and Radyo T 
coverage. This exercise reveals that KFM and Radyo T articulate different 
discourses within their small differences reflecting political interests associated 
with each station.
VIiA.v.a KFM
The following are the three sentences unique to KFM which signify support for 
the CTP while representing the Republic as an enemy:
1. Ergakica said, “This desire [“in finding a complete and early solution”] 
was revealed directly with the votes of Turkish Cypriot people in the 
referendum on 24 April 2004.”
2. For this reason and due to the Greek Cypriot side’s slow attitude 
change to find a solution, now finding a complete solution to the Cyprus 
problem should happen quickly.
3. It should not be forgotten that the side which should have been 
changed is the Greek Cypriot side, (my numbering)
It can be seen from this excerpt that the CTP is represented as actively desiring
“solutions” using two strategies. Firstly, all three sentences are attributed to
Ergakica who nominalises and activates the government in the state process of
“this desire was revealed” in sentence one. Though nominalisations obscure
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responsibility, they are also used for brevity (Fairclough, 2008: 814). In this case, 
“this desire” is short for the government’s aim at finding a solution to the Cyprus 
conflict.
Secondly, collocations reveal the CTP is represented as desiring solutions. Due 
to “the desire” in sentence one and the Republic’s “slow attitude change” in 
sentence two, the Cyprus problem is collocated with “a complete solution” and 
the modal “should happen quickly” also in sentence two. Here, by representing 
the Republic now ready to work for solutions, it is pre-supposed that the CTP has 
wanted solutions and has been waiting. This realises discourses of CTP’s pro­
solution credentials.
It can also be seen that these three sentences create a CTP and residents’ “we” 
group. In sentence one, “the referendum on 24 April 2004” is collocated with 
residents and “this desire”. These collocations blur lines as to who desires a 
solution. At the sam e time, it creates a “we” group of the CTP and voters, 
producing an association which represents the CTP positively.
In these sentences, it can also be seen that the Republic is represented as 
different, oppositional and an enemy. Three strategies are used for this. Firstly, 
naming it “the Greek Cypriot side” and “the side” in sentences two and three 
connote difference and opposition. Grammatical strategies and collocations also 
represent the Republic negatively. In sentence two, the government is in a 
subordinate clause and in the prepositional phrase “to the Greek Cypriot side’s 
slow attitude change to find a solution”. This de-emphasises the Republic, while 
collocating it in ways which clearly blame it for no solution. In sentence three, it 
is modally activated in the negative event process of “the side which should have 
been changed”. Again, it is clearly responsible for no solution. These 
representations run against pro-solution ideas, drawing upon discourses of the 
Republic as an oppositional ‘other’. This is counter to discourses which promote 
partnership and a federation, but allow the CTP to deflect criticisms of it not 
finding solutions to the Cyprus conflict.
VIlA.v.b Radyo T
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Radyo T s story includes eight exclusive sentences, three of which represent 
TRNC-Republic relations. These sentences are:
1. Ergakica expressed that giving control of the buffer zone at Lokmaci to 
the UN m akes the opening of the gate a bigger problem.
2. Addressing one of the questions, Hasan Ergakica said that President 
Talat will go to the Islamic Orgnisation Conference in Dakar, Senegal after 
his visit in Ankara.
3. Pointing out the Turkish side’s decisively positive attitude in this 
process, Ergakica said he is not explaining its attitude with the media 
before som e points are clear and for this reason he may not be able to 
answer som e questions openly, (my numbering)
It can be seen that these three exclusive sentences represent TRNC, Turkey and
the Republic as seen by Turkish nationalists. The TRNC and its government are
multi-functional, TRNC statehood is suggested and bound to Turkey, CTP
successes are belittled and the Republic is represented as an enemy.
Like BRTI, the TRNC and its government are represented as multi-functional. 
This is achieved by activating the government going to a conference and Turkey 
in sentence two and interacting with reporters in sentence three. These 
activations identify actions and events with government involvement such as 
conferences, travel, press conferences and meetings, realising discourses of an 
active and multi-functional government.
More than the other stations, representations of aspects of the nation suggest 
TRNC statehood. “The media” represents a TRNC social institution, while 
“Lokmaci”, “the gate” and “the buffer zone” name three aspects of TRNC’s 
border, emphasising where TRNC ends.
Unlike the other stations, these three sentences represent the TRNC as part of a 
pan-Turkish nation which is opposed to the Republic. This is achieved using a 
number of strategies. Firstly, the CTP is named “the Turkish side” and “its” (short 
for “the Turkish side”) in sentence three. Naming the government a “side” carries 
oppositional connotations, while “Turkish” and not “Turkish Cypriot” is a common 
slippage between the two namings on Radyo T which reflects UBP policies that 
see TRNC as part of a pan-Turkish nation opposed to the Republic.
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Secondly, activations and collocations in these sentences also represent TRNC 
as not only part of a pan-Turkish nation, but part of an Islamic world. In sentence 
two, Talat is collocated with “will go to the Islamic Organisation conference” and 
“Ankara”. These actions, which bind TRNC to the Islamic and Turkish worlds, 
are excluded from the other stations’ recontextualisations of the press 
conference. These evoke discourses of sam eness based on religion and 
Turkishness and difference from the Republic not seen on the other stations.
Though these sentences represent government actions, CTP successes are 
belittled while the Republic is represented as an enemy. Through collocations 
and presuppositions, this occurs twice in sentence one. Firstly, Lokmaci is 
collocated with “giving control...to the UN”. Giving control of part of a nation to an 
outside organisation is something nations find hard to imagine (Billig, 1995: 76).
It is presupposed that the Republic is responsible for this action. Secondly, 
Lokmaci is collocated with “a bigger problem”. Collocating “a bigger problem” 
with Lokmaci presupposes that there is a problem with the opening of Lokmaci 
and again the Republic is to blame. This sentence contributes to the idea that 
Lokmaci is a problem brought on by the CTP, not a success. It also evokes 
discourses about the Republic as a dangerous enemy which wants to take 
control away from TRNC, reflecting Turkish nationalist ideology.
VII.4. vi 4 March 2008 Summary
All stations represent this news conference very much like the other stations. 
However, this analysis has revealed subtle differences which reflect national 
discourses associated with stations’ interests.
On BRTI, the TRNC government is represented in ways which draw upon 
discourses of “Turkish Cypriot” sam eness and function. These reflect BRTPs 
legal requirements which demand it promotes a Turkish Cypriot nation, running 
counter to discourses which signify an all-inclusive Cypriot federation.
The CTP is named personally providing listeners with a functionally-emphasised 
government official a s  a point of identification. It desires solutions on Cyprus, 
while waiting for the Republic. When Cyprus is represented positively, the CTP
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is looking for Cypriot solutions. The only time the CTP is not emphasised is 
when TRNC and the Republic’s governments are represented together.
The Republic is surrounded with uncertainty. It is the ‘other’ Republic whose 
actions are de-emphasised. Modality constructs an entity with no certainty, 
questionable ideas and stances. This uncertainty and de-emphasis illustrates 
BRTI's mix of interests it needs to appeal to whilst writing news. These mixed 
representations articulate discourses of conditional cooperation, though this is 
little more than a pretext for dominant discourses of ‘otherness’ and uncertainty. 
The representation of relations between the two states, though not blatantly 
negative, leaves many questions a s  to whether or not the two states can work 
together for a better future.
KFM-Radyo T draw upon discourses of difference that are even more 
pronounced than those on BRTl. The government is “Turkish”, not “Turkish 
Cypriot” and a “we” group of TRNC and Turkey is created. These are reflections 
of Turkish nationalist ideology, more in line with the UBP than the CTP. 
Alternatively, discourses about an active and important CTP are evoked. The 
positive role of the CTP in Cyprus is emphasised far more than on BRTl, 
benefiting the CTP and its search for solutions, not Cyprus itself. The CTP is 
full of good intentions and attitudes in regard to finding a solution and solving 
problems like the opening of Lokmaci, though precisely what it does is unclear.
Like BRTl, the Republic is the ‘other’, a ‘them’ group of “Greek Cypriots” 
associated with them es of change and uncertainty. But, unlike BRTl, it is also 
attributed with wrong actions and attitudes. This draws upon discourses about 
the Republic as not only the ‘other’, but an oppositional ‘other’.
Discourses about Turkey being important and close to TRNC are evoked. This is 
despite KFM and TAKs close links with the CTP. This representation is closely 
aligned to Turkish nationalist politics which articulate discourses of pan-Turkish 
nationalism.
KFM exclusive sentences continue discourses about a positive, active CTP 
government which wants solutions. A “we” group is exploited again, this time
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including the CTP and voters. This is excluded from Radyo T. The Republic is 
de-emphasised again and clearly blamed for no solution to the Cyprus problem. 
This negative representation is much stronger than BRTI's questioning 
representation of the Republic.
Radyo T exclusive sentences represent a multi-functional government and a 
successful multi-functional TRNC nation. Discourses about TRNC being part of 
the “Turkish” and “Islamic” world distinguish it from the Republic. This realises 
discourses of sam eness in terms of Islam and Turkey not seen on other stations 
and reflects UBP policy. The opening of Lokmaci is seen as a problem, not a 
CTP success. The Republic is represented, though backgrounded, as an 
aggressive enem y which wants to control parts of the TRNC and cause troubles. 
These exclusive sentences put the story in a nationalist framework, in line with 
the politics in Radyo Ts newsroom.
VII.5 TRNC and the Republic’s  Relations Conclusion
This chapter has analysed stories about relations between TRNC and the 
Republic from the time when the CTP was the sole pro-federation government on 
Cyprus, during the time of transition between governments and then when both 
states claimed to be pro-federation.
During this time of transition, politicians were talking about a federal “solution”.
An all-Cypriot federation presupposes that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
comprise a single nation-state. Part of building a single nation is articulating 
discourses not only about ‘us’ the nation, but also ‘them’ the ‘other’ (Bishop and 
Jaworski, 2003; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, 
Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Billig 1996). If TRNC media are to aid in creating an 
all-Cypriot nation, it should represent an inclusive Cypriot ‘us’ group. This, 
however, goes against TRNC’s media history which have traditionally identified 
Turkish Cypriots in relation to the ‘other’ Cypriots (Azgin and Bailie, 2008: 57; 
Panayiotou, 2006: 30; Lacherand Kaynak, 2005: 156; Mallinson, 2005: 109).
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This chapter’s analysis has revealed that changes in political context are 
reflected somewhat in the stories analysed. However, stations mostly signify 
discourses not conducive to solutions. Instead, stories articulate different 
national discourses which reflect each station’s interests. Unfortunately, these 
do little in realising discourses about unity, peace and a federation on Cyprus, 
despite this being a stated goal of both governments.
On BRTl, the representation of TRNC remains the same throughout this period. 
It is a multi-functional “Turkish Cypriot” nation. The government is important, 
international, legitimate, active and looking for “solutions” while waiting for the 
Republic to be pro-solution too, a reflection of CTP closeness to BRTl. This 
draws upon discourses of Turkish Cypriot sameness, CTP legitimacy and pro­
solution credentials and difference from the Republic. These are counter to 
discourses of unity.
Before Christofias, the Republic’s government is a “Greek Cypriot" oppositional 
‘other’. It acts against TRNC interests, though grammatical strategies cloud 
agency of negative acts from the Republic. Cyprus is named negatively and 
once as the negative imaginary “a Greek Cypriot state”. With the election of 
Christofias, the Republic is still named emphasising its ‘other-ness’. It is de­
emphasised, passivated and powerless while Christofias’s status is belittled. 
Though now represented as “pro-solution”, it is an entity with no certainty, 
questionable ideas and stances. The idea of TRNC and the Republic together is 
de-emphasised.
Cyprus is still identified as a problem with two sides and two peoples. However, 
there is hope. Cyprus is imagined twice as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal 
solution. This spells out a “solution” which mirrors CTP policies, thereby 
legitimising the party. The CTP and its “solutions” are offered as a positive 
option, a way out of the problem.
However, BRTl still evokes discourses of difference by promoting a distinct 
Turkish Cypriot nationalism and the Republic as the ‘other’ with many questions. 
This representation of relations reflects both Turkish nationalist and pro-solution
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national ideologies, satisfying an array of interests associated with the station. 
Though not blatantly negative, these representations articulate far more negative 
than positive discourses about relations. This leaves many questions regarding 
whether the two states can work together for a better future.
On KFM, discourses about a CTP-led nation are signified. It is active, legitimate, 
important, full of good intentions, attitudes and thoughts in finding “solutions”. 
Cyprus is surrounded by negativity with the CTP offered as the answer with its 
efforts, new initiatives and constructive stances. Residents think along the lines 
of CTP policies. A “we” group of the CTP and its supporters is created in one 
story. These reflect pro-CTP sentiments at KFM. But the government is 
“Turkish”, not “Turkish Cypriot” and a “we” group of the government and Turkey 
is created in another story. These demonstrate newsroom practices which see 
little care taken in news writing.
KFM does not represent the nation, creating possibilities for discourses about 
alternative forms of nation. However, no alternative is represented. Before 
Christofias, the Republic is named in ways which create a ‘them’ Greek Cypriot 
group which acts against TRNC interests. Grammatical strategies emphasise its 
negative power. This draws upon discourses about the Republic as the reason 
for no solutions, deflecting criticisms about its lack of success at finding solutions, 
more than on BRTl.
With Christofias, the Republic’s government is still negatively represented, again 
deflecting criticisms about the CTP. It is belittled, de-emphasised and the ‘Greek 
Cypriot’ other. Though the government is pro-solution “now”, it is attributed with 
change, uncertainty. Unlike on BRTl, it is also attributed with wrong actions and 
attitudes. It is blamed for no solution to the Cyprus problem. Cyprus is 
associated with positive themes attributed to CTP actions. Turkey is represented 
as important and close to TRNC, but with CTP pro-solution conditions attached.
Like BRTl, relations with Christofias are better than with Papadopolous. Though 
the CTP is represented as looking for solutions, none are represented. The 
Republic, Turkey and Cyprus are represented in ways which suit the CTP. The
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result is that despite a thin veneer of “solutions” covering a troubled Cyprus, no 
alternative pro-solution national discourse is signified. These stories draw upon 
discourses of a nation governed by pro-federation CTP, though what nation it 
governs is unclear.
On Radyo T, a successful TRNC state is represented as part of the “Turkish” and 
“Islamic” world, which distinguishes it from the Republic. Although the 
government shares som e of the positive attributes described on KFM (due to 
TAK sourcing), before Christofias, the government incorrectly handles relations 
with the Republic, lies, is unsuccessful, self-serving and in secret agreements 
with the Republic. Together, the CTP and the Republic deceive TRNC residents 
and attack TRNC itself, while the Republic wants Enosis.
In contrast, Turkey is represented positively with no CTP conditions. The UBP is 
peaceful, friendly, resists attacks from the Republic and the CTP, is responsible 
(along with Turkey) for creating a safe and comfortable TRNC state and aims to 
create a deserved and honorable solution for the TRNC “state”. These 
discourses reflect UBP and Turkish nationalist ideology at the station.
With Christofias, the Republic continues to be a dangerous enemy which desires 
to control parts of the TRNC and cause troubles. Though some positive themes 
are associated with the Republic during this time, modality, uncertainty and 
“waiting” surround these representations. Cyprus is either a negative entity, or 
associated with two societies, two regions, efforts, problems and compromise. 
These all point to UBP nationalistic policies. In turn, these discourses draw upon 
national discourses which offer the least potential for improving relations with the 
Republic.
This chapter’s analysis has unearthed some glimmers of hope. Discourses 
articulated on all stations by stories after the election are not as negative as 
during the time of Papadopoulos. However, all stations recontextualise events 
slightly differently in ways which represent TRNC interests associated with each 
station positively, whether it be BRTl satisfying the CTP, its nation-building 
mandate and Turkish national interests, KFM satisfying CTP interests, or Radyo
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T promoting a Turkish nationalist ideology. These do not signify discourses 
about partnerships with the Republic which could free residents from a life with 
embargoes and isolation.
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VIII Non-political Stories Analysis
VIII.1 Introduction
Nations are legitimised in our minds importantly through the most banal and 
everyday topics and not necessarily through overt nationalist language (Billig, 
1995). Not only overtly political stories or those that overtly refer to qualities of 
the nation-state and its citizens work to define and legitimise nations and 
nationalisms. It has been shown that in news, it is precisely the most ‘forgettable’ 
stories, and not rallying speeches by politicians where nations become part of the 
taken for granted everyday social and cultural landscape (Flowerdew and Leong 
2007; Higgins 2004; Bishop and Jaworski 2003; Billig 1995: 114). This ‘banal’ 
nationalism, as Billig (1995; 8) calls it, “enable(s) the established nations of the 
West to be reproduced”. Banal nationalism takes on particular importance in the 
case of TRNC due to its status as an unrecognised state by all countries but 
Turkey.
VIII. 1.i Non-political events news coverage
A count of stories in the thesis’s corpus reveals up to 20 percent of news stories 
can be characterised a s  these more mundane stories or “routine coverage”. This 
is a significant number of stories considering contextual factors which prioritise 
political stories. Salient are stations’ close affiliations with political parties and 
newsroom practices, such a s  stations’ reliance on TAK for news gathering and 
writing, both of which prioritise political stories. Nevertheless, these more 
mundane stories are a staple part of news and, as Billig suggests, are one 
important way that national ideologies are created and maintained.
In this chapter, ten stories which recontextualise four non-political events are 
analysed. These are two tourist events60, the opening of The Municipalities’ 
Union of the Turkish World office in Nicosia61 and the announcement of Cancer
60 See Appendix 12 C for all stations’ scripts and translations.
61 See Appendix 12 B for all stations’ original scripts and translations.
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week62. This chapter dem onstrates how these stories recontextualise seemingly 
non-political events in ways which articulate different national discourses.
On 4 March 2008, there were two tourism related events in TRNC covered by the 
radio stations. One was a visit to TRNC from a delegation from the Turkish 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The delegation worked with TRNC officials 
planning tourism strategies. This was excluded from KFM but covered by BRTl 
and Radyo T. There was also the rare chance for TRNC tourism companies and 
organisations to participate in an international event, the ITB Berlin 2008 Tourism 
Fayre. The fayre offered conferences, panels and displays for and from 11,000 
tourism companies from around the world. TRNC tourism organisations and 
companies being able to represent their interests at this event was a success for 
tourism in TRNC. This is because TRNC is usually barred from international 
events due to embargoes and isolation. This event was covered by BRTl and 
KFM, while excluded from Radyo T.
The Municipalities’ Union of the Turkish World (hereafter TDBB) is a “Union of 
local governments in countries and regions speaking the Turkish language and 
dialects.”63 On 13 March 2008, the TDBB opened a new office in Nicosia. The 
opening which was covered by all stations included a ceremony with speeches.
A few weeks later, TRNC like many other places around the world, participated in 
World Cancer week, which ran from 1 April to 7 April 2008. All stations covered 
the announcement of this annual campaign which aims to raise awareness of 
cancer. In TRNC, events included the launching of an early warning cancer 
scanning campaign. This was run by the Ministry of Health in conjunction with 
the Help Those with Cancer Association (hereafter the association). This 
association is a TRNC-based cancer patient support group.64
Despite these seemingly non-political events, stories are framed such that 
governance, TRNC’s position in Cyprus and its relations with Turkey and other
6: See Appendix 12 A for all stations’ original scripts and translations.
63 Information downloaded from http://www.tdbb.org-tr/ingeng/default.aspx?cm=HaberGosterandtui=14 
downloaded 11.05.09.
64 Information from http://www.cypyp.com/partnertulipshome.htm downloaded 20.01.09.
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nations positively reflect power holders associated with each station. In other 
words, stories are written in ways which support the interests of those who 
support the stations while ignoring residents.
Stories did not have to be written as such. TRNC is home to the historic port 
town of Kyrenia, ancient ruins, miles of sandy beaches and one of the few places 
in the world where sea  turtles nest. Despite these natural resources, tourism in 
TRNC is far less developed than in the Republic, hosting ten percent of the 2.4 
million tourists the Republic receives annually. This is due to embargoes and 
isolation which forbid direct flights to TRNC from anywhere in the world except 
Turkey. Seeing as tourism is a likely avenue for Turkish Cypriot financial 
success if embargoes and isolation are lifted, tourism stories could have been 
framed so that it was seen as a whole island concern. This could have 
happened on a micro-level by comparing a struggling TRNC hotel with a 
profitable Republic one. This would emphasise sam eness in terms of challenges 
and benefits. Or stories could have been framed in ways which emphasise how 
a successful Cypriot tourism industry would benefit all residents.
The TDBB office opening story could have been written from a union worker’s 
point of view, describing how the office helps workers and the municipality. 
Likewise, Cancer week excludes cancer victims and their points of view. One 
can easily imagine the way this would have been covered in a North Atlantic 
news outlet, framed emotionally as one person’s struggle with cancer. Or it could 
have represented cancer as a worldwide problem with no borders. Instead, 
stories are framed in ways which benefit those associated with each station.
VIII. 1M Chapter’s structure and analytical approach
The representation of TRNC and Turkish participants and their actions are 
analysed. The Republic is excluded from these stories, so is not analysed. In 
both sections, recontextualisations on BRTl, then KFM and finally Radyo T are 
examined.
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, internal relations 
within TRNC are examined; that is, governance, power holders, those without
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power and relations between these groups. In the second section, 
representations of TRNC’s relations with Turkey, Cyprus and the international 
community are analysed. Representations of these aspects of Turkish Cyprus 
tell us not only about how stations imagine those with power within the nation 
and how they exercise this power, but also whether they see TRNC as part of a 
Turkish, Cypriot or legitimately independent nation. These are all contested 
aspects of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.
The analysis of language used in these stories reveals that each station shapes 
its coverage in subtly different ways. Stations use their coverage of non-political 
events to represent their own ideas and interests about the nature of TRNC and 
its standing in relation to other nations. This allows for stories that on one level 
appear to be non-political to be shaped in ways which foreground the nation in 
different ways for the benefit of those associated with each station. 
Unfortunately, these draw upon national discourses which do not “help find a 
solution” and are not “what is good for the nation”.
VIII.2 Internal Relations
Vlll.2.i BRTl
In this sample of stories about non-political events, BRTl signifies discourses of 
support for a separate, multi-functional and legitimate TRNC nation. It 
represents a hierarchy within TRNC, with the pro-federation CTP government 
and officials leading a nation of powerless Turkish Cypriots.
These stories show BRTl support for a distinct TRNC nation by constantly 
reminding listeners of their nation. BRTl names not only the nation, as in 
“TRNC”, “the Republic” and “the North” but also aspects of the nation such as 
“the North’s tourism sector”, “non-governmental organisations”, “16 
municipalities” and “the Help Those With Cancer Association”. The sheer 
number of utterances is a constant reminder of TRNC. Specific namings identify 
various functions and the magnitude of the nation. For example, “non­
governmental organisations” and “Help Those With Cancer Association” draw
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attention to these and other organisations in “the Republic”. “16 municipalities” 
legitimises TRNC by acknowledging TRNC has many governed population 
centres like other nations. TRNC, with its organisations, associations and 
governance is sophisticated, large and legitimate, not a small, unrecognised part 
of a small island. At the same time, the nation is mostly in prepositional phrases 
which de-emphasises it. So although it is reminded, it is not emphasised. The 
government is.
Government emphasis is part of strategy which represents an internal TRNC 
hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is the CTP and officials. A number of 
strategies are used to achieve this. One strategy is namings of the government. 
BRTl names government officials like “Minister of Economy and Tourism 
Erdogan §anlidag” using functional honorifics, emphasising function and 
formality. These articulate discourses of support for a functional government and 
nation.
Another strategy used to emphasise government importance and power is 
sentence position and activations. For example:
The Ministry of Health, meanwhile, will launch cancer scanning in 
cooperation with the Help Those With Cancer Association within the 
framework of the week.
Here, “the Ministry of Health” is in dominant first position in the sentence. It is
activated performing the action process of launching cancer scanning. Action
processes suggest power, more than other activations, signifying discourses of a
powerful government. BRTl support for the CTP reflects its links to the Prime
Minister and its nation-building mandate outlined in the BRTK Law which BRTl
workers such as editor Dagun ‘feel’ daily through checks and controls upon their
work.
In this sample we also find that officials, whether or not they are CTP members, 
are represented positively and powerful. Personal representations of all officials 
emphasise function and formality as in the naming of non-CTP officials “the 
Mayor of Lefkosa - President of the Cyprus Turkish Municipalities’ Union Cemal 
Bulutoglulari” and “Mayor of Guzelyurt - the Vice-President of TDBB Mahmut
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Ozginar”. Furthermore, they are collocated with “opening” and “inauguration”. 
These collocations create a theme of officials’ importance. This support for all 
officials reflects BRTFs attempt to satisfy its many interests. Editor Dagun said 
that BRTl tries to “not offend” all participants in the Cyprus conflict when writing 
news, so power holders are represented positively. Although discourses of 
support for existing power holders are articulated, opportunities for discourses of 
change are reduced.
Below this upper echelon in TRNC, this sample of stories represents “non­
governmental organisations” and the Help Those With Cancer Association. They 
are represented as secondary players assisting government actions. This is 
achieved grammatically by placing them after the government and in 
prepositional phrases, yet associated with positive actions (van Dijk, 1991: 216) 
as in the citation above.
Represented at the bottom of the hierarchy within TRNC is its residents. They 
are always de-emphasised in prepositional phrases. No resident is named, 
offering no point of identification for listeners. Instead they are homogenised as 
“Turkish Cypriots” , a nation-building strategy. These representations constantly 
remind listeners of their nationality and nation, while their officials are activated 
and powerful. These representations serve the status quo and officials well while 
addressing BRTFs mandate of promoting the nation.
VIII.2.H KFM
In these stories, it can be seen that unlike KFMs political stories, a distinctly 
“Turkish Cypriot” TRNC is represented. Like BRTl, an internal hierarchy is 
articulated making clear that the CTP leads the nation. However, unlike BRTl, 
TRNC businesses and associations are not secondary players, but top TRNC’s 
internal hierarchy along with the CTP. As is the case on all stations, residents 
are represented at the bottom of this hierarchy.
In this sample, and especially the recontextualisation of the Berlin Tourism Fayre, 
we find that aspects of the nation are represented extensively, unlike most other 
stories on KFM. However, unlike BRTl which represents the TRNC nation, KFM
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represents TRNC commercial interests such as “Turkish Cyprus Hotels 
Association”, “Turkish Cyprus Travel Agencies Association”, “Turkish Cyprus 
Guides Association”, “Turkish Cyprus press representatives” and “Restaurants 
Association”. These exclusive “Turkish Cyprus” namings draw upon discourses 
of sameness within TRNC and difference with the Republic, TRNC nation- 
building strategies.
This inconsistency in namings across KFM  stories can be explained through 
news gathering and writing practices. KFM  editors cut and paste whole 
sentences from TAK, generally lacking concern for lexical and grammatical 
choices, according to my observations and editor-announcer Basri. There are no 
control and editing mechanisms to ensure consistency. The result is though 
there is a background murmur of support for the CTP and writing “what is good 
for the nation”, no other consistency is evident, including pro-federation policies.
One consistent representation in this sample and throughout the whole corpus is 
support for the CTP. Working with the CTP for the good of the nation is TRNC 
commercial interests and associations in the Berlin Tourism Fayre story and the 
association in the Cancer week story. This is achieved through a variety of 
strategies. In the recontextualisation of the Berlin Tourism Fayre, grammatical 
strategies are used. Firstly, the nation is activated in “the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus will be represented at this fayre”. However, the following 
reveals who will “represent” TRNC:
The Turkish Cyprus Hotels Association, Turkish Cyprus Travel Agencies
Association, Turkish Cyprus Guides Association and Restaurants
Association delegations and Turkish Cyprus press representatives left the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [...]
Here, associations are activated in the action process of leaving the TRNC for 
the Fayre. In the following sentence, the CTP’s §anlidag is also activated 
leaving for the Fayre. These sentences identify the CTP and business officials 
going to the Fayre to “represent” and “promote”. This articulates discourses of a 
nation led by a strong CTP government and business sector. This works well for
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KFM's owner who is a powerful TRNC businessman with interests in media, 
property and retail.65
In its recontextualisation of the announcement of Cancer week, lexical and 
grammatical strategies bind the CTP with the association which are represented 
acting positively together, unlike BRTl which represents the association as a 
secondary partner. This binding works as a three-step strategy.
Firstly, KFM uses the lexical choice “association” seven times, granting this 
group of volunteers credibility as an “association”. The association is activated 
mostly verbally. Being the only named source implicitly shows support for the 
association (White, 2006: 58, Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). Within reported 
speech, the association represents itself active. Together, these lexical and 
grammatical strategies represent the association positively, active and credible.
Secondly, the government is also represented positively, like the association. It 
is represented impersonally as “the government authority”, “12 district 
departments” and “the Ministry of Health”. These represent the CTP as multi­
functional, large and powerful, with “authority”, ministries and multiple 
“departments”. Grammatically, the government performs positive actions such 
as "will run their own activities to draw the public’s attention to cancer.” It is 
collocated with continuing scanning, being asked to invest in facilities and 
drawing attention to cancer. These draw upon discourses of the CTP acting for 
the good of TRNC residents.
Thirdly, the government and the association, which are both represented 
positively, are collocated. The CTP is represented alongside the association 
involved in positive actions. For example, the government appears in the 
following reported speech:
65 Asil Nadir’s list of commercial interests includes Polly Peck Group with import-export licenses and/ or 
exclusive sales of Del Monte, Unipac, Meyna, Sunzest, Niksar, Van Den Brink, Frio, Friico, Prevor, 
Medelson-Zeller, Standart Fruit, Sansui, Vestel, Capetronic, Imperial, Russel Mobbs Tower, Voyager 
kibris and Pizza Hut. He also has controlling shares in the following TRNC companies: Jasmine Court, 
Palmich, Cristal Cown, Olive Tree, Unipac fabrikasi, ICP ilaq: fabrikasi, Sunzest paketleme tesisleri, 
Sunzest konsantre fabrikasi, Wear Well konfeksiyon, Traveloz, Safeco Sigorta, Kend Bank, AN Grafik, 
Benlarit limited, Derece Lim, Cemar Ar.
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[...] we [the association] work together with the Ministry of Health, so the 
Cancer scanning programmes will continue.
Here the government and the association are represented working for the good
of residents, linking the two performing positive deeds. The CTP and the
association are represented as the solution to residents’ and the nation’s
troubles.
Like BRTl, at the bottom of KFM's national hierarchy is the nation and its 
residents. The nation and residents are represented with no power. Collocations 
reveal the nation and its residents have problems, such as “5200 people have 
cancer” and there is a need for a “hospital” in order “to solve” treatment 
problems. Though residents are activated as in “522 people developed cancer” 
and “every day 2 or 3 people develop cancer” residents are far from active.
These activations, collocations and co-text articulate discourses about residents 
and the nation without power and in trouble.
VIll.2.iii Radyo T
In these stories, we find a functional TRNC nation is emphasised. Within the 
nation, the UBP is represented as powerful at the top of an internal hierarchy of 
power, while the CTP government and non-governmental organisations are de­
emphasised or active but act as a pretext for discourses of Turkish nationalism 
which see Turkey’s role in TRNC as one of a leader. Residents are represented 
as powerless and part of a pan-Turkish nation.
The TRNC nation is represented as a fully-functional homeland, far more than 
the other stations. These representations sideline discourses which promote 
negotiations between TRNC and the Republic, TRNC being a positive solution to 
the Cyprus conflict. Though this serves the UBP and nationalist politicians well, 
this does nothing to relieve the embargoes and isolaton residents face.
In the sample, Radyo T represents the nation and aspects of this nation far more 
than other stations. Similar to BRTl, it names the nation as in “TRNC” ,“the two 
countries”, “Turkish Cyprus”, “Turkish Cypriot” and “16 municipalities” and unlike 
KFM  which names TRNC commercial interests. These namings, such as one of
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“the two countries” articulates discourses of TRNC nationhood, not an area of 
Cyprus with a disputed status. This echoes UBP policy which promotes the idea 
of two separate states on Cyprus.
It can be seen in the sample that recontextualisations of these non-political 
events also represent the nation’s institutions and places far more than on other 
stations. These stories map out institutions including health centres (Lefko§a 
Kentsel Health Centre, etc.), hospitals (Ye§ilyurt Cengiz Topel hospital, etc.), 
villages (Dipkarpaz, etc.), towns (Guzelyurt, etc.) and cities (Nicosia, etc.). The 
sheer number of mentions map out the nation (Billig, 1995: 114). Though mostly 
de-emphasised in prepositional phrases, the nation is constantly reminded. This 
reflects UBP policy of maintaining two states, while using its numerous mentions 
as a backdrop for the actions of power holders, especially those associated with 
the UBP.
Radyo T represents officials in ways which show support for the UBP and 
nationalists, placing them at the top of an internal hierarchy in TRNC. This is 
done lexically and grammatically. On a lexical level, Democratic Party politician 
Bulutoglulari is named as “Municipalities Union President Cemal Bulutoglulari”. 
This titulation excludes his other title as Mayor of Nicosia, which was included on 
BRTl. By omitting this title, his political role is suppressed. Alternatively, the 
UBP politician Ozginar is named as “The Turkish Cypriot Municipalities Union’s 
Vice-President and Guzelyurt Municipality’s Mayor Mahmut Ozginar”. This 
identifies both his roles. By suppressing roles of politicians from other parties 
and highlighting roles of UBP politicians, namings realise discourses of UBP 
importance and associates the UBP with good news, in this case, the TDBB 
office opening.
At the level of grammatical choices, we also find support for the UBP. Agency is 
given to power holders in TRNC, favouring those associated with the UBP and 
Turkey, two important actors in the UBP’s TRNC. Activations include action 
processes involving the Turkish union, Turkish politicians and the UBP’s Ozginar 
who “work”, “participate” and “open”.
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This sample also reveals that CTP government representations are used to 
support UBP and its policies. This is achieved using three strategies. Firstly, the 
government is named in ways which remind listeners of the multi-functional 
nature of their government and nation. In the tourism delegation story, §anlidag 
is named formally with functional honorifics as “the Minister of Economy and 
Tourism Erdogan §anlidag” three times. Though these emphasise §anlidag’s 
status, they also emphasise functions of the government and the nation. This in 
turn, reflects UBP policy that the nation is multi-functional and a success.
Secondly, it can be seen that the government is represented in ways which 
emphasise Turkish importance and cooperation, not government actions.
Though some BRTl representations are similar, on Radyo T these 
representations are far more plentiful and there are fewer other activations. This 
theme of Turkish importance to TRNC is dominant on Radyo T and a 
cornerstone of Turkish nationalism. For example, in the tourism delegation story, 
the government is activated in the action process of “received a visiting 
delegation”. This act, represented twice, emphasises the importance of the 
Turkish delegation. Only important groups are received by a Minister. Also, the 
TRNC government “are following tourism in Turkey” and are “pleased with the 
cooperation [...] and their coming to TRNC”. Though the CTP is activated, it is 
Turkey which is represented as important, leading and cooperating with TRNC.
Thirdly, CTP government representations indirectly support the UBP by being 
less positive than they could be. Three strategies are used to achieve this. 
Though some of these strategies are used on the other stations, their 
combination along with pro-UBP strategies are unique to Radyo T. Firstly, the 
CTP is mostly named impersonally, de-humanising it and depriving listeners a 
point of identification as in “Health Centres associated with Gazimagusa’s 
government hospital”. This naming identifies two aspects of the nation (“health 
centres” and the city of “Gazimagusa”) reminding listeners of their nation while 
impersonally naming the government.
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Secondly, the government shares actions and positive representations with the 
association in the Cancer Week story as in:
The Ministry of Health and the Help Those with Cancer Association 
together have announced April 1 to 7 is Cancer week.
Here, the government is active and enjoys dominant sentence position similar to
that seen on KFM, but it is activated with the association sharing positive news.
A third strategy used to de-emphasise the government is representing it in
prepositional phrases such as:
Health centres and hospitals associated with the Ministry of Health will do 
the tests.
Though this is an action process, the “Ministry” is in a prepositional phrase, de­
emphasising it somewhat. Together, these strategies represent the CTP less 
positively than it could be, thus working in favour of the UBP.
As is the case on the other two stations, residents are at the bottom of TRNC’s 
internal hierarchy always passivated or de-emphasised in prepositional phrases, 
acting as a backdrop for the actions of mostly UBP officials as in “The cancer 
scanning will target people” . Here, “people” are passivated by the actions of the 
nominalisation “cancer scanning” which represents the government and the 
association.
Though residents are powerless, lexical choices connote support for UBP 
policies. In the recontextualisation of the announcement of Cancer week, 
residents are represented as “the general public” and “people”, not “Turkish 
Cypriots”, as is usually the case. By using more inclusive lexical choices, Radyo 
T reflects UBP policies which have allowed many Turkish immigrants into TRNC. 
This policy is both ideological and practical. Ideologically, the UBP believes 
mainlanders and Cypriots are all Turks, so allowing mainlanders in TRNC seems 
natural. This sentiment was reiterated by Radyo T s owner Ersin Tatar who said, 
‘W e ’re all Turks afterall.” Practically, by allowing mainlanders into TRNC, 
nationalist support has been supplemented. My ethnography taught me that 
Turkish mainlanders are natural UBP Turkish nationalist supporters. So, these
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namings draw upon discourses of sameness amongst Turkish Cypriots and 
mainlanders, a part of Turkish nationalist ideology.
W//.2./V Internal Relations Summary
BRTFs lexical and grammatical choices represent a distinct independent 
“Turkish Cypriot” nation. It also represents a hierarchy within TRNC, with the 
pro-federation CTP government and non CTP officials leading the nation. These 
are multi-functional, important, active and part of the Turkish Cypriot nation. 
Non-governmental organisations play a secondary role in the nation. Below this 
are residents who are de-emphasised and represented without power. These 
representations evoke discourses of support for the nation, the CTP government 
and officials, benefiting said parties while satisfying BRTFs mandate to promote 
the nation.
On KFM, the CTP government is also named in ways which represent it as multi­
functional, large and powerful. However, government representations differ from 
BRTl by being represented as working in partnership with the association and the 
“Turkish Cypriot” business sector. Together they lead a successful nation of 
Turkish Cypriots, working for the good of the nation and its people who are in 
trouble. These representations not only show support for the CTP, but also the 
business sector and associations which benefits KFMs owner, a dominant 
businessman in TRNC.
On Radyo T, the nation is named in ways which stresses its “Turkish Cypriot” 
nature like that heard on BRTl. But unlike BRTl, the sheer number of its 
representations map out TRNC geographically and institutionally, indicating the 
importance Radyo T gives TRNC. Aspects of the nation associated with power, 
and especially the UBP, are activated and in control. The government is multi­
functional and active, though positive attributes are limited through grammatical 
strategies and the government is in need of Turkish assistance. These 
representations articulate discourses of a normal functioning TRNC nation and 
government independent of the Republic, without promoting the CTP. Residents 
are named in ways which include them in a pan-Turkish nation.
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VIII.3 The Turkish world or Cypriot nation?
VIII.3J BRTl
In the analysis of internal relations, it was revealed that BRTl journalists 
recontextualise non-political events in ways which support existing TRNC power 
structures. In this analysis, we find discourses about Turkish cooperation, 
closeness, importance, aid and leadership. But representations of its external 
relations are not limited to those with just Turkey. It is a nation amongst nations. 
These represent TRNC as independent yet closely aligned to, though not an 
integral part of, a Turkish world.
In this sample, with the exception of the Cancer week story where it is excluded, 
aspects of Turkey are represented as active. Turkey is activated in a variety of 
process types such as the action process of “[The Municipalities’ Union of the 
Turkish World (TDBB)] has opened a representation office”, the event process of 
“[the TDBB office] was inaugurated this morning” and the state process of “the 
TDBB has nearly 1,100 members from 9 countries”. These activations draw 
upon a discourse of Turkey being positive, active and in control: part of Turkish 
nationalist ideology.
It can be seen that Turkey is also represented as important. A number of 
strategies are used, namings being one. Personal namings of Turkish officials 
emphasise their roles, as in the functional naming of the “delegation”. The 
“delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism” highlights not only 
the group’s role but also their importance, being from a “Turkish ministry”. In 
fact, nominations are minimal in these stories, witholding a point of identification. 
When they are named, it is formally with functional honorifics, such as “Vice- 
President of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party [AKP] Huseyin Tanriverdi” 
which emphasise the official’s power and importance. These namings evoke 
discourses about Turkey being important to the TRNC nation, though because 
there are few nominations, closeness is withheld. To withhold closeness 
between TRNC and Turkey reflects CTP interests. This is another example of
236
what editor Dagun said was BRTI’s attempt to “not offend” all parties in the 
Cyprus conflict.
Impersonal namings also emphasise Turkey’s importance by identifying many 
aspects of Turkey, such as the tourist delegation, the union, its members, its 
office and the Turkish government. These namings mostly include “Turkish” or 
an abbreviation, reminding listeners of Turkey’s importance and roles in TRNC. 
For example, the TDBB office is represented as belonging to the Turkish union in 
“The Municipalities’ Union of the Turkish World (TDBB) has opened a 
representation office”. Naming the office as that of a Turkish union and not 
belonging to TRNC emphasises Turkey and its importance. This naming is 
similar to that seen on Radyo T  and the opposite of KFM  which represents the 
office belonging to the TRNC.
Interestingly, “the Municipalities Union of the Turkish World” is only named once, 
“TDBB” being preferred. This almost exclusion of the “Turkish World” naming 
backgrounds the idea of the TRNC office being part of the “Turkish world”, while 
reminding listeners of Turkey’s importance. This compromise naming is a result 
of influences in BRTI newsrooms such as CTP supporting managers and writers 
who must not “offend” Turkish nationalist interests, yet find the idea of a “Turkish 
world” too close for their liking. These choices evoke discourses of important 
links with Turkey, but refrain from articulating discourses of membership to a 
“Turkish world”.
This idea ot TRNC being not part of the Turkish world, though closely linked to it 
can be seen through collocations. These reveal TRNC is internationally 
legitimate, a nation amongst nations. In the Berlin Tourism Fayre story, TRNC 
associations and businesses are part of “nearly 11 thousand tourism companies 
from 180 countries”. This represents TRNC as a nation amongst 180 other 
nations, reaffirming TRNC’s legitimacy as an independent nation, as mandated 
by BRTPs Law and not part of the Turkish world.
All the same, we find collocations continue to represent Turkey as important. For 
example, the Turkish tourist delegation was “received” by the minister. Normal
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groups of people are not “received” by ministers, only groups deemed important. 
The TDBB office opening is collocated with “ inaugurated” and “speeches are 
delivered”, representing it as an important event. “TRNC municipalities and 
TDBB” is collocated with “cooperation”. This cooperation will “promote the 
TRNC”, is an “important step” and “create[s] new opportunities”. These 
collocations represent Turkey as important for TRNC with its power, importance, 
cooperation and aid. These benefit those associated with BRTI with Turkish 
nationalist interests, such as the Turkish government, its military and those 
profiting from political patronage.
In this sample, we also find that BRTI writers use reported speech to represent 
Turkey as not only important, but aiding TRNC. Turkish sources are used 
extensively for reported speech, showing support and importance given to 
Turkey (White, 2006: 58; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). In the following, the 
illocutionary glossing verb “emphasised” is used to highlight the importance of aid 
to TRNC in:
Underlining the need for lifting the international isolation on the Turkish
Cypriot people, Mr Tanriverdi emphasised that the AKP will continue
taking steps towards realising this goal.
This sentence highlights two common themes on BRTI. Firstly, it represents 
TRNC residents suffering from isolation, a theme exploited by all TRNC parties 
who want the lifting of embargoes and isolation. Residents are victims, de­
emphasised in a prepositional phrase within a subordinate clause. Secondly, the 
Turkish government is represented aiding TRNC residents by “taking steps 
towards” lifting international isolation. This is a distillation realising purpose (van 
Leeuwen, 1995: 99). It does not reveal any detail of actions while serving the 
politician well by evoking a discourse of Turkey’s AKP party aiding TRNC 
residents.
A second strategy used to represent Turkey aiding TRNC can be seen in 
collocations. For example, the Turkish tourist delegation is in TRNC to “carry out 
planning work to help develop tourism”, “within the framework of the cooperation 
and dialogue” and “will contribute to developing the North’s tourism sector.”
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Though Turkey is represented as important, cooperative and helpful, the 
relationship between Turkey and TRNC is not one of two equals. In fact, TRNC 
is represented as subordinate to Turkey. For example, in the Turkish tourist 
delegation story:
Pointing out that they followed closely tourism developments in Turkey, 
the Minister of Economy and Tourism expressed his desire to benefit from 
the delegation’s experience in the field.
“They” in indirect speech of §anlidag refers to the TRNC government. Though
“they” are activated, which emphasises TRNC, the act of “following” Turkey
defines relations between the two states. Furthermore, the illocutionary glossing
verbal phrase “[§anlidag] expressed his desire” connotes the importance to the
speaker of what is said (Coulthard-Caldas, 1994: 304). For §anlidag to express
his desire to learn from the Turkish delegation, BRTI emphasises the
delegation’s importance and knowledge. This realises a discourse about Turkey
being a country to follow, satisfying BRTI’s Turkish nationalist interests.
This relationship of TRNC following Turkey is evident in many aspects of TRNC 
life due to embargoes and isolation. Turkey is the only route that goods, services 
and knowledge can go through. For this reason, TRNC is in a position where it 
must follow Turkey. As editor Dagun said, TRNC is too weak to be truly 
independent without Turkey’s help. However, this discourse omits that this 
“following” is due to no solution to the Cyprus conflict. With a solution, 
embargoes and isolation would be lifted and Turkish Cypriots could choose who 
and what to follow. By emphasising “following”, stations ignore that the 
“following” is a result of no solution.
VIII.3.H KFM
In the previous internal relations analysis, it was seen that KFM recontextualises 
non-political events in ways which represent an internal TRNC hierarchy which 
supports the CTP and its associates. However, previous chapters’ analyses 
have revealed that with the exception of distancing TRNC from Turkey, CTP 
policies are mostly omitted. This analysis reveals that Turkey is almost excluded, 
while some lexical choices in one story suggest support for a Cypriot federation.
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Unfortunately, this is minimally represented, with dominant discourses about 
external relations supporting division and TRNC as a successful international 
nation under the leadership of the CTP.
According to CTP politician Beralti, CTP does not consider TRNC part of a pan- 
Turkish nation, but more as part of a future united Cyprus. In this sample, we 
find that KFM reflects this policy by minimally representing Turkey (named twice). 
These are impersonal representations, de-emphasised in prepositional phrases. 
By almost excluding Turkey, discourses which reflect KFM and CTP’s vision of 
the TRNC nation as one which backgrounds Turkey’s role are signified.
Even when Turkey is represented, grammatical choices de-emphasise it. In 
coverage of the TDBB office opening, the office is named as the “Turkish Cypriot 
Municipalities Union’s Nicosia main office”. Unlike BRTI and Radyo T, KFM 
represents the TDBB office not as Turkish but as TRNC’s by using the 
possessive “s”. Emphasising TRNC in this story runs against KFM's almost 
exclusion of the TRNC nation seen throughout its news. In most stories, this 
exclusion makes negotiations for a new form of nation seem natural. However, 
in this story, by representing the office as Turkish Cypriot, TRNC is emphasised, 
signifying discourses of difference from the Republic and distance from Turkey, 
two common themes on KFM.
Unlike other stories on KFM, in the Cancer week story we find a few instances 
where lexical choices suggest support for a Cypriot federation. This CTP policy 
is reflected in Cyprus being named as a single entity. These inclusive namings 
appear in the association's direct speech. This gives control of representations 
to the association and distances responsibility from KFM writers (Caldas- 
Coulthard, 1994: 304). All the same, choosing to use these utterances shows a 
degree of support for them (White, 2006: 58, Fairclough, 1995; ibid.).
Inclusive Cypriot namings are “[...] on the island we have many people with 
cancer” and “[...] in Cyprus, we need a hospital with facilities for cancer 
treatment.” Though these namings appear in prepositional phrases, dominant 
sentence positions counter de-emphasis somewhat. Importantly, these
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represent cancer as an all-island problem, articulating a discourse of an all- 
Cypriot ‘us’ group with cancer problems and needing a hospital.
In 2003, the CTP was voted into power on a platform which dismissed Turkish 
nationalist ideology of scepticism towards a federation. The day after being 
elected, the CTP promised the government’s priority was “[...] to achieve a 
settlement to the Cyprus problem based on the Annan Plan.”66 The settlement 
the Annan plan envisioned and the CTP claims it desires is a federation. These 
namings draw upon such discourses, a step towards a federation.
In the same story, some representations of residents further blur lines between 
TRNC and the Republic. Though some utterances refer specifically to TRNC 
residents, others refer to Cypriot residents and others are vague. For example, 
the first three sentences of the Cancer week story read:
1. Help Those with Cancer Association drew attention to the fact that in 
2007, 281 people died of cancer and 522 people developed cancer.
2. In the year 2008, every day two or three people develop cancer.
3. The Association said that in The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 
5200 people have cancer; 15 years ago there was little cancer and they 
are afraid of it growing, (my numbering)
In the first two sentences it is unclear who “281 people”, “522 people” and “two or
three people” refer to. Sentence three makes clear “5200 people” are TRNC
residents. Considering the all-inclusive Cyprus namings cited above, these
numbers possibly represent more inclusive groupings, blurring the borders of
who is included in national ‘us’ groups which signify more inclusive discourses of
an all-Cypriot federation.
Unfortunately these namings are few in number, while the majority, even in this 
sample, realise discourses of support for the CTP, businesses and associations 
and difference from the Republic, such as the abundant “Turkish Cyprus” 
namings analysed earlier. This inconsistency in namings across KFM stories 
reflect news gathering and writing practices which do not prioritise concern for 
lexical and grammatical choices. It follows then that the Cancer week story uses
66 Downloaded 04.06.09 from http://nsl .brtk.net/enews/archive/oarchive.htin.
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some lexical choices which evoke discourses of unity, while the vast majority of 
scripts do not.
This inconsistency in namings is exemplified in KFM's recontextualisation of the 
Berlin Tourism Fayre. This story promotes TRNC as an internationally 
recognised nation, more than the other stations’ accounts of tourism events.
One strategy used is framing the Fayre as an important, international event. By 
doing so, TRNC’s participation takes on greater international significance. The 
Fayre is represented 14 times, being “the most prestigious” and “most important 
and biggest tourism fayres” with “nearly 11 thousand tourism companies” and 
“exciting events”. It expects “150000 visitors”. Its in its “42nd” year, adding 
legitimacy through its longevity. Even locating it “in the capital of Germany” adds 
importance being in a “capital”, not a small unimportant town.
Representing the Fayre as important serves the CTP well. This is because 
TRNC is being “promoted” and “represented” by the CTP and businessmen with 
“a 120 metre square stand with various activities.” This draws upon discourses 
of CTP success, participating in an important international fayre in no small way*
The Fayre is not only represented as important, but internationally important.
This represents TRNC’s participation as being a nation amongst nations, far 
more than BRTI. The story claims “the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will 
be represented at this fayre”, not TRNC businessmen representing their 
interests. Like BRTI, TRNC is represented as one of “more than 180 different 
nations” at the Fayre. Unlike BRTI, there are 20 utterances of countries, cities 
and “nation” in this story, constantly drawing upon discourses of TRNC as a 
recognised nation amongst nations.
This recontextualisation of events runs counter to pro-federation CTP policies. 
Representing the TRNC as a nation amongst nations is in line with Turkish 
nationalist ideology which aims to maintain two states. However, by representing 
the CTP and businesses active at the Fayre, discourses about a successful, 
international TRNC, under the wing of the CTP and businessmen are evoked.
Vlll.3.iii Radyo T
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In the previous analysis of internal relations it was seen that the nation is 
accentuated and power holders associated with the UBP are at the top of an 
internal hiearchy, the CTP is de-emphasised and residents are named in ways 
which include Turkish mainlanders. These representations reflect UBP policies.
Another major plank in UBP policy is maintaining close relations between TRNC 
and Turkey. This close relationship has served many UBP supporters well 
through patronage. It serves Radyo T well, its owner being a prominent UBP 
politician with its associated benefits.67 Two of these stories (Cancer week 
excludes Turkey) recontextualise events in ways which articulate discourses of 
Turkey’s importance, closeness and a TRNC-Turkish partnership, similar to that 
seen on BRTI. Representations differ however, by all these themes being 
accentuated on Radyo T, TRNC being represented as part of a pan-Turkish 
nation and the idea of TRNC being a nation amongst other nations excluded. 
Together these reflect UBP policies which view Turkey as a protector, guardian 
and close ally, with TRNC being part of a pan-Turkish nation.
In this sample, Turkey is represented as important and powerful, similar to BRTI. 
Two strategies are used, one being lexical choices. Like BRTI, specific 
categorisations such as the “delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism” highlight the delegation’s connections with the Turkish government and 
its importance. Turkish officials “AK Party General Vice-President and local 
Manise Parliamentarian Huseyin Tanriverdi”, “Municipalities Union of the Turkish 
World President Erol Kaya” and “Turkish Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertugrul 
Giinay” are named formally with functional honorifics, emphasising role and 
importance. Unlike BRTI, Radyo T names far more Turkish officials throughout 
the sample giving listeners more points of identification which indicates 
closeness with Turkey.
67 Ersin Tatar is the owner and manager of Kanal T and Radyo T. He is a partner in Tatar and Co. 
Chartered Accountants. At the time of reseacrh, he was the Shadow Minister of Finance for UBP and 
became the Minister of Finance on 23 April 2009 with the UBP parliamentary victory. These positions 
allow him access to contacts and contracts which businessmen without his political connections may not 
enjoy.
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Another strategy used to identify Turkey as important and powerful is activations. 
Turkey is activated in a wide variety of action processes. For example, the 
Turkish delegation is activated in action processes of it “came to the TRNC”, “will 
carry out investigative work” and “will carry out some investigations” while 
Turkish officials “Kaya, Tanriverdi opened the representation office”. These 
activations have agency, emphasising Turkey and its power (Fairclough, 1995a: 
113).
A third strategy used to represent Turkish importance is collocations and co-text 
Like BRTI in the tourism delegation story, the delegation is “received” by the 
TRNC minister. Unlike BRTI, the “Turkish Minister of Culture and Tourism 
Ertugrul Gunay” is collocated with “the formal visit”. A “formal visit” is again an 
important event reserved for important people. These strategies signify 
discourses of Turkish power and importance.
In this sample, we also find Turkey and TRNC are represented positively working 
together, a theme similar to that on BRTI. Activations are used to represent 
Turkey and TRNC in “they will reach and succeed in their aims”. Though both 
states are activated, this is a distillation. This distillation gives no indication of 
what actions are being performed, though like most distillations, serves purposes 
(van Leeuwen, 1995: 99). In this case, representing the two states succeeding 
together serves UBP and Radyo T well by mirroring Turkish nationalist ideology 
of a close successful partnership between TRNC and Turkey.
But Turkey is represented as more than a partner, but a nation to learn from.
This theme is seen on BRTI, though its multiple representations on Radyo T 
accentuate this theme. Turkey is collocated with helpful lexical choices such as 
“carry out planning work to develop tourism”, “cooperation”, “works”, and “carry 
out investigative work”. These create a helpful theme. Works with Turkey “will 
contribute” to TRNC tourism, the TRNC “are following tourism in Turkey” and the 
Minister wants to “take benefits from Turkey’s experiences”. These themes of 
Turkish experience and a nation to follow draw upon a discourse of TRNC 
dependency on Turkey, reflecting UBP policies.
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Unlike the other stations, Turkey is represented as more than a nation, it is a 
world. The lexical combination “Turkish W orld” is used extensively in the TDBB 
office opening story. This lexical combination (uttered six times on Radyo T, 
twice on KFM and once on BRTI) represents Turkey being larger than a country; 
a “world”, large and powerful. This articulates a discourse of pan-Turkish 
nationalism not seen on the other stations.
In this sample, it can be seen that TRNC is represented as part of this pan- 
Turkish world. “TRNC” is collocated with Turkey throughout the sample, lexically 
binding the two together. For example, twice the TDBB office is named as 
“Municipalities Union of the Turkish World TRNC representation office”. The 
words “work”, “process” and “opening” are collocated with the two states, along 
with the co-texts of “every day that number grows” and “an important step”. 
These utterances draw upon discourses of TRNC and the Turkish world together 
expanding and improving. The Turkish Cypriot Union will work in and be part of 
the Union of the Turkish World, a simile for the TRNC nation being part of the 
Turkish world.
W//.3./V The Turkish World or Cypriot World Summary
In this sample of recontextualisations of non-political events, we find that BRTI 
represents Turkey as important, cooperative, helpful, powerful and in control. 
TRNC is a nation bound to Turkey with aid and cooperation, but by withholding 
closeness and lexical choices BRTI suggests TRNC is not a part of a Turkish 
world. It is a nation amongst nations, albiet with close connections to Turkey.
On KFM, we find Turkey is excluded or de-emphasised, connoting distance 
between TRNC and Turkey. A few lexical choices in the recontextualisation of 
the announcement of Cancer week suggest the nation and its people are part of 
an all-inclusive Cyprus. These few utterances draw upon discourses of unity, 
conducive to creating a federation. However, the vast majority of representations 
throughout the sample articulate discourses of difference, as evident in the TDBB 
office opening story and TRNC legitimacy in the Berlin Fayre story. The only 
consistent discourse evident throughout this sample is the CTP is positive,
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powerful and leading a nation of residents, though who these residents are is 
sometimes unclear.
Radyo T recontextualises these events in ways which draw upon discourses of 
TRNC legitimacy and pan-Turkish nationhood. Turkey is important, close, 
strong, activated, expanding and leading TRNC. This is emphasised far more 
than on the other stations. Turkey is more than a country, but a “world” of which 
TRNC is a part. TRNC progresses and cooperates with Turkish assistance. 
Cooperation results in “important steps” and “development” for TRNC. These 
representations signify discourses about TRNC as a junior partner in its relations 
with Turkey, more than on BRTI, reflecting UBP Turkish nationalism which sees 
Turkey as an ally, protector and the motherland in a pan-Turkish nation.
VIII.4 Non-political Stories Conclusion
It has been found that non-political news stories are fertile ground for nation- 
building and maintaining (Flowerdew and Leong, 2007; Higgins, 2004; Bishop 
and Jaworski, 2003; Billig, 1995). This chapter has analysed the coverage of 
non-political events to reveal how each station represents internal relations, 
TRNC’s relations with Cyprus, Turkey and other nations. It has revealed that 
each station draws upon different national discourses, each reflecting the 
interests of power holders closely associated with each station.
On BRTI, discourses are evoked which support the TRNC led by existing power 
holders. The “Turkish Cypriot” nation is represented extensively articulating 
discourses of sameness, yet distinguishing it from the Republic. These 
representations serve as a backdrop for the actions of officials. Powerful 
government and non-governmental officials are represented in charge, 
controlling events in a multi-functional nation.
Many actions suggest TRNC is a junior partner with Turkey. Turkey is important, 
powerful, cooperative, a source of information, a leader and helpful to TRNC and 
its residents. TRNC is bound to Turkey with aid and cooperation.
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Though these representations appeal to the governing CTP and Turkish 
nationalists, they do little to evoke discourses about cooperation, compromise or 
unity. These discourses suppress the reason why TRNC follows Turkey is 
because there is no solution to the Cyprus conflict. With a solution, TRNC would 
be in a position to decide which nations to follow for various aspects of its 
functioning. Indeed, these do little to “help find a solution”, the supposed 
purpose of news on BRTI during the time of this thesis.
On KFM , an internationally successful CTP-led Turkish Cypriot nation in 
partnership with businesses and non-governmental associations are the most 
dominant discourses signified in this sample. The CTP and associates have 
attitudes and thoughts for the good of the nation and its people, being the 
solution to their troubles. These representations reflect CTP’s close relationship 
with KFM.
Unlike previous analysis, a few lexical choices in one story draw upon CTP pro­
federation discourses of unity. These blur the lines of who and what is the nation 
and its people. At the same time, the CTP policy of distancing TRNC from 
Turkey is evident. Unfortunately, representations of these policies are flawed. 
Firstly, lexical choices which connote a single Cyprus appear only a few times in 
one story. The vast majority of representations clearly distinguish Turkish 
Cypriots and their businesses, associations and government from the Republic 
while supporting the CTP. This thesis’s ethnography revealed that KFM mainly 
cuts and pastes sentences from TAK with little interest in news, politics and 
lexical and grammatical choices. Pro-federation sentiments are not a priority, 
but an oversight or pretext for pro-CTP discourses.
Secondly, representing Turkey as being outside of TRNC is also flawed. 
Presently, the reality for TRNC is that it relies entirely on Turkey for its existence. 
Creating distance between itself and Turkey can only work effectively if an 
alternative is being represented. KFM  fails to do this. With very few exceptions, 
KFM  does not articulate discourses of unity and life without embargoes and
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isolation, representing CTP interests at the expense of “what is [really] good for 
the nation”.
Radyo T recontextualises non-political events in ways which draw upon 
discourses of sameness, difference and nationhood aligned with UBP Turkish 
nationalism. The nation is constantly reminded geographically, institutionally and 
socially far more than other stations. This is a reflection of UBP policies which 
promote a two-state solution.
UBP officials are represented as powerful and acting for the good of residents. 
The government is represented as multi-functional and active, though the CTP is 
not promoted. This articulates discourses about a normal functioning nation with 
a multi-functional government, again reflecting UBP policy.
These stories also evokes discourses of pan-Turkish nationalism. TRNC 
progresses, takes important steps and develops whilst working with Turkey. 
Turkey is important, powerful, active, expanding and leading TRNC. Turkey is 
the motherland, an ally and protector. It is a “world” in which TRNC belongs.
This representation of a Turkish Cypriot nation within the Turkish world reflects 
TRNC as seen by the UBP. Unfortunately, this does little to promote Cypriot 
compromise, cooperation or unity, discourses essential for contributing to a 
better life for residents of TRNC.
This chapter has demonstrated that news stories about non-political events 
articulate different discourses of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. This confirmed 
Billig’s (1995:8) assertion that the “forgettable” banally contributes to nation- 
building and nation-maintaining. Unfortunately, these national discourses pay 
little heed to “what is good for the nation” and what “helps to find a solution to the 
Cyprus problem”. Instead, choices reflect stations’ interests which for the most 
part are counter to finding a solution to the Cyprus conflict.
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IX Conclusion
Cypriot, regional and international powers recognise the importance of Cyprus for 
their own agendas. These powers are responsible for creating conditions for 
both dividing the island and maintaining its division. While many have benefitted 
from this division, TRNC residents have suffered with embargoes, fear of their 
island’s co-habitors and political, social and economic isolation.
Media in several contexts, including Cyprus, have been attributed with 
contributing to national ideology (Panayiotou, 2006; Richardson, 2006; Bishop 
and Jaworski, 2003; Fairclough, 2003, 1995a and 1989; Moores, 2000; Wodak, 
de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999;
Hobsbawm, 1997; Martin-Barbero, 1997; Krishnamurthy, 1996; Billig, 1995; 
Anderson, 1991; van Dijk, 1991; Tuchman, 1978). Broadcast news disseminates 
national discourses by representing and transforming political texts which are 
then recontextualised into “everyday life, where it contributes to the shaping of 
how we live, and the meanings we give to our lives” (Fairclough, 1989: 34-37). In 
TRNC, where radio is a popular form of media, this takes on significant 
importance.
This thesis contributes to a volume of work which claims that historically and 
presently, Cypriot media have played a role in the division of Cyprus by framing 
news in conflicting nationalistic terms (Bailie and Azgin 2008; Panayiotou 2006; 
Kannaouros 2004; Azgin 1996; Dedegay 1988). However, this thesis differs from 
previous ones in two ways. Firstly, it demonstrates that national ideology is not a 
uniform expression and allegiance in and through news media, but is internally 
fractured, politically differentiated and dynamically moving through time. Using 
Critical Discourse Ananlysis, this thesis has detailed how TRNC radio news 
recontextualises events which signify different national discourses that serve 
interests associated with different stations.
Secondly, this thesis differs from most CDA by contextualising its close textual 
analysis in three ways (Widdowson, 2004; Philo, 2007). Firstly, the social goings 
on behind news texts have been examined by an ethnography of the production
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of news, looking specifically at political and economic contexts, news gathering 
and writing practices at each station. This discloses where ideological 
discourses identified in the textual analysis come from. It also makes clear how 
national discourses in radio texts serve the political interests associated with 
each station. Secondly, TRNC and its media have been historically examined. 
This has aided in clarifying meanings in texts. It has also helped understanding 
media’s roles in Turkish Cyprus. Thirdly, an examination of nationalism has 
exposed common elements of nationhood and strategies of nation-building and 
maintaining. This has exposed how different Turkish Cypriot nationalisms have 
come about and clarified current national ideological thinking. These 
examinations have contextualised the textual analysis by illustrating how national 
discourses in TRNC are articulated in and through history and the media.
XI. 1 Which station offers the most potential?
Though this thesis’s analysis has revealed how discourses evoked in news serve 
political interests associated with each station, it has not considered which radio 
station’s news offers the most potential to improve the lives of TRNC residents. 
Three criteria are considered when determining this potential.
The first criteria considers whether stations’ news articulates discourses about a 
nation which frees residents of the embargoes, fear and isolation they presently 
experience. Discourses of compromise and cooperation contribute to the idea 
that discussions with the Republic and a solution to ending the conflict seem 
natural’. Discourses of unity could also play a role. Unity contributes to the idea 
of an all-inclusive Cyprus, such as a federation, one solution promoted by some 
political parties.
The second criteria, derived from Habermas’s (1984) idea of the public sphere, 
prescribes media airing an array of voices. The media are expected “to facilitate 
democracy through providing pluralistic information from which informed choices 
can be made and debates can take place” (Manning, 2001 in Atton and 
Wickenden, 2005: 347). Debates allow an “exploration of differences, and a 
move towards resolving them so as to reach agreement and form alliances”
250
(Fairclough, 2003: 44). In the context of this thesis, TRNC news could offer a 
variety of discourses for residents to consider. This includes an array of voices 
about both internal relations in TRNC and all-Cypriot issues. With a variety of 
discourses, residents have the opportunity to consider options regarding their 
current situation.
The third criteria is which stations offer residents a national group identity, 
something residents have been struggling for since British colonial time. 
Hobsbawm (1997:46) notes there is no doubt people long for group identity. He 
writes national identity “can mobilise certain variants of feelings of collective 
belonging, which already existed [before the era of the nation-state] and which 
could operate [...] with modern states and nations”. In short, the desire to belong 
to a group can be satisfied through a national group identification. There is no 
doubt TRNC residents feel a need for such a national group identity.
XI. 1.i BRTI
Discourses about the nation, residents and its government are consistent 
throughout this thesis. BRTI evokes discourses of support for the TRNC nation. 
It is multi-functional and “Turkish Cypriot” with a Turkish language, a border, an 
airport, associations, areas, officials, residents, a government and a crossing. 
Discourses of support for existing TRNC power holders include “Turkish Cypriot” 
police, businessmen, officials and immigration officers. These are important, 
active, powerful and controlling events in a “Turkish Cypriot” nation. Residents 
are “Turkish Cypriot” , yet powerless, passivated by isolation due to the Republic 
and aided by the CTP government and sometimes Turkey. By accentuating 
“Turkish Cypriot-ness” , discourses of difference and division between the TRNC 
and the Republic are articulated.
Like all stations, governance is at the centre of BRTts representation of the 
nation. BRTI draws upon discourses of support for the pro-federation CTP 
government. It is hard-working, “Turkish Cypriot”, important, pro-solution, active, 
powerful, internationally legitimate and protects the nation from the Republic. It 
is waiting for the Republic to be pro-solution like itself.
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Discourses of the Republic vary throughout stories, reflecting changes in political 
circumstances. For the most part, it is an oppositional ‘other’ in Lokmaci 
coverage and relations stories. This is compounded with discourses of 
difference between the Republic and TRNC. Relation stories also draw upon 
discourses of uncertainty about a troublesome Republic which lacks authority, 
status and legitimacy. The Republic is late in being pro-solution. However, 
grammatical strategies such as passive sentence structures background many 
negative actions.
Some discourses of commonality, cooperation, compromise and unity between 
Turkish and Greek Cypriot residents and governments are unearthed in this 
analysis. In Lokmaci and some relations coverage, residents of the Republic and 
TRNC are inclusively “Cypriot”. The Republic residents and politicians perform 
positive actions together with residents and politicians from TRNC. The idea of 
TRNC and the Republic together is represented, though de-emphasised.
Discourses of problems and assimilation in Cyprus are evoked. Cyprus is a 
problem with two sides and two peoples. However, more positive discourses of 
Cypriot solutions, reunification and settlement are also articulated, though far 
less frequently and used as a pretext to emphasise CTP positive actions. For 
example, twice Cyprus is represented as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal 
solution, a CTP policy.
Discourses of Turkey’s importance are suggested in Lokmaci coverage, but far 
more pronounced in non-political stories. Here discourses of importance, 
cooperation, links and power are realised. Turkey is a helpful ally, a source of 
information and a leader to follow. TRNC is bound to Turkey with aid and 
cooperation. This is an important relationship, though TRNC is a nation unto 
itself.
Considering the three criteria of potential, BRTI offers the most potential for 
residents out of the three stations. Firstly, BRTI offers some discourses of 
cooperation, compromise and unity in coverage of Lokmaci and relations. These 
are far less common than more negative discourses, acting as a pretext for
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discourses of support for TRNC and its government. However, they have been 
revealed. Residents and governments o f both TRNC and the Republic are 
represented together and acting positively together, though this only occurs when 
the Republic is de-emphasised. The Republic’s government is named personally 
which gives listeners a point of identification. When represented alone, 
discourses of uncertainty are articulated. Cyprus is represented with solutions, 
reunification and settlements, though again most discourses are negative.
Secondly, BRTI represents a multitude of voices and influences. Though most 
discourses support current power holders in TRNC, this is a bigger array of 
voices than on the other two stations. This gives residents an array of 
possibilities to consider for their future, albeit a limited array. This is especially 
true in political stories which make up the bulk of news.
Thirdly, a dominant discourse on BRTI is its support for Turkish Cypriot 
nationalism. This allows residents to imagine themselves as Turkish Cypriots 
within a Turkish Cypriot nation. Though this is counter to an all-Cypriot national 
ideology, it offers residents a popular form of group identity.
Overall, BRTI offers the most potential. It offers some discourses of 
compromise, cooperation and unity amongst a vast array of other discourses. 
This allows some room for an alternative imagining of the two peoples, possibly a 
new sense of community, citizenship and partnership. At the same time, it grants 
Turkish Cypriots their desire for a Turkish Cypriot group identity.
XI.1.HKFM
Discourses of unquestioned CTP governance are most dominant in KFM  scripts. 
The CTP is powerful, multi-functional, large, pro-solution and legitimate. Its 
leader, President Talat, is a celebrity. The CTP acts for the good of the nation 
and its powerless residents, along with its business and non-governmental 
partners. It is full of good intentions, attitudes and thoughts in finding “solutions”. 
A discourse of a CTP positive present and a UBP negative past are present in 
Lokmaci and relations stories.
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Alongside these positive discourses about the CTP, discourses of support for 
TRNC are minimal. For the most part, KFM  suppresses a Turkish Cypriot nation. 
When the nation is represented, it is distinct from the Republic and framed in 
ways which evoke discourses of difference and praise for the CTP. Lokmaci and 
the Berlin ITB Tourist Fayre exemplify this treatment. In the Berlin Fayre story, 
TRNC is an internationally successful nation, a nation amongst nations, but led 
by the CTP, businesses and associations.
Discourses of sameness amongst residents and victimisation by the Republic are 
articulated. But again the CTP is supported. Whether residents are represented 
as victims or in need of help, the CTP government, businesses and non­
governmental organisations are the solution to residents1 troubles.
Despite supporting pro-federation CTP, pro-solution discourses are rare. KFM 
evokes discourses of the Republic being different, a worrisome opposition, 
troublesome, lacking legitimacy and status, a reluctant peace-maker and even an 
enemy. The Republic’s government is named and attributed with actions which 
create a ‘them’ Greek Cypriot oppositional group, more than on BRTI. It is 
attributed with wrong actions and attitudes such as being blamed for no solution 
to the Cyprus conflict, preventing aid and troubles at Lokmaci, again more than 
BRTI.
Cyprus is mostly represented in ways which draw upon discourses about division 
and problems. When positively represented, Cyprus is framed in ways which 
support the CTP. Themes of CTP “solutions” and the “importance” of Cyprus are 
numerous. However, no solution is offered. There are some positive Cypriot 
discourses drawn upon in the recontextualisation of Cancer week. Discourses of 
a single population and social entity are signified, creating an all-inclusive Cypriot 
‘us1 group. This is significant. Unfortunately, this is not repeated elsewhere, 
used as a pretext for discourses about CTP support.
Distance is represented between Turkey and TRNC. Turkey is not part of KFM's 
nation, being either excluded from news stories or its role played down. In 
relations stories, discourses of Turkish importance and closeness are evoked,
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but this is far less than on other stations. Turkey is important, with Turkish 
institutions aiding Turkish Cypriots. But like most representations on KFM, 
Turkey is represented in ways which suit the CTP: in this case, pro-solution 
conditions are attached.
Applying the three criteria to KFM  reveals that it is failing residents for the most 
part. In the vast majority of stories (with the exception of Cancer week), 
discourses of cooperation, compromise and unity are absent, despite the 
station’s close affiliation with pro-federation CTP. In the Cancer week story, the 
nation and its people are named in ways which blur the lines as to who and what 
is the nation and its people. However, this is a pretext for praising the CTP’s 
actions. Furthermore, this positive potential is not repeated. Elsewhere, 
discourses of division, difference and the Republic as an oppositional ‘other’ are 
articulated far more than on BRTI. These discourses leave little room for 
discourses appropriate for a solution, despite the CTP’s aim for a federation.
Considering the second criteria of offering an array of voices, again KFM fails. 
There is one dominant voice in these scripts: CTP support. Even representations 
of other participants are framed in such a way that praise the CTP. Other 
political perspectives, such as the UBP nationalists, are framed negatively. This 
closes down all voices both within and outside TRNC, depriving residents of the 
opportunity to consider options to resolve their current situation.
KFM fails worst than the other stations on the third criteria of creating a feeling of 
national belonging. A Turkish Cypriot nation is mostly excluded. By suppressing 
a Turkish Cypriot nation, a feeling of national belonging is lost on listeners. In 
fact, membership to any nation is difficult to imagine. Residents are not Turkish, 
its representations minimal or backgrounded. Residents are not Cypriot, the 
Republic and Cyprus represented negatively.
Despite draping “solutions” around the CTP, the Republic and Cyprus, KFM 
offers nothing. It does not offer discourses of cooperation, compromise or unity, 
making a solution difficult to imagine. It does not offer an array of voices, just
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praise for the CTP. It offers no group identity. This analysis reveals that despite 
a thin veneer of “solutions” , KFM  does not deliver.
XI. 1 Mi Radyo T
Radyo T offers listeners one option in regard to the Cyprus conflict: the status 
quo. This is achieved through its articulation of discourses of Turkish 
nationalism.
Dominant discourses on Radyo T support TRNC, TRNC statehood and TRNC as 
a viable solution to the conflict, more than the other stations. The nation is multi­
functional and “Turkish” with borders, barricades, soldiers, police, areas, 
customs, flags, hospitals, institutions, committees, problems, cities, towns, 
villages and personality traits. Its sheer number of representations constantly 
remind residents who and what nation is theirs. Though the border between the 
Republic is firmly sealed, discourses of unity and sameness with Turkey and 
Islam signify a porous one. Power holders associated with nationalists such as 
police, soldiers and officials are empowered. Residents are recipients of power 
holders’ actions, governmental or not.
Discourses of support for the Turkish nationalist UBP are common. The UBP is 
important, knowledgable, powerful, peaceful, friendly, active, in partnership with 
Turkey and responsible for a safe and comfortable TRNC state. The UBP 
watches over the CTP, resists attacks, created TRNC with Turkey and aims to 
create a deserved and honorable solution for the TRNC “state”.
Alternatively, discourses of pro-federation CTP’s unsuitability to govern, its lack 
of status and even it as the internal ‘other’ demonstrate Radyo T s opposition to 
the CTP. It incorrectly handles relations with the Republic, lies, is unsuccessful, 
self-serving and in secret agreements with the Republic. Together the CTP and 
the Republic deceive TRNC residents and attack TRNC itself. Although 
discourses of a strong, multi-functional government in a normal functioning nation 
are evoked, lexical and grammatical strategies limit positive effects for the CTP.
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Discourses of the Republic again point to Turkish nationalism which aims to be 
independent of the Republic. Discourses of the Republic emphasise no 
commonality, but difference, evil, danger, threat, fear, opposition, illegitimacy, 
otherness, uncooperativeness, and uncertainty. The Republic’s government 
thinks, says, aims and acts in ways which sometimes threatens the very 
existence of TRNC. Even the Republic’s residents are a threat, involved in 
protests which use military lexical choices. The Republic is not only the ‘other1, 
but the enemy.
Discourses of division, separation, two states, two regions and two societies on 
Cyprus are drawn upon. Cyprus is a negative entity, a problem, associated with 
unnecessary efforts and compromises. It is much more of a negative entity than 
the other stations.
Discourses of mainland Turkey being close, important, cooperative, powerful, 
helpful, a close ally, expanding, growing and leading TRNC are common 
throughout all scripts. Mainland Turkey is part of governance, being a guarantor, 
the motherland and protector. It is more than a country, but a “world” of which 
TRNC is a part. Discourses of sameness between Turkish mainlanders and 
Turkish Cypriots signify pan-Turkish national ideology.
Applying the three criteria to the discourses signified in Radyo T news stories, we 
find this station fails TRNC residents in two of the three areas. Firstly, it offers no 
discourses of compromise, cooperation and unity. On the contrary, most 
discourses are opposed to these. The Republic is the enemy, leaving no 
opportunities for residents imagining a solution with the Republic. Cyprus is only 
imagined in ways which reflect the present status of two oppositional entities 
sharing a land mass.
In regard to the second ‘array of voices’ criteria, Radyo T also fails. There is one 
dominant voice represented here and that is the voice of Turkish nationalism. 
Even when pro-federation CTP is represented, lexical and grammatical choices 
minimise this voice. This dominant voice closes down dialogue both internally 
and externally, offering few opportunities for residents to consider their options.
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On the third criteria, Radyo T offers much potential. A distinct Turkish Cypriot 
national identity is most obviously represented on Radyo T. The TRNC state is a 
success thanks to the UBP and Turkey. This allows residents the comfort of 
belonging to a Turkish Cypriot nation which is part of a pan-Turkish nation. In 
terms of offering listeners a feeling of belonging, Radyo T offers listeners the 
most potential. However, in terms of its potential to relieve listeners of their 
present situation, Radyo T offers listeners the least.
XI. 2 Roles o f journalism
Almost all media in TRNC, broadcast and print, are directly or indirectly linked to 
political parties and interests, working with few resources and untrained staff.
The stations in this thesis are from both types of broadcasters in TRNC: the state 
broadcaster and two commercial broadcasters from opposing near-ends of the 
political spectrum. Stations’ news reflects the interests of political powers 
associated with each station and fail in the three resident-friendly criteria. 
Because most other TRNC stations share similar political and economic 
contexts, it is likely their news also fails, reflecting the interests of those 
associated with stations.
This being the case, the model and roles of broadcast journalism in TRNC are 
failing TRNC residents. To remedy such a problem is difficult, remembering that 
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 8) note there is a close relationship between news 
media, “the nature of the state, the system of political parties, the pattern of 
relations between economic and political interests, and the development of civil 
society, among other elements of social structure.” To call for a change of model 
and role of journalism is calling for a complete change in TRNC. However, by 
referring back to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) three models of media and politics 
in the West, one can imagine how media in TRNC could be used to really help 
find solutions in Cyprus.
Presently, TRNC’s model resembles most aspects of the Mediterranean or 
Polarized Pluralist Model. TRNC journalism is politically orientated with high 
circulation; has high political parallelism where the government, political parties
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and commercial interests with political ties use the media; the state plays a large 
role as owner, regulator and funder of media; autonomy and journalistic 
professionalism is limited; freedom of the press is somewhat curtailed; and there 
is a high degree of ideological diversity and conflict in society with a strong role 
for the state and political parties. TRNC journalism’s role within this model sees 
media promoting the interests of power holders, not solutions.
Though changing the role and model of media is impossible without changing 
many aspects of society as noted above, the low political parallelism in the North 
Atlantic model has positive potential for nations with high levels of political 
parralellism as noted in TRNC. With low political parallelism, the media could 
take on the role of the fourth estate. Machin and Niblock (2006: 96) note the 
fourth estate, which has been the cornerstone of liberal accounts of news media, 
sees the press’s role as a watchdog of the powerful. It is essential for democracy 
itself (ibid.). Though the fourth estate has its critics, it is an ideal. In fact, many 
question whether this role is even achievable (Machin and Niblick 2006; Lloyd 
2004; Boyce 1978). However, it offers something that broadcasting in TRNC 
presently lacks; that is, independence from or at least separation between 
journalists and political parties and interests.
Presently, TRNC media are too close to power holders to fulfil a watch-dog role. 
Lloyd (2004) claims dependence or closeness to power holders is a danger to 
the fourth estate role. By creating distance between political interests and radio 
journalists, broadast journalism in TRNC has the potential to become more 
resident-friendly.
Firstly, if TRNC journalists were independent of political interests, discourses 
other than those supporting these interests could be articulated. Some of these 
could include discourses of cooperation, compromise and possibly unity with the 
Republic. Secondly, with more independence, a wider range of voices could be 
a possibility for radio news. Thirdly, stations could articulate discourses about 
group identification, whether they be an all-inclusive Cypriot identity or other
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forms of group identity based on resident desires, and not the interests of political 
parties.
Adhering to a fourth estate role can be achieved without having to covet the 
value of objectivity. Objectivity, Chalaby (1998: 130) claims, encompasses the 
news values of neutrality, impartiality, balance, fairness, truthfulness, factuality, 
accuracy and completeness. Some journalism does not consider objectivity an 
important value. For example, sub-Saharan African journalists from 11 countries 
play down the importance of objectivity, writing for the good of their society and 
playing a role in conflict prevention and resolution (McGoldrick, 2005: 4).
In TRNC, the most important news priorities are “helping to solve the Cyprus 
conflict” and “what’s good for the nation”, two priorities not dissimilar to the 
African priorities cited above. Of course, how these priorities are reflected in 
news presently differ, reflecting political interests associated with each station. 
With the constraints of closeness between stations and political parties lifted, and 
a watchdog role adhered to, these values could be applicable with the good of 
residents in mind.
The national discourses drawn upon by TRNC radio news stories are generally 
self-serving, poisoning a volatile and potentially violent situation. They offer very 
few possibilities for a solution to the Cyprus conflict, sustaining and aggravating a 
life with economic embargoes, international isolation, the threat of violence, 
military presence and restrictions on the lives of TRNC residents. Thus, a new 
way of thinking about radio journalism, such as outlined above, is needed.
XI. 3 Last Thought
Presently, Cyprus is in a state of conflict. Residents have endured the 
consequences of many years of a pronounced military presence and 
segregation. A solution to this situation will result in TRNC residents enjoying life 
without fearing their neighbours and without the constraints of social, political and 
economic isolation. But a solution has yet to be found. A solution, no matter 
what shape it eventually takes, must encom pass a life free from isolation, 
embargoes and fear.
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So, on the one hand, a solution does not necessarily mean a federation. A 
separate state may be the answer to Turkish Cypriots’ desire for a feeling of 
national group identity. However, a separate state is only a “solution” if it 
encom passes a life free from isolation, em bargoes and fear.
On the other hand, a separate state may not ensure this desired Turkish Cypriot 
national group identity. Hobsbawm (1989: 184-185) states politically and 
culturally small sta tes simply “increase the number of insecure political entities”.
If Turkish Cypriots are to achieve an independent state, they are likely to become 
one of these small “insecure political entities”, possibly losing their chance at 
being truly independent.
If this is the case, the answer for residents may be a more inclusive imagining of 
the nation. Hobsbawm (ibid.) notes:
Cultural freedom and pluralism at present are almost certainly better 
safeguarded in large states which know themselves to be plurinational and 
pluricultural than in small ones pursuing the ideal of ethnic-linguistic and 
cultural homogeneity.
This points to a Cyprus which knows itself as Turkish, Greek and all the other 
‘foreign’ Cypriots which now make up this small island’s population.
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Appendix 1-A Turkish Cypriot enclaves 1964 to 1974
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Appendix One
Appendix 1-B Map of Cyprus with border
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Appendix Two
Newspapers in the TRNC and their political affiliations
1. Birlik (the Unity) started in 1980 as the organ of UBP. It takes a nationalist 
stance and frequently comes out against a federal solution to the Cyprus 
problem. It propagates the idea of integration and union with Turkey.
2. Ortam (The Medium) started in December 1980 as a weekly owned by the 
deputy of the TKP. It is now a daily which promotes the leftist policies of 
its party which promotes the idea of a federal solution.
3. Kibris (Cyprus) has the biggest circulation, started on 11 July 1989. The 
owner has close personal relations with influential Turkish Cypriot 
politicians. Kibris is a coloured tabloid. Before 2004, it promoted 
nationalistic-conservative policies. Now it supports the government in 
power and their federalist policies.
4. Vatan (The Motherland) started on 1 May 1991. Its chief editor is known 
to be close to the policies of Rauf. Denkta§.
5. Yeni Demokrat (The New Democrat) started on 17 May 1993 and is an 
organ of the Demokrat Partisi (DP).
6. Yeni Qag (The New Epoch) is a weekly started on 2 September 1990 and 
an organ of the Yeni Kibris Partisi (New Cyprus Party). It states that 
Cyprus must become a member of the EU even before a solution of the 
Cyprus problem is found.
7. Cyprus Today, which is owned by Kibris media group, is an English 
weekly which, like Kibris newspaper, publishes the official Turkish Cypriot 
government’s policies, but in English.
8. Yeni Duzen, and Halkm sesi act as organs of CTP.
9. Ekonomi (The Economy) started on 13 Feb 1979 is a weekly and is an 
organ of the Turkish Cypriot Trade Board which defends the interests of 
businessmen and propagates the liberal market economy.
Yeni Duzen, (circulation:900) and Halkm sesi (circulation: 650) act as organs
of CTP.
10. Birlik (the Unity), (circulation: 575) started in 1980 is the organ of UBP.
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1'\.0rtam  (The Medium), (circulation: 550) started in December 1980 as a 
weekly under the ownership of the deputy of the TKP.
*\2.Kibris (Cyprus), (circulation: 7500) with the biggest circulation for a TRNC 
newspaper started 11 July 1989. The owner has close personal relations 
with influential Turkish Cypriot politicians.
13. Vatan (The Motherland), (circulation: 400) started on 1 May 1991 with its 
chief editor linked closely with the policies of Denkta§.
14. Yeni Demokrat (The New Democrat), (circulation: 520) started on 17 May 
1993 as an organ of the Demokrat Partisi (DP).
15. Yeni Qag (The New Epoch), (circulation 250) is a weekly, started on 2 
September 1990 and is an organ of the Yeni Kibris Partisi (New Cyprus 
Party).
16. Cyprus Today, (circulation 1000) which is owned by Kibris media group, is 
an English paper which, like Kibris newspaper, publishes the official 
Turkish Cypriot government’s policies, but in English.
M.Ekonomi (The Economy), (circulation: 1000) started on 13 Feb 1979, is a 
weekly and an organ of the Turkish Cypriot Trade Board which defends 
the interests of businessmen and propagates the liberal market economy
(Figures taken from main distribution firm Yaysat Kibris Ltd. in Azgin, 1996,
p.655).
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Appendix Three
TRNC Radio - Television Stations and political affiliations
Kibris FM/ KTV: Private station owned by the Kibris Media Group which is the 
biggest media group in TRNC. They have close personal connections with the 
government. Main newscasts are TV and radio simucasts.
Sim-FM: Private radio broadcaster whose owner is a dominant member of CTP. 
They have one reporter, the rest is agency feed.
Avrasya FM I Avrasya TV: Private station which has nationalist party affiliations 
(Dektag does a weekly political show).
Radyo Mayis: Private radio station owned by the Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi 
(TDP) which is a pro-settlement left wing party.
First-FM/ Geng TV /InterFirst FM: A media group which is associated with ORP 
(Liberal Party).
Radyo Guven (Security Radio): Turkish Military run radio statio.
Radyo Vatan (Nation Radio): TRNC’s civil defence-run station.
Radyo TI Kanal T TV: Media group which are owned and managed by Ersin 
Tatar, Finance minister for UBP nationalist party.
BRTK Radio and TV: The TRNC’s government run TV and radio services.
There are four radio services and two television services. The main newscasts 
are TV/radio simulcasts.
Dance-FM: Very successful dance music station that is listened to on both sides 
of the island. They have no news.
Radyo Plus: Is an all music radio. They are owned by Mr. Niyazi Deniz, who 
owns a chain of shops. He uses the station to advertise his shops.
Akdeniz TV -  FM: Associated with nationalist parties and politics
Cool-FM: Closed at time of review..
Kuzey-FM: Directly linked to TRNC Security forces
Agik Radyo: Unavailable at the time of review
Radyo Enerji: no news, owned by DanceFM.
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DAU-FM/DAU TV: University radio and TV 
GAU-FM/ GAU TV: University radio and TV 
YDU-FM/ YDU TV: University radio and TV 
UKU-FM: university radio 
LAU-FM: university radio 
ODTU-FM: university radio 
Demokrasi TV: In test stage at the moment 
Retro Radio FM: In test stage at the moment 
infoNet FM: In test stage at the moment 
AS FM / AS TV: In test stage at the moment
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Appendix Four
TAK Agenda 25 Septem ber 2007
25 EYLUL,2007
 iQiNDEKiLER  SALI
1). -BM IKLiM DEGi§iKLiGi DORUGU SONA ERDi
2). -JAPONYA’NIN YENi BA§BAKANI YASUO FUKUDA
3). -ABD’DEN TEROR ORGUTU PKK’NIN ELiNDEKi AMERiKAN 
SiLAHLARINA iLlKlNAQIKLAMA
4). -ABD’DE ERMENi KURULU§U AAA,HRANT DiNK ADINA E§iNE ODUL 
VERECEK
5). -AKARYAKITA ZAM
6). -BASIN-SEN BASIN TOPLANTISI
7). -MALiYE BAKANI UZUN.KIB-TEK VE EL-SEN YETKiLiLERiYLE 7 SAATLiK 
TOPLANTI YAPTI
8). -KARiKATUR SANATQISI TUNCERi HAWALKE iQiN ?iZDi
9). -LTB BALKAN VE MECLiSi,A§IK VE ZABiT’E SALDIRILARI KINADI
10)._ §EHiT Al'LELERi YETKl'LiLERi igl§LERl BAKANI MURATI ZiYARET 
ETTi
11)._AFGANiSTAN’DA SON24 SAATTE 40 TAN FAZLA OLU
12)._GONYELi ALTYAPI MASTER PLANININ HAZIRLANMASI 
QALI§MALARIYLA iLGiLi BiLGiLENDiRME TOPLANTISI YAPILDI
13)._EMLAK VERGiLERiNDEN EGiTiME YUZDE 15 PAY AYRILMASL
14)._FRANSIZ LIBERATION GAZETESl:”AB UYELiGl iQlN REFERANDUMUN 
KALDIRILMASI,TURKiYE’NlN i§iNl KOLAYLA§TIRMAK iQiN MANEVRA”
15)._SiYASl PARTiLER DE^ERLENDiRME LERiNi YAPIYOR
16)._KTAMS SINAVTUZUGUNUN iPTALi VE UYGULAMASININ 
DURDURULMASI iQiN ANAYASA VE YGKSEK iDARE MAHKEMESl’NDE 
DAVA AQTI
17)._MYANMAR’DAKiGOSTERiLER...
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18)._”STRES GRiBi DE TETiKLiYOR"
19)._AFGANiSAN’DA iKi OTOBUS <?ARPI§TI:40 OLO,39 YARALI
20)._TC DI§i§iLERi BAKANI BABACAN'IN BM’DEKi TEMASLARI...
21)._BES DP’DEN i§TEN QIKARILAN 25 QALI§AN HAKKINDA DESTEK 
iSTEDi
23)._KAMU_i§’DEN HOk QMET’E ELE§TiRi...
24)._GAZiMAGUSA KAZASINA BAGLI 9 KOYDE YARIN ELEKTRiK KESlNTiSi 
YAPILACAK
25)._KIZILAY’IN iFTAR YEMEKLERi SQROYOR
26)._DA0_KAM GORSEL SANATLAR AR?iV PROJESiNi s u r d u r Oy o r
27)._LEFKO§A BOLGESlNDE ZEYTiN TOPLAMA TARlHi 1 EKiM...
28)._BKP:”8 TEMMUZ ANLA§MASI HAYATTA GEQlRiLMELiDiR”
29)._DEMOKRASi VAKFI BA§KANLlGlNA METiN ARHUN GETiRiLDi
30)._SAGLIK_SEN YILIN iKiNCl ASGARi OCRETlNlN HALEN 
BELiRLENEMEMESiNE TEPKl GOSTERDi
31)._ ERQAKICA’NIN BRiFiNGi...
32),_igi§LERi BAKANLlGl ICRAATLARINI ANLATAN BRO§0R YAYINLADI
33)._BULUTOGULLARI, VETERiNER HEKiMLERi KABUL ETTi...
34)._MALiYE BAKANI UZUN VE TARIM BAKANI SENNAROGLU'NUN ORTAK 
BASIN TOPLANTISI(I)
35)._SQLEYMAN QAKICI, i§YERlNDE KALP KRiZiNDEN HAYATINI 
KAYBETTi...
36)._NARENCiYE URETiCiLERi BiRLiGi, ORONLERiNi DEGERiNlN ALTINDA 
SATMAMALARI KONUSUNDA LIRETiCiLERi UYARDI
37)._SiVlL SAVUNMA BALKAN I BOZDEMiR VE E§i BOLENT ECEViT 
REHABiUTASYON MERKEZl'Ni ZlYARET ETTl
38)._AB KOMiSYONU, YENi MADENl EURO’LARIN DiZAYNINA IU§KiN 
ONERlLERiNiN DYE ULKELERCE DEGi§TiRiLDlGiNi DOGRULADI
39)._”D ViTAMiNl"ARA§TIRMASI...
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40)._KARAOGLANOGLU’NDAKi ARAQ HIRSIZLIGI...1 Ki§i TUTUKLANDI
41)._ELEKTRiK AKIMI QALAN S.Z TUTUKLANDI
42)._ GiRNE VE GAZiMAGUSA’DA HIRSIZLIK...
43)._KAQAK MULTECiLER...
44)._KAR?IYAKA VE LEFKO§A’DA HIRSIZLIK... 16 YA§INDA GENQ 
TUTUKLANDI
45)._TEKNEYLE KKTC’YE GiRMEYE QALI§AN 5 SURiYELi TUTUKLANDI
46) ._U LU S LAR AR AS I KIBRIS TiYATRO FESTlVALl.. .
47)._TABiPLER BiRLiGi’NiN SENARYO YARI§MASI...
48)._AVCI, iTALYA PARLAMENTOSU’NDA KONU§TU
49)._NiJER’DE SELLER:7 OLU
50)._YENi ZE LAN DA’DA RUAPEHU YANARDAGI FAALlYETE GEQTi
51)._YUNANiSTAN’DA TARTI§MALI TARiH KlTABI GERI QEKiLDi
52)._MALiYE BAKANI UZUN VE TARIM BAKANI SENNAROGLU’NUN ORTAK 
BASIN TOPLANTISI(2 SON)
53)._UBP:”DI§ TEMASLARLA iLGiLi YANLI§ VE YANILTICI HABERLER 
YAYINLIYOR... YONETiCl'LERlN REKLAMI YAPILIYOR”
54)._”KARDE§ ULKE GECELERi”NiN iLKi ISKELEDE YAPILDI... BU AK§AM 
GUZELYURT’TA...
55)._BES, SlMAVi A§IK’A YAP I LAN SALDIRIYI KINADI
56)._DP GENEL BA§KANI DENKTA§:
“GONEY’DEN ALI§VERl§ YAPAN KIBRISLI TURK SAYISINDA ARTI§ 
VAR...
57)._CASiNOCULAR BiRLiGi’NiN 1’iNCi OLAGAN GENEL KURULU
58)._AFGNiSTAN’DA iNTiHAR SALDIRISINDA 5 POLiS OLDU
59)._DI§i§LERi BAKANI AVCI’NIN ROMA ZiYARETi...
60)._QAU§OGLU, AKARYAKIT ZAMMINI ELE§TiRDi
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Appendix Five
Stories and sources  for 25 Septem ber 2007
BRTI
1. Presidential Spokesperson Hasan Ergakica briefing -  TAK story 31.
2. Petrol price increases in TRNC -  TAK story 5.
3. Foreign Minister Turgay Avci in Italian parliament -  TAK story 48
4. Foreign Minister Turgay Avci gives passports -  TAK story 59.
5. US asks UN to help in Cyprus problem -  BBC
6 . E.U. says Cyprus problem is a UN problem -  TAK story 20.
7. E.U. financial aid regulations for TRNC -  TAK story 12.
8 . New Japanese prime minister -  TAK story 2.
9. Burma demonstration -  BBC
10. UN comments on Darfur and Burma -  BBC
11. Lebanese parliamentary problems -  BBC 
KFM
1. Presidential Spokesperson Ergakica comments on UN -  TAK story 31.
2. Foreign Minister Turgay Avci in Italian parliament -  TAK story 48
3. Finance Minister Uzun briefing -  TAK story 7.
4. UBP statement about CTP mishandling of ferry boats -  TAK story 53.
5. DP leader Serdar Denktag statement -  TAK story 56.
6 . Petrol price increases in TRNC -  TAK story 5.
7. Three TRNC political parties meeting -  TAK story 15.
8 . Public Workers Trade Union actions -  TAK story 16.
9. Finance Minister Uzun meets with bankers -  TAK story 7.
10. Environmentalists accuse government -  TAK story 23.
11.Toys made in China in T R N C -fro m  BRT 24.09.07.
12. Milk campaign to be launched -  TAK story 52.
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13. Water shortages in Gazimagusa -  from BRT 24.09.07.
Radyo T
1. Road works in Nicosia -  unknown
2. Parliamentary speaker Ekenoglu interview -  from BRT 24.09.07.
3. Ferry boats between Syria and TRNC -  TAK story 31, 53, and BRT.
4. Turkish Cypriot footballers may play with Cypriot team -  unknown
5. E.U. financial aid regulations for TRNC -  TAK story 12.
6 . Greek Cypriots react to Turkish Prime Minister Gul visit -  unknown
7. UBP’s §erife Unverdi criticises CTP -  TAK story 53 and interview.
8 . Three TRNC political parties meeting -  TAK story 15.
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Appendix Six
TAK Story 31 Er?akica briefing
Lefkoga, 25 Eyliil 07(T.A.K):_Cumhurbagkanligi Sozcusu Hasan Ergakica,
Kibrisli Turklere uygulanan izolasyonlarin tamamen Kibris Rum tarafindan 
gayretlerinden kaynaklandigimn, son giinlerde yaganan geligmelerle bir kez daha 
ortaya giktigim soyledi.
Mali Yardim Tiiziigu ile Yegil Hat T iiz iig ii’nun uygulanmasindaki zorluklarin da 
tamamen Kibris Rum tarafindan kaynaklandigmi igaret eden Ergakica “AB 
uyeliginin ve diger uluslararasi iligkilerinin sagladigi olanaklari Kibrisli Turkler 
aleyhine kullanmaya dayali uzun vadeli bir strateji izlemekte ve bu siirenin 
sonunda Kibrisli Turkleri kendi devlet sistemine osmosis yoluyla entegre etmeyi 
diiglemektedirler” dedi.
Hasan Ergakica bugun duzenledigi haftalik basin brifinginde, Kibris Turklerine 
uygulanan izolasyonlar ve son giinlerde yaganan geligmeleri degerlendirdi.
 TUZUKLERiN UYGULAMA RAP OR LAR I__
Hasan Ergakica, Mali Yardim Tuzugii’nun uygulama raporunda uygulamada 
kargilagilan zorluklar agiklanirken.tuzugiin onaylanmasindaki gecikmeden dolayi 
ugranan zaman kaybina ve uygulamada ortaya gikan birtakim aksakliklara 
dikkat gekildigini kaydetti.
Ergakica, “Rum tarafinin engellemeleri nedeniyle Mali Yardim Tuziigu.Avrupa 
Komisyonu’nun onerdigi tarihten ancak 18 ay sonra kabul edilebilmigtir ve yine 
Rum tarafinin israriyla Mali Tiizuk kabul edilmeden once eklenen maddelerle 
miilkiyet sorununda kargilagilabilecek zorluklarin agilmasi igin varolan esneklikler 
gegersiz kilinm igtir” dedi.
 YE§iL HAT TUZUGU__
Benzer bir durumun Yegil Hat Tiizugu igin de gegerli oldugunu kaydeden 
Ergakica, tiizuk kapsaminda yapilan ticaretin hacminde gecen yilla gore yiizde 
yuzluk bir artig gorulmekle birlikte bu ticaret miktarinin onemli boyutlara 
ulagmadigmi anlatti.
Ergakica, goyle dedi:
Degerlendirme raporunda bunun nedenleri olarak Kibris Rum tarafinin Kibris 
Turk kamyonlarinm giineye gegigine ve Kibris Turk reklamlarmin Guney’de
291
yayinlanmasina engel koymasi, Tiirkge etikete sahip urunlere raflarda yer 
verilmemesi oldugu agikga ifade edilmektedir.”
 BAL VE BALIK SATI§I__
Cumhurbagkanligi sozciisii Ergakica, Yegil Hat Tiiziigu kapsamina alinan bal ve 
balik iirunleri konusunda yaganan zorluklarin da, Kibris Rum tarafinin AB 
uyeligini Kibrisli Turkler aleyhine kullanma girigimlerinin sonucu oldugunu 
soyledi.
Ergakica,’’balik satigmin Tiirk tarafinin balikgi tekne sayismi bildirmemesinden 
dolayi gergeklegemedigi” iddialarinin hatirlatilmasi iizerine, Kibris Turk tarafinin 
bu konuda yerine getirmedigi bir yiikiim liiliigu olmadigim kaydetti. Ergakica, 
“Bizden kaynaklanan higbir zorluk yoktur .Zorluk,Kibris Rum tarafinin AB uyeligini 
Turkler aleyhine kullanmaya devam etmesinden kaynaklamyor” dedi.
Komisyonda gorev yapan Rum komiserin, bal iireticileri ile balikgi tekneleriyle 
ilgili listeleri Kibris Rum tarafindaki Veteriner Dairesi’ne verilmesini istedigini 
kaydeden Ergakica,Rum Veteriner Dairesi’nin boyle bir otoritesi olmadigim ve 
Kibris Turk tarafinin buna razi olmasinm mumkiin olmadigim belirtti.
_ AMAQ OSMOSiS”_ _
Ergakica,"Kibris Rum tarafi, AB iiyeliginin vediger uluslar arasi iligkilerinin 
sagladigi olanaklari Kibrisli Turkler aleyhine kullanmaya dayali uzun vadeli bir 
strateji izlemekte ve bu siirenin sonunda Kibrisli Turkleri kendi devlet sistemine 
osmosis yolu ile entegre etmeyi diiglemektedir” diye konugtu.
Ergakica, “Kibris Rum tarafinin, bu oyunu bagariya ulagtirma giiciine sahip 
olmadigim, sadece Kibris sorununun gdzumsuzliigunun uzamasina yardimci 
oldugunu vurguladi.
 MULKlYET KONUSU__
Rum Yonetimi’nin Taginmaz Mai Komisyonu’na bagvuranlari tehdit edip vatan 
hainligiyle suglanmasina da deginen Ergakica, mahkemelerin aldigi kararlari her 
platformda siyasi bir silah gibi Kibris Turk tarafi ve Tiirkiye aleyhine kullanan 
Rum tarafinin, gimdi kendi insanlarinin haklarinm kullamlmasmi engelleme 
noktasina vardigmi soyledi.
Ergakica, goyle devam etti:
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“Uzun yillardan beridir bireysel mulkiyet hakkmin kutsalligi ve bunu elde 
edebilmek igin her turlu yolun denenmesi gerektigini iddia eden ve sirf siyasi 
kazang elde etmek ugruna duygularini istismar ettigi binlerce Kibris Rum’u 
Turkiye’yi dava etmeye tegvik eden Kibris Rum Yonetimi, konu kendi siyasi 
gikarlarmi tehdit eder duruma gelince bu bireysek hakkin kullanimim engelleme 
noktasina gelmigtir.”
 MULKiYET HAKKI SEBEST iRADEYE GORE KULLANILACAK__
Kibrisli bir Rum’un Taginmaz Mai Komisyonu ile yaptigi anlagmanin Avrupa 
insan Haklari Mahkemesi huzurunda onaylanmayi bekledigine dikkat geken 
Ergakica, bu kararin onaylanmasiyla birlikte bir Kibrisli Rum’un mulkiyet hakkini 
kendi serbest iradesine gore kullanmig olacagmi belirtti.
Ergakica, Kibris Rum yetkililer ile Rum Lider Tasos Papadopulos’un son 
gunlerdeki agiklamalarinda, mulkiyet sorununu Kibris sorununun 
gbzumsuzlugunun bir araci yapmak istediklerini bir kez daha gosterdigini soyledi.
_KKTC_SURiYE iU§Kil_ERi__
Hasan Ergakica, Kibris Rum tarafinin Gazimagusa_Lazkiye hattmin yeniden 
agilmasina gosterdigi tepkinin e bu hattin kapattirma gayretlerinin tumuyle 
dugmanlik koktugunu soyledi.
Ergakica, “Kibris Rum tarafi, bu hatti kapattirmak igin her geyi yapacak ve Suriye 
ile olan iligkilerini Kibrisli Turkler aleyhine kullanmaktan gekinmeyecektir” dedi.
 PAPADOPULOS_BAN GORU§M ESi__
Ergakica, Rum Lider Papadopulos’un BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki Moon ile 
gergeklegtirdigi gorugmeyle ilgili soruyu yanitlarken de,20  dakika suren 
gorugmeyle ilgili Rum Liderin agiklamalari diginda bir bilgileri olmadigim 
kaydetti.
Papadopulos’un “8  Temmuz surecine destek vermedigi yonundeki sozlerinin 
hatirlatilmasi uzerine 8 Temmuz surecine destek vermek ya da destek 
vermemek”ikilem olmadigim igaret eden Ergakica, bu tartigmanin Rum lider 
tarafindan yaratildigim soyledi Ergakica, “Destek vermesi zaten olagan bir 
geydir...
Soyut ifadeler. Derinlemesine degerlendirmeye gerek gbrmuyorum...Bazi kelime 
oyunlari yaparak, bir manipulasyon yapmaya gahgti” dedi.
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TALAT _  PAPADOPULOS GORU§MESi_ _
Hasan Egakica, BM Genel Sekreteri ban’in tutumunun, Cumhurbagkam Mehmet 
Ali Talat ile 16 Ekim’de gergeklegtirecegi gorugmede netlegecegini de soyledi.
Ergakica, Ama bize ulagan bilgiler, BM ve daimi uyelerin,8 Temmuz surecinin 
etkin bir gekilde uygulamp neticelendirmesi egiliminde oldugu yoniindedir dedi.
Cumhurbagkam Talat’in New York gezi programmin heniiz belli olmadigim 
kaydeden Ergakica, bir bagka soruya kargilik, 16 Ekim sonrasinda Talat 
Papadopulos_Ban’dan olugacak uglu bir zirvenin gundemde bulunmadigmi 
belirtti.
Ergakica, Turk tarafinin higbir gorugmeden kagmadigina igaret ederek, BM Genel 
Sekreteri’nden uglu bir zirve gagrisi gelmesi halinde bundan kagmayacagmi 
ekledi. (FEZ/GUR)
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Appendix Seven
BRT1 Ergakica story on 25 September 2007
Cumhurbagkanhgi Sozcusu Hasan Ergakica,Kibris Rum tarafinin, Kibrisli 
Turkleh izolasyon altmda tutma gayretlerini Kibris sorununa bariggi gozum 
bulma gabalari ile bagdagtirmanm olanaksiz oldugunu vurguladi.
Cumhurbagkanhgi Sozcusu Hasan Ergakica duzenledigi haftalik basin 
brifinginde Kibrisli Turklerin nasil bir izolasyon altinda oldugu ve bunun surmesi 
igin kimin nasil bir ugrag verdiginin son giinlerde yaganan geligmelerle bir kez 
daha ortaya giktigini igaret etti
Ergakica Kibris Rum tarafinin Gazimagusa _ Lazkiye deniz hattmm yeniden 
agilmasma gosterdigi tepkinin dugmanlik koktugunu vurguladi.
Avrupa Birligi tarafindan yaymlanan Mali Yardim Tuzugu degerlendirme raporuna 
da deginen Hasan Ergakica, raporda ortaya konulan unsurlarm Rum tarafinin 
olumsuzlugunu bir kez daha gozler onune serdigine dikkat gekti.
Ergakica Kibris Rum tarafinin, Kibrisli Turkleri izolasyon altmda tutma 
gayretlerini Kibris sorununa bariggi gozum bulma gabalari ile bagdagtirmanm 
olanaksiz olduguna vurgu yapti.
Ergakica,’’Kibris Rum tarafi Avrupa Birligi liyeliginin ve diger uluslararasi 
iligkilerinin sagladigi olanaklari Kibrisli Turkler aleyhine kullanmaya dayali 
uzun vadeli bir strateji izlemekte ve bu siirenin sonunda Kibrisli Turkleri 
kendi devlet sistemine ozmosis yolu ile entegre etmeyi diiglemektedir”dedi.
Mulkiyet konusunda Rum tarafinin kendi insanmm haklarmi kullanmasma engel 
koydugunu da anlatan Ergakica bir soru uzerine 8 Temmuz surecinin etkin bir 
gekilde uygulanmasmi ve kapsamli gozum muzakerelerinin baglamasmi isteyenin 
Kibris Turk tarafi olduguna igaret etti ve papadopulos’un suregle ilgili 
agiklamalarmm soyut ve manipulasyon amagli oldugunu soyledi.
Ergakica bir bagka soru uzerine, Tiirk tarafinin gdriigmeden kagmadigini 
Cumhurbagkam Mehmet Ali Talat’in, papadopulos ile sosyal igerikli bir 
gorugmede de bir araya gelebilecegini soyledigini hatirlatti.
* italics are a mix of sentences and ideas from TAK original.
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KFM Ergakica Briefing 25 September 2007
Cumhurbagkanhgi Sozcusu Hasan Ergakica,bugun duzenledigi haftalik basin 
brifinginde “Birlegmig Milletler Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki Moon’un Kibris 
konusundaki tutumunun,Cumhurbagkam Mehmet Ali Talat ile 16 Ekim’de 
gergekle§tirecegi goru§mede netle§ecegini soyledi.Ergakica, Ama bize 
ulagan bilgiler, Birle§mi§ Milletler ve daimi uyelerin 8 Temmuz siirecinin 
etkin bir §ekilde uygulanip neticelendirilmesi egiliminde oldugu 
yonundedir’ dedi.
Cumhurbagkam Talat’in New York gezi programimn heniiz belli olmadigim 
kaydeden Ergakica, bir ba§ka soruya kar§ilik, 16 Ekim sonrasmda 
Talat_papadopulos_Ban’dan olu§acak uglii bir zirvenin giindemde 
bulunmadigim belirtti.Ergakica, Turk tarafinin higbir gorugmeden 
kagmadigma i§aret ederek,Birle§mi§ Milletler Genel sekreteri’nden iiglii bir 
zirve gagrisi gelmesi halinde Tiirk tarafinin bundan kaginacagmi soyledi..”
296
Appendix Eight
Story 15 from TAK agenda 25 September 2007
Lefkoga,25 Eylul 07(T.A.K.) : Siyasi partiler,dun cumhuriyet Meclisi’nde yapilan 
toplantida gorugulen ara formulu degerlendirmek uzere yetkili organlarmi 
topluyor.
Anayasa,Siyasi Partiler Yasasi, Segim ve Halkoylamasi Yasasi ve Cumhuriyet 
Meclisi ig Tuzugu’nde yapilacak degigiklikler ve erken segim gundemiyle yapilan 
toplantilar gergevesinde.mecliste gurubu bulunan Cumhuriyetgi Turk 
Partisi,Ulusal Birlik Partisi ve Demokrat Parti’nin genel bagkanlari dunku 
toplantilarinda detaylari basma agiklanmayan bir oneriyi parti yetkili organlarinda 
degerlendirip Pergembe gunu yeniden bulugma karan almigti
TAK muhabirinin parti yetkililerinden aldigi bilgilere gore CTP Merkez Yonetim 
Kurulu bugun oglenden sonraki rutin toplantisinda bu konuyu da 
gorugecek.Ardindan saat 19:30’da parti meclisi bu gundemle toplanacak.
UBP’de de degerlendirmeler suruyor.Ancak parti yetkili organlarinm ne zaman 
toplanacagi henuz belli olmadi.Genel Sekreter Nazim Qavugoglu ‘Birkag gun 
iginde yetkili organlar toplanacak.Kendi aramizda degerlendirmelerimiz suruyor’ 
dedi.
DP ise yarin saat 17:00’de merkez yonetim kurulunu, ardindan da parti meclisini 
toplayacak.
(GUL/CAN)
Radyo T 25.09.07
Cumhuriyetgi Turk Partisi Birlegik Gugler, Ulusal Birlik Partisi ve Demokrat Parti, 
anayasanm yam sira bazi yasalarm da degerlendirilmesi konusunda Pazartesi 
gunu uzerinde uzlagiya varilan ara formulu degeriendiriyor. ..
Anayasa, Siyasi partiler Yasasi, Segim ve Halkoylamasi Yasasi ve 
Cumhuriyet meclisi ig Tuzugu’nde yapilacak degigiklikler ve erken segim 
gundemiyle yapila toplantilar gergevesinde, mecliste grubu bulunan 
Cumhuriyetgi Turk Partisi, Ulusal Birlik Partisi ve Demokrat parti ara formul 
ile ilgili degerlendirmelerini surduruyor. Cumhuriyetgi Turk Partisi Birlegik Gugler 
Merkez Yonetim Kurulu dun ogleden sonraki rutin toplantisinda bu konuyu 
gorugtu. Ardindan Parti Meclisi ayni gundemle toplandi. Toplantida neler
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konu§uldugu ise basina apiklanmadi. Ulusal Birlik Partisi’nde de 
degerlendirmeleri suruyor. Ara formul dun Meclis Grubu’nda masaya yatirilarak 
tarti§ildi... Parti Genel Ba§kam Tahsin Ertugruloglu, Turkiye Devlet Bakam Cemil 
Qigek ile g6 ru§mek uzere Genel Sekreter Nazim Qavu§oglu ile birlikte bugun 
saat 12.00’de Ankara’ya gitti... Genel Ba§kan ve Genel Sekreterin adaya 
geli§inin ardindan da Parti Meclisi karar almak uzere toplanacak. Demokrat Parti 
ise bugun saat 17.00’de merkez yonetim kurulunu, ardindan da parti 
meclisini toplayarak konuyu degerlendirecek.
* italics are similar to TAK original
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Appendix Nine (chapter six)
Appendix 9 A: BRTI
01.04.08
The Presidential Spokesperson Hasan Ercakica has announced that immigration 
and customs officials will start their duties at the Lokmaci Gate as from tomorrow.
Mr Ercakica said the preparatory work of the Lefkosa Turkish Municipality is 
almost completed in the area, noting that crossings at the Lokmaci Gate can start 
either tomorrow or on Thursday the latest.
In his weekly press briefing, Mr Ercakica also pointed to the increase in the 
number of cases brought against the EU Commission on the implementation 
process of the EU Financial Aid Regulation for Turkish Cypriots by the Greek 
Cypriot Administration, which he described as saddening.
Ercakica stressed that this approach- which was started during Tassos 
Papadopoulos’ term of administration- does not comply with the constructive 
spirit of the new solution process in Cyprus.
He said the Turkish Cypriot Side expects this negative process to come to an 
end, stressing that the Turkish Cypriot Side is paying particular attention to the 
sending of positive messages.
The implementation of the EU Financial Aid Regulation will be a good practice in 
terms of confidence-building. However, the Greek Cypriot side is not giving the 
implementation o f the Regulation a chance and it seems like it won’t give in the 
future too' the Spokesperson added.
Stressing that the solution of the Cyprus problem is not against Turkey’s 
interests, Ercakica stated that Turkey can no way be ignored during a solution 
and that the Turkish Cypriot side is moving in full harmony with Turkey.
He said the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias’ attempt to address Turkey 
as the side responsible for the non-solution on the island is a critical negativity.
Also touching upon the issue of working groups and technical committees, he 
said the works of these groups are expected to start by next week.
The Presidential Spokesperson noted that working groups will comprehensively 
take up the substantial issues of the Cyprus problem and the study of these
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groups will be used during comprehensive negotiations process which will start 
between the two leaders of the island in the second half of June.
02.04.08
Reports say the long-awaited opening of the Lokmaci Gate might take place 
tomorrow morning.
The Mayor of Lefkosa Turkish Municipality Cemal Bulutoglulari has stated that 
the Turkish Cypriot Side will be completing the preparatory work on its side by 
this evening, in order to be ready for the Gate’s opening at 9 tomorrow morning.
The preparatory work is almost completed on the Turkish Cypriot side of the 
Lokmaci Gate.
The paravane in the northern part of the Gate has also been removed.
The Mayor of Lefkosa Cemal Bulutoglulari told the BRT newsroom that the 
Lokmaci Gate will be opened by 9 am tomorrow if the Greek Cypriot side 
completes its preparatory work too.
The plan is to open the Gate tomorrow morning. And this will be the case if both 
sides complete their works of construction' he said.
Mr. Bulutoglulari and the Mayor of South Lefkosa Eleni Mavrou have held a 
meeting at the buffer zone to discuss the final details for crossings at the 
Lokmaci Gate.
03.04.08
The historic Lokmaci Gate which has been the symbol of division for 45 years 
has finally been opened for crossings with great hopes.
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have witnessed the opening of Lokmaci 
together with the hopes for peace and reunification.
A special ceremony was held at Lokmaci this morning which was marked by high 
participation of people and peaceful slogans.
The opening of the Lokmaci Gate for crossings is seen as the overthrowing of a 
symbol of division in Cyprus which raised hopes towards lasting peace on the 
island.
Peaceful speeches were delivered during the opening ceremony which all 
highlighted the expectation that the opening of Lokmaci will help the solution of 
the Cyprus problem gain a momentum.
The first speech was delivered by the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias’
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aide Yorgos Yakovu who expressed his willingness for the elimination of all 
barricades in Cyprus.
Referring to the establishment of working groups and technical committees 
following the start of negotiations between the two leaders of the island, Mr 
Yakovu said they will be doing their best to reach an agreement for the future of 
Cyprus as soon as possible.
‘It is not an easy road and this difficult road has led to this happy occasion. I hope 
we will overcome all problems through negotiations aimed at uniting the island 
and reaching peace* Mr Yakovu added.
Another speech was delivered by the aide of President Mehmet Ali Talat- Ozdil 
Nami who referred to the opening as ‘historic*.
‘We are witnessing the overthrow of one of the obstacles in the way towards 
reunification of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots can solve the 
problems by building mutual trust through good will' he said.
Mr Nami stated that a new era has been opened and that this is the continuation 
of positive moves that have been taking place in Cyprus recently.
The Turkish Cypriot aide said the opening of the crossing point at Lokmaci 
indicates that the two sides in Cyprus are able to overcome fear and arguments. 
He went on saying that the opening of Lokmaci marks a new era in Cyprus with a 
new understanding and that this must be put into good use.
This is an important day not only for Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots but 
also for the whole world who has been watching us‘ Mr Nami added.
For his part, the Mayor of Lefkosa Turkish Municipality Cemal Bulutoglulari stated 
that with the opening of Lokmaci the capital Lefkosa has been reunified.
Mr Bulutoglulari thanked all those who participated in the preparatory works. 
Later, the Mayor of South Lefkosa Eleni Mavrou said the Lokmaci barricade has 
been the symbol of long decades of hate.
She stressed that the opening of Lokmaci generates the hope that ‘something* 
can happen in Cyprus and wished that it will give inspiration to peaceful efforts. 
‘Bullet holes around us show us that there is still a long way to go for a solution 
and the agreement reached between Talat and Christofias is a response to our 
expectations* Mavrou said, finalizing her speech in the Turkish language by 
saying ‘Peace in Cyprus, Insallah!'.
The UNFICYP Chief of Mission Elizabeth Spehar in her speech pointed to the 
long process in the way towards a settlement in Cyprus but stressed that the 
opening of Lokmaci is a good sign which signifies what can be done for a
301
solution.
A statement was also read out by an EU official on behalf of the EU 
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn which said Mr Rehn is delighted that 
the two sides have moved ahead with the decision to open Lokmaci.
Underlining the symbolic value of the opening, Mr Rehn stated that the opening 
shows that the two sides are ready to put aside the difficulties of the past and 
work together for a comprehensive settlement and reunification in Cyprus under 
the aegis of the United Nations.
He added that the EU Commission will fully support initiatives aimed at realizing 
this goal.
In the meantime, the Citizens’ Initiative for the Opening of Lokmaci has organized 
a feast in the Lokmaci area for this evening to celebrate the opening.
04.04.2008
The crossings at Lokmaci-Ledra Border Gate are continuing between the two 
sides in Cyprus despite a brief closure of the gate late on Thursday.
The gate - which was opened to crossings yesterday morning -  was closed by 
the Greek Cypriot Side at around 08.30 with a claim that Turkish Cypriot police 
violated the buffer zone.
The crossing was reopened around three hours later after mediation by UN 
officials.
President Mehmet Ali Talat has said that Thursday’s developments at Lokmaci 
were an isolated incident that should not be exaggerated.
Speaking at Ercan Airport on his return from Istanbul, President Talat reminded 
that the Turkish Cypriot Side has been working since 2005 for the opening of the 
gate.
The President reminded that there were similar attempts during the era of the 
former Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopulos and added that it’s very 
natural to see the reflections of old attempts today.
Mr Talat also noted that there is no need to open a debate on who is responsible 
for Thursday’s incident as the problem at the gate was solved.
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Expressing the hope that the incident would not affect the new process started in 
Cyprus, he said ‘it was an isolated incident1. There was an attempt to stage a 
protest, our police intervened in line with the law*.
Speaking soon after the closure of the gate, Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer 
rejected Greek Cypriot Side’s claims that Turkish Cypriot police violated the 
buffer zone.
Calling the closure of the gate as unacceptable, he said the Turkish Cypriot Side 
has been acting in line with the agreement reached on the issue and will continue 
to do so.
Another comment on the issue came from deputy-Prime Minister -  Foreign 
Minister Turgay Avci who said ‘if they have any problem, we are ready to discuss 
but our borders are not negotiable*.
For his part, Minister of Interior Ozkan Murat said that a group of Greek Cypriots 
-  carrying placards and chanting slogans -  crossed the Greek Cypriot barricade 
and entered into the north part of the Cikkos area, which is under the control of 
the TRNC.
He explained that Turkish Cypriot police intervened in the protest and took the 
placards from protestors to prevent the disruption of crossings.
Turkish Cypriot police has the right to intervene the situation in this area in line 
with the agreement reached with the United Nations' he noted.
President Mehmet Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias agreed 
on the 21st of March to open the gate which remained closed for 45 years.
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Appendix 9 B: KFM
KFM April 1 Ergakica
Turkish Original
Lokmaci Kapisi’nm agilmasi amaciyla Lefkoga Turk ve Rum Belediyelerinin 
baglattigi bakim-onarim galigmalari turn hiziyla surerken, Lokmaci Kapisfndan 
gegiglerin en geg Pergembe gunu baglayabilecegi bildirildi.
Cumhurbagkanhgi Sozcusu Hasan Ergakica, Lokmaci Kapisi’ndan yarin, en geg 
Pergembe gunu gegiglerin baglayabilecegini soyledi. Lefkoga Turk Belediyesi’nin 
Turk tarafi adina surdurdugu galigmalarin bugun tamamlanmasinin beklendigini 
kaydeden Ergakica, igigleri Bakanligi’nm da yarindan itibaren Muhaceret ve 
Giimruk memurlarini Lokmaci Kapisi’nda hazir bulunduracagmi belirtti. Ergakica 
bugun duzenledigi haftalik brifingde gazetecilerin sorusu uzerine, Lokmaci 
Kapisi’nm agilmasi girigimleriyle ilgili geligmeleri anlatti.
Ergakica, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Bagkam Orgeneral Yagar 
Buyukamt’in “Lokmaci Kapisi’nm agilmasi gozum gibi algilanmamali” sozlerinin 
hatirlatilmasi uzerine, “Hakli bir geye degindi. Biz de oyle algilamiyoruz. Kibris 
Rum tarafinda da benzer gorug ve elegtiriler var” dedi.
Ergakica, Lokmaci Kapisi’nm agilmasinin sembolik birdegeri olmadigim 
soylemenin de mumkun olmadigim belirterek, 1963’de “barikat” olarak ortaya 
gikan bir noktanm bugun gegige donugmesinin ozel bir geligme oldugunu 
kaydetti.
Rum Yonetimi’nin Mali Yardim Tuzugu’nun uygulanmasim engellemek igin 
Avrupa Komisyonu aleyhine agtigi davalara da deginen Ergakica, Rum tarafinin, 
Kibris Turk halkina uygulanan izolasyonlari kaldirmak igin degil agirlagtirmak igin 
galigtigim soyledi. Ergakica, Kibris’ta kapsamli gozum arayiglari devam ederken, 
iki halkin iligkilerini iyilegtirmek ve Kibris Turk halkimn gozum surecine bagliligmi 
devam ettirmek igin izolasyonlarin kaldirilmasi igin de galigmak gerektigini 
soyledi. Avrupa Komisyonu aleyhine bugune kadar 8 dava agildigina, bu 
davalarin 2’sinin Rum Yonetimi Bagkam Dimitris Hristofyas ddnemineait 
olduguna igaret eden Ergakica, “Hristofyas’in goreve yeni geldigi gunlerde bu 
davalari ‘kucaginda buldugu’ yorumunu yapmig ve ondan daha farkli bir tavir 
gormeyi ummugtuk. Rum tarafinin bu tutumunda israretmesi tarafimizdan hayret 
ve uzuntuyle kargilanmigtir” dedi.
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Rum tarafinin agtigi davalann Hristofyas segildikten sonra da devam etmesinin 
Avrupa Parlamentosu’nda milletvekilleri tarafindan gagkinlikla kargilandigmi da 
soyleyen Ergakica, “Avrupa Parlamentosu milletvekillerinin bukonudaki 
gagkinliklarini en kisa zamanda atlatarak, sozkonusu davalarin mahkeme 
tarafindan reddedilmesi dogrultusunda girigimlerde bulunmalarini umuyoruz” 
dedi. Rum kilisesinin Bruksel’de temsilcilik agma girigimlerinin hatirlatilmasi 
uzerine de Ergakica, “Rum kilisesinin Bagpiskopos Hrisostomos doneminde 
olabildigince politiklegtigini” soyledi. Ergakica, siyasal birsorun olan Kibris 
sorununun dinsel bir sorun haline getirilmeye galigilmasinin tehlikeli bir gidigat 
olduguna da vurgu yapti.
Translation
The Turkish and Greek Nicosia Municipalities reported that work has started on 
both sides of the Lokmaci gate. The Lokmaci gate crossing will open on 
Thursday at the latest.
The Presidential spokesman Hasan Ergakica said tomorrow, or at the latest 
Thursday, they will open Lokmaci gate. The Turkish Nicosia Municipality will 
finish work on the Turkish side today, Internal Affairs department specified that 
after tomorrow Immigration and Customs workers will be ready at Lokmaci gate. 
Ergakica explained about the developments of the opening of Lokmaci Gate to 
the reporters in a weekly briefing which was held today.
Ergakica said that the Turkish National Chief of Staff General Yagar Buyukanit 
said “Its not to be considered as a solution by opening the Lokmaci gate.” He 
reminded that, “This is truly said. We perceive the situation similarily. The Greek 
Cypriot side Thinks the same.”
Ergakica noted that the Lokmaci opening is of special value because in 1963 
there was a “barricade” and now today there is a crossing gate. It is an important 
development.
Ergakica dealt with the issue of the Greek Administration who were using the 
European Commission financial aid regulation as an obstruction. The Greeks 
want to slow down the removal on the continuing isolation of the Turkish Cypriot 
public. Ergakica said that in searching for a comprehensive solution in Cyprus, 
both the public relations improvements and the Turkish Cypriot public are 
connected to the solution process to remove the isolations. Up to now, the 
European Commission has had eight disadvantageous laws and two of them
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have begun during the time of the new Head of the Greek Administration Dimitri 
Hristofyas. Ergakica commented, “By the time Hristofyas started his job, it is 
claimed that the laws were in his lap, we were expecting some different behavior 
from him. The insistence by the Greek side for this approach surprised and made 
us sad”.
The parlimentarians of the European Parliment were surprised because of the 
reopening of the case by the Greek Cypriots was still continuing after Hristofyas 
was elected. Ergakica said “ We are hoping to eliminate the surprise of the 
parlimentarians of the European Parliment in a least time period about the 
interference in accordance with the comittee’s decission”.
The Greek church tried to open an association in Brussels and Ergakica said 
that, “Hrisostomos term as head of the Greek church, has has become as 
political as possible”. Ergakica said that Cyprus problem is a political problem 
and they want to make it a religious problem which is a very dangerous path.
4 April Ban Ki Moon
Turkish Original
Sayin seyirciler Lokmaci Kapisi'nm agilmasindan dolayi Birlegmig Milletler Genel 
Sekreteri Ban Ki-Mun da memnuniyet duydugu belirtildi.
Birlegmig Milletler Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-mun, Lokmaci Kapisi'nm agilmasmi 
memnuniyetle kargiladigi bildirildi. Birlegmig Milletler Sozcu Yardimcisi Marie 
Okabe tarafindan yapilan agiklamada, Ban'in, 1963yilindan beri Lokmaci 
Kapisi'nm kapali olmasmin, Ada'daki bolunmeyi temsil ettigini ve 40 yildan fazla 
bir sure sonra kapinin bugun agilmasmin Ada'da yeni ve umut verici bir ortamin 
simgesi oldugunu vurguladigmi soyledi. Agiklamada, "Birlegmig Milletler'in, 
Kibrislilar'in Ada'nin birlegmesi amaciyla muzakerelere yeniden baglama 
yolundaki zorlu surece yaklagtiklari bir donemde onlara yardim etmeye kararli 
oldugu" vurgulandi.
Translation
Dear viewers, the United Nations General Secretary Ban Ki Moon has expressed 
satisfaction at the opening of the Lokmaci gate.
The United Nations General Secretary Ban Ki Moon has expressed satisfaction 
at the opening of the Lokmaci gate. The United Nations deputy spokesman 
Marie Okabe said that Moon remarked that since 1963 Lokmaci gate was closed.
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This showed the division of the island for more than 40 years . The opening of 
the gate today gives the island new hope, she said.
She remarked, “The United Nations, Cypriots’ and the island’s cooperation is the 
aim to start compromise. Compromise is very difficult and we want to help 
resolutely,” she stressed.
April 4 Lokmaci Turgay Avci
Turkish Original
Lokmaci Kapisi’nm dun gece tek tarafli olarak kapatilmasi ile ilgili Bagbakan 
Yardimcisi ve Digigleri Bakam Turgay Avci’da da agiklamada bulundu. Avci, 
Rumlar'in Lokmaci Kapisi'm tek yanli gegiglere kapatmasiyla ilgili olarak, 
"Sorunlari varsa tartigilir, konugulabilir ama simrlarimiz tartigtirilmaz" dedi.
Bagbakan Yardimcisi ve Digigleri Bakam Turgay Avci, Rumlar'in Lokmaci 
Kapisi'm tek yanli gegiglere kapatmasiyla ilgili olarak, "Sorunlari varsa tartigilir, 
konugulabilir ama simrlarimiz tartigtirilmaz" dedi. Turgay Avci, AA muhabirinin, 
Kibris Rum Yonetimi Sozcusu Stefanos Stefanu'nun, Lokmaci Kapisi'nm 
kapatilmasina gerekge olarak, "Kibris Turk polisinin, kapinin oldugu caddenin bir 
bolumunde "yasadigi" olarak devriye gezmesini" gosterdigini hatirlatmasi 
uzerine, "Onlarin iddiasina gore konugtuklari bolge, Kuzey Kibris Turk 
Cumhuriyeti simrlari igindedir" dedi. Rumlar'in, saat 21.00 itibariyle gegigleri tek 
yanli durdugunu kaydeden Avci, "Kuzey Kibris Turk Cumhuriyeti simrlari igindeki 
higbir yer sorgulanamaz ve tartigtirilamaz. Bir konu varsa tartigilabilir ama Kuzey 
Kibris Turk Cumhuriyeti simrlari igindeki higbir bolge higbir sinir sorgulanamaz, 
buna da izin vermeyiz" diye konugtu.
Translation
At the Lokmaci gate, there was a problem with one way traffic being closed 
related Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Turgay Avci. Avci 
related that the Greeks closed the Lokmaci gate to one way traffic. He said, “If 
there is a problem we discuss and speak but our borders are never discussed,” 
he said.
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Turgay Avci said traffic was 
closed by the Greeks at Lokmaci gate. “If there is a problem we discuss and 
speak but our borders are never discussed,” he said. An Anadola Agency 
reporter reported that the Greek Cypriot Administration Spokesman Stefanos
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Stefanu’s said that Lokmaci gate was closed because “Turkish Cypriot police 
‘illegally’ patrolled”somewhere on the gate’s road.” Turgay Avci said, “In regard 
to what Stefanu said on this topic, this area is within the borders of Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus.” Avci acknowledged at 21:00, Greeks stopped 
pedestrians passing. “There is no negotiations and dealings within the borders of 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. If there is an issue, we deal with it but 
within the borders of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus we never give 
permission.”
KFM 4 April Talat
Turkish Original
istanbul’daki temaslarim tamamlayarak adaya donen Cumhurbagkam Mehmet 
Ali Talat. Ercan Havaalam’nda gazetecilere yaptigi agiklamada, dun sabah 
torenlerle agtigimiz Lokmaci Kapisi’nm gece saat 20.30 siralarinda Rum 
tarafinca tek tarafli olarak kapatilmasi ile ilgili agiklamada bulundu. Talat, 
yaganan geligmeleri, “eski engellemelerin bugune yansimasi” olarak niteledi. 
Cumhurbagkam Mehmet Ali Talat, Rumlar'in Lokmaci Kapisi'm tek yanli 
gegiglere kapatmasinm.Kibris Turk tarafindan kaynaklanan bir sikinti olmadigina 
igaret ederek, Rum tarafinin eski engellemelerinin bugune yansimalari bigiminde 
tepkiler ortaya koydugunu soyledi. istanbul’daki temaslarim tamamlamasimn 
ardindan adaya donen Cumhurbagkam Mehmet Ali Talat, Ercan Havaalam’nda 
gazetecilere Lokmaci Kapisi’nda yaganan geligmelerle ilgili agiklamada bulundu. 
Cumhurbagkam Mehmet Ali Talat, Lokmaci Kapisi’nda dun gece yagananlarla 
ilgili, “Bizden kaynaklanan bir gey yok. Munferit bir olaydi. Normal kargilamamiz 
lazim. Biz sakince igimizi yapalim” diye konugtu. istanbul temaslari ile ilgili de 
bilgi veren Talat, istanbul’da, Kibrisli Turklere yonelik izolasyonlarin 
kaldirilabilmesi igin gok ciddi galigmalar yapan Turk Musevi Cemaati 
yoneticileriyle bir araya geldigini soyledi. TUSiAD istigare ve yonetim kuruluyla 
yemekte bir araya geldigini de belirten Talat, Kibris sorununun son durumunu, 
Turkiye’nin Avrupa Birligi surecini ve Kibris’ta baglayan yeni siireci konugtuklarim 
kaydetti. TUSiAD’dan surekli olarak Kibris sorununun gdzumii ve Kibrisli 
Turklere uygulanan izolasyonlarin kaldirilmasi konusundaki galigmalari devam 
ettirmesini istediklerini ve olumlu yamt aldiklanm belirten Talat, istanbul’da 
bulundugu sure iginde Turkiye medyasimn dig haberler editorleriyle de bir araya 
geldigini kaydetti.
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Translation
President Mehmet Ali Talat finished his meetings in Istanbul and returned back to 
the island, from Ercan airport, he commented to reporters yesterday morning, 
“We opened the Lokmaci gate with a ceremony and last night at 20:30 Greeks 
closed the gates one way.” Talat said, this development, “its an old hinderance 
[engelleme] mirrored today.”
President Mehmet Ali Talat said Greeks closed the Lokmaci gate one way. Its 
not happened on the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek side is mirroring the old 
barriers. President Mehmet Ali Talat finished his meetings in Istanbul and 
returned back to the island. From Ercan airport, he told reporters about 
developments at Lokmaci gate. President Mehmet Ali Talat said last night, “We 
had a problem at Lokmaci gate and it’s not from us”. Its a possible fact. Its a 
normal occurence. We did our work in a relaxed way he said. Talat gave 
information about his meetings in Istanbul. He said that in Istanbul, the Turkish 
Jewish Association are working hard to help end the Turkish Cypriots isolation. 
Talat met TUSiAD’s representatives and directing committee for a meal. Talat 
discussed, the latest status of the Cyprus problem, Turkey’s European Union 
process and the new process started in Cyprus. Talat wants TUSiAD to continue 
working on the topics solving the Cyprus problem, and the ending of the Turkish 
Cypriot isolation. They gave him positive answers. When Talat was in Istanbul, 
he met with Turkish media editors.
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Appendix 9 C: Radyo T
2 April Lokmaci Denktag
Turkish Original
Cumhurbagkam Rauf Denktag, Lokmaci Kapisi’nm agilmasmin niye bu denli 
onemsendigini anlayamadigmi soyledi. Trabzon’a giden Denktag, havalimanmda, 
gazetecilerin gundeme iligkin sorularim yamtladi.
Lefkoga’daki Lokmaci Kapisi’nm agilmasina iligkin soru uzerine Denktag,KKTC 
ile Kibris Rum kesimi arasindaki Lokmaci Kapisi’nm yaya gegigine agilmasmin, 
"gok kuguk bir teferruat” oldugunu belirterek, “Niye bukadar onemsendi ben 
anlamiyorum.Bir gok kapi var agilrrng.Bunlar bizim gartlarimiza gore agilir.Orada 
gumruk muamelesi var.Bayragimiz.askerimiz ve polisimiz var.Aym gartlarda 
agtik.Rumlar, “asker oradaysa gelmeyiz, agmayiz” demiglerdi.Ama biz 
gerilemedik.§atlarimizi kabul etmiglerdir ki agildi.Ama bu 90k btiyuk bir olaymig 
gibi buyutuluyor” diye konugtu.Kapinin agilmasmin,gorugme surecine olumlu etki 
yapacak bir olay gibi algilandigmi ifade eden Denktag,gunlari kaydetti: “Berlin 
Duvari,son Berlin Duvari yikildi gibi edeb'iyatlar yapiliyor.Berlin Duvari bir milleti 
ikiye bolmug bir duvardi.Burada bir millet,diger milleti yok etmek igin harekete 
gegtiginde,Allah razi olsun ana vatammizin askeri sayesinde gizilmig bir huduttan 
ibarettir.Dolayisiyla bunu iyi anlamasi lazim yabancilarin.Bu duvar milleti ayiran 
bir duvar degildir.soy kirim i onleyen bang duvaridir. “Denktag,2002 yilinda turn 
kapilari agmak igin harekete gegen tarafin kendileri oldugunu dile getirerek, 
“Rumlara ‘sakin gitmeyin’ diye feryat ettiler, ama kimse bunu dinlemedi.herkes 
geldi.Dolayisiyla bunu buyutmeyelim.Esas olan gorugmelerdir.Gbrugmeler hangi 
gartlarda baglayacak.budur esas olan.Bu konuda endigelerimiz var.Ama uyamk 
birteyakkuz igerisinde izlemekteyiz” dedi. Denktag,onceki gunlerde gergeklegen 
Genelkurmay Bagkam Orgeneral Yagar Buyukamt’in KKTC’yi ziyareti ile ilgili 
soru uzerine ise gunlari soyledi: “Allah razi olsun
Genelkurmayimiz’dan.Gelmigtir,buyuk bir maneviyat getirmigtir.Buyuk bir gug 
kaynagi olmugtur.Guven vermigtir halkimiza.Qunku bu guven yavag yavag 
erozyona ugramaktaydi.Qunku ne olacagi bilinmeyen birsureg devam 
etmekteydi.Kimse bize “KKTC vardir ve var olacaktir.asker bariga kadar vardir 
ve barigtan sonra da anlagacagimiz sayida var olmaya devam 
edecektir.Garantor Tiirkiye’nin askeri olarak” dememigtir.Bunu bize
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s6ylemi§tir,altini 9 izmi§tir.Bize gu9 ve maneviyat vermi§tir.Hakikaten halkimiz 
canlanmi§ ve kendine guven gelmi§tir.”
Translation
President Rauf Denkta? said that Lokmaci gate opened but he doesn’t 
understand why it is important. Denkta§ went to Trabzon and answered 
reporters’ questions at the airport.
Answering a question about the Lokmaci opening, Denkta§ said that the 
pedestrian crossing between TRNC and the Greek Cypriot side, “It’s a very small 
detail, but I can’t understand the importance because there are many gates 
opened. That gate is open on our conditions. There are Customs. Our flag, our 
soldiers and our police are there. We opened it under the same conditions as 
before. The Greeks used to say, “If there are soldiers, we won’t open.” But we 
didn’t step back. They agreed to our conditions so it is opened. But they have 
made it into a big event. Because of the gate opening, they think this has 
affected negotiation timing.” And Denkta§ said, “They make a story like the 
Berlin wall was destroyed. The Berlin wall divided a nation into two districts.
Here, one nation tried to destroy the other nation but God bless our motherland’s 
soldiers because the soldiers drew a border. At the gate, foreigners understand 
it well. This wall doesn’t divide a nation, it prevents genocide, this wall is a peace 
wall.”
Denkta? said, “ In the year 2002 we made the move to open a gate. The Greeks 
didn’t agree. They pleaded but nobody listened to this. Everybody agreed. So, 
its not a big deal. Conditions are important. How the conditions begin is 
important. We are afraid of this topic. But we are awake and alert in our 
vigilance.”
Yesterday, the Turkish National Chief of Staff General Ya§ar Buyukanit came to 
TRNC. He was asked what he thought about visit? He said,” God bless the 
General. Its a big honour that he came. He’s a big boast. He gives trust to our 
people because that trust can slowly decrease because we forget what 
happened. Nobody can say the TRNC exists or doesn’t. Soldiers are here; 
when peace comes and after an agreement is reached. We will make an 
agreement as to how many soldiers will remain. Turkish soldiers are our 
guarantors. Turkey told us and underlined this. They give us power and moral 
support. Truly our nation is alive and confident.”
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4 April Lokmaci
Turkish Original
RUM Yonetimi’nin, kar§ilikli yaya gegi§ine agilan Lefko§a’daki Lokmaci Kapisi’m, 
once tek yanli olarak gegi§lere kapatmasi, 3  saat sonra da yeniden agmasinm. 
“Beklenen bir olay” oldugu ve Rumlar’in, lokmacida “taviz verdik” duygusunda 
olduklari bildirildi. Konuyla ilgili olarak Anadolu Ajansi muhabirinin goru§une ba§ 
vurdugu KKTC’den bir yetkili. Rumlar’in hedefi, Tiirkeler’e aityerin kontrolunun 
BM nin kontrolune vermektir. “Btitun manevranm bunun uzerine” olduguna vurgu 
yapan yetkili, “Bu olamdigi taktirde, agsalar bile oburgun yine kapatacaklar.
Bunu saglayamadiklari suriice de bu boyle devam edecek” dedi. Rumlar’in boyle 
bir §ey yapmasmin bekledigine, bolgedeki sinir hatti ve kapinin i§letilmesi 
konusunda Rumlar’in “taviz verdik” duygusuna kapildigina i§aret eden yetkili 
Rumlan’in Ermu Caddesi’nden bir devriye aracinin gegi§ini de bahane ederek 
kapiyi kapatabilecegi bildirdi. Rumlar’in “polis siniri ihlal etti” diye asilsiz bir 
gerekge yarattigmi, sonra da kapinin agildigi kaydeden ye tk ili, Rumlar’in 
amacinin, 1974’teki KKTC sinirin in 1963 sinirma gekilmesi oldugunu belirterek, 
“Bunu saglayamadiklari igin taviz verdik duygusundalaf diye konu§tu.
Translation
The Greek administration said the pedestrian crossing at Lokmaci gate in 
Lefko§a had one way traffic for three hours before opening again. “Its to be 
expected” and the Greeks think they compromised by opening the gate.
Related with this topic, an Anadola reporter talked with a TRNC authority: Greeks 
think “Its to be expected”.
Greeks have an aim to give the Turkish area to UN control. He thought that “all 
manouvres on it” are part of a game and “ if it is not given to UN control, they 
won’t open. But the day before they closed it. It will happen like that.”
He said he was waiting for the Greeks to do this in this border line area and the 
Greeks think they gave a compromise. The Greeks will close the gate again if 
they see a patrol car near the border. The Greeks said the police crossed the 
border and after that they opened the gate. The Greeks’ aim is to replace the 
1974 TRNC border with the 1963 border and “they can’t do this, so they think 
they gave a compromise.”
4 April Lokmaci
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Turkish Original
Sayin Seyirciler dun sabah torenle agilan Lokmaci Kapisi’nda dun ak§am 
ya§anan kisa sureli krizin, KKTC’nin kontrolundaki bolgeyi ihlal eden Rum 
gostericilerin pankartli eyleminden kaynaklandigi ogrenildi.
igi§leri Bakam Ozkan Murat’tan alinan bilgiye gore, saat 20:15 civarinda 20 
civarinda Rum , ellerinde pankartlarla ve sloganlar atarak Rum barikatmi gegerek 
KKTC’nin kontrolundaki Cikkos’un Kuzey tarafina gegtiler. KKTC polisinin, 
guvenli gegigin engellememesi igin gostericilere mudahale ettigini ve ellerindeki 
pankartlari aldigini soyleyen Murat, ‘KKTC polisi, BM ile varilan mutakat uyarinca 
bu bolgede mudahale etme yetkisine sahiptire’ dedi Murat, ‘Sorun girigimler 
sonucu agilmig durumda. Saat 23:00 itibariyla herhangi bir sorun kalmadi. Biz 
kapinin agilmasi konusunda BM ile varilan mutabakata bagliyiz ve bu 
mutabakata uygun harekete diyoruz’ dedi.
Translation
Dear listeners, yesterday morning Lokmaci gates opened and last night we had a 
little crisis, the TRNC’s controlled area was illegally breached by Greek 
protestors.
Internal Affairs Minister Ozkan Murat reported this to reporters at 20:15. Nearly 
20 Greeks shouting slogans and carrying protest signs passed the Greek 
barricades and came to the TRNC’s controlled area north of Cikkos. TRNC 
police intervened, blocking their path and taking their protest signs while 
pedestrians continued to pass. Murat said, “TRNC police have permission to 
intervene in this area because they have an agreement with the UN.” Murat said, 
“the problem was solved according to agreements. At 23:00 the problem was 
solved. We have an agreement with the UN and we use the agreement to open 
the gate and we act according to the agreement.”
April 5 De Soto
Turkish Original
BM eski genel sekreteri’nin Kibris Ozel Temsilcisi olarak gorev yapan Alvaro De 
Soto, international Herald Tribune isimli gazetede yayimlanan makalesinde 
"lokmaci kapisinin acilmasi kibris sorununu bitirmez’ konusuna degindi.
BM eski genel sekreteri’nin Kibris Ozel Temsilcisi olarak gorev yapan Alvaro De 
Soto, Kibris sorununun gbzumu konusunda iyimser olmanin gok zor oldugunu ve
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kibris konusunda kapinin agilmasimn gok onemli olmadigini belirtti. De Soto “ 
Kibrislta ne degigti ki iyimser olmamiz gereksin?”diye sordu.
Rum gazetesi Fileleftheros; “De Soto Bir Yamltici Baglangig Daha mi Diye 
Soruyor-Anahtar Tutanlar, Korkular ve Baskilar” baglikli haberinde, BM eski 
Genel Sekreteri’nin Kibris Ozel Temsilcisi olarak 1999’dan 2004’e kadar Kibris 
sorunuyla ilgili muzakereleri buyuten Alvaro De Soto’nm “international Herald 
Tribune” isimli gazetede yayinlanan “ Another False Down?” baglikli makalesine 
yer verdi. Kibris sorununun bir kilit oldugunu ve agilmasi igin Kibrisli Tiirklerin, 
Rumlarin, Turkiye ve Yunanistan’in elinde bulunan 4 anahtara ihtiyag oldugu 
gorugunu one gikaran De Soto’nun bu makalesiyle bir kez daha “vurudugu” 
yorumunu yapan gazete, Kibris sorununun gozum inisiyatiflerine yer verilen 
makalenin bazi bolumlerini okurlarina goyle aktardi:
“Ada’nin bolunmuglugunun kaldirilmasina yonelik inisiyatifler tarihi bir yamltici 
baglangiglar silsilesi olarak nitelendirilebilir.
Herzaman, liderlerin biri veya digeri (baglatilan) gabaya kugkucu yaklagir ve 
guglii bir gekilde “hayir” der. Arkasindan, ya Ankara’dan veya Atina’dan destek 
gelir, ancak gecen hafta Cuma yeni segilmig Kibrisli Rum lider Dimitris Hristofyas 
ve Kibrisli Turk “dengi” Talat yeni bir gabada goru§tuler. Lokmaci kapismi agtilar. 
Neden iyimser olmamiz gerek ki?
Kibris sorunu da; agilmasi igin Kibrisli Rumlarin, Kibrisli Turklerin, Yunanistan’in 
ve Turkiye’nin elindeki dort anahtara ihtiyag olan bir kilit olarak nitelendirebilecek 
bir hedef var.
Liderleri; gorugmelerinin arkasindan okunan ortak agiklamalarinda, 
miizakerelerin uzerinde gergeklegtirilecegi zeminle ilgili olasi dikenli sorulara 
atifta bulunmaktan ustaca kagmildi. Iki tarafin bu inisiyatifi elbette bir avantajdir. 
Digardan dayatildigi duygusu 2004 gabasina zarar vermigti.
Translation
The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special Representative Alvaro De 
Soto wrote about the Cyprus problem in light of the opening of Lokmaci Gate in 
the Herald Tribune . The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special 
Representative Alvaro De Soto wrote that it is very difficult to solve the Cyprus 
problem, involving more than the opening of a gate. De Soto asked, “ in Cyprus 
what has changed to make a solution easy?”
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The Greek newspaper Fileleftheros quoting the title of the article wrote, “De Soto 
stated in the title, Th is is a wrong start again -  the key is fear and pressure’.”
The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special Representative negotiated the 
Cyprus problem from 1999 to 2004. Alvaro De Soto’s article in the International 
Herald Tribute is entitled, “Another false down?” . It says the Cyprus problem is 
a critical door and if it is opened, Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Turkey and 
Greece have the four keys and the Cyprus problem needs those four keys. The 
newspaper article used many parts of the original from the Herald:
“The division of the island has seen many initiatives, but this is a fake start of its 
history. All the time, one or the other of the leaders thinks twice when they 
negotiate and they strongly say ‘no’. After that, support from Ankara or Athens 
comes. Last Friday, there was a new Greek Cypriot leader Dimitri Hristofyas and 
there is Turkish Cypriot Talat who are"similar” in their new negotiations. There 
was also the opening of Lokmaci. Why are we thinking positive?
The Cyprus problem is about Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and 
Turkey who have the four keys and we need those four keys. Our aim is the 
keys.
After the negotiations the leaders and partners read the account, but nobody 
asks difficult questions about the negotiations. Both sides have the initiative 
which is an advantage. From the outside, sentiments are imposed as was the 
case in 2004.”
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Appendix Ten
The ex-UN G eneral Secretary and Cyprus Special 
Representative Alvaro De Soto
Radyo T names De Soto six times, “the UN” four times, and three times vaguely 
as “everybody”, “nobody” and “we”. This is seven impersonal and six personal 
representations. Many impersonal namings on Radyo T background UN 
functions. For example, “everybody” and “nobody” are in the following Denkta§ 
reported speech:
“In the year 2002 we made the move to open a gate. The Greeks didn’t agree. 
They pleaded but nobody listened to them. Everybody agreed.”
It is unclear who “everybody” and “nobody” are. The UN are most definitely part 
of this group, along with other international players such as Turkey and possibly 
the EU. These references background the UN, yet represent the UN agreeing 
with the UBP.
De Soto is the only actor personally represented, twice formally with functional 
honorifics, once functionally as “The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus 
Special Representative” , twice formally with no honorifics as “De Soto” and once 
semi-formally as “Alvaro De Soto”. Three functional namings highlights his role 
as an expert on Cyprus from the UN. Highlighting his importance legitimates his 
points of view which are represented as agreeing with UBP policies, thereby 
legitimising those policies.
Radyo T activates the UN in one story. Five times De Soto is activated, in two 
event processes of “wrote”, two verbal processes of “asked” and “negotiated” and 
one state process in, “De Soto’s article in the International Herald Tribute is 
entitled, “Another false down?” So De Soto does things in line with UBP policies 
(discussed below).
De Soto demonstrates his scepticism towards peace initiatives in his reported 
speech. An excerpt reads:
“The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special Representative Alvaro De 
Soto wrote that it is very difficult to solve the Cyprus problem, involving more 
than the opening of a gate. De Soto asked, “ in Cyprus what has changed to 
make a solution easy?”
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Here, De Soto utterances are multi-layered,as discussed earlier. However, he is 
represented as describing the “Cyprus problem” in a state process as “very 
difficult” . In a rhetorical question, the underlining meaning is nothing has 
changed “to make a solution easy”. Opening Lokmaci is not the answer. The 
rest of the article continues as such. For example, De Soto is activated in the 
verbal process, “De Soto stated in the title, This is a wrong start again -  the key 
is fear and pressure”’. Again, De Soto “stated” scepticism towards peace 
initiatives, as does UBP.
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Appendix Eleven (chapter six)
Appendix 11 A: Relations stories on 25.09.07
BRTI
Deputy Prime Minister - Foreign Minister Turgay Avci has said that it is high time 
the international community removes the unjust international isolation imposed 
on the Turkish Cypriot people.
He called on the Italian government to support the Turkish Cypriot Side’s efforts 
to that end.
Foreign Minister Turgay Avci who is in Italy as guest of the Italian Radical Party 
addressed the Italian Parliament this afternoon.
Speaking to an audience of deputies, the Foreign Minister said that the Greek 
Cypriot Administration which rejected the Annan Plan during the 2004 
referendum was not prepared to share political power with the Turkish Cypriot 
people.
He said that the International community should recognize the fact that the 
Turkish Cypriot people expressed their free will and fulfiled their obligation 
towards finding a comprehensive settlement and remove the isolations imposed 
on them.
Touching upon the EU financial assistance regulation, Avci complained that 
many changes had been introduced to the regulation before it was implemented, 
changes that aimed to divert the regulation’s true purpose.
As for the stalled EU Direct Trade Regulation, Mr. Avci explained how the 
implementation of the regulation which aimed to allow direct trade been North 
Cyprus and EU countries as well as to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot 
people was being prevented within the EU by the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Mr. Avci called on the current EU Term President Portugal to put into affect the 
regulation without further delay and to allow Turkish Cypriots to trade with EU 
member countries through their own ports.
Referring to the Turkish Cypriot Side’s ongoing efforts towards finding a solution 
to the Cyprus Problem, the TRNC Foreign Minister said that Turkish Cypriots 
were with the opinion that a comprehensive solution will not be found to the 
Cyprus Problem in the near future.
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He said that the only acceptable solution for the Greek Cypriot Side was for the 
assimilation of the Turkish Cypriot people into a minority within a Greek Cypriot 
State.
Mr. Avci also pointed out that the 8th July process had provided the Greek Cypriot 
Side an excellent opportunity to free itself of international pressure and to delay a 
political settlement on the island.
Underlining the importance of strengthening the North Cyprus economy whilst 
working for the removal of the international isolation at the same time, Mr. Avci 
briefed the Italian parliamentarians on the recent economic developments that 
have taken place in the TRNC.
KFM
Turkish original
Bagbakan Yardimcisi ve Digigleri Bakam Turgay Avci,Kibrisli Turklerin kapsamli 
bir gozumun yakin bir gelecekte gergeklegemeyecegi kanaatinde oldugunu 
soyledi.Avci, Kibris Rum tarafi igin kabul edilebilir bir gozumun ancak “Kibrisli 
Turklerin Kibris Rum devleti igerisine asimilasyonuyla” olabilecegi gorugunde 
olduguna da igaret etti. italya’da temaslarda bulunan Turgay Avci, bugun italya 
Cumhuriyeti Parlamentosu’nda bir konugma yapti. Digigleri Bakam Turgay Avci, 
Kibris sorunuyla ilgili muzakere gabalari hakkinda bilgi verdigi konugmasinda, 24 
Nisan 2004 referandumu sonrasinda yeni bir donemece giren Kibris sorununda 
yeni bir durum ortaya giktigim soyledi. Avci, adada iki egit halkin bulundugu ve 
higbirinin bir digerini temsil edemeyecegi gergegini teyit eden eg zamanli ayri 
referandumlarda guglu bir “hayir” diyen Rum tarafinin, Turk tarafiyla gug 
paylagimina girigmeye hazir olmadiginin anlagildigmi kaydetti. Digigleri Bakam 
Turgay Avci,Kibrisli Turklerin kapsamli bir gbzumunun yakin bir gelecekte 
gegeklegemeyecegi kanaatinde oldugunu da soyledi.(Jozumsuzlugun bir 
istikrarsizlik riski tagidigmi kaydeden Avci,Kibrisli Turkler’in bu nedenle 
gorugmelerde yapici bir tutum izledigini ve gdzumiin saglanabilmesi igin birgok 
agilimlar ve yeni insiyatifler yaptigini kaydetti. Avci, Kibris Rum tarafinin 8 
Temmuz surecini hem kendilerine uygulanan baskilardan kurtulmak, hem de 
geciktirme taktikleri uygulayarak kosteklemek igin mukemmel bir firsat olarak 
degerlendirdiklerini soyledi. Avci, “sureci agik tutmaktaki amaglari Tiirkiye’nin AB 
yeni surecinde tavizler elde ederek uyeligini engellemek, dolayisiyla iyice
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yerle§mi§ BM parametrelerini ve gozume yonelik gali^malari tasfiye etmektir” 
dedi.
Translation
Deputy prime minister foreign minister Turgay Avci said that it was the Turkish 
Cypriot people’s general perception that a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus 
Problem will not take place any time soon. Acvi said that the only settlement 
acceptable for the Greek Cypriot side was one which involved assimilation of 
Turkish Cypriots into a minority within a Greek Cypriot state. Holding contacts in 
Italy, Turgay Avci delivered the speech at the Italian parliament. Briefing the 
Italian Parliamentarians on the Cyprus Issue and the latest efforts to revitalise the 
negotiations process, Avci said that the Cyprus Problem had entered a new 
phase following the 2004 referendum turning point. Stating that there are two 
equal peoples on the island which cannot represent the other, Avci said that the 
Greek Cypriot side had said a resounding no to the Annan plan which proved it 
was not ready to share political power with Turkish Cyprus.
Explaining that the non-solution on the island carried the risk of creating 
instability, Avci said that for this reason the Turkish Cypriot side was adopting a 
constructive stance on the Cyprus Issue as well as introducing new initiatives. 
Avci said that the Greek Cypriot side saw the 8 July process as an excellent 
oppportunity to ease international pressure imposed on them and to introduce 
new delaying tactics on finding a settlement.
“By keeping the process going, they aim to prevent Turkey’s EU membership by 
gaining concessions plus getting rid of established UN parameters and sidelining 
to find a solution “ added Avci.
Radyo T
Turkish Original
Ulusal Birlik Partisi Lefko§a Milletvekili §erife Unverdi, Cumhuriyet Meclisi 
Ba§kam Fatma Ekenoglu’nun hala daha surdugunu iddia ettigi Kibris 
konusundaki yanli§ tutumunu hayret ve uzuntuyle izlediklerini ifade ederek,
"Sayin Ekenoglu biryandan Rum tarafmi suglarken digeryandan hala Kibris 
Turk halkini bo§ vaatler ve beklentilerle oyalamaya 9ali§iyor” g6ru§unii savundu.
UBP Lefko§a milletvekili §erife Unverdi, Ekenoglu’nun Kibris konusunda ileri 
surduklerinin dogru olmadigim da iddia ederek, ‘’Kibris Turk Halkini hala daha
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dar siyasi gikarlar ve koltuk igin ‘ Rumlarla egitlik temelinde bir anlagma 
yapilabilir’ diye aldatmanm kimseye birfayda saglamayacagim” belirtti. Onverdi, 
Ekenoglu’nun ‘’hala, gegmige gamur atarak bir yere varilabilecegini sandigim” 
belirterek, *’ Sayin Ekenoglu unutmamalidir ki eger bugun Kuzey Kibris Turk 
Cumhuriyet Meclisi’nin Bagkam ise bunu o begenmedigi ve elegtirdigi 40 yillik 
mucadeleye ve politikaya borgludur” dedi. §erife Unverdi, Turk tarafinin Kibris 
konusunda sadece gimdi degil hep bariggi politikalar ortaya koydugunu, ancak 
Rum-Yunan ikilisinin adanin butunune sahip gikma niyetinden dolayi turn bang 
planlanni reddettigini vurgulayarak, Rum tarafinin gimdi uzlagmaz olmadigmi 
CTP’nin de bu gergegi ozellikle genglerin dikkatinden kagirmayi 
bagaramayacagim belirtti.
UBP’nin Turkiye’yle birlikte, Kibris Turku’nu topraksiz, ekonomisiz, devletsiz bir 
noktadan alarak guvenli, refah iginde bir devletin vatandaglari haline getirdigini 
ifade eden Unverdi,” Bugun bu ulkede ne varsa hepsinin altinda UBP’nin muhrii 
var” dedi. Unverdi, UBP’nin ‘’turn ig ve dig mihrakli girkin saldirilara ragmen” 
tavam ve tabamyla bir butun olarak Kibris Turk halkina inandigim ve KKTC 
devleti ile halkmin dunyada hak ettigi yeri onurlu bir gekilde almasi igin yoluna 
devam edecegini vurguladi.
Translation
§erife Unverdi, the Lefkoga UBP representative member of parliament, claimed 
that, “Fatma Ekenoglu, the speaker of the Republic’s assembly, is accusing the 
Greek side, but on the other hand, she is trying to waste the Turkish Cypriot 
community’s time on “blind promises”. She also expressed that they are 
watching Mrs. Ekenoglu’s incorrect handling of the Cyprus issue with grave 
sadness.
§erife Unverdi, the Lefkoga UBP representative member of parliament, claimed 
that some of Ekenoglu’s statements about the Cyprus issue are misleading. 
“Ekenoglu is deceiving the Turkish Cypriot community by claiming there might be 
an equal agreement with the Greeks in order to keep her position, which 
demonstrates narrow political attitudes,” she said and also she expressed that 
this situation will not contribute anything to anybody. Gnverdi claimed that 
Ekenoglu is throwing “mud to the past” in order to benefit herself. She said that, 
"Mrs. Ekenoglu shouldn’t forget that she is the speaker of the Northern Cyprus 
Republic’s assembly today, her position is indebted to 40 years of struggle and
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politics, which she herself is criticising.” §erife Unverdi claimed that the Turkish 
side always follows peaceful political attitudes about the Cyprus issue and not 
only today. She also expressed that the Greeks and Greece rejected all peaceful 
political attitudes, with the intention of being the owner of the whole island, and 
she expressed that now the Greek side is agreeable, but CTP will not be 
successful at keeping this agreeability secret.
Before the UBP and Turkey, Turkish Cypriots had no land, no economy, no 
government, but now residents live in a safe and comfortable state. “Today the 
UBP’s stamp is apart of everything in this country,” Unverdi said. Unverdi 
stressed that all the members of UBP believe in the Turkish Cypriot community, 
even though there are attacks from inside and outside, and the UBP will continue 
its path in order to achieve a place deserved by the TRNC state in an honourable 
manner.
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Appendix 11 B: International reactions on 26.02.08
BRTI
US-CHRISTOFIAS
The Unites States has congratulated Dimitris Christofias on his victory on 
Sunday’s presidential election in South Cyprus.
The US State Department Spokesman Tom Casey said that Washington was still 
committed to a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution on the island.
Speaking at a press briefing, the spokesman expressed the hope that Mr 
Christofias will work together with the US in order to promote the reunification of 
Cyprus and reach a settlement.
Mr Casey reiterated that the US was still committed to a bi-zonal and bi- 
communal federal solution on the island which will be accepted by the majorities 
of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
He said the US would jointly work with the United Nations, the two sides on the 
island, Turkey, Greece and the European Union in order to help reach a 
comprehensive, just and lasting settlement.
KFM
Turkish Original
ingiltere Adalet Bakam Jack Straw ve i§pi Partisi Enfield milletvekili ve 
ingiltere’nin Kibris Ozel Temsilcisi Joan Ryan, Kibris’ta gozum apisinda onemii 
bir noktada bulunuldugunu ve gereken destegin de verilmesi gerektigini 
vurguladi.
ingiltere'de l§gi Partisi iktidarina mensup milletvekilleri ile Turk asilli bazi belediye 
meclisi uyeleri, akademisyenler, i§adamlari ve gazetecilerin kuruculari arasinda 
bulundugu Turkiye'nin l§gi Partili Dostlari lobi grubu kurulu§unun birinci yil 
donumunu ingiltere Avam Kamarasi'nda duzenlenen bir toplanti ile kutladi.
Adalet Bakam Jack Straw burada yaptigi konu§mada Rum yonetiminde yapilan 
segimlerin sonucunun onemine de dikkat gekerek, gdziim yolunda istekli bir 
yonetimin i§ba§ina gelmesinden duydugu memnuniyeti dile getirdi. Straw, Adada 
ya§ayan Turklerin gozum yolunda ya§adiklari sikintilara i§aret etti. straw "bizim 
de gergek bir degi§im isteyen bu iyi niyetli insanlarin arkasinda olmamiz ve
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onlara ihtiyap duyduklari destegi vermemiz gerekir" dedi. Straw, Adada gdziime 
ula§ilmasiyla Turkiye'nin Avrupa Birligi uyeligi onundeki onemli bir engelin de 
a§ilmi§ olacagini soyledi. Straw sozlerini tamamlarken, Kibris'ta adil ve e§it bir 
gozumu istediklerini de belirtti.
i§gi Partisi Enfield milletvekili ve ingiltere’nin Kibris Ozel Temsilcisi Joan Ryan ise 
Turkiye'nin i§gi Partili Dostlari grubunun kurulu§unun birinci yil donumunii 
kutluyor olmasindan duydugu memnuniyeti dile getirirken, Kibris ile ilgili 
degerlendirmelerde bulundu. "Kibris konusunda 90k onemli bir noktadayiz" diyen 
Ryan, "Ada'da pdzum konusunda ileri gitmek ve birle§meyi saglamak apisindan 
onumuzde buyuk bir firsat var" dedi. Turkiye’nin bu konudaki istekliligini 
vurguladigmi, §imdi bu isteklilige Rum yonetiminin de katildigmi belirten Ryan, 
onumuzdeki 9-10 ayin son derece onemli oldugunu, yapilacak 90k §ey 
bulundugunu anlatti. Qozumun Turkiye'nin durumu a9 isindan da buyuk fark 
yaratacagmi belirten Ryan, ortaya 9 ikan bu firsatin buyuk birgu9 le 
desteklenmesi gerektigini vurguladi.
Translation
The English Justice Minister and the Labour Party’s Enfield Representative and 
Cyprus Special Representative of England Joan Ryan stressed that now is an 
important time in Cyprus and efforts should be given. In England, Turkey’s 
Labour Party’s political branch, which consists of Labour party members, city hall 
representatives of Turkish descent, academics, businessmen, and journalists, 
celebrated its first year with a meeting in the House in Parliament.
Jack Straw, Minister of Justice, in his speech concerning the importance of the 
elections in the Greek Administration, said he feels happy that an administration 
which is willing to find a solution took the job. Straw pointed out that Turks who 
live on the island are faced with some problems in regard to a solution. Straw 
said, “We have to stand behind these people who have good intentions in terms 
of real change and we need to provide the help which is needed by them.” Straw 
said that important barriers in front of the process of Turkey’s membership to the 
European Union will be eliminated after a solution on the island. When Straw 
came to the end of his speech, he indicated that he wants a fair and balanced 
solution in Cyprus.
The Labour Party’s Enfield Representative and Cyprus Special Representative of 
England Joan Ryan expressed her pleasure about Turkey’s Labour Party’s
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political branch’s foundation celebration, and also made some remarks about 
Cyprus. “We are at a very important point in time about Cyprus,” she said, “We 
have a great chance in front of us to go forward regarding a solution and 
reunification of the island.”
She explained that Turkey stressed its willingness about this topic and now the 
Greek Administration is contributing this willingness. The next 9 to 10 months 
are important and there are lots of things to do. Ryan expressed that a solution 
will create a great chance for Turkey’s situation and this great chance should be 
taken.
Radyo T
Turkish Original
ABD Digigleri Bakanligi, Guney Kibris’ta yapilan bagkanhk segimlerini kazanan 
Dimitris Hristofyas'i kutladi.Digigleri Bakanligi Sozcusu Tom Casey yaptigi yazili 
agiklamada, ABD'nin, Hristofyas ile adanin yeniden birlegmesi ve uzlagma 
saglanmasi yonunde birlikte galigmayi bekledigini belirtti.Casey, "ABD, Kibris 
Rum ve Kibris Turk toplumlarimn gogunlugunca kabul edilebilecek iki bolgeli, iki 
toplumlu bir federasyon gergevesinde, kapsamli bir gozum bulunmasi ilkesine 
baglidir. Biz, adil ve kalici bir gozumu desteklemek igin BM, Kibris Rum tarafi, 
Kibris Turk toplumu, Turkiye, Yunanistan ve AB ile galigacagiz" dedi.
ingiltere Adalet Bakam Jack Straw ve iggi Partisi Enfield milletvekili ve 
ingiltere’nin Kibris Ozel Temsilcisi Joan Ryan, Kibris’ta gdziim agisinda onemli 
bir noktada bulunuldugunu ve gereken destegin de verilmesi gerektigini 
vurguladi.ingiltere'de iggi Partisi iktidarina mensup milletvekilleri ile Turk asilli 
bazi belediye meclisi uyeleri, akademisyenler, igadamlari ve gazetecilerin 
kuruculari arasinda bulundugu Turkiye'nin iggi Partili Dostlari lobi grubu 
kurulugunun birinci yil donumunu ingiltere Avam Kamarasi'nda duzenlenen bir 
toplanti ile kutladi.
Translation
The American Ministry of Foreign Affairs congratulated Dimitris Christofias who 
won the presidential elections in South Cyprus. The spokesman for the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Tom Casey expressed in a written announcement that the US 
is waiting to work together with Christofias in terms of reuniting the island and 
reaching a compromise.
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Casey said, “The US is committed to the principle of an extensive solution which 
will be accepted by most of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot publics for a 
federation which consists of two regions and two societies. We will work with the 
UN, the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriot public, Turkey, Greece and the 
EU to find a fair and permanent solution.”
The English Justice Minister and the Labour Party’s Enfield representative and 
Cyprus Special Representative of England Joan Ryan stressed that now is an 
important time in Cyprus and efforts should be given. In England and in the 
Labour Party’s Turkish political branch, which consists of Labour party members, 
city hall representatives of Turkish descent, academics, businessmen, and 
journalists, celebrated its first year with a meeting in the House in Parliament.
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Appendix 11 C: Erfakica press conference 4 March 2008
BRTI
The Presidential Spokesman Hasan Ercakica has said that there is a good 
possibility that President Mehmet Ali Talat and the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris 
Christofias will be coming together before the end of this month.
Speaking with reporters during his weekly press briefing, the Presidential 
Spokesman said that date for the meeting had not yet been fixed and would only 
be determined following the UN Special Representative Michael Moller’s contacts 
this week.
Pointing out that all eyes had turned on the Greek Cypriot Administration to see 
what kind of a stance it will adopt on the Cyprus Problem, Ercakica said that the 
Turkish Cypriot Side position which clearly supports a solution has not changed 
since the period leading to the referendum on the Annan Plan.
Stressing that the Turkish Cypriot Side will only be contributing positively to the 
new process, the Presidential spokesman said that how the Greek Cypriot Side 
will contribute to the talks now that their has been a change in leadership, will 
only become clear following the meeting between the two leaders.
Ercakica also said that a UN delegation headed by Lynn Pascoe, the UN 
Secretary General’s Undersecretary for Political Affairs will be visiting the island 
in the first half of April to hold contacts on both sides of the island.
Stressing that the Turkish Cypriot Side wants to keep the issue of opening the 
Lokmaci barricade out side of the Cyprus Issue, Ercakica expressed the view 
that it could be possible to open the Lokmaci crossing point soon if a practical 
approach was adopted.
He added that the Turkish Cypriot Side desired the opening of the Lokmaci 
crossing point at the earliest possible time.
Responding to questions, the Presidential spokesman reiterated the Turkish 
Cypriot Side is ready to work towards finding an immediate and just solution to 
the Cyprus Problem.
KFM
Turkish Original
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Cumhurbagkanligi Sdzcusu Hasan Ergakica, Cumhurbagkani Mehmet Ali Talat 
ile Guney Kibris Rum Yonetimi Lideri Dimitris Hristofyas’in, Mart ayi iginde 
gorugecegini soyledi. Ergakica, bolgeyi ziyaret etmesi beklenen Birlegmig 
Milletler degerlendirme heyetinin de, Nisan ayinin ilk yarisinda Ada’ya gelecegini 
belirtti.
Guney Kibris’taki segimler sonrasinda yeniden gundeme gelen Lokmaci 
Kapisi’nm agilabilmesi igin ara bolgenin BM’ye devredilmesi yonundeki 
haberlerin sorulmasi uzerine Ergakica, “Hayir boyle birgey yok. Bu, sorunu 
buyutmek anlamina gelir. Bu gergekten kapinin agilmasmi imkansiz hale 
getirebilir” dedi.
Cumhurbagkanligi Sdzcusu Hasan Ergakica, bugun duzenledigi haftalik 
brifinginde, Guney Kibris’taki segimler sonrasinda hareketlenen sureg hakkinda 
bilgi verdi.
Kibris Rum liderliginde yaganan degigimin, Kibris sorunuyla ilgili siyasi ortami 
etkiledigine ve mtizakereler yoluyla kapsamli bir goziim bulma umutlarmi 
artirdigina igaret eden Ergakica, Turk tarafinin uzun zamandan beridir devam 
eden ve gayet agik olan tavrinin, Kibris sorununa erken ve kapsamli bir gozum 
bulma oldugunu yineledi.
Ergakica, “Bu arayig, 24 Nisan 2004 referandumunda dogrudan dogruya Kibris 
Turk halkmin oylari ile ifade edilmigtir. Bu irade devam etmektedir. Bu nedenle, 
Kibris sorununa kapsamli bir gozum bulma gabalarinin hiz kazanmasi, Kibris 
Rum tarafinin gosterecegi iradeye baglidir. Degigmesi gereken tarafin Kibris 
Rum tarafi oldugu unutulmamalidir” diye konugtu.
Hasan Ergakica, Lokmaci Kapisi’nm agilmasiyla ilgili bir soruya yamtinda, Turk 
tarafinin kapinin agilmasina olan ilgisine vurgu yaparak, diger kapilar nasil 
agildiysa bu kapinin da oyle agilacagmi dile getirdi.
Ankara’dan beklentilerin sorulmasi uzerine Ergakica, Cumhurbagkam Talat 
bagkanliginda bir heyetin, Pergembe gunii Ankara’ya gidecegini ve ust duzey 
temaslar yapacagmi; ancak Turk tarafinin durugunun, Talat’in 3 Ocak’ta 
Ankara’ya yaptigi ziyarette netlegtigini soyledi. Ergakica, “Gelinen agamada daha 
detayli gorugme ihtiyaci dogdu. Spesifik olarak bekledigimiz birgey yoktur. 
Turkiyeli yetkililerle tutumumuzu gozden gegirecegiz. Kugkumuz veya endigemiz 
veya bir tartigma noktamiz yok, ama bu istigarelere ihtiyag var” diye konugtu. 
Hristofyas’in “Turkiye hazirsa, ben de hazirim” agiklamasinin hatirlatilmasi
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uzerine Ergakica, “Kibris’ta gdzumu Turkiye’nin engelledigini soylemeye 
galigiyor. Bu gok yanlig bir tutum. Sorunu yanlig tanimladiginiz zaman gozumu 
saglamak da mumkiin olmaz... Madem ki Talat ile gbrugmeleri gergeklegtirmek 
konusunda gonullu davramyor, bu agiklamayi tamamiyla ig politikaya donuk bir 
soylem olarak da degerlendirebiliriz.” dedi.
Translation
The Presidential spokesman Hasan Ergakica has said that there is a good 
possibility that President Mehmet Ali Talat and the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris 
Christofias will be coming together before the end of this month. Ergakica 
stated that the United Nations Evaluation Committee which is expected to visit 
the region, will come to the island in the first half of April.
Addressing the question about giving control of the buffer zone to the UN 
triggered by the elections in South Cyprus, he said that “No there is no way. It 
means to make the problem bigger. This point certainly makes the opening of 
the gate impossible.”
The Presidential spokesman Hasan Ergakica, in his weekly press briefing, gave 
information about the process which has been activated since the election in 
South Cyprus. By pointing to the change in Greek Cypriot leadership, Ergakica 
repeated that this change affected the political atmosphere concerning the 
Cyprus problem and this situation contributed to the hopes of a comprehensive 
solution by means of negotiations. Also he expressed that the attitude of the 
Turkish side is clear and continues as it has for a long time with the aim of finding 
a complete and early solution.
Ergakica said, “This desire was revealed directly with the votes of Turkish Cypriot 
people in the referendum on 24 April 2004 and this desire continues. For this 
reason and due to the Greek Cypriot sides’ slow attitude change to find a 
solution, now finding a complete solution to the Cyprus problem should happen 
quickly. It should not be forgotten that the side which should have been changed 
is the Greek Cypriot side.”
Addressing the question about the opening of the Lokmaci gate, Hasan Ergakica 
uttered that this gate will also be opened the same way as other gates are 
opened and he stressed the intention of the Turkish side on the opening of the 
gate.
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Addressing the question about the expectations from Ankara, Ergakica said 
President Talat is chairing a committee which will go to Ankara on Saturday and 
it will meet with senior contacts, though the attitude of the Turkish side was 
confirmed on the visit of Talat to Ankara on 3 January.
Ergakica said, “We have come to a point where we need detailed meetings. 
Specifically we don’t have any kind of expectations. We will re-examine our 
attitudes with the Turkish authorities. We don’t have any suspicions or worries or 
arguments, but these consultations are needed.”
Reminded of Hristofias’ statement that “If Turkey is ready I am ready too”, 
Ergakica continued: “He intends to say that Turkey is blocking the solution in 
Cyprus. This is really a very wrong attitude. When you identify the problem 
falsely, providing a solution will be impossible. If he is willing to meet with Talat, 
then we may interpret this explanation completely as internal politics.”
Radyo T
Turkish Original
Cumhurbagkanligi Sozcusu Hasan Ergakica, Cumhurbagkam MehmetAli Talat 
ile Guney Kibris Rum Yonetimi Lideri Dimitris Hristofyas’in, Mart ayi iginde 
gbriigecegini soyledi. Ergakica, bolgeyi ziyaret etmesi beklenen Birlegmig 
Milletler degerlendirme heyetinin de, Nisan ayinin ilk yarisinda Ada’ya gelecegini 
belirtti.Ergakica, Lokmaci Kapisi’nm agilabilmesi igin ara bolgenin BM’ye 
devredilmesinin ise sorunu buyutmek anlamina geldigini ifade etti.
Cumhurbagkanligi Sdzcusu Hasan Ergakica, bugun duzenledigi haftalik 
brifinginde, Guney Kibris’taki segimler sonrasinda hareketlenen sureg hakkinda 
bilgi verdi.Kibris Rum liderliginde yaganan degigimin, Kibris sorunuyla ilgili siyasi 
ortami etkiledigine ve muzakereler yoluyla kapsamli bir gozum bulma umutlarini 
artirdigina igaret eden Ergakica, Turk tarafinin uzun zamandan beridir devam 
eden ve gayet agik olan tavrinin, Kibris sorununa erken ve kapsamli bir gozum 
bulma oldugunu yineledi.
Hasan Ergakica, Lokmaci Kapisi’nm agilmasiyla ilgili bir soruya yamtinda, Turk 
tarafinin kapinin agilmasma olan ilgisine vurgu yaparak, diger kapilar nasil 
agildiysa bu kapinin da oyle agilacagmi dile getirdi. Turk tarafinin her gekliyle 
Lokmaci Kapisi’nm agilmasi igin hazir oldugunu kaydeden Ergakica, Moller’in
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agiklamalarindan, Rum tarafinin da on kogulu bulunmadigi izlenimi edindigini; 
bundan buyuk memnuniyet duydugunu belirtti.
Ergakica, kapinin agilmasinda yaganan sikintilarin, Lokmaci ve ara bolgenin 
BM’ye devredilerek agilmasi formulu uzerinde galigildigi yonundeki haberlerin 
sorulmasi uzerine, “Hayir boyle birgey yok. Bu sorunu buyutmek anlamina gelir. 
Bu gergekten kapinin agilmasmi imkansiz hale getirebilir” dedi.Ankara’dan 
beklentilerin sorulmasi uzerine Ergakica, Cumhurbagkam Talat bagkanliginda bir 
heyetin, Pergembe gunu Ankara’ya gidecegini ve ust duzey temaslar yapacagmi; 
ancak Turk tarafinin durugunun, Talat’in 3 Ocak’ta Ankara’ya yaptigi ziyarette 
netlegtigini soyledi.Ergakica, “Gelinen agamada daha detayli gorugme ihtiyaci 
dogdu. Spesifik olarak bekledigimiz birgey yoktur. Turkiyeli yetkililerle 
tutumumuzu gozden gegirecegiz. Kugkumuz veya endigemiz veya bir tartigma 
noktamiz yok, ama bu istigarelere ihtiyag var” diye konugtu. Hasan Ergakica, bir 
soru uzerine Cumhurbagkam Talat’in, Ankara ziyaretinin ardindan Dakar’daki 
islam Konferansi Orgutu zirvesine katilmak uzere Senegal’e gidecegini 
soyledi.Hristofyas’in “Turkiye hazirsa, ben de hazirim” agiklamasimn 
hatirlatilmasi uzerine Ergakica, goyle devam etti:“Kibris’ta gozumu Turkiye’nin 
engelledigini soylemeye galigiyor. Bu gok yanlig birtutum. Sorunu yanlig 
tammladiginiz zaman gozumu saglamak da mumkun olmaz... Madem ki Talat ile 
gorugmeleri gergeklegtirmek konusunda gonullu davramyor, bu agiklamayi 
tamamiyla ig politikaya donuk bir soylem olarak da degerlendirebiliriz.” Hasan 
Ergakica, yeni suregte olumlu bir rol oynama kararliligindaki Turk tarafinin, bazi 
konular netlik kazanmadan tavrini basin yayin organlari araciligiyla 
agiklamayacagina igaret ederek, bu nedenle her soruya agiklikla cevap verme 
olanagmi biraz daha fazla yitirebilecegini soyledi.
Ergakica, “Verimli bir galigma ortaminin olugmasi igin taraflarin bazi 
pozisyonlarim peginen kamuoyu onunde ifade etmemeleri ve katilagtirmamalari 
gerekir. Bunun nedeni, basin mensuplariyla aramizda bir guvensizlik veya gizli 
bir plan hazirliyor olmamiz degildir” dedi.
Translation
The Presidential spokesman Hasan Ergakica has said that there is a good 
possibility that President Mehmet Ali Talat and the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris 
Christofias will be coming together before the end of this month. Ergakica 
stated that the United Nations Evaluation Committee which is expected to visit
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the region, will come to the island in the first half of April. Ergakica expressed 
that giving control of the buffer zone at Lokmaci to the UN makes the opening of 
the gate a bigger problem.
The Presidential spokesman Hasan Ergakica, in his weekly press briefing, gave 
information about the process which has been activated since the election in 
South Cyprus. By pointing to the change in Greek Cypriot leadership, Ergakica 
repeated that this change affected the political atmosphere around the Cyprus 
problem and this situation contributed to the hopes of a comprehensive solution 
by means of negotiations. He expressed that the attitude of the Turkish side is 
clear and continues as it has for a long time with the aim of finding a complete 
and early solution.
Addressing the question about the opening of the Lokmaci gate, Hasan Ergakica 
uttered that this gate will also be opened the same way as other gates are 
opened and he stressed the intention of the Turkish side on the opening of the 
gate. Ergakica noted that the Turkish side is ready to open Lokmaci gate. He 
specified that he has an impression from Moller that the Greek side doesn’t have 
preconditions. He specified that he is pleased with this situation.
Addressing the question about a formula which overcomes the problems about 
giving control of the buffer zone to the UN, he said, “No there is no formula. It 
means to make the problem bigger. This point certainly makes the opening of 
the gate impossible.”
Addressing the question about the expectations from Ankara, Ergakica said 
President Talat is chairing a committee which will go to Ankara on Saturday and 
it will meet with senior contacts, though the attitude of the Turkish side was 
confirmed on the visit of Talat to Ankara on 3 January.
Ergakica said, “We have come to a point where we need detailed meetings. 
Specifically we don’t have any kind of expectations. We will re-examine our 
attitudes with the Turkish authorities. We don’t have any suspicions or worries or 
arguments, but these consultations are needed.”
Addressing one of the questions, Hasan Ergakica said that President Talat will go 
to the Islamic Orgnisation Conference in Dakar, Senegal after his visit in Ankara. 
Reminded of Hristofias’ statement that “If Turkey is ready I am ready too”, 
Ergakica continued: “He intends to say that Turkey is blocking the solution in 
Cyprus. This is really a very wrong attitude. When you identify the problem
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falsely, providing a solution will be impossible. If he is willing to meet with Talat, 
then we may interpret this explanation completely as internal politics.”
Pointing out the Turkish side’s decisively positive attitude in this process,
Ergakica said he is not explaining its attitude with the media before some points 
are clear and for this reason he may not be able to answer some questions 
openly.
Ergakica said, “That in order to create beneficial working conditions, both sides 
shouldn’t explain their positions beforehand in front of the public to gain flexibility. 
The reason for this is not a disbelief between us and journalists and it doesn’t 
mean that we are working on a secret plan.”
KFM and Radyo T Identical script selection 4 March Ergakica
The Presidential spokesman Hasan Ergakica has said that there is a good 
possibility that President Mehmet AN Talat and the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris 
Christofias will be coming together before the end of this month. Ergakica 
stated that the United Nations Evaluation Committee which is expected to visit 
the region, will come to the island in the first half of April.
The Presidential spokesman Hasan Ergakica, in his weekly press briefing, gave 
information about the process which has been activated since the election in 
South Cyprus. By pointing to the change in Greek Cypriot leadership, Ergakica 
repeated that this change affected the political atmosphere concerning the 
Cyprus problem and this situation contributed to the hopes of a comprehensive 
solution by means of negotiations. Also he expressed that the attitude of the 
Turkish side is clear and continues as it has for a long time with the aim of finding 
a complete and early solution.
Addressing the question about the opening of the Lokmaci gate, Hasan Ergakica 
uttered that this gate will also be opened the same way as other gates are 
opened and he stressed the intention of the Turkish side on the opening of the 
gate.
Addressing the question about the expectations from Ankara, Ergakica said 
President Talat is chairing a committee which will go to Ankara on Saturday and 
it will meet with senior contacts, though the attitude of the Turkish side was 
confirmed on the visit of Talat to Ankara on 3 January.
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Ergakica said, “We have come to a point where we need detailed meetings. 
Specifically we don’t have any kind of expectations. We will re-examine our 
attitudes with the Turkish authorities. We don’t have any suspicions or worries or 
arguments, but these consultations are needed.”
Reminded of Hristofias’ statement that “ If Turkey is ready I am ready too”, 
Ergakica continued: “He intends to say that Turkey is blocking the solution in 
Cyprus. This is really a very wrong attitude. When you identify the problem 
falsely, providing a solution will be impossible. If he is willing to meet with Talat, 
then we may interpret this explanation completely as internal politics.”
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Appendix Twelve (Chapter eight)
Appendix 12 A: C ancer week 01.04.08
BRTI
World Cancer Week begins today.
Various events have been organized by the Ministry of Health and Non­
governmental organisations throughout the Republic with the aim of raising 
public awareness on cancer.
The Ministry of Health, meanwhile, will launch cancer scanning in cooperation 
with the Help Those With Cancer Association within the framework of the week.
KFM
Turkish Original
Kanser Hastalarina Yardim Demegi, 2007 yili igerisinde ulkedeki kanser 
vakalarinda 281 olum yagandigim ve 522 yeni vakayla kargilagildigim ifade etti. 
2008 yilina girdikten sonra ise bu rakamin gun igerisinde 2-3 vakaya kadar 
yukseldigine dikkat gekti. Dernek, Kuzey Kibris Turk Cumhuriyeti’ndeki kanser 
hastaligi vakasmin gu anda 5200 civarinda oldugunu belirterek, 15 yilda ilk kez 
kanser hastaligmin boyutlarinin kendilerini bu kadar korkuttugunu ve urkuttugunu 
kaydetti.
Kanser Hastalarina Yardim Demegi, 1-7 Nisan Kanser Haftasi dolayisiyla 
yayinladigi basin agiklamasinda, artik devlet ve hukumet yetkililerinin ulkede tam 
tegekkullii bir hastaneyi ivedilikle hayata gegirip radyasyon onkolojisinde ve bir 
gok tetkikte yaganan sikintilara son verilmesi gagrisinda bulundu. Demek, adada 
yaganan yogun kanser vakalarmi onlemek amaciyla yillardan beridir Saglik 
Bakanligi ile igbirligi igerisinde yiirutulen Kanser Tarama Programlan’m kesintisiz 
surdiirdugunu belirterek, Kanser Haftasi gergevesinde, bu konudaki tibbi 
destegin yaninda, 12 bolge sorumlusu ile bolgelerde bu konuyu gokfaal bir 
gekilde gundemde tuttugunu kaydetti. Kanser konusunda her sorumlunun kendi 
bolgesinde etkinlikler duzenleyerek kansere kargi duyarliligi artirmaya ve bolge 
halki ile butunlegerek halkin destegini de yanlarina almaya galigtiklarmi ifade 
eden Kanser Hastalarina Yardim Demegi, hastaligin artik urkutucu boyutlara 
geldigini vurguladi. Dernek, bu gergevede hasta olanlarin tedavi gorecegi tam 
tegekkullu hastane yaninda Kibris’ta kanserin nedenlerini aragtiracak bir
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“Aragtirma Hastanesi”ne de ihtiyag bulundugunu belirtti. Yil boyunca her bir 
erigkin kanser hastasi ile losemili-lenfomali-kanser hastasi gocuga da hizmet 
vermeye ve gare olmaya galigirken, surekli gelir getirici etkinlikler yaptigmi 
aktaran Dernek, etkinliklerine 7’den 70’e herkesin destek verdigini kaydetti.
Translation
Help Those with Cancer Association drew attention to the fact that in 2007, 281 
people died of cancer and 522 people developed cancer. In the year 2008, every 
day 2 or 3 people develop cancer. The Association said that in The Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, 5200 people have cancer; 15 years ago there was 
little cancer and they are afraid of it growing.
The Help Those with Cancer Association has announced “April 1 to 7 is Cancer 
week”. The association invited the government authority to invest in cancer 
treatment facilities such as radiation oncology units for hospital in the nation to 
solve the many scanning and early warning problems. The Association said, "On 
the island we have many people with cancer and we have been trying to solve 
the cancer problems for many years and we work together with the Ministry of 
Health, so the Cancer scanning programmes will continue.”
During Cancer Week, 12 district departments will run their own activities to draw 
the public’s (Halki) attention to cancer. The idea is for the public to meet 
together with The Help Those with Cancer Association to become stronger 
against the trend of rapidly developing cancer. The association said that “In 
Cyprus, we need a hospital with facilities for cancer treatment and a research 
hospital. This year, we are trying to develop a cancer service for every adult who 
develops cancer, Leukemia , lymphomatous and children’s cancer sevice and try 
to do fund-raising activities.” The association aims to gain the support of 
everyone aged between 7 and 70.
Radyo T
Turkish Original
Saglik Bakanligi, “ 1-7 Nisan Kanser Haftasi” dolayisiyla Kanser Hastalarina 
Yardim Dernegi ig birligi ile ulke genelini kapsayan kanser tarama kampanyasi 
gergeklegtirecek erkan tam igin halkta ve ozellikle risk gruplarinda olan kigiler 
arasinda biling olugturmayi amaglayan kampanya duyurulacak,Nisan ayi 
boyunca devam edecek.
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Saglik Bakanligi Basin Burosu’ndan verilen bilgiye gore,Kanser Hastalarina 
Yardim Dernegi i§ birligi ile 1 Nisan Sail giinu baglayacak ve Nisan ayi boyunca 
devam edecek olan kampanya Lefkoga Kentsel,Guzelyurt,Gegitkale,inonu,iskele 
ve Yeni Erenkoy Saglik Merkezleri bagta olmak iizere bazi Saglik Ocaklari ile 
Gazimagusa Devlet Hastanasi,Girne Dr.Akgigek ve Yegilyurt Cengiz Topel 
Hastanelerinde surdurulecek.Kanser taramalarinda, 40 ya§ uzeri ve ailesinde 
Kanser vakasi gorulen risk gruplarindaki kadinlarda pap-smear,erkeklerde ise 
PSA tetkileri yapilicak.
Ucretsiz yapilacak tetkitlere katilamayan ve risk gruplarinda yer alan 
vatanda§lara,kampanya sonrasinda da Saglik Bakanligfna bagli saglik 
merkezleri ve hastanelerde soz konusu testier yapilabilecek.Saglik Bakanligi 
Temel Saglik Hizmetleri Dairesi Muduru Dr.Sidika Kayimba§ioglu,kampanyada 
ozellikle ureme pagina gelmi§ kadinlar igin rahim agzi kanserinin erken te§hisinin 
onemine dikkat pekip farkindalik yaratmanm hedeflenen temel amaglardan biri 
oldugunu soyledi.
Bakanlik agiklamasina gore,kanser tarama kampanyasi,Nisan ayi boyunca her 
hafta §u programa gore yapilacak:
Smear testleri
Pazartesi: Guzelyurt,Yenierenkoy ve inonii Saglik Merkezleri ile Girne 
Dr.Akgigek Hastanesi
Sali: Gazimagusa Devlet Hastanesi
Qar§amba: iskele.Gegitkale ve Lefko§a Kentsel Saglik Merkezleri
Per§embe: Ye§ilyurt Cengiz Topel Hastanesi
PSA testleri
Pazartesi: iskele Saglik Merkezi
Sali: Yenierenkby,Dipkarpaz,Mehmetcik Saglik Merkezleri ile Girne
Dr.Akgigek Hastanesi
Qargamba: Gegitkale.Akdogan ve Lefkoga Kentsel Saglik Merkezleri
Pergembe: Yegilyurt Cengiz Topel Hastanesi
Cuma: Esentepe ve Lapta Saglik Merkezleri.(GUL\PHA)
Translation
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The Ministry of Health and the Help Those with Cancer Association together 
have announced “April 1 to 7 is Cancer week”. They have launched an early 
warning cancer scanning campaign with the aim to raise awareness for the 
general public and special risk groups. The campaign continues throughout 
April.
The Ministry of Health Press Office, who are working with the Help Those with 
Cancer Association, are starting on Tuesday 1 April and continuing through the 
whole of April. The campaign will be in Lefkoga, Kentsel, Guzelyurt, Gegitkale, 
Indnii, Iskele, Yeni Erinkoy Health Centre, Health Centres associated with 
Gazimagusa’s government hospital, Girne Dr. Akgigek and Yegilyurt Cengiz 
Topel hospitals. The cancer scanning will target people aged 40 and upwards 
with families with cancer history, women who have the pap-smear and men’s 
PSA scan.
The scanning is free. If someone cannot attend the scanning and are in these 
risk groups, after the campaign, Health centres and hospitals associated with the 
Ministry of Health will do the tests. The Ministry of Health’s Specific Health 
Service Office Manager, Dr. Sidika Kayimbagioglu, said early warning is the 
most important aim in the campaign specifically aimed at women womb 
scanning.
The Ministry of Health remarked that the cancer scanning campaign continues 
throughout April following this programme:
Smear tests
Monday: Guzelyurt, Yeni Erenkoy and Inonii Health Centre and Dr. Akgigek 
Hospital.
Tuesday: Gazimagusa Government Hospital
Wednesday: iskele, Gegitkale and Lefkoga Kentsel Health Centre.
Thursday: Yegilyurt Cengiz Topel Hospital 
PSA tests:
Monday: iskele Health Centre
Tuesday: Yeni Erenkoy, Dipkarpaz, Mehmetcik Health Centre and Girne Dr. 
Akgigek Hospital
Wednesday: Gegitkalei, Akdogan and Lefkoga Kentsel Health Centre
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Thurdsday: Ye§ilyurt Cengiz Topel Hospital 
Friday: Esentepe and Lapta Health Centre.
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Appendix 12 B: Municipalities’ Union of the Turkish World 
Representation Office 13.03.08
BRTI
The Municipalities’ Union of the Turkish World (TDBB) has opened a 
representation office in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
The representation office at the Lefkosa Turkish Municipality headquarters, was 
inaugurated this morning.
Addressing the opening ceremony, the Mayor of Lefkosa - the President of the 
Cyprus Turkish Municipalities’ Union Cemal Bulutoglulari said the opening of the 
office will create new opportunities for further cooperation with the TDBB.
He said that the major goal was to follow up with the recent activities of 
municipalities all around the world and that this in return would contribute to the 
realisation of contemporary reforms in all municipalities.
Also speaking, the Mayor of Guzelyurt - the Vice-President of TDBB Mahmut 
Ozcinar said the opening of the office was one of the most important initiatives 
taken in the way towards improving cooperation between TRNC municipalities 
and TDBB.
'Our aim is to gain a representative status in TDBB as this will contribute to the 
efforts aimed at promoting the TRNC', Mr Ozcinar added. Another speech was 
delivered by TDBB President Erol Kaya who said that there was a global race 
among the cities and not nations in today’s world, adding that this race should be 
continued in cooperation.
Finally speaking, the Vice-President of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party 
Huseyin Tanriverdi said the TDBB representation office in the TRNC was an 
important step.
Underlining the need for lifting the international isolation on the Turkish Cypriot 
People, Mr Tanriverdi emphasized that the AKP will continue taking steps 
towards realizing this goal.
The TDBB has nearly 1,100 members from 9 countries, including 16 
municipalities from the TRNC.
KFM
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Turkish Original
Turk Dunyasi Belediyeler Birligi’nin Kuzey Kibris Turk Cumhuriyeti’ndeki 
Temsilcilik Ofisi’nin apilipi bu sabah gergekleptirildi.
yaklapik 1100 uyesi olan Turk Dunyasi Belediyeler Birligine Kuzey Kibris’taki 16 
belediye de uye olarak bulunuyor.
Temsilcilik binasi Kibris Turk Belediyeler Birligi’nin Lefko§a’daki genel merkez 
binasi iperisinde yer aliyor.
Translation
The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ representation office of The 
Municipalities Union of the Turkish World opened this morning. Nearly 1100 
members of The Municipalities Union of the Turkish World from 16 North Cyprus 
municipalities attended. The Turkish Cypriot Municipalities Union’s Lefkopa main 
office is now situated in the representation office.
Radyo T
Turkish Original
Turk Dunyasi Belediyeler Birligi ’nin KKTC’deki temsilciliginin apilipi
yapildi.Merkez, Lefkopa’daki Kibris Turk Belediyeler Birligi Merkezi bunyesinde
palipacak.
Turk Dunyasi Belediyeler Birligi ’nin KKTC’deki temsilciliginin apilipi 
yapildi.Belediyeler Birligi Bapkam Cemal Bulutoglulari yaptigi konupmada daha 
once yapilan protokole bagli kalarakTurk Dunyasi Belediyeler Birligi ile 
ipbirliginin pekiptirildigini ve bu baglamda ofisin apildigmi ifade etti.
Kibris Turk Belediyeler Birligi Bapkan Yardimcisi ve Guzelyurt Belediye Bapkam 
Mahmut Ozginar da Belediyeler Birligi’nin baplattigi giripim ve Turk Dunyasi 
Belediyeler Birligi Bapkam Erol Kaya’nm Kibris’a olan ilgisi ile gelipen surepte 16 
belediyenin Turk Dunyasi Belediyeler Birligi’ne katildigmi soyleyerek, bu agin 
gun geptikpe gelipecegini belirtti.
AK Parti Genel Bapkan Yardimcisi Yerel Yonetimler Bapkam Manisa Milletvekili 
Huseyin Tanriverdi ise ofisin KKTC’de apilmasinin hem Turk dunyasi hem de 
KKTC adina onemli bir adim oldugunu soyledi.
Konupmalarin ardindan Bulutoglulari, Ozpinar, Kaya ve Tanriverdi temsilciligin 
apilipi yapti.
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Translation
The Municipalities Union of the Turkish World (TDBB) TRNC representation 
office has opened. The Turkish Cypriot Municipalities Union will work in the 
TDBB centre.
The Municipalities Union of the Turkish World TRNC representation office has 
opened. Before it was opened, the Municipalities Union President Cemal 
Bulutoglulari stated that they made an agreement with the Municipalities Union of 
the Turkish World, then opened the office.
The Turkish Cypriot Municipalities Union’s Vice- President and Guzelyurt 
Municipality’s Mayor Mahmut Ozginar explained that the municipalities union 
made the initial contact. The Municipalities Union of the Turkish World President 
Erol Kaya was interested in Cyprus, so the process began. Now 16 
municipalities participate in the Municipalities Union of the Turkish World in 
TRNC and every day that number grows.
AK Party General Vice-President and local Manise Parliamentarian Huseyin 
Tanriverdi said the opening of the office in TRNC is an important step for TRNC 
and the Turkish world.
After the speeches, Bulutoglulari, Ozginar, Kaya, Tanriverdi opened the 
representation office.
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Appendix 12 C: Tourism 04.03.08
BRTI
The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdogan Sanlidag received today a 
visiting delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism
The delegation is in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to carry out 
planning work to help develop tourism in the Republic.
Speaking during the visit, Sanlidag said that the delegation was in the TRNC 
within the framework of the cooperation and dialogue established between the 
TRNC and Turkey.
He said that work to be carried out by the delegation will contribute to developing 
the North’s tourism sector.
Pointing out that they followed closely tourism development in Turkey, the 
Minister of Economy and Tourism expressed his desire to benefit from the 
delegation’s experience in the field.
The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be represented at the ‘ITB Berlin 
2008 Tourism Fair’, one of the world’s prestigious tourism fairs.
The fair on the fairgrounds of Messe Berlin in Germany will be opened tomorrow.
The TRNC will be promoted at a 120 metre square stand with various activities.
The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdogan Sanlidag will also be flying to 
Berlin on Thursday.
Nearly 11 thousand tourism companies from 180 countries are attending the fair 
which will remain open until the 9th of March.
KFM
Turkish Original
Dunyanin en onemli ve en biiyuk turizm fuarlarindan olan ve Kuzey Kibris Turk 
Cumhuriyeti’nin de tamtilacagi “ITB Berlin 2008 Turizm Fuari” yarin ba§liyor.
Kibris Turk Otelciler Birligi, Kibris Turk Seyahat Acenteleri Birligi, Kibris Turk 
Rehberler Birligi ve Restorantcilar Birligi’nden heyetler ile Kibris Turk basininin 
temsilcileri Almanya’da duzenlenecek ITB Berlin 2008 Turizm Fuarina katilmak 
uzere bu sabah Kuzey Kibris Turk Cumhuriyeti’nden ayrildi.Ekonomi ve Turizm
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Bakam Erdogan §anlidag fuara katilmak uzere 6 Mart Pergembe gunu Berlin’e 
gidecek.9 Mart’a kadar surecek ve 180’den fazla ulkeden 11 bine yakin turizm 
girketinin stant agip gegitli aktiviteler duzenleyecegi Berlin Fuari’nda, Kuzey 
Kibris Turk Cumhuriyeti’nin tamtimi 120 metrekarelik bir stantta yapilacak.Bu yil, 
42’incisi duzenlenen ITB Berlin Turizm Fuari, Londra WTM Turizm Fuari ile 
birlikte dunyanm en prestijli turizm fuari kabul ediliyor.Almanya'nin bagkenti 
Berlin'de gergeklegtirilecek ITB Berlin, Messe fuar alanmda yer alacak. ITB 
Berlin, toplam 150 bin metrekarelik 26 salondan oluguyor. Her yil rengarenk ve 
hareketli goruntulere sahne olan Fuar, ilk 3 gunde, yalmzca turizm 
profesyonellerine, son 2 gun de tatilcilere agik olacak.Fuari yaklagik 150 bin 
kiginin ziyaret etmesi bekleniyor. Fuar suresince, konferans, panel, agik 
oturumlar duzenlenecek ve turizm sektorunun gelecegine iligkin bildiriler 
sunulacak.
Translation
One of the most important and biggest tourism fayres “ITB Berlin 2008 Tourism 
Fayre” will start tomorrow and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be 
represented at this fayre.
The Turkish Cyprus Hotels Association, Turkish Cyprus Travel Agencies 
Association, Turkish Cyprus Guides Association and Restaurants Association 
delegations and Turkish Cyprus press representatives left the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus in order to attend ITB Berlin 2008 Tourism Fayres which will 
be held in Germany.
The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdogan §anlidag will leave for Berlin on 
Thursday 6 March in order to attend the fayre. The Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus will be promoted at a 120 metre square stand with various activities in 
Berlin’s fayre which will consist of nearly 11 thousand tourism companies from 
more than 180 different countries and the fayre will remain open until 9 March. 
This year is ITB Berlin Tourism Fayre’s 42 annual event and ITB Berlin Tourism 
Fayre with the London WTM Tourism Fayre is accepted as the most prestigious 
tourism fayre. The ITB Berlin fayre will be in the capital of Germany, Berlin, on 
the Messe fayre grounds.
ITB Berlin consists of 26 parts for a total of 150000 square metres . Each year 
the fayre stages exciting events, the first three days are for tourism professionals 
and the last two days are open for tourists, with 150000 visitors expected.
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During the fayre, conferences, panels and forums, will be held and tourism 
announcements will be presented.
Radyo T
Turkish Original
Ekonomi ve Turizm Bakam Erdogan §anlidag, KKTC turizminin planlamasi 
konusunda galigmalar yapmak uzere adaya gelen Turkiye Kultur ve Turizm 
Bakanligi heyetini kabul etti.
Ekonomi ve Turizm Bakam Erdogan §anlidag, Turkiye Kultur ve Turizm 
Bakanligi heyetini kabul etti.Ekonomi ve Turizm Bakam Erdogan §anlidag 
kabulde, Turkiye Kultur ve Turizm Bakanligi ile ile geligtirilen igbirligi ve diyalog 
gergevesinde teknik heyetin KKTC’ye gelmesinden memnun oldugunu belirterek, 
galigmalarin iki ulke arasindaki turizmin geligimine katki koyacagina inandigmi 
soyledi.Turkiye turizmini yakindan takip etmekte olduklarim ve hedeflerine 
bagaracagina inandiklarmi kaydeden §anlidag, Turkiye Cumhuriyetinin 
tecrubelerinden yararlanmak istediklerini ifade etti.
KKTC’ye dun gelen adada KKTC heyetleri ile galigmalar yapacak olan Turkiye 
Kultur ve Turizm Bakanligi heyeti, Turkiye Kultur ve Turizm Bakam Ertugrul 
Gunay’in, onumuzdeki aylarda ulkeye yapacagi resmi ziyaret oncesi 
incelemelerde bulunacak.
Translation
The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdogan §anlidag received a visiting 
delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism to carry out planning 
work to develop tourism in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdogan §anlidag received a visiting 
delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In the meeting, the 
Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdogan §anlidag said that he is pleased with 
the cooperation with the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism technical 
committee and their coming to TRNC. He expressed works between the two 
countries will contribute to the development of tourism. §anlidag noted that they 
are following tourism in Turkey and he noted that they will reach and succeed in 
their aims. He expressed his desire to take benefits from Turkey’s experiences. 
The Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism committee came to the TRNC 
yesterday and they will carry out investigative work concerning tourism on the
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island with the TRNC committees. Also, they will carry out some investigations 
before the formal visit of the Turkish Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertugrul 
Gunay.
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